2
Defining FORCEnet

2.1 THE ORIGIN AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE FORCENET CONCEPT

2.1.1 From the Sea to Sea Power 21

For the U.S. Navy, the key transformation of the post–Cold War epoch was introduced in the 1992 white paper entitled … From the Sea. That Navy–Marine Corps white paper embodied “a fundamental shift away from open-ocean warfighting on the sea toward joint operations from the sea”1 and implicitly recognized that sea control was a means to an end—namely, the projection of power ashore. Accordingly, the white paper outlined an expeditionary force that could be “swift to respond on short notice to crises,” “structured to build power from the sea,” “able to sustain support for long-term operations,” and “unrestricted by the need for transit or overflight approval.”2

From the Sea was quickly followed, in 1994, by another Navy–Marine Corps white paper, Forward … From the Sea, which expanded the original document to include peacetime operations and conventional deterrence,3 and in 1996

1  

Department of the Navy. 1992. …From the Sea, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., September, p. 2.

2  

Department of the Navy. 1992. …From the Sea, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., September, pp. 2-3.

3  

Department of the Navy. 1994. Forward … From the Sea: Continuing the Preparation of the Naval Services for the 21st Century, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., September 19, p. 2.



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FORCEnet: Implementation Strategy 2 Defining FORCEnet 2.1 THE ORIGIN AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE FORCENET CONCEPT 2.1.1 … From the Sea to Sea Power 21 For the U.S. Navy, the key transformation of the post–Cold War epoch was introduced in the 1992 white paper entitled … From the Sea. That Navy–Marine Corps white paper embodied “a fundamental shift away from open-ocean warfighting on the sea toward joint operations from the sea”1 and implicitly recognized that sea control was a means to an end—namely, the projection of power ashore. Accordingly, the white paper outlined an expeditionary force that could be “swift to respond on short notice to crises,” “structured to build power from the sea,” “able to sustain support for long-term operations,” and “unrestricted by the need for transit or overflight approval.”2 … From the Sea was quickly followed, in 1994, by another Navy–Marine Corps white paper, Forward … From the Sea, which expanded the original document to include peacetime operations and conventional deterrence,3 and in 1996 1   Department of the Navy. 1992. …From the Sea, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., September, p. 2. 2   Department of the Navy. 1992. …From the Sea, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., September, pp. 2-3. 3   Department of the Navy. 1994. Forward … From the Sea: Continuing the Preparation of the Naval Services for the 21st Century, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., September 19, p. 2.

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FORCEnet: Implementation Strategy by the Marine Corps’s Operational Maneuver from the Sea,4 explaining how the Marines proposed to execute this expeditionary concept. These were succeeded by a 1997 vision statement from the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) entitled “Anytime, Anywhere,” which defined the Navy role as being able “to influence events ashore, directly and decisively, from the sea, anytime, anywhere.”5 The vision also defined a broad littoral that encompassed “most of the earth’s land masses, more than 80 percent of its population, and most of its capitals and major cities” and foresaw a mounting “area denial” challenge.6 The expanded role of naval forces in projecting power ashore that was outlined by the naval Services between 1992 and 1997 confronted head-on the historic mismatch between the limited combat power that could be projected from seaborne forces and the far larger assets that could ultimately be mounted from shore. It appeared to fly in the face of Admiral Nelson’s adage, “A ship’s a fool that fights a fort.”7 The new role, therefore, revolved about the challenge of giving “a highly trained, well-equipped, but perhaps smaller military force such as ours an impact so disproportionate to its numbers as to make it decisive in peace and in war.”8 This challenge, in turn, posed questions as to how much power of what kinds could be projected from sea-based forces and, by extension, how the impact of that power might be focused and multiplied—exactly the kinds of questions that were to become key joint issues in the wake of the events of September 11, 2001 (9/11) and OIF. Starting in late 1997, this problem was posed to a succession of CNO Strategic Studies Groups (SSGs)9 as well as to a committee of the Naval Studies Board of the National Research Council.10 Highlights of these groups’ contributions include the following: The first of the SSGs to address the problem—SSG 17—examined ways to better project power from the sea both by designing forces that could operate 4   Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps. 1996. Operational Maneuver from the Sea, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., January 4. 5   ADM Jay Johnson, USN. 1997. “Anytime, Anywhere,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, November, pp. 48-50. 6   ADM Jay Johnson, USN. 1997. “Anytime, Anywhere,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, November, pp. 48-50. 7   Admiral Horatio Nelson (1758-1805). 8   ADM Jay Johnson, USN. 1997. “Anytime, Anywhere,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, November, p. 50. 9   The Strategic Studies Group is a body of from 8 to 13 fellows specially selected by the Chief of Naval Operations, the Commandant of the Marine Corps, and the Commandant of the Coast Guard to study a specific topic, tasked by the CNO for a 1-year fellowship. They work at the Naval War College under the guidance of a retired four-star admiral and are assisted by associate fellows drawn from the classes of the War College and the Naval Postgraduate School and a staff of qualified analysts. 10   Naval Studies Board, National Research Council. 2000. Network-Centric Naval Forces: A Transition Strategy for Enhancing Operational Capabilities, National Academy Press, Washington, D.C.

