techniques can be used to bring countries posing a nuclear proliferation threat toward the “fold.” Such approaches, however, should not be considered as replacements for the NPT regime, the international safeguards system, or the Additional Protocol.
Vladimir Shmelev of the Kurchatov Institute argued that the proliferation landscape has changed dramatically over a relatively short period of time. In his view, the nonproliferation regime must leave its Cold War roots behind and adapt in response to evolving threats from non-state actors, RDDs, and clandestine programs to develop nuclear weapons. The safeguards system was initially designed to address the situation as it was when the nonproliferation regime was first created. This required the development of new technologies, and they were relatively effective, in the Cold War context, in preventing international and domestic proliferation. We are now faced with the need to adapt to our new situation. The challenges of adapting to the new circumstances will take many forms. The adoption of the Additional Protocol, for example, will not only increase the burden upon individual states as they work to comply, but also upon those responsible for processing and managing the enormous volume of new data that will result. Shmelev also argued that scientific resources must be focused on conducting systematic investigations of proliferation threats and assessing methods of addressing those threats. He cited a number of technological hurdles that must be overcome, including developing proliferation-resistant nuclear energy technology, assessing options for internationalizing portions of the nuclear fuel cycle, and improving MPC&A mechanisms and inspection techniques. He also underscored the difficulty of maintaining the necessary balance between nonproliferation goals and honoring NPT commitments to share the benefits of nuclear technology. In short, Shmelev argued, adequate safeguards are a prerequisite for an effective nuclear nonproliferation regime.