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FORCEnet: Implementation Strategy 4 Coevolution of FORCEnet Operational Concepts and Materiel Simply grafting new technology to old processes will not work. To fully leverage the advantages technology brings, we must speed our process of innovation and co-evolve concepts, technologies, and doctrine.1 4.1 INTRODUCTION Chapter 2 introduced the notion of integrating spiral developments of operational constructs and materiel architecture and technology. The operational-construct spiral involves the coevolution of doctrine, organization, training, leadership and education, personnel and facilities (nonmateriel solutions), with changes in materiel to take advantage of emerging technology and dynamic challenges. However, the traditional process for the acquisition of large, capital-intensive systems—ships, submarines, aircraft, and spacecraft—so-called ACAT I programs,2 is a linear process dominated by large up-front investments in time and resources to ensure that the relatively small number of systems procured are the best and most cost-effective available at the time. That process can be summarized as follows:3 1 ADM Robert J. Natter, USN. 2003. “Sea Power 21 Series, Part VIII: Sea Trial: Enabler for a Transformed Fleet,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, November, p. 62. 2 The ACAT designations (I, II, III, and so on) are established for all the military Services by DOD Instructions 5000.1 and 5000.2 and their Service-specific supplements. 3 A useful review of the acquisition process for ships can be found in Robert S. Leonard, Jeffery A. Dreener, and Geoffrey Summers, 1999, The Arsenal Ship Acquisition Process Experience, RAND, Santa Monica, California.
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FORCEnet: Implementation Strategy FIGURE 4.1 Implementing FORCEnet. Conduct studies and experimentation to refine capability needs and potential solutions; Generate functional capability requirements and priorities; Gain approval of capabilities through the DOD budget; Establish the program, its governance, and its milestones; Conduct design and feasibility studies and establish the initial design; Award contracts for initial, low-rate production; and Reanalyze the design and contracting and award follow-on contracts for full production. The challenge in implementing FORCEnet is to make this linear process highly iterative and integrate it with concept development, as suggested by Figure 4.1. The authority for each of the three major FORCEnet implementation activities is indicated in the diagram: the CFFC for operational concept and requirements development; the ASN(RDA) for acquisition and engineering execution; and the OPNAV for program formulation and resource allocation. However, the responsibilities for these activities are even more distributed, as indicated in Tables 4.1 (“Navy FORCEnet Implementation Responsibilities”) and 4.2 (“Marine Corps FORCEnet Implementation Responsibilities”). Although some of this diffusion is required by law, successful implementation of FORCEnet will re-
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FORCEnet: Implementation Strategy TABLE 4.1 Navy FORCEnet Implementation Responsibilities Functional Area Organization Responsibilities Operational concepts CFFC Oversee concept development and experimentation (CD&E). Second Fleet Conduct CD&E for Sea Strike and Sea Basing. Third Fleet Conduct CD&E for Sea Shield. NETWARCOM Conduct CD&E for FORCEnet and ensure alignment with joint concepts. NWDC Coordinate CD&E. Requirements CFFC Lead development of fleet operational requirements. Second Fleet, Third Fleet Determine requirements for Sea Power 21 pillars and relate them to needed FORCEnet capabilities. NETWARCOM Determine FORCEnet requirements. Programs and resources OPNAV N6/N7 Validate and prioritize FORCEnet requirements for program development and coordinate with other warfare area sponsors. OPNAV N8 Assess programs for resourcing and requirements. Acquisition ASN(RDA) Oversee acquisition of all FORCEnet capabilities and ensure compliance with FORCEnet architecture. PEOs Oversee program execution in area of jurisdiction. CNR Oversee Navy science and technology development for FORCEnet capabilities. Engineering SPAWAR Develop FORCEnet architecture and function as FORCEnet chief engineer. NAVSEA, NAVAIR Develop architectures for Sea Power 21 pillars. PEOs Apply architectures in program execution. NOTE: Acronyms are defined in Appendix C. quire close coordination of and collaboration among these activities. This chapter examines the activities and the prospects for improving their coordination. 4.2 COEVOLUTION OF OPERATING CONCEPTS AND TECHNOLOGY INTO WARFIGHTING CAPABILITIES The enhanced capabilities of Sea Power 21 are made possible by the technical capabilities of the FnII and of the systems that it interconnects. More importantly, however, FORCEnet implementation requires the development of new operational processes—concepts of operations and tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs)—that take advantage of the new FnII capability if advances are to be achieved in the naval warfighting capabilities represented in Sea Strike, Sea Shield, Sea Basing, and EMW. Coevolution of technical-capabilities development and operational-concept development is the process by which change in one can be synchronized with change in the other.
