tect this material, but the job is still not finished. The amount of additional funding from abroad that will be required to upgrade protection of all stocks of weapon-usable material depends on the ability of Russia to assume full responsibility for protecting its own material. This report assumes that there will be significant shortfalls in Russian contributions in the near term. As a result, the U.S. effort in Russia must continue.
The National Research Council committee has defined indigenization as the process of making the transition from the U.S.-Russian cooperative program financed largely by the Department of Energy (DOE) to an MPC&A program managed, maintained, and financed by Russia that ensures the security of weapon-usable material at a level that is necessitated by the threat of international terrorism and is consistent with internationally acceptable practices. Indigenization is the focus of this report.
Both the U.S. and Russian governments are vitally concerned about the increasing threats of terrorists obtaining weapons of mass destruction. Both countries have made strong commitments at the United Nations and at G-8 summit meetings to help prevent such a development. The U.S. government places high priority on preventing terrorist groups from acquiring weapon-usable material in Russia that could lead to nuclear detonations anywhere in the world. On the other hand, the Russian government is primarily concerned with: (1) preventing sabotage of its facilities that house dangerous materials; (2) ensuring the safety and security of its stockpiles of chemical weapons; (3) dismantling its nuclear submarines; and (4) preventing the theft of its radioactive material for use in dirty bombs—measures that could prevent near-term catastrophes in Russia. As a result, Russia’s actions to meet its own national security priorities are not fully aligned with U.S. priorities.
In 1996, the Russian government enacted the Law on Funding Sites and Facilities of the Highest Radiological and Nuclear Hazard, which should have provided a strong basis for cooperation. However, the Russian government has not moved as quickly as the U.S. government would like in implementing MPC&A upgrades, nor has it taken adequate steps to provide financial support for MPC&A activities. Based on numerous discussions in Russia, we conclude that Russian officials and specialists simply do not share the high level of concern regarding the vulnerability of material to theft from their facilities as is held by U.S. experts.
Meanwhile, the technical, regulatory, and economic considerations surrounding the cooperative MPC&A program have changed significantly during the past decade. For example, twelve years of cooperation have fostered a considerable degree of mutual respect and understanding among officials and specialists from the two countries while enabling Russian experts to become acquainted with