6
Science and Technology to Support the FORCEnet Information Infrastructure

6.1 OVERVIEW AND BACKGROUND

Because FORCEnet has no fixed end state but is subject to continual innovation, it is not possible to establish a fixed set of science and technology (S&T) investments required to enable successful implementation of the FnII. Figure 4.2 in Chapter 4 of this report depicts the view of the CFFC,1 of this innovation process, showing Sea Trial as the center of a process in which warfare challenges lead to new concepts. These concepts drive both materiel and nonmateriel innovations that are tested in Sea Trial, iteratively refined, and, when implemented, lead to new operational capabilities.

In Figure 6.1, the committee places this construct in a larger context. (The processes added by the committee are identified by the shaded boxes and the dotted lines in Figure 6.1.) The chart closes a loop to account for the Network-Centric Operations Capability Vision, including evolving threats and new warfare challenges being affected by capability gaps and indicates that technology gap analysis can motivate science and technology programs that will lead to technology that can help close the gaps in operational capabilities. A path for spiral experimentation has also been added. This path connects the “New Operational Capability” box in Figure 6.1 with the “NCO Capability Vision and Evolving Threats” box. In this way, the new operational capabilities can use spiral experimentation to determine how well they perform with respect to the evolving

1  

ADM Robert J. Natter, USN. 2003. “Sea Power 21 Series, Part VIII: Sea Trial: Enabler for a Transformed Fleet,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, November, p. 62.



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FORCEnet: Implementation Strategy 6 Science and Technology to Support the FORCEnet Information Infrastructure 6.1 OVERVIEW AND BACKGROUND Because FORCEnet has no fixed end state but is subject to continual innovation, it is not possible to establish a fixed set of science and technology (S&T) investments required to enable successful implementation of the FnII. Figure 4.2 in Chapter 4 of this report depicts the view of the CFFC,1 of this innovation process, showing Sea Trial as the center of a process in which warfare challenges lead to new concepts. These concepts drive both materiel and nonmateriel innovations that are tested in Sea Trial, iteratively refined, and, when implemented, lead to new operational capabilities. In Figure 6.1, the committee places this construct in a larger context. (The processes added by the committee are identified by the shaded boxes and the dotted lines in Figure 6.1.) The chart closes a loop to account for the Network-Centric Operations Capability Vision, including evolving threats and new warfare challenges being affected by capability gaps and indicates that technology gap analysis can motivate science and technology programs that will lead to technology that can help close the gaps in operational capabilities. A path for spiral experimentation has also been added. This path connects the “New Operational Capability” box in Figure 6.1 with the “NCO Capability Vision and Evolving Threats” box. In this way, the new operational capabilities can use spiral experimentation to determine how well they perform with respect to the evolving 1   ADM Robert J. Natter, USN. 2003. “Sea Power 21 Series, Part VIII: Sea Trial: Enabler for a Transformed Fleet,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, November, p. 62.

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FORCEnet: Implementation Strategy FIGURE 6.1 Recommended augmented process for identifying technology gaps in operational capabilities. Adapted from ADM Robert J. Natter, USN, 2003, “Sea Power 21 Series, Part VIII: Sea Trial: Enabler for a Transformed Fleet,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, November, p. 62. threats indicated by the Director of Naval Intelligence, the intelligence community, and the combatant commanders. The committee had access to the following material: gap analyses of operational capabilities performed by N704, a translation of these gaps to S&T needs performed by N706,2 and parallel but not entirely consistent requirements generations and S&T shortfall lists produced by NETWARCOM and its OAG. The committee also had access to work by ONR identifying critical enabling technologies and to SPAWAR’s Technology Framework for FORCEnet.3 The committee also studied aspirations of the ASD(NII) for the GIG, and made its own assessment of the technical challenges facing naval implementation of FnII while leveraging GIG capabilities (discussed in Chapter 3, Section 3.6) and complying with GIG requirements. 2   N704 is the FORCEnet Integration and Assessments Branch for N6/N7; N706, the former Science and Technology Branch, no longer exists. 3   Space and Naval Warfare Systems Command. 2003. FORCEnet Government Reference Architecture, Version 1.0, April.

