D
United States Legislative Basis for DOE MPC&A Activities in Russia and DOE MPC&A Program Description

D.1 NUNN-LUGAR COOPERATIVE THREAT REDUCTION LEGISLATION1

[Excerpts: “Soviet Nuclear Threat Reduction Act of 1991”]


H.R. 3807 (P.L. 102-228)

Agreed to November 27, 1991

One Hundred Second Congress of the United States of America


AT THE FIRST SESSION

Begun and held at the City of Washington on Thursday, the third day of January, one thousand nine hundred and ninety-one

An act to amend the Arms Export Control Act to authorize the President to transfer battle tanks, artillery pieces, and armored combat vehicles to member countries of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in conjunction with implementation of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe.


Part B – Findings and Program Authority


Sec. 211. National Defense and Soviet Weapons Destruction.

1  

This legislation can be accessed at http://www.fas.org/nuke/control/ctr/docs/hr3807.html.



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Strengthening Long-Term Nuclear Security: Protecting Weapon-Usable Material in Russia D United States Legislative Basis for DOE MPC&A Activities in Russia and DOE MPC&A Program Description D.1 NUNN-LUGAR COOPERATIVE THREAT REDUCTION LEGISLATION1 [Excerpts: “Soviet Nuclear Threat Reduction Act of 1991”] H.R. 3807 (P.L. 102-228) Agreed to November 27, 1991 One Hundred Second Congress of the United States of America AT THE FIRST SESSION Begun and held at the City of Washington on Thursday, the third day of January, one thousand nine hundred and ninety-one An act to amend the Arms Export Control Act to authorize the President to transfer battle tanks, artillery pieces, and armored combat vehicles to member countries of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in conjunction with implementation of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe. … Part B – Findings and Program Authority Sec. 211. National Defense and Soviet Weapons Destruction. 1   This legislation can be accessed at http://www.fas.org/nuke/control/ctr/docs/hr3807.html.

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Strengthening Long-Term Nuclear Security: Protecting Weapon-Usable Material in Russia (a) Findings – The Congress finds— (1) that Soviet President Gorbachev has requested Western help in dismantling nuclear weapons, and President Bush has proposed United States cooperation on the storage, transportation, dismantling, and destruction of Soviet nuclear weapons; (2) that the profound changes underway in the Soviet Union pose three types of danger to nuclear safety and stability, as follows: (A) ultimate disposition of nuclear weapons among the Soviet Union, its republics, and any successor entities that is not conducive to weapons safety or to international stability; (B) seizure, theft, sale, or use of nuclear weapons or components; and (C) transfers of weapons, weapons components, or weapons know-how outside of the territory of the Soviet Union, its republics, and any successor entities, that contribute to worldwide proliferation; and (3) that it is in the national security interests of the United States (A) to facilitate on a priority basis the transportation, storage, safeguarding, and destruction of nuclear and other weapons in the Soviet Union, its republics, and any successor entities, and (B) to assist in the prevention of weapons proliferation. (b) Exclusions. – United States assistance in destroying nuclear and other weapons under this title may not be provided to the Soviet Union, any of its republics, or any successor entity unless the President certifies to the Congress that the proposed recipient is committed to— (1) making a substantial investment of its resources for dismantling or destroying such weapons; (2) forgoing any military modernization program that exceeds legitimate defense requirements and forgoing the replacement of destroyed weapons of mass destruction; (3) forgoing any use of fissionable and other components of destroyed nuclear weapons in new nuclear weapons; (4) facilitating United States verification of weapons destruction carried out under section 212; (5) complying with all relevant arms control agreements; and (6) observing internationally recognized human rights, including the protection of minorities.

