National Academies Press: OpenBook
Suggested Citation:"Front Matter." National Research Council. 2005. Reopening Public Facilities After a Biological Attack: A Decision Making Framework. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/11324.
×

Reopening Public Facilities
AFTER A BIOLOGICAL ATTACK

A Decision Making Framework

Committee on Standards and Policies for Decontaminating Public Facilities Affected by Exposure to Harmful Biological Agents: How Clean Is Safe?

Division on Earth and Life Studies

Board on Life Sciences

NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NATIONAL ACADEMIES

THE NATIONAL ACADEMIES PRESS
Washington, D.C.
www.nap.edu

Suggested Citation:"Front Matter." National Research Council. 2005. Reopening Public Facilities After a Biological Attack: A Decision Making Framework. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/11324.
×

THE NATIONAL ACADEMIES PRESS
500 Fifth Street, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20001

NOTICE: The project that is the subject of this report was approved by the Governing Board of the National Research Council, whose members are drawn from the councils of the National Academy of Sciences, the National Academy of Engineering, and the Institute of Medicine. The members of the committee responsible for the report were chosen for their special competences and with regard for appropriate balance.

This material is based upon work suported by The Regents of the University of California Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory under Subcontract No. B530522 as part of the Restoration and Domestic Demonstration and Application Program funded by the Department of Homeland Security through Interagency Agreement No. HSHQPB05X00123. Any opinions, findings, conclusions, or recommendations expressed in this publication are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory or the Department of Homeland Security.

International Standard Book Number 0-309-09661-8

Library of Congress Cataglog Card Number 2005929183

Additional copies of this report are available from the
National Academies Press,
500 Fifth Street, N.W., Lockbox 285, Washington, DC 20055, Washington, DC 20055:800-624-6242 or 202-334-3313 (in the Washington Metropolitan Area); Internet, http://www.nap.edu

Copyright 2005 by the National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.

Printed in the United States of America

Suggested Citation:"Front Matter." National Research Council. 2005. Reopening Public Facilities After a Biological Attack: A Decision Making Framework. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/11324.
×

THE NATIONAL ACADEMIES

Advisers to the Nation on Science, Engineering, and Medicine

The National Academy of Sciences is a private, nonprofit, self-perpetuating society of distinguished scholars engaged in scientific and engineering research, dedicated to the furtherance of science and technology and to their use for the general welfare. Upon the authority of the charter granted to it by the Congress in 1863, the Academy has a mandate that requires it to advise the federal government on scientific and technical matters. Dr. Ralp J. Cicerone is president of the National Academy of Sciences.

The National Academy of Engineering was established in 1964, under the charter of the National Academy of Sciences, as a parallel organization of outstanding engineers. It is autonomous in its administration and in the selection of its members, sharing with the National Academy of Sciences the responsibility for advising the federal government. The National Academy of Engineering also sponsors engineering programs aimed at meeting national needs, encourages education and research, and recognizes the superior achievements of engineers. Dr. Wm. A. Wulf is president of the National Academy of Engineering.

The Institute of Medicine was established in 1970 by the National Academy of Sciences to secure the services of eminent members of appropriate professions in the examination of policy matters pertaining to the health of the public. The Institute acts under the responsibility given to the National Academy of Sciences by its congressional charter to be an adviser to the federal government and, upon its own initiative, to identify issues of medical care, research, and education. Dr. Harvey V. Fineberg is president of the Institute of Medicine.

The National Research Council was organized by the National Academy of Sciences in 1916 to associate the broad community of science and technology with the Academy’s purposes of furthering knowledge and advising the federal government. Functioning in accordance with general policies determined by the Academy, the Council has become the principal operating agency of both the National Academy of Sciences and the National Academy of Engineering in providing services to the government, the public, and the scientific and engineering communities. The Council is administered jointly by both Academies and the Institute of Medicine. Dr. Ralph J. Cicerone and Dr. Wm. A. Wulf are chair and vice chair, respectively, of the National Research Council.

www.national-academies.org

Suggested Citation:"Front Matter." National Research Council. 2005. Reopening Public Facilities After a Biological Attack: A Decision Making Framework. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/11324.
×

This page intentionally left blank.