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FORCEnet: Implementation Strategy To deal with evolving statements of desired operational capabilities, and recognizing the evolutionary process of FORCEnet implementation, the committee abandoned the attempt to set hard performance goals for FnII technology. Instead, it integrated the ONR taxonomy4 and its own analysis of GIG challenges into a list of eight FnII critical technologies (see below). Subsequent sections in this chapter describe the challenges in each, but the establishment of metrics that must be met at a particular date need to await agreement on the operational capabilities desired for that date and for better modeling and simulation tools to accurately assess the effect of FORCEnet performance on the warfare effectiveness of the Navy. The committee examined several documents, as mentioned, and from those documents it identified eight critical FnII functional capabilities, listed below. These capabilities, used as the organizing basis for discussion in this chapter to highlight potential capability gaps and associated S&T shortfalls, are as follows: Reliable wideband mobile communications; Information management (including COP); Situational awareness and understanding; Information assurance; Modeling and simulation; Dynamic composability and collaboration; Support of disadvantaged user-personnel, platform, or sensor; and Persistent intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance. 6.2 ENABLING TECHNOLOGIES AND FUNCTIONAL CAPABILITIES 6.2.1 Reliable Wideband Mobile Communications 6.2.1.1 Communications Overview In today’s naval forces, communications with moving platforms and personnel are characterized by intermittent connectivity and low data rates. Today, most ships have only satellite capability and achieve data rates of less than 100 kb/s, whereas larger ships, such as carriers, can achieve data rates of multimegabits. Satellite connectivity for small ships is often in the area of 80 percent. The primary limiting factor appears to be antenna blockage, but other possibilities could be electromagnetic interference (EMI) and tracking problems during dynamic maneuvers. Submarines, which must put an antenna on or above the sur- 4   Office of Naval Research. 2002. “Taxonomy of Technology Limitations to Support the Five Enabling Functions Required for Navy Network Centric Operations,” Arlington, Va. Available at http://www.onr.navy.mil/02/baa/expired/2003/03_007/default.asp. Accessed July 24, 2004.

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FORCEnet: Implementation Strategy face, and dismounted troops have more serious data rate and connectivity problems. Operations in the future network-centric environment of FORCEnet (see Figure 6.2) will require much higher data rates (fleet representatives have estimated requirements to be as high as 50 Mb/s per large-deck ship) and more-robust connectivity. Simultaneous connectivity to satellites, sensor nodes, airborne relays, and other ships will drive antenna requirements. Furthermore, maintaining an Internet type (e.g., IP-based) network while nodes and users are moving is a significant technological challenge. 6.2.1.2 Communications Technology Challenges The following subsections discuss key communications technology challenges that must be addressed if FORCEnet is to achieve the vision of full network-centric operations. Communications Links and Apertures. The difficult shipboard environment for radio-frequency (RF) apertures makes it a high-priority area for future improvement. An example of the antenna layout on a typical ship today is shown in Figure 6.3. The figure illustrates the many trade-offs that need to be considered in planning communications antennas on a ship. The larger the antenna, the greater its throughput, but larger antennas also have larger cross-sections and so their detectability is larger. Also, pointing accuracy and the amount of topside space required increases with the growth in antenna size. FIGURE 6.2 Notional future FORCEnet nodes and links.

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FORCEnet: Implementation Strategy FIGURE 6.3 Example of the antenna layout on a typical ship today: antennas resident on a U.S. Navy cruiser, circa 1996. NOTE: A list of acronyms is provided in Appendix C. SOURCE: CDR J.J. Shaw, USN, Head, Space Section (N611), “Transformational Communications Architecture Overview” presentation, August 11, 2003, briefing.

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FORCEnet: Implementation Strategy Typical improvements addressed are (1) the sharing of apertures among different functions (radar, communications, and so on) and frequencies and (2) multiple simultaneous (or agile) beams to allow communications with multiple, independent nodes. Operating at higher frequencies (Ka band and above) provides improved performance for a given transmitting and receiving aperture size. This, however, increases the pointing and tracking challenge owing to the reduced beam widths. Optical frequencies should be investigated for communications from UAV relays or satellites to ships in order to provide the increased bandwidth when allowed by the atmospheric environment. While deformable mirrors are potential technology solutions for ameliorating the distortion caused by the atmosphere, serious issues related to atmospheric scattering in the marine environment remain, without clear means of being overcome. As the Navy moves toward the distributed nature of a network-centric FORCEnet capability, ships will need to be able to track multiple signal nodes simultaneously. An example, taken from the LCS concepts of operations, is shown in Figure 6.4. The need for multiple agile beams indicates a phased array FIGURE 6.4 Concepts of operations overview for the Littoral Combat Ship and its distributed off-board systems. SOURCE: Navy Warfare Development Command. 2003. Littoral Combat Ship, Concept of Operations Development, Newport, R.I., February.