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FORCEnet: Implementation Strategy TABLE 4.2 Marine Corps FORCEnet Implementation Responsibilities Functional Area Organization Responsibilities Operational concepts MCCDC, MCWL Oversee concept development and experimentation. Requirements MCCDC Lead long-term USMC requirements. Lead command element requirements. DCMC(PP&O) Lead ground combat element requirements. DCMC(Aviation) Lead aviation requirements. DCMC(I&L) Lead logistics and facilities requirements. Programs and resources DCMC(P&R) Serve as program and resource sponsor for all USMC programs. Acquisition ASN(RDA) Oversee acquisition of all FORCEnet capabilities. MARCORSYSCOM Oversee and execute all USMC programs. Engineering MARCORSYSCOM Conduct engineering development for USMC programs. NOTE: Acronyms are defined in Appendix C. With such coevolution, when improved capabilities are deployed, the operational concepts initially employed are those currently in existence that are most closely related to the new capability. The operational concepts are adjusted or changed only after experience with the new equipment is gained in the operational environment. For example, when the F/A-18 Hornet was first introduced to fleet operations in the post–Vietnam War era, flight profiles used in large-air-wing strike packages (known as Alpha strikes) required all strike aircraft, regardless of type, to rendezvous and fly together in a large formation to the target for mutual protection en route and to facilitate a coordinated, near-simultaneous attack. This worked reasonably well when the aircraft mix included A-6s, A-7s, and F-14s, because none suffered a significant performance (fuel) penalty for the air speeds and altitudes used en route to the target. Once the F/A-18 took the place of the A-7 in the strike formation, the operational concept for Alpha strikes had to change to allow the F/A-18s, for fuel efficiency, to fly a higher, faster flight profile than that of the A-6s and F-14s. Designating a fixed time on target provided the means for coordinating the attacks, while the F/A-18s flew a different speed and altitude profile to maximize aircraft performance. Just as introducing new capability stimulates change in operational concepts, changes in the operational environment can drive change as well. An example of such an interaction is found in the contrast between Operation Desert Storm and more recent operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. In Operation Desert Storm, air operations were scheduled via a serial process, the ATO, based on a 72-hour planning and execution cycle. Targets were picked early in the cycle and attacked in the last 24 hours of the cycle. Three 72-hour cycles ran concurrently, each
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FORCEnet: Implementation Strategy staggered from the next by 24 hours; thus, as target development was beginning for one, another was in the middle of ATO production, and the third was in execution on the same day. Except for close-air-support missions, specific targets were assigned ahead of time with the publication of the ATO, and they generally remained unchanged as aircrew and sortie assignments were made, flight plans were briefed, aircraft were manned and launched, and weapons were delivered in the execution phase of each 72-hour ATO cycle. The formality of the 72-hour ATO cycle works well against fixed targets in a war of attrition such as that accomplished by air operations in Desert Storm prior to the initiation of ground action. But the need for more flexibility became apparent with the initiation of Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan; in this conflict the operational environment initially precluded basing aircraft within reasonable distances of the targets, and the targets were more fugitive. Mission flight times during Operation Enduring Freedom increased by three to four times over those of Desert Storm, and targets were more transient. In many cases, special operations forces on the ground identified time-sensitive targets that required dynamic pairing of weapons to targets in real time—otherwise the opportunity was lost. To meet the need, the nature of the ATO changed to make more extensive use of a concept called flex targeting, in which some aircraft are launched without target assignments. This type of change in operating concept, brought about by a change in the operating environment, can have significant impact on the FnII capabilities that are needed. In this example, the location for the delivery to the aircrew of up-to-date battlefield intelligence and targeting information, including recent imagery, moves from the preflight briefing room on deck to the aircraft cockpit airborne somewhere en route to the target. The need for a means to receive—at over-the-horizon distances and display in usable form—the needed intelligence and targeting information places a new requirement on FnII. The foregoing examples involved new concepts for the use of already-deployed materiel. The coevolution of concepts and materiel may involve experimenting with prototypes so that the value of the combination of new materiel capabilities and concepts for their use can be evaluated as each is refined. The Navy has formalized this process under the name Sea Trial. Figure 4.2 is drawn from the instruction that describes the Sea Trial process. This process begins with the generation of concepts in response to warfare challenges, as discussed in the next section. 4.3 CONCEPT DEVELOPMENT 4.3.1 Concept Hierarchies The Navy’s approach to concept development, applied by the Concepts Development Department of NWDC in partnership with the fleet and the Marine
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FORCEnet: Implementation Strategy FIGURE 4.2 Notional Sea Trial capabilities development process. SOURCE: ADM Robert J. Natter, USN. 2003. “Sea Power 21 Series, Part VIII: Sea Trial: Innovation Enabler for a Transformed Fleet,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, November, p. 62. FIGURE 4.3 Naval concept hierarchy. SOURCE: Navy Warfare Development Command, Newport, R.I.