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FORCEnet: Implementation Strategy without the use of local ports and airfields and by improving command and battlespace knowledge so as to multiply the power of sea-based forces through precise nodal targeting (in which timed firepower is focused on targets selected to have the greatest impact).11 SSG 18 expanded upon this effort and introduced what was termed Sea Strike, a concept for greatly increasing the volume and precision of sea-based firepower in the conduct of joint operations. To that end, this studies group drew heavily upon network-centric warfare concepts to increase and focus the flow of information to commanders and sea-based strike forces including Marines as part of a joint response.12 SSG 19 carried these network-centric solutions another step, with proposals for fully networking the naval Services into what was termed FORCEnet, which was to be an integral part of a larger and also fully networked joint force. It also proposed extending this structure to include a responsive expeditionary sensor grid.13 SSGs 20 and 21 then refined the concept and addressed how FORCEnet might be implemented, as well as how the Navy might select, educate, and train the 21st-century warriors who would operate the new networked Navy.14 In parallel with these activities, the CNO asked the Naval Studies Board to specifically examine a transition strategy for enhancing the operational effectiveness of naval forces through the application of network-centric operations. One result of the study carried out in response to that request is the following definition of network-centric operations: [Network-centric operations are] military operations that exploit state-of-the-art information and networking technology to integrate widely dispersed human decision makers, situational and targeting sensors, and forces and weapons into a highly adaptive, comprehensive system to achieve unprecedented mission effectiveness.15 The efforts summarized above—beginning with the … From the Sea white papers and continuing on through the efforts of five different SSGs and a CNO-requested study by the Naval Studies Board—are significant both because they 11   ADM James R. Hogg, USN (Ret.), Director, CNO Strategic Studies Group, personal communication, November 9, 2005. 12   ADM James R. Hogg, USN (Ret.), Director, CNO Strategic Studies Group, personal communication, November 9, 2005. 13   ADM James R. Hogg, USN (Ret.), Director, CNO Strategic Studies Group, personal communication, November 9, 2005. 14   ADM James R. Hogg, USN (Ret.), Director, CNO Strategic Studies Group, personal communication, November 9, 2005. 15   Naval Studies Board, National Research Council. 2000. Network-Centric Naval Forces: A Transition Strategy for Enhancing Operational Capabilities, National Academy Press, Washington, D.C., p. 1.