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FORCEnet: Implementation Strategy as one possible solution. Several programs supported by ONR are addressing these antenna issues. Automated, intelligent management of link characteristics, including beam pointing and tracking, jamming, spectrum usage, and atmospheric environmental effects such as rain attenuation and fading, would be needed to maintain the robustness of link performance. Note that Figure 6.4 points out the need to consider alternatives to satellite relays, such as unmanned air vehicle relays. These alternatives are required because of possible shortages of satellite capacity, owing either to congestion or to adversary action, and to blockages of the line of sight from a shipborne antenna to a satellite. Network Quality of Service and Resource Management in a Military Context. In today’s commercial Internet, there is little or no capability for allocating QoS among various classes of traffic. The result is that all messages have the same priority, and when there is a heavy demand on the network, all users experience the same degradation. In a military context, high-priority traffic needs to take precedence over low-priority traffic; otherwise a heavy demand of low-priority traffic could preempt the higher-priority information. The transition to IPv6 from IPv4 will provide a tool, but more work will be needed in order to enable reconfiguration of the network infrastructure in response to varying military missions. Monitoring and control of the infrastructure from the network level and down to the link level will be required for enabling response to the time-varying needs. The monitoring and control should be automated to the extent possible, especially when latency is a critical requirement. Although several programs address monitoring and control, the committee finds no comprehensive systems-level effort directed at the total problem. Automated Networking in a Dynamic, Mobile Environment. The ability of moving personnel and platforms to continuously maintain the data rate and connectivity necessary for the achievement of their assigned missions is a significant technological challenge. The standard protocols used in the commercial Internet work well in the fixed infrastructure, but when the users and, in particular, the nodes and hosts are moving, special protocols are required. If only the hosts (e.g., users with laptop computers) are moving and the routers are static, the situation is easily handled by the Mobile IP without placing significant burden or design changes on existing routing protocols, such as Open Shortest Path First. A more challenging situation arises when the routers are also moving, as would be expected in a dynamic battlefield situation involving ships, troops, and UAVs. Without new routing protocol designs, the system would lose track of the user locations (i.e., which router they are using), connections would time-out, and connectivity would be lost. This type of network is referred to as a Mobile Ad-Hoc Network (MANET). The MANET Working Group of the Internet Engineering Task Force has been working on developing standard routing protocols for MANETs. Today,

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FORCEnet: Implementation Strategy there are several MANET protocols operating at the IP layer—for example, Ad hoc On-demand Distance Vector (AODV) and Optimized Link State Routing (OLSR)—but they are still classified as experimental. The working group has not come up with a single solution, because it was thought that too many unknowns exist and the solution may be situation-dependent. Some protocol designs keep constant track of the locations of all users, so that if one wishes to communicate with another, the path is already known. Such solutions, known as proactive (such as OLSR), have high overhead but low latency. Other designs, known as reactive (such as AODV), determine a path only when needed, resulting in lower overhead but higher latency. Also, there is some uncertainty on the scalability of these solutions to hundreds of nodes or more. Although some implementations of MANETs exist and some experiments have been done (e.g., the Army’s FCS program), insufficient information is available today to allow systems engineering trade-offs. Another challenging problem area arises when some or all of the links of the network are not constantly connected, but suffer dropouts for varying periods of time. With today’s protocol designs, such behavior causes large numbers of repeated transmissions of packets and possible crashing of the network. The Delay-Tolerant Networking (DTN) Research Group (of the Internet Research Task Force) has been addressing this area for some time, but, as is the case with MANET, solutions are immature. The Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) has initiated a new program, Disruption-Tolerant Networking, to address this area. Overlaying the issues of routing protocols for mobile and disruptive networks is the issue of resistance to adversarial attack—that is, information assurance specific to the network. A robust network must not be susceptible to data corruption, corruption of routing, or saturation of the network with garbage traffic (denial of service). It must also be resistant to traffic analysis (i.e., to revealing who is sending information to whom). Of course the way to protect such information is to encrypt it, but if the headers containing the protocols are encrypted, they must be decrypted at each router if the routers are to take action based on them. Thus, there appears to be a trade-off between security and performance in a dynamic network, especially within the concept of a “black core,” that is, the part of the network with the highest security. The future FORCEnet will have the characteristics of both MANETs and DTN; emphasis should be placed on continued research in both of these areas. On top of this will be the need for a level of network information assurance. A multidimensional trade-off will be needed between potentially conflicting requirements, with solutions being dependent on the specific missions, architectures, and systems designs. Today there is not enough knowledge of these areas and their interrelationships to be able to do these trade-offs. More modeling and simulation and experiments are needed to explore the solution space. Solutions for one type of mission may be different from those for other types, perhaps