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Strengthening Long-Term Nuclear Security: Protecting Weapon-Usable Material in Russia SEC. 212. AUTHORITY FOR PROGRAM TO FACILITATE SOVIET WEAPONS DESTRUCTION. (a) In General. – Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the President, consistent with the findings stated in section 211, may establish a program as authorized in subsection (b) to assist Soviet weapons destruction. Funds for carrying out this program shall be provided as specified in part C. (b) Type of Program. – The program under this section shall be limited to cooperation among the United States, the Soviet Union, its republics, and any successor entities to (1) destroy nuclear weapons, chemical weapons, and other weapons, (2) transport, store, disable, and safeguard weapons in connection with their destruction, and (3) establish verifiable safeguards against the proliferation of such weapons. Such cooperation may involve assistance in planning and in resolving technical problems associated with weapons destruction and proliferation. Such cooperation may also involve the funding of critical short-term requirements related to weapons destruction and should, to the extent feasible, draw upon United States technology and United States technicians. PART C – ADMINISTRATIVE AND FUNDING AUTHORITIES SEC. 221. ADMINISTRATION OF NUCLEAR THREAT REDUCTION PROGRAMS. (a) Funding.— (1) Transfer authority. – The President may, to the extent provided in an appropriations Act or joint resolution, transfer to the appropriate defense accounts from amounts appropriated to the Department of Defense for fiscal year 1992 for operation and maintenance or from balances in working capital accounts established under section 2208 of title 10, United States Code, not to exceed $400,000,000 for use in reducing the Soviet military threat under part B. (2) Limitation. – Amounts for transfers under paragraph (1) may not be derived from amounts appropriated for any activity of the Department of Defense that the Secretary of Defense determines essential for the readiness of the Armed Forces, including amounts for— (A) training activities; and (B) depot maintenance activities.

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Strengthening Long-Term Nuclear Security: Protecting Weapon-Usable Material in Russia (b) Department of Defense. – The Department of Defense shall serve as the executive agent for any program established under part B. (c) Reimbursement of Other Agencies.—The Secretary of Defense may reimburse other United States Government departments and agencies under this section for costs of participation, as directed by the President, only in a program established under part B. (d) Charges Against Funds. – The value of any material from existing stocks and inventories of the Department of Defense, or any other United States Government department or agency, that is used in providing assistance under part B to reduce the Soviet military threat may not be charged against funds available pursuant to subsection (a) to the extent that the material contributed is directed by the President to be contributed without subsequent replacement. (e) Determination by Director of OMB. – No amount may be obligated for the program under part B unless expenditures for that program have been determined by the Director of the Office of Management and Budget to be counted against the defense category of the discretionary spending limits for fiscal year 1992 (as defined in section 601(a)(2) of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974) for purposes of part C of the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985. SEC. 222. REPAYMENT ARRANGEMENTS. (a) Reimbursement Arrangements. – Assistance provided under part B to the Soviet Union, any of its republics, or any successor entity shall be conditioned, to the extent that the President determines to be appropriate after consultation with the recipient government, upon the agreement of the recipient government to reimburse the United States Government for the cost of such assistance from natural resources or other materials available to the recipient government. (b) Natural Resources, Etc. – The President shall encourage the satisfaction of such reimbursement arrangements through the provision of natural resources, such as oil and petroleum products and critical and strategic materials, and industrial goods. Materials received by the United States Government pursuant to this section that are suitable for inclusion in the Strategic Petroleum Reserve or the National Defense Stockpile may be deposited in the reserve or stockpile without reimbursement. Other material and services received may be sold or traded on the domestic or international market with the proceeds to be deposited in the General Fund of the Treasury.

