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Biological Science and Biotechnology in Russia: Controlling Diseases and Enhancing Security (2005)
Development, Security, and Cooperation (DSC)

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. "Appendix H Highest Priority Measures for Creating a System to Counter Biological Terrorism." Biological Science and Biotechnology in Russia: Controlling Diseases and Enhancing Security. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press, 2005.

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Biological Science and Biotechnology in Russia: Controlling Diseases and Enhancing Security

spectrum of reactions was very broad—from the emotionally exaggerated statement of George Bush regarding “ongoing biological warfare” to the adequate assessment of Vladimir Putin that “the use of biological agents for terrorist purposes has become a reality”—society was united in its opinion that the world had changed in the course of a few days and the twenty-first century had become qualitatively different. In our opinion, despite their seemingly “modest” scale, the 13 anthrax cases resulting from this malicious act, five of which were fatal, must be condemned by mankind just as strongly as previous instances in which weapons of mass destruction were used, such as the chlorine gas attacks during World War I and the atomic bombings of Japanese cities during World War II.

The reality of the use of infectious pathogens means we must decisively reject certain stereotypical opinions that have arisen not only among casual observers but also most unfortunately even in certain professional circles, namely that biological weapons problems are mythical and illusory in nature and may even have been dreamed up by military specialists for their own self-interested purposes. Biological terrorism is an enormous social evil, an extremely dangerous phenomenon carrying with it the threat of consequences that are difficult to predict yet intentionally unfavorable. Efforts to counter it will be effective only if they come in the form of a system of balanced and coordinated measures carried out at the federal, regional, and local levels. Of course, such measures must be scientifically based, technically feasible, and economically realistic. Here, the interests of effectively countering bioterrorism both as a global phenomenon and at the local incident level require careful and comprehensive scientific research and development work on a systemic basis, with the broadest possible international integration and the involvement of a large number of competent specialists. Understandably, the results of these systemic efforts will not be immediately evident; however, due to the extreme urgency of this problem, measures must be taken now, building on the basis of a thorough assessment of the current situation and aided by the knowledge and experience that have been accumulated in eliminating epidemic foci of especially dangerous infections and overcoming the consequences of other emergency situations. On this basis, we could already propose a number of measures that, if implemented, would facilitate progress in resolving the very complex problem of creating a bioterrorism prevention and response system.

In our view, this problem must primarily be resolved in conjunction with efforts to deal with two closely linked issues, namely the biological security of the country as a whole and the sanitary-epidemiological welfare of the population. Therefore, the following actions would be expedient:

  • Assigning full authority and responsibility for leading and coordinating the bioterrorism-related efforts of various departments and agencies to those federal and local agencies responsible for overall biological security, with these agencies to include substantial representation from specialists from the State Sanitary Epidemiological Surveillance Service.

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Front Matter (R1-R10)
Summary (1-9)
Introduction (10-20)
1 The Vision for Russia’s Future (21-26)
2 Pillar One: Improving Surveillance and Response (27-35)
3 Pillar Two: Meeting Pathogen Research Challenges (36-46)
4 Pillar Three: The Promise of Biotechnology (47-58)
5 Pillar Four: The Human Resource Base (59-64)
6 Reshaping U.S.-Russian Cooperation in the Biological Sciences and Biotechnology (65-75)
Epilogue (76-78)
Appendix A Committee Biographies (79-85)
Appendix B Organizations Consulted During the Study (86-88)
Appendix C Decision of the Board of the Ministry of Health of the Russian Federation: Tasks for the Periods 2001-2005 and 2006-2010 from Protocol #6 (89-92)
Appendix D Main Goals and Objectives in Combating Infectious Diseases in the Russian Federation (93-95)
Appendix E Regulations on the Federal Service for the Supervision in the Sphere of Health and Social Development (96-103)
Appendix F Recent Reports by the National Academies on Global Health Concerns (104-105)
Appendix E Regulations Regarding the Federal Service for the Supervision in the Sphere of Health and Social Development (106-107)
Appendix H Highest Priority Measures for Creating a System to Counter Biological Terrorism (108-112)
Appendix I National Immunization Calendar of the Russian Federation (113-114)
Appendix J Selected Russian Research and Related Institutions with Activities Relevant to Infectious Diseases, Diagnostics, Treatment, Prevention, and Control (115-119)
Appendix K Scientific and Methodological Research Results Highlighted by the Russian Ministry of Health and Social Development (120-124)
Appendix L List of Research Projects Proposed in Open Competitions Organized in 2003 (125-126)
Appendix M Test Systems and Other Products Being Developed in Russian Laboratories (127-130)
Appendix N RosAgroBioProm Organizational Structure (131-131)
Appendix O Activities of Russian Research Institutes in Developing Vaccines for Human Use (132-132)
Appendix P Regulation of the Russian Government on Licensing Activities Connected with the Use of Infectious Disease Antidotes, No. 731 (133-136)
Appendix Q Bioengagement Programs Financed by the United States Government (137-142)
Appendix R International Programs and Projects of Special Significance to the Ministry of Health and Social Development (143-144)
Selected Bibliography (145-146)