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FORCEnet: Implementation Strategy FIGURE 4.4 Marine Corps concept hierarchy. SOURCE: Marine Corps Combat Development Command, Quantico, Va. Corps, is shown in Figure 4.3. FORCEnet is shown as the enabling capability that spans every level of the concept hierarchy. The Marine Corps has a similar concept hierarchy, with the capstone concept EMW, as shown in Figure 4.4. The Naval Operating Concept flows from the vision of Sea Power 21 and the strategy of Sea Power 21 and Marine Corps Strategy 21, from which the supporting concepts are developed. Naval forces support the pillars of Sea Power 21 (Sea Shield, Sea Strike, and Sea Basing) through specific concepts as well as through traditional naval capabilities. Figures 4.3 and 4.4 reflect the FORCEnet-enabled capabilities for naval concepts. The Navy specifically intends to support the Sea Power 21 pillars through Mission Capability Packages (MCPs), listed in boxes in the subsections below, whereas the Marine Corps provides specific support to the MCPs in the form of embarked forces, fires, equipment, and capabilities. In addition, the Marine Corps provides general and specific support to Sea Power 21 pillars in the form of task-organized Marine Air-Ground Task Forces (MAGTFs). 4.3.2 Navy Concept Development NWDC coordinates concept development for the Navy, but the CFFC has assigned concept-development responsibility for the Sea Power 21 pillars to operational agents—the Second Fleet for Sea Strike and Sea Basing and the Third
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FORCEnet: Implementation Strategy Fleet for Sea Shield—and has assigned concept-development responsibility for FORCEnet to the NETWARCOM. Note that distinguishing FORCEnet from the Sea Power 21 pillars risks confining “FORCEnet concept development” to the FnII. Nevertheless, NETWARCOM is engaged in a collaborative effort with many other participants—the Navy War College, the NWDC, the Net-Centric Warfare Directorate of the DCNO for Warfare Requirements and Programs (N71, formerly N61),4 MCCDC, SPAWAR, numbered fleet commanders, and Warfare Centers of Excellence—to provide a functional-level concept that describes how future joint and combined network-centric capabilities may be used to facilitate and enhance naval operations in the 2015–2020 time frame. The functional concept for FORCEnet is intended to support the development process for FORCEnet transformational requirements, the development of the FORCEnet operational architecture, and CD&E. The FORCEnet concept is to evolve to serve as a coherent unifying concept that enables Sea Strike, Sea Shield and Sea Basing. As of this writing, a final draft for senior leadership review was planned for June 30, 2004.5 4.3.3 Marine Corps Concept Development Concept development in the Marine Corps is a continuing process. It occurs as the nature of warfare changes, trends are identified, capabilities are assessed, and concepts are written and requirements validated. The commanding general of MCCDC at Quantico, Virginia, is formally tasked with concept development for the Marine Corps. Although ideas and initiatives for concepts may originate from numerous sources, the Expeditionary Force Development Center at Quantico actually writes and publishes Marine Corps concepts. As shown in Figure 4.4, the Marine Corps has several types of concepts. EMW is the Marine Corps capstone concept. EMW is the union of core competencies, maneuver warfare philosophy, expeditionary heritage, and the concepts by which the Marine Corps organizes, deploys, and employs forces. Integrating concepts for MAGTF organizations are broad-based in nature and define capabilities, organizational structures, and force maneuver options. Operational concepts for Ship-to-Objective Maneuver are based on the Marine Corps warfighting philosophy of maneuver warfare: that is, seeking to shatter enemy cohesion through a series of rapid, violent, and unexpected actions that create turbulent and deteriorating situations with which the enemy cannot cope. Functional concepts 4 The Net-Centric Warfare Directorate is the program sponsor for space, naval, and shore communications, networks, command and control, intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance, and intelligence oversight. 5 Naval Network Warfare Command. 2004. White paper: “FORCEnet Concept Development,” Norfolk, Va., February 24.
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FORCEnet: Implementation Strategy BOX 4.1 The Four Naval Capability Pillars of Sea Power 21 and Their Mission Capabilities Sea Shield Sea Strike Sea Basing FORCEnet Force Protection Surface Warfare Undersea Warfare Theater Air and Missile Defense Strike Fire Support Maneuver Strategic Deterrence Deployment and Employment of Naval Forces Provision of Integrated Joint Logistics Pre-positioning of Joint Assets Afloat Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance Common Operational and Tactical Pictures Communications and Data Networks address capabilities in specific areas (such as logistics) and tend to be more technical than operational concepts are. Before being formally adopted, concepts are exposed to rigorous examination. As concepts are being developed, they are subject to war gaming, experimentation, modeling and simulation, tabletop seminars with subject-matter experts, Marine Corps Unit review, and operational evaluation by fleet forces. Core competencies are signature characteristics of Marines and the Marine Corps. 4.3.4 The Navy Pillar Concepts and Capabilities The Navy is in the process of further refining and defining operating concepts for the three Sea Power 21 pillars of Sea Shield, Sea Strike, and Sea Basing. The three pillars, together with FORCEnet, constitute the four Naval Capability Pillars (NCPs) (see Box 4.1). Each NCP is further divided into MCPs6 that relate to the broad missions that the NCP is to address (see the subsections below). Each MCP contains several specific capabilities that must be realized to some level in each deploying Joint Maritime Force Package.7 Note in Box 4.1 that the FORCEnet NCP comprises little more than the FnII. Even the Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) MCP does not include all ISR capabilities, many of which are organic to platforms in other NCPs. One consequence of this narrow definition of the FORCEnet NCP is to 6 The term “Mission Capability Package” has a different meaning in the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, as discussed in Section 4.5.1. 7 The composition of deployable force packages is discussed in VADM Michael Mullen, USN, 2003, “Sea Power 21 Series, Part VI: Global Concept of Operations,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, April.