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FORCEnet: Implementation Strategy represent a revolutionary change from the naval Services’ traditional approach to naval warfare and because they embody a coherent direction in Navy thinking maintained through the tenure of two different Chiefs of Naval Operations and three different Commandants of the Marine Corps (CMC). These efforts also provide clear antecedents for ideas contained in the Navy’s current Sea Power 21 vision and in the Marine Corps Expeditionary Maneuver Warfare (EMW) vision as well as for potential naval roles in much of the currently emerging Joint Operating Concept. Most of all, however, they provide a clear context for FORCEnet and what it is to accomplish. 2.1.2 Sea Power 21: The Dimensions of the FORCEnet Challenge The Sea Power 21 vision of naval forces in the 21st century applies the sustained, decade-long evolution of Navy and Marine Corps thinking described above to a post–9/11 security environment “fraught with profound dangers: nations poised for conflict in key regions, widely dispersed and well-funded terrorist and criminal organizations, and failed states.”16 This environment, the Sea Power 21 vision contends, will produce frequent crises, often with little warning of timing, size, location, or intensity. Associated threats will be varied and deadly, including weapons of mass destruction, conventional warfare, and widespread terrorism. Future enemies will attempt to deny us access to critical areas of the world, threaten vital friends and interests overseas, and even try to conduct further attacks against the American homeland. These threats will pose increasingly complex challenges to national security and future warfighting.17 To provide the needed “Joint Capabilities”18 to deal with this new, still-changing, and complex security environment, Admiral Vern Clark, Chief of Naval Operations, proposed a Navy vision that rests on three pillars: Sea Basing, Sea Strike, and Sea Shield. These Navy pillars are supplemented by the Marine Corps’s EMW, with all of the operational constructs enabled by the network-centric-operations thinking and capabilities embodied in FORCEnet and, by extension, the still-evolving overall joint network. FORCEnet, Sea Basing, Sea Strike, and Sea Shield are, in turn, supported by three additional concepts: Sea Trial, Sea Warrior, and Sea Enterprise, which will provide the development, personnel, and acquisition underpinnings to carry out the Sea Power 21 initiative. 16   ADM Vern Clark, USN. 2002. “Sea Power 21 Series, Part I: Projecting Decisive Joint Capabilities,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, October, p. 1. 17   ADM Vern Clark, USN. 2002. “Sea Power 21 Series, Part I: Projecting Decisive Joint Capabilities,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, October, p. 3. 18   ADM Vern Clark, USN. 2002. “Sea Power 21 Series, Part I: Projecting Decisive Joint Capabilities,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, October, p. 1.

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FORCEnet: Implementation Strategy 2.1.2.1 The Three Pillars: Sea Basing, Sea Strike, and Sea Shield Sea Basing. Sea Basing will provide the increased seaborne ability to protect, project, and support forces that was intimated in the … From the Sea white papers. The sea base is not a place or a unit but an assembly of capabilities that expands and contracts to match the requirements of the joint forces commander. Naval forces operating from dispersed locations using networked command-and-control structures will interface with naval shore facilities and set up strategic pipelines to support joint forces. As conditions change, the sea base provides the joint commander the ability to reconstitute forces at sea and redeploy them to exploit opportunities. Sea Strike. Sea Strike will enable the Joint Force Commander to project decisive offensive power from the sea base. The projection of offensive power will be through the delivery of joint fires with increased range, lethality, accuracy, and timeliness from aircraft, ships, submarines, unmanned vehicles, and ground forces. Improved strike operations will be enabled by FORCEnet through the fusing of information from naval, joint, national, and multinational sensors and other sources. FORCEnet will create information networks with new levels of connectivity and integration, which will provide common and constant data throughout the force so as to permit offensive operations at the time and location of the Joint Force Commander’s choosing. Sea Shield. Sea Shield will produce an integrated, layered global defensive posture for joint forces operating in the littorals and at sea. Upon arrival in a region, naval forces will dominate the region’s air, surface, subsurface, and cyberspace environments. Naval forces will provide this sustainable protective posture through a networked, distributed force that includes the deployment of air and missile defensive capabilities as well as surface, subsurface, land, and mine countermeasure assets. 2.1.2.2 Marine Corps Overarching Concepts of Operations Expeditionary Maneuver Warfare. Paralleling the Navy’s Sea Power 21 pillars is the Marine Corps concept of EMW. This concept describes how the Marine Corps will conduct operations within the complex, post–9/11 environment—a shift from reliance on the quantitative characteristics of warfare (mass and volume) to a realization of the importance of qualitative factors (speed, stealth, precision, and sustainability). Operating from the sea, Marines will maneuver to achieve decisive effects, concentrating forces at critical points to achieve surprise, shock, and momentum.