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FORCEnet: Implementation Strategy indicating the need for different solutions for different enclaves of users. Perhaps focusing on the LCS program would be a useful place to start. 6.2.1.3 Communications Science and Technology Perspectives A considerable number of efforts are ongoing under ONR sponsorship in the area of RF antenna technology. Some work is ongoing in the optical regime, but not enough to really assess its adequacy for the future FORCEnet environment. The committee is not aware of any efforts to support a comprehensive design of an automated monitoring and control system for FORCEnet links and networks. The ONR, DARPA, and the Army have a number of efforts supporting MANET; DARPA is initiating an effort on DTN. As yet, these efforts are not sufficiently mature to provide performance results for dynamic networks with specific security requirements under specific missions and scenarios. The National Security Agency is developing a new security protocol, HAIPE, which will help solve some of the security issues previously discussed. Findings. Currently available technology is not sufficient to support the robust communications infrastructure needed for the long-term FORCEnet network-centric operations vision. In particular, the current technology gaps include the following: The capability in link and antenna technologies to provide increased data rates and beam agility; Insufficient quality of service and network monitoring, control, and reconfiguration to provide the necessary availability and latency for priority traffic; Necessary protocols in standard use to support the mobility, ability to overcome disruption, and information assurance robustness that will be needed in the future FORCEnet; Reliable communications technologies to reach underwater vehicles at speed and depth; Shared, robust, reliable, multibeam apertures, satellite relay alternatives to support communications on the move, and adaptive networks; Reliable high-speed communications, including optical, in the marine layer; and Improved antenna aperture technology for use by disadvantaged users: personnel, platforms, and sensors. Recommendation. Based upon the findings presented above and on the issues described in this section, the committee recommends the following:

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FORCEnet: Implementation Strategy Recommendation for ONR: Monitor technology availability and, as appropriate, invest to sustain investigations that: Examine the applicability of optical frequencies for high-data-rate communications from satellite or airborne platforms to surface ships. Although the future Transformational Communication System holds promise for achieving as much as 100 Mb/s to ships at Ka band, research into optical communications could provide a hedge against a need for higher data rates in the future. Examine providing automated monitoring and control for FORCEnet links and networks. Explore the solution space for network approaches for FORCEnet mobility, disruption, and security using modeling and simulation and experimental approaches; it should particularly consider applications, such as the Littoral Combat Ship, as points of departure for this effort. 6.2.2 Information Management 6.2.2.1 Information Management Overview Information management encompasses a spectrum of issues critical to the implementation and effectiveness of FORCEnet. The process of information management includes the generation and manipulation of data or information in support of decision makers. By implication, the process may take different forms, depending on the decision maker’s role or responsibility (e.g., command and control, strike, logistics). The information management process includes all activities related to the collection, accessing, processing, dissemination, and presentation of data or information. The process includes technical means as well as policy, procedural, and doctrinal aspects, with a focus on producing the right information (the content and quality that are needed) at the right time to satisfy mission demands. As implied, information management processes must be adjusted to satisfy specific mission drivers. A high-level summary of the contributing technologies follows: Sensor management—enterprise-mediated collection planning to maximize information value from observations of multiple areas and locations of interest by sensors most likely to satisfy mission needs, with appropriate mode, geometry, and timing; adjudication of competing demands for sensing coverage in support of all users in accord with command priorities. Sensor processing and data fusion—single and multiple sensor and source fusion to minimize uncertainty; includes temporal alignment, geospatial registration, location, tracking, identification of objects and events, and aggregation into appropriate representation of battlespace objects and events. Such processing is often referred to as Level 1 data fusion processing. In centralized architectures,

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FORCEnet: Implementation Strategy Level 1 processes are often applied to sensors and message traffic, reflecting wide area coverage, to form a common operational picture. Information services—models, pedigrees, metrics, database services, and so on to support efficient, dynamic management of information. Data strategy and information dissemination—consistent mapping of (1) data meaning and significance (classes, properties, relationships) and (2) information content, structure, and latency, to network limitations and technical capability of users. User-defined visualization—representation of information in forms appropriate to user roles; decision support to aid human cognition. In stand-alone (platform-centric) systems, these process issues are assessed and resolved at design time. The technical aspects (e.g., data parameters, processing constraints, and information products) are embedded in the system design and tend to be modified only infrequently over the life of a platform. Typically when new requirements are imposed, needed design updates (or reengineering) are dictated by “interoperability” limitations and prove to be both time-consuming and expensive. Among cooperative platforms, protocols and procedures can be established to assure that information is exchanged within a predetermined structure and used in ways that are appropriate for particular mission goals. 6.2.2.2 Information Management Technology Challenges In network-centric operations, the information management process must work across all node components of the network in a fashion that is seamless and adaptive to command direction. This suggests that all nodes must make all their contributing elements of the information management process transparent to network command and control. Further, network environments will be characterized by high volumes of data or information supporting a diverse set of users and mission goals. In such an environment, there is evident need for underlying consistency in the description of information and for automation in the application of tools to enable dynamic and efficient information management. Without such automated tools, the network will become bottlenecked by delays and capacity limitations caused by humans engaged in futile efforts to resolve information conflicts and inconsistencies. This is an issue of information integrity—the requirement that information, as it propagates around the network, be processed and interpreted in ways that are mathematically and logically consistent with source sensing characteristics and intermediate processing updates. Common problems occurring in today’s battle management environments, which will be dramatically compounded in network-centric environments, are these: Trust—lack of metadata about information source, intermediate processing, and quality to inform users;