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FORCEnet: Implementation Strategy narrow the role of the Naval Network Warfare Command, which is the FORCEnet operational agent, in devising concepts for network-centric operations. 184.108.40.206 Sea Shield The Sea Shield NCP has four Mission Capability Packages, which contain the capabilities listed in Box 4.2. The Sea Shield mission is to sustain access in contested littorals, to project defensive power from the sea, and to provide maritime defense for the homeland. The Commander of the Third Fleet, together with Commander of the Seventh Fleet, is assigned the responsibility for advancing Sea Shield capabilities. The Third Fleet command ship USS Coronado (AGF-11) hosts PACOM’s Joint Task Force for Experimentation and acts as the Navy’s sea-based battle laboratory to provide a venue for testing new concepts and technology. The defenses put in place under the Sea Shield pillar envision the use of large numbers of networked, distributed sensors and weapons. FORCEnet obviously has a major role in connecting all of the elements of Sea Shield. A draft document entitled “Sea Trial Concept Development Plan—Top Level Version 030213,” provided to the committee by the Commander of the Third BOX 4.2 Sea Shield Mission Capability Packages Force Protection Surface Warfare Undersea Warfare Theater Air and Missile Defense Protect against Special Operations Force and terrorist threats. Mitigate effects of chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and environmental threats. Provide self-defense against surface threats. Conduct offensive operations against surface threats. Provide self-defense against subsurface threats. Neutralize submarine threats in the littorals. Neutralize open-ocean submarine threats. Counter minefields from deep to shallow water. Breach minefields, obstacles, and barriers water to the beach exit zone. Conduct mining operations. Provide self-defense against air and missile threats. Provide maritime air and missile defense. Provide overland air and missile defense. Conduct sea-based missile from very shallow defense.
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FORCEnet: Implementation Strategy Fleet, contains an outline for Sea Shield in the three primary mission areas of Littoral Sea Control, Theater Air and Missile Defense, and Homeland Defense, each further subdivided as shown in Box 4.3. An additional “cut-and-paste” level of detail is provided in the document for each of the bullets given in Box 4.3. No further information on the plans for concept development beyond the list was provided. The lists for each warfare area provide insufficient detail and little indication of what Sea Shield will bring to naval warfare that is new or different in operational concepts from what has been the case historically, although homeland defense is a new area altogether in need of much development. 220.127.116.11 Sea Strike The Sea Strike NCP has four MCPs, which contain the capabilities shown in Box 4.4. The Sea Strike mission is to provide naval power projection focused on offense using both lethal and nonlethal means. The Commander, Second Fleet, in conjunction with the Commander, Fifth Fleet and the Commander, Sixth Fleet, has responsibility for the Sea Strike pillar. Sea Strike capabilities rely on the infrastructure and functionality provided by FORCEnet for command and control and on the ability to transform sensor data and information into actionable knowledge for targeting, maneuver, and strike. The Second Fleet developed the “Fleet Required Capabilities List for Sea Strike” that includes the following: Command and control (C2) and C4ISR interoperability; ISR data links to ships; Support tools for naval fires; Information operations targeting; Unmanned vehicles; Time-sensitive targeting; Jam-resistant technology for weapons guided using the Global Positioning System; Tactical decision aids for efficiently and effectively conducting operations including two or more warfare areas at once (e.g., antiair and antisubmarine warfare); and Portable and expendable shipboard-launched air targets. Each of these areas implies the need for some combination of materiel and nonmateriel solution. The Second Fleet has responsibility for identifying and developing nonmateriel approaches where possible, to achieve the required capability. In several of the areas listed the overlap with NETWARCOM responsibilities for FORCEnet is obvious, in that FORCEnet capability will be required to support the fielding of the capability prescribed by the Second Fleet for Sea Strike. Whatever the interaction between the Commander, Second Fleet and
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FORCEnet: Implementation Strategy year, culminates in a set of joint approved system requirements and priorities being delivered by N8. The N8 then compares the priorities from the N6/N7 against the Navy’s available resources and works closely with the CNO to develop the POM, the DON prioritized budget request submitted to OSD. The ASN(RDA) reviews acquisition program budget changes and new starts during the process to ensure that programs can be certified executable at the programmed levels. Typically, the POM is provided to the DOD about a year before it is anticipated to be voted on by Congress. This year is spent in close discussions with the Congress and the President to develop and pass a final budget. 4.6 PROGRAM ACQUISITION Once Congress has approved funding for a new start, the ASN(RDA) is able to establish a program office and direct the acquisition of the desired technology or capability. (Note that about 2 years have passed since the need was first identified by the fleet.) The ASN(RDA) and staff, and the Deputy Assistant Secretaries of the Navy, typically work through and with the various naval systems commands and program executive offices to design the acquisition strategy needed to meet the need, and to generate the specifications necessary to develop, acquire, and support the needed capability. This process involves not only additional design and feasibility studies, but also work with potential industrial suppliers to ensure that a cost-effective system can be procured. The process requires the development of numerous documents, plans, studies and assessments, mandated by oversight organizations, prior to the release of a request for proposals (RFP). The development of these documents alone can take an additional year or more. One drawback to this stage is that often the offices establishing the original need (the fleet and the DCNOs) are not included in the acquisition stage. This has led to a concern over how the fleet and DCNOs can more effectively ensure that their needs will be met during