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Strengthening Long-Term Nuclear Security: Protecting Weapon-Usable Material in Russia SEC. 223. DIRE EMERGENCY SUPPLEMENTAL APPROPRIATIONS. It is the sense of the Senate that the committee of conference on House Joint Resolution 157 should consider providing the necessary authority in the conference agreement for the President to transfer funds pursuant to this title. PART D – REPORTING REQUIREMENTS SEC. 231. PRIOR NOTICE OF OBLIGATIONS TO CONGRESS. Not less than 15 days before obligating any funds for a program under part B, the President shall transmit to the Congress a report on the proposed obligation. Each such report shall specify – (1) the account, budget activity, and particular program or programs from which the funds proposed to be obligated are to be derived and the amount of the proposed obligation; and (2) the activities and forms of assistance under part B for which the President plans to obligate such funds. SEC. 232. QUARTERLY REPORTS ON PROGRAM. Not later than 30 days after the end of each quarter of fiscal years 1992 and 1993, the President shall transmit to the Congress a report on the activities to reduce the Soviet military threat carried out under part B. Each such report shall set forth, for the preceding quarter and cumulatively, the following: (1) Amounts spent for such activities and the purposes for which they were spent. (2) The source of the funds obligated for such activities, stated specifically by program. (3) A description of the participation of the Department of Defense, and the participation of any other United States Government department or agency, in such activities. (4) A description of the activities carried out under part B and the forms of assistance provided under part B. (5) Such other information as the President considers appropriate to fully inform the Congress concerning the operation of the program under part B.

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Strengthening Long-Term Nuclear Security: Protecting Weapon-Usable Material in Russia D.2 TRANSITION TO RUSSIAN FEDERATION SUPPORT OF MPC&A SYSTEMS2 The Bob Stump National Defense Authorization Act of 2003 mandates that a sustainable MPC&A system be transferred to sole Russian Federation support no later than January 1, 2013. [Excerpt] SEC 3156. (b) 1 “The Secretary of Energy shall work cooperatively with the Russian Federation to develop, as soon as practicable but no later than January 1, 2013, a sustainable nuclear materials protection, control, and accounting system for the nuclear materials of the Russian Federation that is supported solely by the Russian Federation.” D.3 DESCRIPTION OF THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY MATERIALS PROTECTION, CONTROL & ACCOUNTING PROGRAM3 Background The mission of the Office of International Material Protection and Cooperation is to improve security for vulnerable stockpiles of nuclear weapons, weapon-usable nuclear materials, and radiological materials in countries of concern, and to improve the ability to detect their illicit trafficking. Programmatic activities include installing physical security and accountancy upgrades to secure Russian nuclear weapons and weapon-usable material against theft; locating, securing and consolidating radiological materials that could be used to make dirty bombs; consolidating Russian nuclear material into fewer sites where enhanced security systems have already been installed; converting weapons grade highly enriched uranium (HEU) to low enriched uranium (LEU); and helping to secure international borders, including major seaports, against smuggling of nuclear and other radioactive materials. Program Scope The program helps prevent nuclear terrorism by working in Russia and other regions of concern to: (1) secure and eliminate vulnerable nuclear weapons and weapon-usable material; (2) locate, consolidate and secure radiological mate- 2   This document can be accessed at: http://www.defenselink.mil/dodge/olc/docs/PL107-314.pdf. 3   Provided to the committee by DOE in April 2004.

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Strengthening Long-Term Nuclear Security: Protecting Weapon-Usable Material in Russia rials that can be used in a dirty bomb; and (3) install detection equipment at border crossings and mega-seaports to prevent and detect the illicit transfer of nuclear and other radioactive materials. A total of 115 sites encompass work to secure and eliminate vulnerable nuclear weapons and weapon-usable material, including 51 material sites (11 Russian Navy fuel, 9 Ministry of Atom Energy weapons complex and 31 civilian), and 64 nuclear warhead sites (39 Russian Navy warhead and up to 25 Strategic Rocket Forces sites). A total of 313 sites encompass work to install detection equipment at border crossings and mega-seaports to prevent and detect the illicit transfer to nuclear and other radioactive materials. These sites are distributed by country/type as follows: 78 Russia, 25 Ukraine, 25 Kazakhstan, 165 other including border sites in up to 21 additional countries and 20 MegaPorts.

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