agencies regarding jurisdiction for protecting national security. The degree of oversight that the regulatory agency has in establishing standards and procedures, in monitoring compliance with those procedures, and in independent inventory verification is very important. The distribution of oversight authority among government agencies is also among the questions that must be addressed.

Second, Stoiber argued that complacency can be a critical factor in degrading effective safeguards. Complacency in following safeguards procedures is a more difficult problem, he argued, than is complacency in obeying safety rules. This is because the consequences of ignoring safety procedures are much clearer and can be directly linked to a specific action (or failure to act), while events resulting from complacency about safeguards are much more insidious and difficult to identify or measure. Nevertheless, regulatory agencies can and should address complacency about safeguards through inspections to verify compliance with procedures and enforcement measures to penalize infractions.

The third issue that Stoiber raised was that, in order for safeguards to be sustained effectively over time, resources and political support must be adequate, predictable, and enduring. This is because effective safeguards require repeated expenditures for expensive equipment and maintenance and a well-trained and motivated workforce of adequate size. All of these requirements can be reflected in regulations. Regulations alone, however, are not enough. Stoiber noted that effective regulatory oversight requires an adequate legal and organizational framework, sufficient resources, and political support.

Finally, Stoiber discussed the balance between the need to protect sensitive information against the need for transparency and openness in the U.S. regulatory system for domestic nuclear safeguards. Before September 2001, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) had developed a highly transparent approach to information about domestic nuclear safeguards. After the terrorist attacks, however, the National Security Council directed the NRC to restrict the dissemination of information of potential value to terrorists. Since that time, the commission has developed a process that weighs the costs and benefits of releasing information and tries to lean toward transparency whenever possible. Stoiber also provided a list of U.S. statutes and executive orders relevant to public disclosure of sensitive information related to nuclear energy, materials, and weapons. “Classified Information” includes both “National Security Information” governed by Executive Order 12598 as amended by Executive Order 13292, and “Restricted Data” as defined by the Atomic Energy Act, section 142. “Safeguards Information” is governed by the Atomic Energy Act, section 147. “Critical Infrastructure Information” is defined by the Homeland Security Act of 2002, Subtitle B: Critical Infrastructure Information Act of 2002, sections 212-214.

Yuri G. Volodin, of the Russian Federal Inspectorate for Nuclear and Radiation Safety (Gosatomnadzor, or GAN),1 described his agency’s activities in


This agency was renamed during the reorganization of the Russian government that took place in 2004. It is now the Federal Service for Environmental, Technological, and Nuclear Oversight.

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