the final acquisition stage. As noted, this current process typically takes several years from concept definition to release of an RFP for procurement. The source selection process itself will take another year before a contract can be awarded for beginning to develop the needed capability. Even after no less then six recent acquisition reforms, the time from identified need to contract award is longer than the time to design, build, and deliver a commercial off-the-shelf (COTS)-based capability. This amount of time has been acceptable for large systems (ships, aircraft, spacecraft, and the like), for which basic research or extensive development is required. However, it is not responsive to mission needs that can be satisfied by existing computer-driven technologies in which systems (software and hardware) can go from state of the art to nearly obsolete in the span of a few years. The NMCI program short-circuited this lengthy process by buying a service versus a system. The time from validation of the need by the Secretary of the
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FORCEnet: Implementation Strategy Navy (SECNAV), CNO, and CMC to contract award was less than 1 year. The NMCI program was executed by a PEO empowered by both the acquisition community (ASN(RDA)) and the requirements community (CNO/CMC) to make it happen. The requirement was a one-page document that sufficed because the PEO had representatives on his staff from the requirements community to help develop the procurement specification, and the ultimate users of the capability participated fully in the acquisition and source-selection process. The only impediments hampering speed to capability were oversight organizations external to DON, and even they moved with unprecedented vigor. DOD 5000 series16 policy changes and perhaps legislation would be required to implement this approach for a product versus a service. Since the complaint about speed to capability is long-standing, perhaps it is time to press for the required system changes and accept the increased risk. However, the applicability of the NMCI model to FORCEnet is limited. One cannot buy all of the elements that contribute to FORCEnet combat power as a commercial service. Although commercial information technology can make substantial contributions to the FnII, many commercial products assume that the networks on which they ride have continuous high-capacity connectivity—a capability hard to maintain in combat, particularly to ships at sea and dismounted riflemen. 4.7 ENABLING TIMELY AND EFFECTIVE COEVOLUTION The timely and effective coevolution of FORCEnet will require improvements in the three processes shown in Figure 4.1 at the beginning of this chapter (operational concept and requirements development, acquisition and engineering execution, and program formulation and resource allocation) and in the interactions represented by the arrows in that diagram. The material that follows first discusses those activities individually and then discusses the interactions among them. 4.7.1 Improving the Activities The committee observed that the Sea Power 21 operational agents devoted relatively little time to concept formulation. New concepts can inspire the technical community to explore and prototype new capabilities, and an active concept formulation activity would be alert to new technical capabilities and would be devising new concepts to exploit them and experiments to evaluate them. Devoting more resources to concept development would likely be the activity that 16 The 5000 series were the Department of Defense’s acquisition process regulations at the time of the Navy-Marine Corps Intranet actions described. These regulations are in the process of being superseded by a capabilities-based process.
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FORCEnet: Implementation Strategy would accelerate progress in the CFFC’s arena (see Figure 4.1) of operational concept and requirements development. Some committee members, impressed by the resources of the Pacific Fleet and by the operational insights that the fleet has gained from its mission, believe that this fleet could contribute substantially to concept development and exploitation. A major limitation of the OPNAV process is the separation of the FnII from the other Naval Capability Packages in the NCDP. This separation causes FnII components to compete for funding with the sensors, weapons, and platforms that they empower. A better approach would be to evaluate the combination of weapons, sensors, platforms, and FnII components that constitute a mission thread. FORCEnet engagement packs could be constructs for such evaluations. The process would be significantly improved if the simulation tool limitations discussed in Section 4.5.1 above were overcome.17 All acquisition activity is conducted under the authority of the ASN(RDA). In this capacity, the ASN(RDA) oversees the program executive officers, program managers, systems commands, and ONR. In January 2004, the ASN(RDA) led the first meeting of the FORCEnet Executive Committee (EXCOMM) to address FORCEnet implementation issues. The subjects treated included establishing a FORCEnet implementation baseline and redirecting some current-year funds to support FORCEnet objectives. The decisions and actions of the EXCOMM represent a good start in addressing FORCEnet implementation issues, demonstrating a focus on the future and communicating an urgency for FORCEnet implementation. The meeting, however, had only very limited attendance from the fleet commands; greater senior-level representation of that perspective would aid coordination across all functional areas denoted in Table 4.1 in this chapter. The committee identified two other opportunities for improving the acquisition process. One, discussed in detail in Chapter 5, would be the promulgation of an architecture that guides functional partitioning and simplifies the integration of new capabilities. The other would be the introduction of some flexibility in the acquisition process. Today, PEOs presented with specifications and budgets strive for many years to align schedules to meet those specifications, irrespective of what has happened to other acquisitions or to the emergence of new operational constructs and technological opportunities. Keeping the elements of the total FORCEnet synchronized and responding to emerging threats and opportunities requires the ability to change program goals and to reallocate funding among programs without going through the protracted process presently required for major programs. 17 The mission thread analysis planned in conjunction with the FORCEnet baseline assessment could represent a start of the necessary analyses.