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FORCEnet: Implementation Strategy 2.1.2.3 The Enabler—FORCEnet FORCEnet will blend the traditional domains of operations, intelligence, and logistics and will enable adaptable and intuitive command-and-control architectures and systems to increase the speed of decisions and actions. It will provide capabilities that are fully interoperable with joint forces and will provide the Joint Force Commander flexible, adaptive options with which to address the uncertain challenges of the future. 2.1.2.4 The Supporting Concepts Sea Trial. Sea Trial is the process of innovation designed to transition naval forces toward rapid, precise, and responsive network-centric operations through the development of concepts and technology that will deliver enhanced capabilities to the fleet. Sea Trial will deliver warfighting capabilities by experimentation, integrating concepts, technologies, and emerging information age capabilities at the fleet level. It will identify candidates with the best potential to provide the greatest enhancement to warfighting, with candidate technologies and concepts to meet fleet requirements matured through spiral development with targeted investment and rapid prototyping. Sea Warrior. Sea Warrior is the Navy’s commitment to the growth and development of personnel to operate the network-centric fleet of the 21st century. The process begins with an improved selection and classification of recruits and carries on through a life-long continuum of learning. Information age advancements of interactive and Web-based learning will provide for self-paced, progressive skill development and for the maintenance of skill levels in a rapidly changing environment so that all sailors are optimally trained, educated, and assigned. Sea Enterprise. Sea Enterprise addresses the challenge of resourcing tomorrow’s fleet through improved organizational alignment, redefined requirements, and reinvested savings to buy the capabilities needed to transform the Navy. Combining past experience with information age practices and systems, the Navy will streamline organizations and divest noncore functions so as to enhance current operations and increase the investment in future warfighting capabilities. 2.1.2.5 The Application Global Concept of Operations. All of the elements of the Sea Power 21 vision described above contribute to what is termed a Global Concept of Operations, which responds to the complex emerging security environment “with the ability to respond to a broad range of scenarios” so as “to sustain homeland defense, provide forward deterrence in four theaters, swiftly defeat two aggressors at the

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FORCEnet: Implementation Strategy same time, and deliver decisive victory in one of those theaters.”19 This concept of operations builds on FORCEnet to multiply the impact of naval forces by dispersing combat striking power into “independent operational groups capable of responding simultaneously around the world” to counter immediately any unexpected threats but capable of being “netted together for expanded warfighting effect.”20 It is important to note that the Sea Power 21 vision is not and cannot be static. It is neither a fixed objective nor a program, however vast, that can someday be completed. Rather it is an ongoing response to a dangerous and ever-changing set of national security challenges that seeks both to employ current capabilities in new ways and to introduce innovative capabilities as quickly as possible. As Admiral Clark notes: [The Sea Power 21 vision] requires us to continually and aggressively reach. It is global in scope, fully joint in execution, and dedicated to transformation. It reinforces and expands concepts being pursued by other services—long range strike; global intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance; expeditionary warfare; and light, agile ground forces—to generate maximum combat power from the joint team.21 2.2 DEFINITION OF FORCENET 2.2.1 One Definition, Two Elements The FORCEnet concept clearly lies at the center of Sea Power 21 and the Marine Corps’s EMW from two perspectives: that of providing the networking that the Sea Basing, Sea Strike, and Sea Shield concepts require for success and that of enabling both the Navy and the Marine Corps to deal flexibly with new challenges and to introduce new ideas and technologies into a continuing process of adaptation. The definition of FORCEnet laid out by the CNO and a succession of SSGs and endorsed by the CMC is as follows: [FORCEnet is] the operational construct and architectural framework for naval warfare in the information age that integrates warriors, sensors, networks, command and control, platforms, and weapons into a networked, distributed, com- 19   ADM Vern Clark, USN. 2002. “Sea Power 21 Series, Part I: Projecting Decisive Joint Capabilities,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, October, pp. 13-14. 20   ADM Vern Clark, USN. 2002. “Sea Power 21 Series, Part I: Projecting Decisive Joint Capabilities,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, October, p. 50. 21   ADM Vern Clark, USN. 2002. “Sea Power 21 Series, Part I: Projecting Decisive Joint Capabilities,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, October, p. 18.  

