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An International Spent Nuclear Fuel Storage Facility -- Exploring a Russian Site as a Prototype: Proceedings of an International Workshop (2005)
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. "Safe Transport of Spent Nuclear Fuel and High Level Waste: International Experience." An International Spent Nuclear Fuel Storage Facility -- Exploring a Russian Site as a Prototype: Proceedings of an International Workshop. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press, 2005.

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An International Spent Nuclear Fuel Storage Facility: Exploring a Russian Site as a Prototype - Proceedings of an International Workshop

ened to deny transport for consignments. In particular, people have expressed growing concerns that radioactive material transported by sea, if inadvertently released, could affect a significant global area due to coastline contamination or disruption in commercial fishing. Consequently, issues of liability are continuing to be discussed by members of the IMO and the IAEA and their member states.

This paper will review these issues, with a particular focus on transport of spent nuclear fuel and high-level waste. The differences in safety and security will be discussed even though the terms have not yet been succinctly defined. The safety and physical protection in transport of spent nuclear fuel and high-level waste will be presented and the international acceptance of IAEA recommendations will be noted. A summary of the international liability regime will show the conventions that have been enabled to date. Data related to the international experience in shipping materials will also be presented. All of these discussion points demonstrate that the packagings used in transport are robust; that the likelihood of a release during transport is small; and that safety in the transport of radioactive material is not being compromised.

SAFETY VERSUS SECURITY

Before any discussion, the terms safety and security must be defined. The definitions presented here are limited to this paper. Subtleties exist in the definitions of these two terms, between languages and with different applications. In some languages safety and security mean the same thing. For this paper the discussion will focus on text derived from English dictionary definitions.

Because the terms have not been used together they are often defined in an unrelated manner, and there are certain schools that define security as a subset of safety. That is, safety of radioactive sources must involve the source being unable to be obtained by an unauthorized individual; however, a source that is simply secure may not be safe because of an unaddressed radiological hazard. Other schools identify them as separate but overlapping terms because nonradiological hazardous sources, such as poisons or flammables, that are secure may indeed be safe. Some schools consider safety as a part of security. Security of radiological sources potentially involves a threat analysis to determine the nature of security. Because of wide ranging hazards the application of safety and security is usually accomplished according to a graded approach, that is, the complexity of safety and security requirements will depend on the overall hazard of the materials. From a security perspective actions may range from a locked room for low hazards to armed guards for extremely high-hazard materials. Similarly, the application of radiological safety may range from limiting access to an area to excluding an area from most activity, for example, treatment of cancer with teletherapy devices.

For the purposes of this paper the following definitions are used: Safety relates to protection of people and the environment from unintentional exposure

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Front Matter (R1-R12)
Opening Remarks (1-2)
Handling Spent Nuclear Fuel—International Experience -- IAEA Activities in Nuclear Spent Fuel Management (3-11)
Analysis of U.S. Experience with Spent Fuel (12-19)
Problems of Spent Nuclear Fuel Management and Storage Site Selection (20-29)
Feasibility of Transmutation of Radioactive Elements (30-49)
The High Level Waste Disposal Technology Development Program in Korea (50-58)
The Use of Sodium-Cooled Fast Reactors for Effectively Reprocessing Plutonium and Minor Actinides (59-72)
Site Selection for Spent Fuel Storage and Disposal of High Level Waste -- Site Selection for Spent Fuel Storage and Disposal of High Level Waste: Experience of European Countries (73-88)
The Private Fuel Limited Liability Company National Spent Fuel Site (89-95)
Experience of Japan (96-108)
The Current Status of Spent Nuclear Fuel in Korea (109-117)
Safe Transport of Spent Nuclear Fuel and High Level Waste: International Experience (118-127)
Ensuring Nuclear and Radiation Safety During the Transport of Radioactive Materials in Russia (128-142)
Problems in Establishing an International Repository for Spent Nuclear Fuel in Russia -- Creating an Infrastructure for Managing of Spent Nuclear Fuel (143-151)
Current Status of Government Regulation of Activities Associated with the Import of Spent Nuclear Fuel into the Russian Federation Return to the Russian Federation of Irradiated Fuel Assemblies from the Institute of Nuclear Physics of the Republic of Uzbekistan (152-158)
Return to the Russian Federation of Irradiated Fuel Assemblies from the Institute of Nuclear Physics of the Republic of Uzbekistan (159-162)
Investment and International Aspects of the Problem of Spent Nuclear Fuel Management (163-165)
Creation of an Underground Repository for Spent Nuclear Fuel near the City of Zheleznogorsk (Eastern Siberia) (166-176)
Conditions for the Creation of an International Spent Nuclear Fuel Repository near the Priargunsk Mining-Chemical Production Association (City of Krasnokamensk, Chita Oblast) (177-186)
Utilization of High-Level Waste -- Types of High-Level Radioactive Wastes Formed as a Result of Dry Methods of Spent Fuel Regeneration and Technologies for their Management (187-198)
Chemical Treatment of High Level Waste for Utilization (199-207)
Immobilization of High Level Waste: Analysis of Appropriate Synthetic Waste Forms (208-224)
The Management of High-Level Radioactive Wastes from the Mayak Production Association and Plans for the Creation of an Underground Laboratory (225-239)
Creation of Underground Laboratories at the Mining-Chemical Complex and at Mayak to Study the Suitability of Sites for Underground Isolation of Radioactive Wastes (240-247)
Concluding Observations--Milton Levenson (248-250)
Appendix A: Workshop Agenda (251-256)
Appendix B: Environmental Effects of Radiation in the Russian Federation (257-259)
Appendix C: Geochemistry of Actinides During the Long-Term Storage and Disposal of Spent Nuclear Fuel (260-290)