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FORCEnet: Implementation Strategy Dynamically managed, interoperable, high-capacity connectivity, shared apertures, networking, interoperability. Products of these efforts to date include: XTCF—a framework for network-centric information management for naval and joint forces to operate in a GIG-defined environment; this effort will provide an early instantiation of enterprise services capability for NCES; Analytical Support Architecture—a tool for the automated intelligence assessment of enemy air defense; Environmental Visualization—fused, interpreted, analyzed environmental information disseminated within less than 1 hour of collection; Rapid Maritime Identification and Tracking System—near-real-time biometric data for maritime special operations forces, to improve their ability to find people and take action; Multinational Virtual Operations Capability—near-real-time joint force and coalition force exchange of tactical and operational information. During the course of FY 2004, the ONR program was to be restructured around a new description of enabling capabilities more directly related to warfighting gaps identified by OPNAV. The restructuring of enabling capabilities and the determination of technology content are in progress as this report is being written. For FORCEnet, the organization of the program is expected to be consistent with the MCPs defined by the Naval Transformation Roadmap:9 Networks, ISR, and Common Operational and Tactical Picture (COTP), plus essential supporting technology primarily in information assurance. ONR program content is expected to be driven by the following set of shortfalls, identified by N71:10 Vulnerable links, Saturated links, Insufficient communications and network structure, Inadequate network defense in depth, Limited coalition interoperability, Inadequate sensor strategy, Limited undersea picture, 9   Gordon England, Secretary of the Navy; ADM Vern Clark, USN, Chief of Naval Operations; and Gen James L. Jones, USMC, Commandant of the Marine Corps. 2002. Naval Transformation Roadmap: Power and Access … From the Sea, Department of the Navy, Washington, D.C. 10   RADM Thomas E. Zelibor, USN, Space, Information Warfare, Command and Control (N61), “FORCEnet POM 06 Process,” presentation to the National Defense Industrial Association, San Diego Chapter, San Diego, California, October 23.

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FORCEnet: Implementation Strategy Lack of common maritime picture, and Multiple combat identification and BFT solutions. Technology issues under consideration within each of these areas are summarized below: Networks; Multibeam and multiband apertures; High-data-rate communications on the move—including relay, router, quality of service, and network management issues; Undersea and marine layer communications; ISR; Smart sensor networks; Ship’s missile defense; UAV-borne robust surveillance; COTP; COTP integration and dissemination to all users; Near-real-time fusion of intelligence and tactical data; Spatial-temporal registration of multisensor data (imaging and non-imaging); Intelligent and adaptive sensor management; Automated situational and threat awareness; and User-tailorable information feeds and displays. Crosscutting/Leveraging; Information assurance; Real-time, multicombatant command, engagement planning and control; and Real-time deconfliction of targeting information. The ONR program planning effort addresses the FY 2005 to FY 2011 time frame. Trade-offs involving program priorities, resource allocation, and start or delivery timing have not been resolved as of this writing. Table 6.2 provides a listing of program issues and capabilities under consideration by ONR’s Knowledge Superiority and Assurance FNC as of the second quarter of FY 2004. This FNC represents the principal, but not sole, investment in FORCEnet development for ONR. The table does not reflect probable Discovery and Invention investment relevant to FORCEnet. Overall program planning at ONR indicates a strong commitment to the development of relevant network-centric technology, with a broad range of the previously identified shortfalls being addressed. The ONR plans do appear to address a substantial subset of the technologies needed for near-term experimentation with network-centric capability. Given the difficulty of the network-centric