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FORCEnet: Implementation Strategy bat force that is scalable across all levels of conflict from seabed to space and sea to land.22 This definition is a clear point of departure for all FORCEnet implementation efforts: it is already widely used, and it is broad enough to encompass the two different aspects of future FORCEnet development: (1) its role as the key enabler for Sea Power 21 and especially for the Sea Basing, Sea Strike, and Sea Shield pillars and (2) its role in defining the infrastructure of the network-centric naval forces needed to carry out the promise of Sea Power 21 and the Global Concept of Operations. However, it is important to note that the definition points to FORCEnet as both “operational construct and architectural framework.” That is, two different elements and two distinct tasks are envisioned in FORCEnet: the tasks for the one element are to define and implement the operational construct; the tasks for the other element are to design and build the architectural framework that will enable that operational construct to work, and with it, the Global Concept of Operations and the Sea Basing, Sea Strike, and Sea Shield pillars of Sea Power 21. 2.2.1.1 The Operational Construct The operational construct for FORCEnet is in essence the concept of employment of FORCEnet for realizing network-centric operations and applying that concept to “naval warfare in the information age.”23 In this context, the operational construct is inseparable from the Sea Basing, Sea Strike, and Sea Shield pillars of Sea Power 21 for which it is the critical enabler. Moreover, in this same context FORCEnet both supports and is supported by the concepts contained in the Sea Warrior, Sea Trial, and Sea Enterprise initiatives. The operational construct of FORCEnet is very much in the domain of the naval forces’ operator and warfighter and is at the root of their efforts to integrate “warriors, sensors, networks, command and control, platforms and weapons”24 into concepts of operations that optimize each so as to generate the overwhelming effects from the sea that can be “decisive in peace and in war.”25 22   VADM Richard W. Mayo, USN; and VADM John Nathman, USN. 2003. “Sea Power 21 Series, Part V: ForceNet: Turning Information into Power,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, February, p. 42. 23   VADM Richard W. Mayo, USN; and VADM John Nathman, USN. 2003. “Sea Power 21 Series, Part V: ForceNet: Turning Information into Power,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, February, p. 42. 24   VADM Richard W. Mayo, USN; and VADM John Nathman, USN. 2003. “Sea Power 21 Series, Part V: ForceNet: Turning Information into Power,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, February, p. 42. 25   ADM Jay Johnson, USN. 1997. “Anytime, Anywhere,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, November, p. 50.

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FORCEnet: Implementation Strategy To this end, the operational construct for FORCEnet will need to be defined in terms of how the concepts and requirements of Sea Basing, Sea Strike, and Sea Shield are integrated into the desired FORCEnet capability. Further, both FORCEnet and these Sea Power 21 pillars will need to be defined in terms of how they apply to emerging joint concepts for, among other things, forcible entry, undersea warfare, sea basing, and effects-based operations and of how they might apply to multinational and coalition operations. Although it seems clear that FORCEnet will play a critical role in all of the concepts and operations described above, it is evident that the requisite concepts for operational employment have just begun to be developed. Moreover, the security environment to which these concepts must respond is very different from that of the Cold War and is likely to continue mutating in response to the operational requirements that will stem from ever-changing asymmetric challenges and from more traditional threats. This volatile and dangerous security environment was the driver for both the original SSG work and for the Sea Power 21 vision. Neither the volatility nor the danger of the world, and thus the pressure for continual adaptation by naval and joint forces, is likely to diminish in coming years. Given these strategic and operational drivers, Sea Basing, Sea Strike, and Sea Shield will require a continuous process of operational innovation in order to meet the challenges of new circumstances and new threats—sometimes on very short notice. The FORCEnet operational construct, therefore, will not be a fixed end state. Instead it will be a template that will change as operational requirements and the Sea Power 21 pillars themselves change. Accordingly, the starting operational construct must be broad enough to permit a continuing process of conceptual adaptation so as to meet the needs of operators and warfighters, and it must be flexible enough to enable this innovation to incorporate and build upon new technologies. This situation points to the need for a spiral of FORCEnet and Sea Power 21 concept development to be driven by the joint and naval operational demands sparked by changes in the security environment but enabled by changes in the technological environment, particularly in information, sensor, and weapons technologies. 2.2.1.2 The Architectural Framework The architectural framework of FORCEnet describes the networking, technology, and other infrastructure needed for network-centric operations by naval and joint forces. Although there has been a tendency to think of this framework solely in terms of an information infrastructure, it encompasses two distinct parts: (1) the information infrastructure and (2) the weapons, sensor, and command architectures. This two-faceted framework will of necessity have an acquisition focus and be described in terms of architecture and infrastructure. It must also have sufficient detail to permit the creation and execution of the programs needed