Suggested Citation:"Front Matter." National Research Council. 2005. Reopening Public Facilities After a Biological Attack: A Decision Making Framework. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/11324.
×

COMMITTEE ON STANDARDS AND POLICIES FOR DECONTAMINATING PUBLIC FACILITIES AFFECTED BY EXPOSURE TO HARMFUL BIOLOGICAL AGENTS: HOW CLEAN IS SAFE?

KENNETH BERNS (Chair),

University of Florida, Gainesville, Florida

RONALD M. ATLAS,

University of Louisville, Louisville, Kentucky

MANUEL S. BARBEITO,

Biosafety Consultant, Frederick, Maryland

JACQUELINE CATTANI,

University of South Florida, Tampa, Florida

LEE CLARKE,

Rutgers University, New Brunswick, New Jersey

CHRISTOPHER J. DAVIS,

CUBRC, Inc., Buffalo, New York, and Washington, DC

PATRICIA FELLOWS,

DynPort Vaccine Company, Frederick, Maryland

CHARLES N. HAAS,

Drexel University, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania

THOMAS INGLESBY,

University of Pittsburgh Medical Center, Baltimore, Maryland

HARVEY W. KO,

Johns Hopkins University, Laurel, Maryland

R. PAUL SCHAUDIES,

Science Applications International Corporation, Rockville, Maryland

MONICA SCHOCH-SPANA,

University of Pittsburgh Medical Center, Baltimore, Maryland

JOHN D. SPENGLER,

Harvard School of Public Health, Boston, Massachusetts

JAMES TUCCI,

K&J Consulting, Cantonment, Florida

JAMES WILDING,

Metropolitan Washington Airports Authority (retired), Glenwood, Maryland

Board on Life Sciences Liaison to the Committee

RANDALL MURCH,

Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University, Alexandria, Virginia

Staff

KERRY A. BRENNER, Study Co-director

EVONNE P.Y. TANG, Study Co-director

FRANCES E. SHARPLES, Director, Board on Life Sciences

EILEEN CHOFFNES, Senior Program Officer

BRIDGET K.B. AVILA, Senior Program Assistant (until March 2004)

SETH H. STRONGIN, Senior Program Assistant

KATE KELLY, Editor

Suggested Citation:"Front Matter." National Research Council. 2005. Reopening Public Facilities After a Biological Attack: A Decision Making Framework. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/11324.
×

BOARD ON LIFE SCIENCES

COREY S. GOODMAN (Chair),

Renovis, Inc., South San Francisco, California

ANN M. ARVIN,

Stanford University, Stanford, California

JEFFREY L. BENNETZEN,

University of Georgia, Athens, Georgia

RUTH BERKELMAN,

Emory University, Atlanta, Georgia

R. ALTA CHARO,

University of Wisconsin, Madison, Wisconsin

DENNIS CHOI,

Merck Research Laboratories, West Point, Pennsylvania

JEFFREY L. DANGL,

University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, North Carolina

PAUL R. EHRLICH,

Stanford University, Stanford, California

JAMES M. GENTILE,

Research Corporation, Tucson, Arizona

ED HARLOW,

Harvard Medical School, Cambridge, Massachusetts

DAVID HILLIS,

University of Texas, Austin, Texas

KENNETH H. KELLER,

University of Minnesota, Minneapolis, Minnesota

RANDALL MURCH,

Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University, Alexandria, Virginia

GREGORY A. PETSKO,

Brandeis University, Waltham, Massachusetts

STUART L. PIMM,

Duke University, Durham, North Carolina

BARBARA A. SCHAAL,

Washington University, St. Louis, Missouri

JAMES TIEDJE,

Michigan State University, East Lansing, Michigan

KEITH YAMAMOTO,

University of California, San Francisco, San Francisco, California

Staff

FRANCES E. SHARPLES, Director

KERRY A. BRENNER, Senior Program Officer

MARILEE K. SHELTON-DAVENPORT, Senior Program Officer

ROBERT T. YUAN, Senior Program Officer

ADAM P. FAGEN, Program Officer

ANN H. REID, Program Officer

EVONNE P. Y. TANG, Program Officer

JOE C. LARSEN, Postdoctoral Research Fellow

DENISE GROSSHANS, Financial Associate

SETH H. STRONGIN, Senior Program Assistant

MATTHEW D. MCDONOUGH, Program Assistant

Suggested Citation:"Front Matter." National Research Council. 2005. Reopening Public Facilities After a Biological Attack: A Decision Making Framework. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/11324.
×