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FORCEnet: Implementation Strategy TABLE 6.2 Summary of Knowledge Superiority and Assurance Program Plans of the Office of Naval Research (ONR) as of January 2004 (Preliminary for Period FY 2005 to FY 2011) Planned ONR Science and Technology Program Capability Common Operational and Tactical Picture (COTP)   Joint Real-Time Coordinated Engagement Real-time multicombatant commander coordinated engagement planning and control. Automated Situation and Threat Assessment Automated production of actionable information for battlespace understanding and prediction of future battlespace activity. Actionable Information from Multiple Intelligence Sources in the GIG-ES Environment Fused intelligence and cryptologic information: delivered faster, with better quality for command and control of weapons systems. Improved Maritime COTP in the GIG-ES Environment Accurate, timely surface and undersea information, with reduced false-alarm rate and views tailorable to user need. Decision Support for Dynamic Target Engagement Significantly decreased time required to engage a pop-up dynamic target. Reduces several key bottlenecks in the decision process for strike warfare. Networks   Communications in S-Ku multifunction aperture Advanced multifunction system that combines communications with electronic warfare in a single system. Includes line-of-sight and satellite communication capability. Ultrahigh-Frequency (UHF)/L-Band Phased Array Antennas for Aircraft Carrier (CVN) CVN capability to support up to 20 ultrahigh-frequency and L-band communication links, with significantly fewer antennas topside. High-Altitude Airborne Relay ISR range extension and communications to highly mobile naval forces, reduces dependency on SATCOM, connects to GIG Transformational Communication System (TCS). Expendable Airborne Relay and Router Large numbers of expendable communications relays and routers over the battlespace, a tactical complement to GIG TCS. Mobile Dynamic Quality-of-Service Enabled Networks End-to-end mobility using all network links for maximum bandwidth efficiency, with expedited service for high-priority traffic flows. Integrated and Autonomous Network Management Automated monitoring, configuring, and troubleshooting of networks without human action, and design and implementation of networks using models and simulations to predict performance prior to operations. Environmentally Adaptive Networks Active monitoring of environments, proactive prediction, and optimization of performance parameters.

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FORCEnet: Implementation Strategy Planned ONR Science and Technology Program Capability Optical Communications Through the Marine Layer Reliable line-of-sight networking capability among surface, ground, and air platforms. Undersea Optical Communications Reliable undersea networking capability among subsurface platforms and sensor nodes, resulting in improved undersea situational awareness. Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR)   S-Band Missile Defense Radar Full-volume air surveillance to detect and discriminate ballistic missiles; multiple target tracking, long-range target identification, with high-performance in clutter and countermeasures. Reconfigurable Surveillance Unmanned Air Vehicles High-resolution imaging of potential threats day and night, through fog, rain, and camouflage. Smart Sensor Networks Networks with large numbers of unmanned, autonomous sensors to provide persistent, pervasive battlespace ISR. Information Assurance   Secure Distributed Collaboration Secure dissemination of information across multiple joint/ coalition boundaries. Network Assessment, Monitoring, and Protection Protects naval IP networks from network attacks and provides for remote administration of networks in response to attacks. Assured and Trusted Computing Denies adversaries the ability to corrupt software, data, and information on naval networks, both in storage and during transmission. NOTE: Acronyms are defined in Appendix C. challenge, it is not surprising that differing levels of R&D investment (6.1 to 6.3) are required and that not every issue is being addressed with equal attention. Evolutionary development implies a phased approach to technology development, and ONR efforts have an implicit phasing supportive of an evolutionary development process. Each phase is modulated by feedback from user experience gained through hands-on experimentation and by refined requirements derived from evolving concepts of operation, tactics, and procedures. Toward this end, ONR has engaged in continuing interaction with the units responsible for requirements (N6/N7) and acquisition (PEOs and systems commands), and with fleet representatives (NETWARCOM, NWDC), to guide its planning activities and to establish success criteria for its technology products. While such a phased approach supported by a coevolutionary or experimentation process has not been made explicit, an informal basis has been established.

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FORCEnet: Implementation Strategy ONR program personnel have also been active in maintaining awareness of other Service and agency developments so as to leverage progress and to coordinate experimentation wherever possible. In this regard, interaction with the Air Force Research Laboratory, DARPA, and DISA have been particularly notable. Beyond the ONR science and technology program, it is understood that technologies relevant to FORCEnet success are being addressed across the spectrum of DOD, industry, and academic activities. General awareness of these activities resides within the committee, and their potential contribution to FORCEnet capability was factored in to the discussion above. No attempt was made to perform a more complete survey and assessment. As indicated above, ONR program officers and their trusted advisers do attempt to plan S&T activities with awareness of the community state of the art, in order to take advantage of emerging technology, to leverage opportunities, and to avoid redundant effort. The committee suggests that the Navy investigate relevant programs discussed by DARPA at the March 2004 DARPAtech Annual Meeting to determine their applicability to solving Navy FORCEnet capability gaps. Also, it is suggested that the Navy should coordinate with the National Coordination Office for Information Technology Research and Development and its recent publication, Grand Challenges: Science, Engineering, and Societal Advances Requiring Networking and Information Technology Research and Development.11 6.5 SUMMARY TECHNOLOGY FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE FORCENET INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE Section 6.2 in this chapter describes science and technology issues associated with achieving FORCEnet. Eight critical FORCEnet functional capabilities are identified, and findings and recommendations are enumerated. Section 6.3.1 addresses the FORCEnet implications of the GIG identifying several key areas that are major S&T issues for the Navy. Section 6.4 addresses the S&T of the ONR program. The committee studied this information and performed a preliminary analysis of findings to determine a recommended priority for the Navy. This analysis included an assessment for each finding of how critical it was for Navy success in executing FORCEnet, whether it was being addressed by others outside the Navy, what potential it had for enhancing performance, and whether it was needed for near-, mid-, or far-term experimentation to assess naval capability. 11   Interagency Working Group on Information Technology Research and Development. 2003. Grand Challenges: Science, Engineering, and Societal Advances Requiring Networking and Information Technology Research and Development, Office of Advanced Scientific Computing Research, Department of Energy, Washington, D.C., November (first printing), March 2004 (second printing).