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FORCEnet: Implementation Strategy to create the evolving Sea Power 21 infrastructure. And, it must have sufficient flexibility to enable emerging strategic and operational needs to drive technology and program development. The role of FORCEnet in the operational construct described above implies a set of deliverables necessary to govern and implement the operational concept spiral and to support increasingly rapid and accurate decision making. When these deliverables are mature enough to provide an operational capability of sufficient utility to the operational forces to justify the cost, the deliverables are integrated into mission and engagement packs. The deliverables can be divided into two broad categories: (1) design and implementation requirements and (2) technology and systems to be provided: Design and implementation requirements Information infrastructure Network architecture Joint standards Design reference mission Common data packaging Weapons, sensor, and command architectures Modeling and simulation tools and experiments Seamless interoperability Strengthened security Sea Warrior training and education Fire control loops Technology and systems to be provided Information architecture Network management tools Information transport Operations and maintenance training facility Weapons, sensor, and command architectures Networked sensors/information and knowledge Analysis tools Decision aids Battle management systems, including a common operational picture. The list of specific systems and technologies required for FORCEnet implementation will evolve and change as both the technology and operational concepts and, with them, FORCEnet itself, change. This idea can be broadly described as a routine and continual information exchange between the operational construct and the architectural framework.

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FORCEnet: Implementation Strategy 2.2.2 Processes and Descriptive Items It should be noted that the discussion in this report indicates that FORCEnet—as concepts of employment and architectures—is composed of those processes and descriptive items that guide the implementation and realization of network-centric capabilities in the force rather than being the implemented components themselves. The implemented components are referred to using “FORCEnet” as a modifying term—for example, “the FORCEnet Information Infrastructure.” 2.3 DUAL-SPIRAL COEVOLUTION The definition of FORCEnet with its twin focuses of operational construct and architectural framework implies that the evolution of FORCEnet cannot be driven by changes in either of these elements alone. Instead, FORCEnet must reflect a coevolution of both the operational construct and the architecture. The concept of FORCEnet coevolution points to the need to integrate two different development spirals—one centered on the Sea Basing, Sea Strike, and Sea Shield pillars of Sea Power 21 and on all of the operational or nonmateriel aspects of FORCEnet, and the other centered on the technology and architectural aspects. If FORCEnet, EMW, and Sea Power 21 are to succeed, neither of these spirals can proceed independently. Rather, each must continually support, interact with, and inform the other so that the developments in one spiral can drive the evolution of the other cycle and vice versa. New operational requirements can then stimulate and focus new technology while new technology developments enable new operational solutions—an interaction as suggested in Figure 2.1. The innovation potential of the two spirals as well as the agility of both FORCEnet and Sea Power 21 in responding to the operational needs of a rapidly changing world security environment will derive from the interactions between the spirals. However, fostering these interactions poses a problem: each spiral, almost by definition, would be expected to proceed not only independently of the other but also at a different pace, posing a challenge akin to that of matching the spirals of a pair of still-gyrating Slinkies. This challenge suggests that it will be necessary to provide some framework in which the interactions can occur both on a regular basis and in response to specific demands. 2.3.1 Mission, Engagement, and Option Packs One possible framework for interactions between the development spirals might be based on a concept provided by SSG 22: a concept that the group termed engagement packs, an ongoing succession of specific FORCEnet component capabilities at the individual system level (for example, information displays) that apply emerging technologies to emerging warfighter needs but are part of