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FORCEnet: Implementation Strategy Some of the needed flexibility may be attainable by administrative action, but it may be necessary to importune Congress to appropriate a mission thread as a unit and permit the Navy more flexibility in allocating those funds among the components that constitute the thread. 4.7.2 Improving Coordination Beyond improving the three activities designated in Figure 4.1 themselves, there is a need and an opportunity to improve coordination among the activities. As just mentioned, there is no senior fleet representation on the ASN(RDA)’s EXCOMM; that inclusion would improve coordination between the fleet and the acquisition community. More collaborative interaction between the fleet and OPNAV, including the sharing of simulation tools among them, could reduce the dissonance between their respective priority lists. OPNAV should not just pass funded requirements to the acquisition community and wait passively for products to emerge years later. Instead, there should be continuous interaction so that progress in materiel development can be calibrated against changing threats and operational concepts for dealing with them. 4.8 GOVERNANCE Achieving FORCEnet capabilities will require extraordinary process coordination and integration in order to be successful. To oversee this process, the committee believes that a single organization or decision maker may be necessary—one having the mandate and the authority to align inputs across warfighters, technologists, and numerous functional specialists into a coherent, requirements trade-off process. Such an oversight authority would thus need to report to both the CNO on issues of requirements generation, resourcing, concepts of operations, training, and the like; and to the ASN(RDA) on issues related to system prototyping, contracting, procurement, and production. 4.8.1 Naval Nuclear Propulsion Model One model for FORCEnet oversight may be Naval Nuclear Propulsion (NNP). NNP provides a service (nuclear power) to the carrier and submarine communities and so must be responsive to the needs of these communities and must coordinate reactor development time lines to match those of the other ship components. NNP is also responsible for all nuclear power plant concepts of operations, requirements generation, acquisition, R&D, training, and experimentation of naval nuclear reactors. Given NNP’s broad roles, its director is given a unique, 8-year term. This long-term awareness and continuous tracking of all relevant activities by the director has been described by many in the Navy as critical to the success and consistency of NNP in producing reliable and useful
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FORCEnet: Implementation Strategy power plants of the complexity necessary to meet the Navy’s needs. Another strength of NNP has been the availability of highly competent technical support organizations. Although the committee agrees that these two characteristics—leadership continuity and competent technical support—are needed for FORCEnet, it also notes that significant differences exist between FORCEnet and nuclear propulsion. For one, NNP’s mandate is over the power plant, while FORCEnet has the potential to impact every individual in the naval Service. NNP was able to start from scratch (no nuclear reactors existed in the Navy before the office was created), whereas any FORCEnet oversight authority will have to spend significant effort aligning legacy systems and existing initiatives. 4.8.2 Future Combat System Model The Army’s FCS is comparable in scope to FORCEnet in that its materiel aspects include platforms, weapons, and sensors, as well as the equipment that networks them. The Army’s approach to the FCS was to compile a detailed performance specification and then to select a systems integration contractor to which it granted authority exceeding that usually granted to a prime system contractor. The integration contractor decomposes the performance specification into systems, acquires them, and, after they are delivered, will integrate them into the FCS. The committee expresses little enthusiasm for applying the FCS model to FORCEnet. The FCS model presumes a fixed end state that can be described by a system specification, and it appears to make little provision for the coevolution of concepts and materiel capabilities. 4.8.3 Programs-Acquisitions Coordination Board Recognizing that authority over acquisitions is vested in the ASN(RDA) and that authority over programs and resources is vested in OPNAV, another option for managing process coordination and integration calls for the formation of a Programs-Acquisitions Coordination Board, co-chaired by the Vice Chief of Naval Operations (VCNO) and the ASN(RDA) to synchronize and coordinate FORCEnet activities in both their domains.18 Because of the broad scope of FORCEnet, the scope of this board would be tantamount to that of a General Board. The Programs-Acquisitions Coordination Board would have support from a dedicated staff in OPNAV and the office of the ASN(RDA) to monitor events in 18 Including the Commander, Fleet Forces Command, or Commander, Naval Network Warfare Command, on the board could resolve the differences between the requirements priorities of the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations and the fleet.
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FORCEnet: Implementation Strategy both domains and to present issues to the board. The board would meet regularly, and the staff would work issues on a daily basis. The executive secretary of the board, a flag officer or senior executive service equivalent, should have tenure longer than the 2 to 3 years typical for flag assignments. The Naval Studies Board committee that 5 years ago considered the challenges of realizing network-centric capabilities made a similar recommendation in its report.19 4.8.4 Director of FORCEnet Although most of the committee believes the Programs-Acquisitions Coordination Board to be superior to the two previous options—the Naval Nuclear Propulsion or the FCS model—some are pessimistic about the forcefulness of a board. They would prefer to give the responsibility for synchronizing and coordinating all of these activities to a single individual, the director of FORCEnet, an O-9 or O-10 who would serve longer than the typical 2- or 3-year term. Because of Goldwater-Nichols requirements, the director of FORCEnet would report to the ASN(RDA) for acquisitions matters and to the CNO or VCNO for other matters. The director of FORCEnet would be supported by the same staff that the Programs-Acquisitions Coordination Board would have. Because all PEOs must by law report directly to the ASN(RDA), DON’s senior acquisition executive, the director of FORCEnet, would not have line authority over the PEOs. However, if the ASN(RDA) followed the advice of the director of FORCEnet, or if the CNO/VCNO gave the director of FORCEnet control of the funds on which the PEOs depend, the director would have sufficient authority over the PEOs20 to assure that all materiel was acquired in conformance with the FORCEnet architecture. However, giving the director of FORCEnet such wide control over funds might seem to be usurping the authority of the N6/N7 and N8. 4.8.5 Synthesis The committee agrees that a mechanism is needed to synchronize OPNAV’s program responsibilities and the ASN(RDA)’s acquisitions responsibilities. It 19 Naval Studies Board, National Research Council. 2000. Network-Centric Naval Forces: A Transition Strategy for Enhancing Operational Capabilities, National Academy Press, Washington, D.C., p. 7. 20 Some committee members suggest that the problem could be largely solved by merging the PEOs for Integrated Warfare Systems, for Information Technology, and for Command, Control, Communications, and Information into a “super-PEO” led by the director of FORCEnet. There would remain the need to give the director sufficient authority over the PEO for Submarines, PEO for Air, and so on, in order to assure their conformity to the FORCEnet architecture.