Preface

The impact of bioterrorism was brought home to the American public in the fall of 2001. Although there had been earlier instances of bioterrorism, as well as threats and hoaxes in recent years in Japan and the United States, the juxtaposition of the biological attacks of 2001 to the events of September 11, and the use of highly lethal preparations of anthrax, had a profound effect on the national psyche. Private and government facilities alike were affected, and considerable challenges were encountered in the process of cleaning up the affected facilities. The decontamination efforts were heavily publicized, time consuming, and very expensive. Sampling and decontamination approaches and parameters had to be decided upon very quickly. Plans had to satisfy scientific criteria to show that individuals reentering the area would not become infected and, as important, address the concerns and fears of people who used the facilities. Eventually, all of the public and private facilities were successfully decontaminated (although there was a considerable delay, caused by financial concerns, in the cleanup of one private site). However, given the urgency, and lack of preparedness with which decisions were made in 2001 and 2002, it seemed likely that the process could be improved with advance planning. This study was requested to help provide a framework for the restoration of contaminated facilities should it be necessary in the future. Specifically, the study was undertaken to consider the question of “How clean is safe?” and to address the criteria that must be satisfied to determine that the site of a biological attack is fit to use again.

The 2001 anthrax attacks revealed our vulnerabilities, and suggested that a more widespread attack could have serious consequences for the ability of the country to function. Following the 2001 attacks, alternative locations were found so that essential work could continue. However, if a major transportation terminal

Page viii Cite
Suggested Citation:"Front Matter." National Research Council. 2005. Reopening Public Facilities After a Biological Attack: A Decision Making Framework. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/11324.
×

for planes or trains were to be taken out of commission, it would be extremely difficult or perhaps impossible to relocate those services elsewhere. In addition to the large costs of a cleanup, the financial consequences and impact on commerce and society could be enormous. If a larger number of sites were attacked and the areas that had to be cleaned up were more extensive, the costs could rapidly escalate to a level that might prove unsupportable (depending in some part on just how essential or irreplaceable each site was deemed to be). The final costs would depend on the approach taken to decontaminate, the parameters that need to be satisfied in terms of test results, the extent of testing, and the evaluation of acceptable risk. To make recommendations about these issues, the committee considered many questions.

What are the best ways to assess the presence of the agent? What are the best tests and how should they be applied? How much and what type of sampling is enough? How sensitive do the tests need to be? How many organisms constitute an “infectious” dose? What tests are necessary to declare an area safe? Risk analysis constitutes a major component of this study. The participation and confidence of the affected stakeholders in the process of cleanup and the overall response to a bioterrorism incident are crucial.

The recommendations of this report provide guidance on scientific and social science issues because both areas are important to creating a systematic approach to developing standards for effective remediation after a biological attack.

Kenneth Berns

Chair, Committee on Standards and Policies for Decontaminating Public Facilities Affected by Exposure to Harmful Biological Agents: How Clean is Safe?

Suggested Citation:"Front Matter." National Research Council. 2005. Reopening Public Facilities After a Biological Attack: A Decision Making Framework. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/11324.
×

Acknowledgments

This report has been reviewed in draft form by persons chosen for their diverse perspectives and technical expertise in accordance with procedures approved by the National Research Council’s Report Review Committee. The purpose of this independent review is to provide candid and critical comments that will assist the institution in making its published report as sound as possible and to ensure that the report meets institutional standards of objectivity, evidence, and responsiveness to the study charge. The review comments and draft manuscript remain confidential to protect the integrity of the deliberative process. We wish to thank the following individuals for their review of this report:


Roy M. Anderson, Imperial College, London, United Kingdom

Peter Biggins, Dstl Chemical and Biological Sciences, Porton Down, United Kingdom

Margaret Coleman, Syracuse Research Corporation, Syracuse, New York

Baruch Fischhoff, Carnegie Mellon University, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania