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FORCEnet: Implementation Strategy FIGURE 2.1 The concept of FORCEnet coevolution involves the integration of two development spirals: that of the operational concept and that of the infrastructure and technology. overall FORCEnet evolution.26 This concept might be expanded toward mission packs, broad sets of capabilities supporting major Sea Power 21 concepts such as Sea Basing; and toward options packs, which respond to urgent warfighter needs using only those military and civilian technologies immediately available off the shelf. However, a security environment of “frequent crises, often with little warning” and threats that are “varied and deadly”27 underline the need for an additional kind of interaction: generating immediate options from existing capabilities and technologies to deal with urgent warfighter needs, that is, capability options packs. These interactions between the conceptual and technological spirals can occur on multiple levels, from the tactical operational concepts or specific program or system level to the level of broad conceptual development. These considerations suggest a process in which there are three distinctly different kinds of interactions between the spirals. Each type of interaction is independent of the others but nonetheless contributing to the overall FORCEnet evolution, as illustrated in Figure 2.2. 26   ADM James R. Hogg, USN (Ret.), Director, CNO Strategic Studies Group, personal communication, November 9, 2005. 27   ADM Vern Clark, USN. 2002. “Sea Power 21 Series, Part I: Projecting Decisive Joint Capabilities,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, October, p. 3.

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FORCEnet: Implementation Strategy FIGURE 2.2 FORCEnet coevolution: interactions between dual development spirals. 2.3.1.1 Mission Packs At the level of the Sea Basing, Sea Strike, Sea Shield, and EMW concepts and the adaptation of joint and naval strategy and doctrine to security challenges emerging over the long term, the coevolutionary interaction would come in the form of mission packs. These packs would absorb the impact of broad sets of new technologies, systems, and processes from the materiel spiral on the FORCEnet concept development; they would also encompass new requirements for FORCEnet produced by an evolving operational spiral upon which technologies are pursued and would help determine how they are prioritized in the technology spiral. The mission packs would, therefore, reflect both the evolution of the concepts of Sea Basing, Sea Strike, Sea Shield, and EMW and their impact on the FORCEnet concept, together with the interaction between this evolution and the larger set of evolving joint operations concepts and strategies. For example, the FORCEnet technology and program needs for the implementation of Sea Basing might be expected to relate in part to how Sea Shield was used to protect sea-based forces and to the ways in which Sea Basing would support Sea Shield missions beyond simply protecting those forces. This relationship in turn would depend on how the Sea Basing and Sea Shield concepts figured in joint concepts for, among other things, joint forcible-entry operations and joint and coalition sea basing. And, these relationships would in turn be shaped by the requirements of the changing security environment, such as declining access to ports, airfields, and facilities in likely conflict areas, or by changes in national policy.

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FORCEnet: Implementation Strategy The mission packs would permit these broad questions to be considered in interrelated sets. The sets would respond to the security environment, would include a broad range of naval and joint and national factors, and would both drive the technology and materiel tasking and exploit existing advances in order to deal with emerging challenges more effectively. 2.3.1.2 Engagement Packs At the level of more-specific and midterm operational needs and of specific technologies and systems, the coevolutionary interaction might come in the form of engagement packs. These would cover a broad range of interactions, falling into two general types: Like the mission packs, engagement packs might look at an end-to-end problem area from two perspectives: that of the interaction of various warfare areas and that of the linkage of multiple, different technologies and systems to deal with that problem. For example, a problem of air and missile defense for sea-based forces would encompass many different platforms, sensor systems, and weapons and would consider solutions from many different technologies and systems. The engagement packs might also consider much more specific problems involving the application of one particular technology or system to a certain problem or capability. For example, they might consider the impact of improved information displays or decision aids on air defense. Both of these kinds of engagement packs would appear to fit well into the current Sea Trial process, while the first might work into an expanded process that perhaps included elements of war gaming. 2.3.1.3 Options Packs The object of the options packs is to provide sufficient agility in the dual-spiral development process to permit rapid adaptation of the concepts and technologies needed for meeting the ad hoc challenges and rapidly emerging threats that have become the hallmarks of the post–9/11 world security environment. The requirement to respond to emerging, urgent operational needs (e.g., for the detection and detonation of roadside bombs in Iraq) differs from the requirement to respond to needs addressed by mission and engagement packs in that the former entails finding an immediate and perhaps one-time solution, using only the assets and technologies at hand, whether from civilian industry or from government. Whereas the engagement packs fit well into the Sea Trial process, the options packs, as urgent reactions to real-world problems, would largely be proven in the field. Thus, a feedback process including lessons learned will be needed to ensure that operational-technical solutions of lasting value are captured, evalu-

