and government resolutions and directives. These documents define the process established for the issuance of export licenses and relevant export control mechanisms. At the core of this body of law are the guiding principles of the international control regime for the export of conventional weapons and dual-use items and technologies.
The Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) was set up in 1987, at the initiative of the United States, Great Britain, France, Germany, Canada, and Japan. Its introduction was motivated by the need to prevent missile technology proliferation.
An important milestone in activities seeking to maintain the MTCR was Russia’s ascension to it in 1995. Today, a total of 28 countries support the MTCR. The main elements of the MTCR include guiding principles and export restrictions on the delivery of the items, materials, and technologies used to produce missile weaponry.
The guiding principles of the MTCR define general criteria for the control of missile technology transfer, as well as specifics relevant to the logistical side of exports. The MTCR remains the world’s only multilateral mechanism which actually counters the proliferation of dangerous missile weaponry. It has become an important part of the system of international treaties and agreements that seek to prevent the transfer of arms and technology which could be used to produce WMD or the means of their delivery.
In the late 1980s-early 1990s, the issue of a conventional weapons ban and reductions as a means of strengthening world security grew rapidly in significance, alongside the reductions in strategic arms. To respond to this development, representatives of 28 countries, including Russia, gathered in December 1995 in Wassenaar, The Netherlands, outside The Hague, to form a multilateral control regime for exports of conventional weapons and sensitive products and technologies. On June 12, 1996, in Vienna, Austria, the participants of a meeting that had just been held there made the decision to have the Wassenaar Agreement enter into force. The goal of the Agreement was to expand cooperation in the prevention of arms acquisition and dual-use items for a military end use in cases in which the situation in some country or the politics of this country’s government became a concern for the international community.
Pursuant to the Wassenaar Agreement, Russia has set up a system of export controls for sensitive items and technologies of the military or dual-use variety. At the core of the legal environment here are federal laws “On Export Control” (No. 183 of July 18, 1999) and “On Military and Technical Cooperation between the Russian Federation and Foreign States” (No. 114 of July 9, 1998) and associated presidential edicts and government resolutions.
The main objectives of export control are
To protect the interests of the Russian Federation;
To honor the requirements of international treaties to which Russia is a signatory in terms of the nonproliferation of WMD, their means of delivery, and the establishment of export controls over military and dual-use items; and
To create conditions for the integration of Russia’s economy into the world economy.
In the Russian Federation, export control is conducted through regulation of foreign economic activity. The regulation methods include
Identification of items and technologies subject to control, i.e., comparing specific raw materials, equipment, scientific and technical information, operations, services, and results of intellectual work traded in external economic transactions against items and technologies included in “control lists” approved by the president;
The process which mandates that an approval must be granted before one can engage in external economic transactions involving controlled items and technologies; it employs licensing or some other form of state regulation as a tool;
Customs control and customs clearance, upon leaving the Russian Federation, of controlled items and technologies, in accordance with Russian Customs Law;
Hard currency control over the conduct of external economic transactions in items, information, services, and the results of intellectual work, including the timeliness and completeness of hard currency transfers to accounts in authorized Russian banks; and
Use by the state of coercive measures (sanctions) against persons who have violated (or attempted to violate) the established process—spelled out in the Russian federal laws and other government regulations—for the conduct of external economic transactions in items, information, services, and results of intellectual work which could be used to produce WMD, their means of delivery, and other armaments and weaponry.
When conducting space-related activities
The Russian party has the right to attract nonbudget sources of funding, including personal savings;
Organizations and private citizens participating in implementation of space-related projects may be entitled to significant guarantees and benefits by the government;
Foreign investment in space activities associated with the execution of federal space programs may be guaranteed through the federal budget funds and federal property;
Foreign investment in space activities into space-related activities conducted by Russian entities and nationals may be guaranteed through the assets of those entities and nationals or through intellectual or other property;
Russia ensures protection of technologies and commercial secrets that belong to foreign entities and nationals engaged in space-related activities on territory under its jurisdiction;
Foreign entities and nationals conducting space-related