5
Potential Future Efforts

This chapter addresses additional inputs and assessment areas that could not be covered within the committee’s limited work plan and that could be of benefit to the Navy in improving its analytical activities and capabilities-based planning (CBP).

ADDITIONAL INPUTS

The committee’s recommendations in this report are based on its workshop briefings, on the combined experience and backgrounds of the individual committee members, and on additional documentation (e.g., the Joint Defense Capabilities Study—called the Aldridge Study1) reviewed by the committee. The rapid start-up of the committee and the limited time available for it to gather and analyze information and to complete this report did not allow for input from many potentially important sources and on certain important topics, including the following:

  • U.S. Marine Corps—This report addresses the Navy’s activities on the basis of the tasking to the committee. In the committee’s brief workshop, held July 27-29, 2004, no input was received from the Marine Corps about its implementation of capabilities-based planning and the mechanism by which its process

1  

Joint Defense Capabilities Study Team. 2004. Joint Defense Capabilities Study: Improving DoD Strategic Planning, Resourcing, and Execution to Satisfy Joint Requirements, Final Report, January, Department of Defense, Washington, D.C.



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Naval Analytical Capabilities: Improving Capabilities-Based Planning 5 Potential Future Efforts This chapter addresses additional inputs and assessment areas that could not be covered within the committee’s limited work plan and that could be of benefit to the Navy in improving its analytical activities and capabilities-based planning (CBP). ADDITIONAL INPUTS The committee’s recommendations in this report are based on its workshop briefings, on the combined experience and backgrounds of the individual committee members, and on additional documentation (e.g., the Joint Defense Capabilities Study—called the Aldridge Study1) reviewed by the committee. The rapid start-up of the committee and the limited time available for it to gather and analyze information and to complete this report did not allow for input from many potentially important sources and on certain important topics, including the following: U.S. Marine Corps—This report addresses the Navy’s activities on the basis of the tasking to the committee. In the committee’s brief workshop, held July 27-29, 2004, no input was received from the Marine Corps about its implementation of capabilities-based planning and the mechanism by which its process 1   Joint Defense Capabilities Study Team. 2004. Joint Defense Capabilities Study: Improving DoD Strategic Planning, Resourcing, and Execution to Satisfy Joint Requirements, Final Report, January, Department of Defense, Washington, D.C.

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Naval Analytical Capabilities: Improving Capabilities-Based Planning is linked to that of the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations (OPNAV), despite the joint flavor of the 2004 guidance from the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO), which includes the words “Partner with the Marine Corps to identify and develop enablers to achieve Ship-to-Objective Maneuver (STOM).”2 Combatant commanders—The future force planning component of the capabilities-based planning process is intended to resource those capabilities that will be needed by the “tip of the spear” to meet future needs. Time constraints precluded the committee’s seeking input from selected combatant commanders (e.g., the Pacific Command) in order to understand the degree to which these commanders engage with the Navy during the CBP process and whether the Navy should interact more with them or their subordinate commanders. U.S. Joint Forces Command—The U.S. Joint Forces Command is the Department of Defense’s (DOD’s) lead command for transformation and the natural lead organization in defining the capabilities needed by future combatant commands. As a follow-on task, the Navy could address the degree of connectivity between this command and the Navy within the CBP process and evaluate different aspects of that connectivity, as appropriate. Office of the Secretary of Defense—Historically, many new and important capabilities (e.g., the Global Positioning System, precision weapons, sea-launched ballistic missiles, stealth, A-10 and F-16 aircraft) have been introduced not by demand pull from combatant commanders or their predecessors (the commanders in chief), but rather from a combination of technology push and strategic planning. The Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) (and elements within the Services) continue to have an important role in encouraging such ideas, and the Navy could potentially benefit from more interaction with the Under Secretary for Acquisition, the Director of Transformation, or their representatives. Homeland defense—A high priority is assigned to homeland defense in the DOD’s Planning Guidance. However, the committee was not exposed to much information about the DOD’s CBP activities specific to homeland security or homeland defense. Pursuing this area in more depth could benefit the Navy. Non-DOD implementations of CBP—The committee did not have sufficient time to examine the tools used to implement CBP outside the DOD. The Navy could address the potential application of analytic and other planning tools used by very large corporations to Navy CBP. Examples of potential subjects could include methods of using available but uncertain intelligence information about competitors or threats, and the applicability of commercial planning and analysis tools to Navy functional support areas that have similarities to commercial operations. 2   ADM Vern Clark, USN, Chief of Naval Operations. 2004. CNO Guidance for 2004, Department of the Navy, Washington, D.C., p. 15.

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Naval Analytical Capabilities: Improving Capabilities-Based Planning ADDITIONAL ASSESSMENT AREAS Potential areas for further review and assessment that could significantly affect future Navy capabilities-based planning activities include the following: A recommendation in this report relates to the need for the CNO to be advised by a small, top-notch group of analysts. The Navy could better characterize alternative structures for this group, including its relative benefits and its needs (e.g., sources of its membership and the types of education and training needed by its members) before making a decision on how it will proceed in this area. As noted in Chapter 1, the committee found that most of the Navy’s, and the entire DOD’s, CBP activities are focused on the resourcing for weapons and platforms and their operations. The committee is convinced that a good CBP process should also address other important resource areas, including human resources, in which personnel policies and education and training practices impact the utilization of Navy personnel. These functional areas consume large portions of Navy funding and directly impact all Navy capabilities—in particular, force readiness. While the committee briefly heard from representatives of the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (DCNO) for Manpower and Personnel (N1) and the DCNO for Fleet Readiness and Logistics (N4) about human resources and selected readiness analytic efforts, the Navy needs to better integrate their activities into the Navy’s capabilities-based planning process. In its workshop the committee was unable to address the role of gathering, processing, and disseminating intelligence in achieving capabilities and the use of intelligence information in preparing CBP assessments. The gathering of good intelligence information, the availability of such information to analysts, and their use of it in analyses and assessments are all contributors to estimating the risk associated with different alternatives available to operational commanders and to force planners and programmers. Intelligence is a function often assumed away in many models. It is an important subject for review in Navy CBP and analysis and is beyond the purview of much of the OPNAV staff. After its July 2004 workshop, the committee learned that the Assessments Division of the Office of the DCNO for Resources, Requirements, and Assessments (N81) is funding the integration of the Naval Simulation System (NSS) with the U.S. Army’s and the U.S. Marine Corps’s Combat XXI activities.3 This effort could provide a useful simulation tool to support the Department of the Navy’s CBP process, especially as it pertains to joint capabilities involving the 3   This project is entitled Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, N81, and the Naval Postgraduate School World-Class Modeling (WCM) Project.

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Naval Analytical Capabilities: Improving Capabilities-Based Planning Army and Marines. The Navy could benefit from a review of this integration effort to develop a good understanding of the scope and deliverables and, if appropriate, use the results to improve its own CBP process. A new concept being floated within the DOD currently involves “capability deployment groups.” The motivation for the concept stems from the recognition that implementation of grand concepts for capability development will not be realized in the absence of sustained and focused implementation mechanisms. The Navy could assess this concept and its potential to improve Navy CBP activities.