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FORCEnet: Implementation Strategy ated in terms of their potential to support long-term concept or program development, and exploited as feasible. 2.4 FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 2.4.1 Findings Following are the findings of the committee from its considerations related to defining FORCEnet: The concepts embodied in Sea Power 21 and EMW, and especially in Sea Basing, are likely to be primary drivers in defining the operational requirements of the Navy and Marine Corps for the next 20 to 30 years. The Sea Power 21 vision is the Navy’s response to an altered world security environment, a response driven by a consistent, decade-long evolution of Navy–Marine Corps thinking that has transcended any one CNO, CMC, or administration. Since that altered security environment will continue to dictate joint and naval operational requirements for at least the next 20 to 30 years, Sea Power 21 and EMW or some close variants are likely to persist as the defining framework for naval operations. The impetus of the changed security environment is likely to be particularly strong in the case of Sea Basing because of its close link to emerging joint solutions and the requirements of national military strategy. FORCEnet is an integral part of the Navy–Marine Corps response to this security environment and the major enabler of both Sea Power 21 and EMW. Its development cannot be separated from the naval Services’ response to the changing security environment without losing FORCEnet’s coherence and relevance. The current definition of FORCEnet as promulgated by the CNO and successive SSGs is adequate as the point of departure for FORCEnet implementation, but further elaboration of the meaning of and distinction between the terms “operational construct” and “architectural framework” is needed. The current definition of FORCEnet is consistent with Sea Power 21 and EMW and with the direction of naval thought over the past decade, and it is broad enough to permit continued concept development in areas such as Sea Basing. It also offers room for amplification, for example, in the more precise definition of a network-centric architectural framework for the naval Services. The current definition is in such wide use that the introduction of any new definition would likely be confusing and potentially counterproductive. The set of requirements toward which FORCEnet must build is not and cannot be static. FORCEnet will never be completed. Rather, in its full scope FORCEnet could be considered to impact almost all aspects of the naval Services. Thus, FORCEnet will need to be able to offer an ongoing response to new operational requirements and technological possibilities that will change even as FORCEnet is implemented.

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FORCEnet: Implementation Strategy The security environment that both naval and joint concepts of operations address will continue to change, as will the threats and demands upon naval and joint forces. These changes will drive the further evolution of Sea Power 21 and EMW. Accordingly, Sea Basing, Sea Strike, Sea Shield, and FORCEnet are still evolving and must continue to evolve, as must the emerging joint concepts of operations. The technology base and infrastructure upon which the FnII will draw are likewise evolving as the ongoing, multifaceted technology revolution centered in civilian industry continues apace. The potential solution space for meeting requirements will, therefore, evolve as technologies and systems improve. The FORCEnet challenge is not to build toward a distant, fixed requirement, but to adjust to the inevitable changes in real-world requirements and to tap new technologies as they emerge. 2.4.2 Recommendations Based on the finding presented above and on the issues described in this chapter, the committee recommends the following. Recommendation for the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations (OPNAV), the Naval Network Warfare Command (NETWARCOM), and the Marine Corps Combat Development Command (MCCDC): Articulate better the meaning of the terms “operational construct” and “architectural framework” in the description of FORCEnet and indicate how FORCEnet implementation measures relate to each of these concepts. Recommendation for OPNAV, NETWARCOM, and MCCDC: Make clear that FORCEnet applies to the entire naval force and not just to its information infrastructure component. In so doing, the organizations should specifically indicate that the concepts of employment and the architectures developed must apply to the operation of the whole force and not just to its information infrastructure component. Recommendation for DON: Develop, maintain, and institutionalize FORCEnet coevolution along the development spirals of both the operational construct and the architectural framework. The development spirals of both the operational construct and the architectural framework need to interact regularly with one another if FORCEnet is to succeed. Mission, engagement, and options packs should be used to provide mechanisms for ensuring and exploiting interaction between the two development spirals.