David Franz, Midwest Research Institute, Frederick, Maryland

Terrance Leighton, Children’s Hospital Research Institute, Oakland, California

Harold Lewis, University of California, Santa Barbara, California

Richard Marchi, Airport Council International-North America, Washington, DC

Shelly Miller, University of Colorado, Boulder

Sandra Crouse Quinn, University of Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania


Although the reviewers listed above have provided constructive comments and suggestions, they were not asked to endorse the conclusions or recommendations, nor did they see the final draft of the report before its release. The review of

Suggested Citation:"Front Matter." National Research Council. 2005. Reopening Public Facilities After a Biological Attack: A Decision Making Framework. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/11324.
×

this report was overseen by R. Stephen Berry, James Franck Distinguished Service Professor Emeritus, The University of Chicago and Richard B. Setlow, Senior Biophysicist, Brookhaven National Laboratory. Appointed by the National Research Council, they were responsible for making certain that an independent examination of this report was carried out in accordance with institutional procedures and that all review comments were carefully considered. Responsibility for the final content of this report rests entirely with the author committee and the institution.

Suggested Citation:"Front Matter." National Research Council. 2005. Reopening Public Facilities After a Biological Attack: A Decision Making Framework. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/11324.
×
   

 Remediation Experiences in the U.S. Nuclear Weapons Complex,

 

50

   

 Findings and Recommendations,

 

52

   

 References,

 

54

4

 

ANTHRAX DECONTAMINATION AFTER THE 2001 ATTACKS: SOCIAL AND POLITICAL CONTEXT

 

56

   

 Uncertain Science, Certain Social Division,

 

57

   

 Case Study Selection,

 

59

   

 Conclusions,

 

71

   

 Findings and Recommendations,

 

71

   

 References,

 

72

5

 

FRAMEWORK FOR EVENT MANAGEMENT

 

74

   

 Findings and Recommendations,

 

78

   

 References,

 

79

6

 

HAZARD IDENTIFICATION AND ASSESSMENT

 

80

   

 Identification of the Agent,

 

81

   

 Evaluating the State of the Agent,

 

83

   

 Evaluating the State of the Contaminated Building,

 

86

   

 Findings and Recommendations,

 

86

   

 References,

 

87

7

 

FACTORS INFLUENCING EXPOSURE TO HARMFUL BIOLOGICAL AGENTS IN INDOOR ENVIRONMENTS

 

89

   

 Exposure,

 

90

   

 Sources,

 

92

   

 Building Design and Operations,

 

93

   

 Heating, Ventilating, and Air Conditioning Systems,

 

95

   

 Transport and Fate of Harmful Biological Agents,

 

95

   

 Deposition,

 

96

   

 Resuspension,

 

97

   

 Preparing and Operating Buildings for a Bioterrorism Attack and Subsequent Operation,

 

99

   

 Findings and Recommendations,

 

101

   

 References,

 

103

8

 

ANALYZING HEALTH RISKS

 

105

   

 Assessment of Risks Posed by a Biological Hazard,

 

105

   

 Dose–Response: Principles and Uncertainties,

 

107

   

 Findings and Recommendations,

 

115

   

 References,

 

118

Page xiii Cite
Suggested Citation:"Front Matter." National Research Council. 2005. Reopening Public Facilities After a Biological Attack: A Decision Making Framework. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/11324.
×
Suggested Citation:"Front Matter." National Research Council. 2005. Reopening Public Facilities After a Biological Attack: A Decision Making Framework. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/11324.
×

This page intentionally left blank.

Suggested Citation:"Front Matter." National Research Council. 2005. Reopening Public Facilities After a Biological Attack: A Decision Making Framework. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/11324.
×
Page R1
Suggested Citation:"Front Matter." National Research Council. 2005. Reopening Public Facilities After a Biological Attack: A Decision Making Framework. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/11324.
×
Page R2
Suggested Citation:"Front Matter." National Research Council. 2005. Reopening Public Facilities After a Biological Attack: A Decision Making Framework. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/11324.
×
Page R3
Suggested Citation:"Front Matter." National Research Council. 2005. Reopening Public Facilities After a Biological Attack: A Decision Making Framework. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/11324.
×
Page R4
Suggested Citation:"Front Matter." National Research Council. 2005. Reopening Public Facilities After a Biological Attack: A Decision Making Framework. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/11324.
×
Page R5
Suggested Citation:"Front Matter." National Research Council. 2005. Reopening Public Facilities After a Biological Attack: A Decision Making Framework. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/11324.
×
Page R6
Suggested Citation:"Front Matter." National Research Council. 2005. Reopening Public Facilities After a Biological Attack: A Decision Making Framework. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/11324.
×
Page R7
Page viii Cite
Suggested Citation:"Front Matter." National Research Council. 2005. Reopening Public Facilities After a Biological Attack: A Decision Making Framework. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/11324.
×
Page R8
Suggested Citation:"Front Matter." National Research Council. 2005. Reopening Public Facilities After a Biological Attack: A Decision Making Framework. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/11324.
×
Page R9
Suggested Citation:"Front Matter." National Research Council. 2005. Reopening Public Facilities After a Biological Attack: A Decision Making Framework. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/11324.
×
Page R10
Suggested Citation:"Front Matter." National Research Council. 2005. Reopening Public Facilities After a Biological Attack: A Decision Making Framework. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/11324.
×
Page R11
Suggested Citation:"Front Matter." National Research Council. 2005. Reopening Public Facilities After a Biological Attack: A Decision Making Framework. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/11324.
×
Page R12
Page xiii Cite
Suggested Citation:"Front Matter." National Research Council. 2005. Reopening Public Facilities After a Biological Attack: A Decision Making Framework. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/11324.
×
Page R13
Suggested Citation:"Front Matter." National Research Council. 2005. Reopening Public Facilities After a Biological Attack: A Decision Making Framework. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/11324.
×
Page R14
Next: Executive Summary »
Reopening Public Facilities After a Biological Attack: A Decision Making Framework Get This Book
×
Buy Paperback | $49.00 Buy Ebook | $39.99
MyNAP members save 10% online.
Login or Register to save!
Download Free PDF

The anthrax attacks in fall 2001 spurred an extensive and costly decontamination effort where many decisions had to be made about which sites required cleanup, what method to use, how to determine the effectiveness of the cleanup, and how "clean" the building had to be for reoccupation. As part of a project funded by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS), and managed by Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, the National Research Council was asked to consider the criteria that must be met for a cleanup to be declared successful, allowing the reoccupation of a facility. The report finds that efficiently sampling and characterizing a pathogen is critical for choosing the best remediation strategy. However, there should be no universal standard for deciding when a building is safe to re-enter because varying pathogen amounts and characteristics could require different strategies. The report offers a flowchart for decision-makers that includes questions about the characteristics of the pathogen; how far it has spread; whether it is transmissible between humans; and how long it will survive to pose a threat. The report also recommends that a risk-assessment approach be adopted as part of a strategy for achieving a "socially acceptable" standard for cleanup.

  1. ×

    Welcome to OpenBook!

    You're looking at OpenBook, NAP.edu's online reading room since 1999. Based on feedback from you, our users, we've made some improvements that make it easier than ever to read thousands of publications on our website.

    Do you want to take a quick tour of the OpenBook's features?

    No Thanks Take a Tour »
  2. ×

    Show this book's table of contents, where you can jump to any chapter by name.

    « Back Next »
  3. ×

    ...or use these buttons to go back to the previous chapter or skip to the next one.

    « Back Next »
  4. ×

    Jump up to the previous page or down to the next one. Also, you can type in a page number and press Enter to go directly to that page in the book.

    « Back Next »
  5. ×

    Switch between the Original Pages, where you can read the report as it appeared in print, and Text Pages for the web version, where you can highlight and search the text.

    « Back Next »
  6. ×

    To search the entire text of this book, type in your search term here and press Enter.

    « Back Next »
  7. ×

    Share a link to this book page on your preferred social network or via email.

    « Back Next »
  8. ×

    View our suggested citation for this chapter.

    « Back Next »
  9. ×

    Ready to take your reading offline? Click here to buy this book in print or download it as a free PDF, if available.

    « Back Next »
Stay Connected!