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FORCEnet: Implementation Strategy recommends either the creation of the Programs-Acquisitions Coordination Board or the appointment of a senior director of FORCEnet reporting both to the CNO or VCNO and to the ASN(RDA). However, the committee does not have unanimity as to the relative desirability of these two options. Some members believe that boards are not effective and that a strong director of FORCEnet is the only workable option. Others believe that the options are equivalent, because full empowerment of the director would be impractical, and he or she would be relying on the authority of the VCNO and the ASN(RDA), who would be the co-chairs of the board if there were one. All members of the committee agree that the strength and continuity of the director of FORCEnet or the chief of staff of the Programs-Acquisitions Coordination Board are essential factors for success in implementing FORCEnet, as is the quality of the staff support to the director of FORCEnet or the Programs-Acquisitions Coordination Board. 4.8.6 Oversight by the Chief of Naval Operations Whatever governance mechanism emerges to coordinate and integrate FORCEnet-related activities, means are needed to keep a fleet perspective in monitoring and accelerating the deployment of new capabilities. Logically, the CFFC would be responsible for reporting to the CNO both on the development of operational constructs and on the effectiveness of materiel being deployed to support these constructs. By periodically setting goals for new operational capabilities, the CNO could provide oversight to the development of both constructs and technical capabilities. A CNO-driven, annually revised master plan with goals stated in terms of operational capabilities to be realized in the near term would motivate all parties. 4.9 FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 4.9.1 Findings Following are the committee’s findings with respect to the three major FORCEnet implementation activities—operational concept and requirements development, program formulation and resource allocation, and acquisition and engineering execution—and the prospects for improving their coordination. Coevolution using the dual-spiral approach for the development of the operational construct and architecture of FORCEnet provides positive opportunities for interaction between operators and acquirers as a means to validate solutions for FORCEnet capability needs and gaps. Coevolving technology with concepts, doctrine, and other nonmateriel solutions through greater interaction among users and developers can speed the delivery of improvements in warfighting capabilities to the fleet.
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FORCEnet: Implementation Strategy However, very little detail has been developed articulating new operational concepts—only limited descriptive material and certainly nothing with the sort of detail typically found in operational architectures.21 This fact is most likely a consequence of the very limited resources committed to this area. The Second and Third Fleets devote only a few people part time to concept development for the three Sea Power 21 pillars. NETWARCOM appears to have a larger, although still small, commitment of resources to FORCEnet concept development. Interaction between the pillars and FORCEnet as the enabler is very limited. Representatives of the organizations mentioned, especially the Second and Third Fleets, indicated that these limited commitments were a consequence of the many demands (e.g., maintaining readiness) placed on these organizations. All organizations indicated a serious commitment to experimentation, although generally one of modest scope. The Second Fleet has been active in exploring the use of prototype equipment, the Third Fleet has a history of experimentation centered on the USS Coronado command ship, and NETWARCOM is conducting the Trident Warrior series of exercises, with its experimentation thus focusing largely on the FnII. The CFFC has underscored the importance of experimentation by issuing a new experimentation instruction (CFFC Instruction 3900.1A for Sea Trial). Furthermore, the CFFC reduced the number of the large fleet battle experiments to allow more of the smaller, limited objective experiments, which should promote greater exploration and innovation. The Sea Trial instruction promotes greater Navy-wide interaction, thereby potentially bringing more ideas and resources to experiments. At the same time, though, this instruction establishes greater centralized control in approving experiments, which could stifle the very innovation that experimentation seeks to promote. NETWARCOM has an active program for the development of FORCEnet requirements, drawing widespread community participation though its Operational Advisory Group. It does not use any formal analytical methods to relate the requirements to warfighting effectiveness, relying rather on the collective judgment of the group. The Second and Third Fleets demonstrate only very limited requirements development for the three Sea Power 21 pillars of Sea Shield, Sea Strike, and Sea Basing. While fleet FORCEnet requirements lists have been made, very little interaction of the three pillars with FORCEnet is evident. This limited work is most likely a consequence of limited resources, as described above for operational concepts development. The NCDP used by OPNAV for formulating and prioritizing programs in response to fleet requirements has not fully explored the interactions between the 21 In March 2004, after the cutoff date for new input to this study, the Naval Network Warfare Command initiated an effort to develop a FORCEnet operational concept, which could provide a more detailed product.
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FORCEnet: Implementation Strategy FnII and other FORCEnet components and may have led to a competition between the FnII and the other components that it empowers. The modeling and simulation tools used in program assessment are less than ideal, although deficiencies are recognized and efforts to ameliorate some of them are contemplated. Resourcing of programs takes place years after the need for them has been recognized, and program managers have insufficient flexibility to respond quickly to changes in threats or to new concepts or technological opportunities. The need for more flexibility is particularly acute with respect to the FnII because of the rapid pace of technology advancement. The influence of the fleet and OPNAV is greatly diminished once a program enters acquisition. If the coevolution of FORCEnet concepts and technology is to be effective, tighter coupling is needed among the activities depicted in Figure 4.1, and mechanisms are needed to accelerate speed to capability. 4.9.2 Recommendations Based on the findings presented above and on the issues described in this chapter, the committee recommends the following: Recommendation for NETWARCOM, and the Second and Third Fleets especially: Devote significantly more resources to concept development. The criticality of concept development to the overall realization of FORCEnet capabilities certainly requires this increase. The committee recommends that CFFC determine whether the increased resources would come by reassigning personnel already assigned to the organizations or by request to the CNO for additional personnel. Recommendation for the CNO: Assign the Pacific Fleet greater direct responsibility in Sea Power 21 concept development. This action would apply the sizable resources and operational experience of Pacific Fleet to help redress the current limitations in resources devoted to concept development. The action would also help strengthen the joint aspects of concept development through Pacific Fleet’s relation with PACOM. Recommendation for CFFC: Ensure that NETWARCOM plays as broad a role in FORCEnet concept development and experimentation as possible—not just limited to the use of the FnII. This is consistent with NETWARCOM’s charter and reflects the fact that FORCEnet involves forcewide capabilities. Recommendation for CFFC: Ensure that the centralized management processes of the new Sea Trial instruction do not stifle innovation. Local initiative is critical to innovation. The Sea Trial management mechanisms should concern themselves with setting broad guidelines and resource allocations within which individual elements in the Navy would be free to innovate. Every experiment, no matter how small, should not require approval by a centralized committee, as would appear to be the case with the new Sea Trial instruction.