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FORCEnet: Implementation Strategy 6.5.1 Process for the Conduct of an Overall Science and Technology Program In addition to the following prioritized recommendations specific to the needs of the various technology areas described, the ONR will also need to reexamine its process for conducting an overall S&T program that matches the needs of network-centric operations. For ONR to consistently identify S&T gaps, there must be a consolidated set of prioritized FORCEnet capability needs. Regarding process, the committee presents the following findings and recommendations. 6.5.1.1 Process Findings Today, the processes for identifying needed operational capabilities are multiple, independent, and uncoordinated. There is need for a systematic and vigorous process for identifying enabling technologies to satisfy network-centric functional needs as defined and prioritized by NETWARCOM. There is a generally recognized need for naval science and technology activities to avoid duplicative effort by maintaining awareness of DOD, academia, and industry/commercial developments in fields relevant to network-centric operations. There is a need to conduct all naval technology developments with consideration for the variable reliability of the naval communications environment in which those technologies will eventually have to perform. 6.5.1.2 Process Recommendations Based upon the findings presented above and on the issues described in this chapter, the committee recommends the following: Recommendation for ONR: Develop a consistent FORCEnet technology roadmap and list of S&T shortfall assessments for guiding naval S&T investment strategy on the basis of a consistent set of FORCEnet capabilities that is recognized across the Navy. It is also recommended that ONR develop a technology roadmap that responds to the FnII capabilities and addresses near-, mid- and far-term capabilities. As the ONR develops this FnII technology roadmap and associated program, it should: Perform sensitivity analyses to evaluate alternatives, Provide cost–benefit analyses, Assess commercial off-the-shelf applicability, and Identify opportunities for leveraging and providing incentives for participation by industry, academia, and other Services.

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FORCEnet: Implementation Strategy 6.5.2 Summary Findings Regarding Technology for the FORCEnet Information Infrastructure Section 1.3 in Chapter 1 warns that implementing FORCEnet will involve three challenges: an activity of unprecedented scope, an unprecedented need for robustness, and significant difficulties in execution lie ahead. Chapter 4 deals with management and organizational approaches to the scope and execution of FORCEnet, and Chapter 5 addresses engineering approaches. However, the committee finds not only that current technology is inadequate to provide the needed robustness, but also that execution with existing technology may prevent the full realization of FORCEnet’s potential. Network-centric warfare is appealing if the Navy can build and deploy a robust communications fabric and use it to link sensors, weapons, and decision making over great distances. However, network-centric warfare could be a disaster if the fabric is not robust and the naval units do not maintain the capability to operate with uninterrupted, high-capacity connectivity. Enterprise architectures, such as those that the NCES would provide, create a temptation to depend on remote parts of the enterprise for essential services. This temptation needs to be resisted unless the communications fabric is truly robust. Similarly, the Navy should be sure that the fabric is robust before it sends into harm’s way ships that have limited organic defensive capabilities and must depend on other units on the network to detect, track, and deal with threats. In planning naval S&T investments, distinctions should be drawn between challenges on which others are working and those for which the Navy must take responsibility. Four examples of the reasons why naval networks are not robust today are these: (1) blockage of antenna beams by superstructure, (2) dependence on single relays and difficulties in routing through alternative relays, (3) susceptibility to denial-of-service attacks, and (4) the lack of extremely high frequency communications satellite capacity. The first reason is an example of a problem that naval S&T needs to solve. New technology will be needed for affordable multifunction antennas that can command unobstructed sites atop a ship’s superstructure. The second reason is an example of a problem that affects all Services and is receiving attention from all Services, although the Navy may have to plan the acquisition of relay platforms particularly suitable for maritime operations. The third reason is an example of a problem receiving attention from all Services and from the National Security Agency; this problem will require uniform implementation of solutions across the GIG. The fourth reason is a problem for which the Air Force and the National Reconnaissance Office are developing the technology and the Air Force will acquire the satellites, although the Navy may have to program the acquisition of terminals compatible with the new satellites. In prioritizing naval S&T investments that respond to the robustness challenge, the highest priority should be given to the issues involved in the first

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FORCEnet: Implementation Strategy problem, which are unique to the Naval Services. However, this priority attention should not be to the exclusion of investments directed at issues involved in the second and third type, which deserve attention from all Services. In addition to the critical needs for technology to assure robustness, there are needs for technologies that will permit the full benefits of FORCEnet to be realized. Many of them lie in the area of information management, described in detail in Section 6.2. Although few of these needs are challenges solely to the Naval Services, naval participation in the exploration and implementation of the requisite technologies will help assure that they are appropriate for maritime and littoral operations. Table 6.3 distinguishes different types of S&T challenges: those that appear essential for the Naval Services in order to realize the promise of FORCEnet and those that would further enhance FORCEnet capabilities. The table further distinguishes the essential challenges for which ONR must shoulder the burden and the challenges that are receiving attention from others. It is important to understand that the most critical requirement is to pursue the technologies that will yield a robust information infrastructure. Finally, in formulating an investment portfolio, consideration should be given to dates when technologies are needed. Although there is an appropriate desire to achieve quick results and apply them to developmental systems quickly, some technology investments may take time to bear fruit and should be scheduled sufficiently early to mature by the time the technology is needed for incorporation into FORCEnet components. 6.5.3 Summary Recommendations Regarding Technology for the FORCEnet Information Infrastructure Based upon the findings presented above and on the issues described in this chapter, the committee recommends the following: Recommendation for ONR: Give high priority to technology exploration and prototyping to assure continuous connection of naval units to the GIG, giving the highest priority to those naval-unique challenges that others are unlikely to address, including the following: Continuing to develop prototypes that demonstrate solutions to the antenna blockage problem shipboard, such as wide-band multibeam arrays, and alternative relays; Aggressively seeking technologies that will permit connecting to submarines at speed and depth. Recommendation for ONR: After assessing the contributions of DARPA and other Services, give high priority to the remaining issues in these areas: MANET routing over multiple alternate paths, QoS management and monitoring,

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FORCEnet: Implementation Strategy TABLE 6.3 Science and Technology (S&T) Findings of the Committee FORCEnet Information Infrastructure (FnII) Navy Priority Ongoing Office of Naval Research Efforts Comments Essential to Naval Services; No Others Working Essential to Naval Services; Others Working Enhanced-Performance FnII, Desirable But Not Required Communications Technology Challenges (see Section 6.2.1.2) Links/antenna √     Partial Issue for ships and submarines QoS/monitor   √   Partial   Protocols/STD √     Partial   Underwater communications √     Partial Speed and depth issues, optical communications Satellite relay alternative   √   √   Optical communications, marine layer     √ √   Apertures—disadvantaged users   √   Partial   Information Management Technology Challenges (see Section 6.2.2.2) Ontology   √   Partial   Information services   √   Partial   Sensor resource management   √       Distributed fusion √     Partial Includes underwater issues User-defined visualization   √       Enterprise monitor   √       Situational Awareness Challenges (see Section 6.2.3.2) Contextual reasoning   √   Partial   Knowledge bases   √   Partial   Interactive hypothesis management   √       Cognitive interface     √ Partial  

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FORCEnet: Implementation Strategy FORCEnet Information Infrastructure (FnII) Navy Priority Ongoing Office of Naval Research Efforts Comments Essential to Naval Services; No Others Working Essential to Naval Services; Others Working Enhanced-Performance FnII, Desirable But Not Required Information Assurance Challenges (see Section 6.2.4.2) Metrics/monitoring   √   Partial   Sharing enabler/ balance     √     Software trustworthiness   √   √   Power sources   √   √   Modeling and Simulation Challenges (see Section 6.2.5.2) Scaling   √       Systems engineering   √       “What if” analysis     √     Composability Challenges (see Section 6.2.6.2) Mission management     √     Readiness monitor   √       Manpower and training     √     Collaboration   √   Partial Automation in unreliable communications Disadvantaged-User Science and Technology Challenges (see Section 6.2.7.2) Human–machine interface   √   Partial   Customized information   √   Partial   Aperture size/ weight √     Partial Small ships, underwater platforms Power sources   √       Persistent Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Challenges (see Section 6.2.8.2) Automated adaptive sensor control   √   Partial   Manpower reduction   √   Partial   Networked sensors √     Partial E.g., sonobuoys and underwater sensors/vehicles NOTE: Acronyms are defined in Appendix C.

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FORCEnet: Implementation Strategy Network protection and recovery, Information assurance, Connectivity to dismounted units with smaller size and weight antenna apertures, and Small, networked sensors for wide-area, inexpensive alerting in difficult denied areas. Recommendation for ONR: Give high priority to information management in the naval context in order to permit full exploitation of network-centric enterprise services, increasing its investments in ontologies of naval operations, information services, distributed Level 2 through Level 4 fusion, and user-defined visualization. Recommendation for ONR: Invest, as resources permit, in technologies that would further enhance FORCEnet capabilities after due consideration of alternative sources of technology.