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tribution to the Global Partnership11 budget, after that of the United States. If that contribution is clearly advertised and described, then it will certainly convey Russia’s commitment to the financing of nonproliferation projects. Moreover, Russia makes many in-kind contributions to the cooperation, such as providing labor for construction projects. With some analysis, such contributions would provide a clearer sense of Russia’s full financial effort in the nonproliferation and threat reduction arena. Indeed, the development of a stronger mutual perception of partnership in the U.S.-Russian relationship may benefit significantly from a clearer elucidation of the contributions that the Russian government already makes, in part because the data that result will make it possible for U.S. and Russian program staff members to work together on setting annual goals that increase Russian contributions of all types as the partnership between the two nations progresses.12

Overall, greater mutual transparency about the financing of projects will be an important aspect of a more robust partnership. The United States does publish its overall budget numbers openly, but details about how the budget is then allocated are sometimes less clear. Russian project participants have often complained, for example, that more funds are spent in the United States than on work on the ground in Russia. They understand that the programs necessitate substantial support activity in the United States, and they agree that the funds should be spent where they will have the greatest effect, because the goal of the programs is to assist Russia, not simply to expend funds there. Nevertheless, there is resistance to the notion that a significant proportion of the money that is supposed to be spent helping Russia should be spent in the United States instead. These complaints have at times led to action by the U.S. Congress to ensure that a higher proportion of the U.S. funds are spent in Russia.13 Detailed disclosures and explanations of how project funds are spent will help ease these tensions.

Financing is not the only issue that makes for true partnership, however. For Russia and the United States to truly achieve that status, their experts should share responsibility for conceiving, designing, implementing, evaluating, and sustaining the cooperative nonproliferation programs.14 Such an approach would require the United States to be willing to embrace more of a joint approach with Russia than it has in the past. For its part, Russia not only would need to put more of its own resources into the effort but also would need to commit to sustaining high levels of security over time. If the United States and Russia can take these steps, then they will be able to move beyond their current cooperation in the Russian Federation to become co-leaders of a global effort to fight nuclear proliferation.

One potential source of additional resources for nonproliferation is the nuclear energy industry in both the United States and Russia. It is in the interest of nuclear energy providers to promote nuclear security and nonproliferation because it will both increase the security of their facilities and bolster public confidence in the safety and security of nuclear power plants. Improving security at nuclear power plants is a global challenge, because a terrorist attack on such a facility anywhere in the world would have widespread repercussions. Where it is possible to align economic incentives and national security objectives, the results are self-sustaining efforts of greater durability than programs that rely on political and bureaucratic processes that are less infused with the commercial self-interest of the parties.

Partnerships work best when the interests—whether they be economic or political—are truly mutual, as was the case in the useful precedent of the Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) Purchase Agreement. In that partnership the shared interests in tapping the energy potential of former warhead material and reducing nuclear dangers have resulted in a robust degree of cooperation. This effort has generated billions of dollars while converting the uranium in the warheads of more than 10,000 weapons into nuclear fuel that is now used to generate 10 percent of the electricity in the United States. Under this program, the HEU from 10,000 more warheads will be blended down and converted to low-enriched uranium fuel for electrical power generation between now and 2013.

This section has featured challenges to U.S.-Russian cooperation that political actors can address. Many of the recommendations in this section have therefore focused on the political actors and have especially called on the U.S. and Russian presidents to take certain steps. In subsequent sections on legal issues, management and organizational challenges, and scientific and technical cooperation, the study turns to challenges that the players in those arenas can address. Once again, however, there is a close relationship between political issues and legal or management solutions.


The full name is the Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction. The Global Partnership plans to spend $2 billion per year through 2012 to address problems of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, in the first instance, in Russia. Originally a G-8 initiative that was established in 2002, the Partnership has since expanded beyond the G-8 countries to include countries ranging from Norway and Switzerland to Australia, New Zealand. and South Korea. For more information on the Global Partnership, see the Strengthening the Global Partnership home page at Accessed March 21, 2005.


Some progress has been made in this regard. For example, according to U.S. government experts, the Russian government’s claim that it contributed $13 million to the activities of the Arctic Military Environmental Cooperation (AMEC) Program has been substantiated. See U.S. Government Accountability Office, Russian Nuclear Submarines: U.S. Participation in the Arctic Military Environmental Cooperation Program Needs Better Justification, GAO-04-924, September 2004, p. 8, for more information. This is the sort of positive experience that could be replicated in other programs.


For example, after a report by the General Accounting Office in 1998, the Initiatives for Proliferation Prevention (IPP) program was authorized by the U.S. Congress to spend no more than 45 percent of its funds in the United States.


Electronic mail from Matthew Bunn, Harvard University, February 28, 2005.

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