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FORCEnet: Implementation Strategy Recommendation for NETWARCOM: Develop analytical means for the development and prioritization of requirements. This would allow requirements to be tied better to warfighting effectiveness and would thereby better support these requirements in the resource-allocation process. Recommendation for the Second and Third Fleets: Devote more resources to the development of requirements for the three Sea Power 21 pillars. Needed capabilities for the pillars must be adequately specified in order to determine the necessary FORCEnet capabilities. Means to obtain these resources would be addressed by reassigning personnel already assigned to the organizations or by request to the CNO for additional support. Recommendation for the N6/N7 and N8: Develop resource-allocation methods directed at realizing forcewide FORCEnet capabilities. Instead of basing the methods on the current Naval Capability Packages, the Navy should instead use “packages” that inherently reflect network-centric operational concepts. FORCEnet Engagement Packs provide one such example. Recommendation for the N6/N7 and N8: Develop (or acquire) modeling and simulation tools that allow faster exploration of scenarios and better measurement of the effects and limitations of information availability and network connectivity in warfare. This will not be an easy task since such tools are in their infancy, but the Navy should be a proponent for the development of these tools. Recommendation for the ASN(RDA): Take action to include senior members of the fleet commands in the deliberations of the FORCEnet EXCOMM. Their perspective in general would be useful. In particular, the actions necessary to implement FORCEnet capabilities in a fixed-resource environment could impact near-term fleet readiness and should be accomplished in partnership with fleet representatives. Recommendation for the ASN(RDA): Explore methods for increasing flexibility in resource allocation. One approach for doing so is to aggregate program line items into larger line items, including the possibility of establishing a few major lines referring to FORCEnet capabilities (e.g., for implementation of the FnII or for the systems engineering required across the entire fleet). The Navy, in conjunction with the other military Services, could also consider approaching Congress to relax the limit on reallocating program funds. A strong argument for this authority could be made on the basis of the current need to field systems of systems, in contrast to the previous focus on individual systems. Recommendation for the ASN(RDA): Review Navy acquisition processes and practices and institute educational measures as necessary, to ensure that programs are providing as rapid a delivery of capability as possible. For example, financial practices could be reviewed to determine means for emphasizing rapid capability delivery while maintaining accountability, and execution instructions could be reviewed to ensure that there is adequate delegation of authority.
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FORCEnet: Implementation Strategy Recommendation for the SECNAV, in conjunction with the CNO and the ASN(RDA): Develop a means to integrate more closely the Navy’s program-formulation and acquisition functions, to ensure that adjustments in program execution are consistent with program intent and best serve the overall need of providing forcewide FORCEnet capability. Options to consider include establishing (1) a Programs-Acquisitions Coordination Board co-chaired by the VCNO and the ASN(RDA) or (2) a director of FORCEnet reporting to the VCNO and ASN(RDA). This recommendation envisions that the board or director (depending on which was chosen) would have a major role in carrying out the other recommendations pertaining to program formulation and resource allocation and to acquisition and engineering execution. Recommendation for the CNO: Charter the CFFC to provide periodic assessments of the state of realizing FORCEnet capabilities. The review would include the following: the status and plans for concept development and experimentation for each of the Sea Power 21 pillars and FORCEnet, the current understanding of the set of capabilities required in the fleet, recommended changes in programs to align them better with this set of capabilities, and opportunities for employing acquisition prototypes in naval and joint experiments and exercises. NETWARCOM would provide the staff support to the CFFC in preparing this assessment. Recommendation for the CNO, in conjunction with the ASN(RDA): Establish a set of FORCEnet goals to be realized by specified dates in order to drive the implementation process. Examples of these goals include the provision of specified bandwidth increases and networking capabilities to the fleet, the achievement of designated joint maritime and air situational-awareness capabilities, and the achievement of FORCEnet compliance (or phaseout) for a specified set of legacy systems. Goals could also be of a directly operational nature—for example, the ability to destroy a given class of targets within a stated number of minutes after the targets emerge from hiding. Recommendation for the CNO, in conjunction with the ASN(RDA): Direct the preparation of an annual FORCEnet master plan for their review. The plan should lay out milestones—with an emphasis on near-term deliverables—for obtaining key FORCEnet capabilities in terms of operational concepts and systems deployment. The purpose of this plan would be to ensure senior visibility and scrutiny of FORCEnet activities and consequent motivation for conducting these activities.
Representative terms from entire chapter: