. "Appendix D United States Legislative Basis for DOE MPC&A Activities in Russia and DOE MPC&A Program Description." Strengthening Long-Term Nuclear Security: Protecting Weapon-Usable Material in Russia. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press, 2005.
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Strengthening Long-Term Nuclear Security: Protecting Weapon-Usable Material in Russia
(a) Findings – The Congress finds—
(1) that Soviet President Gorbachev has requested Western help in dismantling nuclear weapons, and President Bush has proposed United States cooperation on the storage, transportation, dismantling, and destruction of Soviet nuclear weapons;
(2) that the profound changes underway in the Soviet Union pose three types of danger to nuclear safety and stability, as follows: (A) ultimate disposition of nuclear weapons among the Soviet Union, its republics, and any successor entities that is not conducive to weapons safety or to international stability; (B) seizure, theft, sale, or use of nuclear weapons or components; and (C) transfers of weapons, weapons components, or weapons know-how outside of the territory of the Soviet Union, its republics, and any successor entities, that contribute to worldwide proliferation; and
(3) that it is in the national security interests of the United States (A) to facilitate on a priority basis the transportation, storage, safeguarding, and destruction of nuclear and other weapons in the Soviet Union, its republics, and any successor entities, and (B) to assist in the prevention of weapons proliferation.
(b) Exclusions. – United States assistance in destroying nuclear and other weapons under this title may not be provided to the Soviet Union, any of its republics, or any successor entity unless the President certifies to the Congress that the proposed recipient is committed to—
(1) making a substantial investment of its resources for dismantling or destroying such weapons;
(2) forgoing any military modernization program that exceeds legitimate defense requirements and forgoing the replacement of destroyed weapons of mass destruction;
(3) forgoing any use of fissionable and other components of destroyed nuclear weapons in new nuclear weapons;
(4) facilitating United States verification of weapons destruction carried out under section 212;
(5) complying with all relevant arms control agreements; and
(6) observing internationally recognized human rights, including the protection of minorities.