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Science and Technology Issues in
National and Homeland Security
SUMMARY
Keeping a technological edge over adversaries of the United States has
long been a key component of our national security strategy. US preemi-
nence in science and technology (S&T) is considered essential to achieving
that goal, so throughout the Cold War the United States generously funded
research and development, including basic research, that could contribute
to national security. Since 1950, “defense” funding has been the largest
component of the overall federal R&D budget, and it has been a majority
of that funding since fiscal year (FY) 1981 (see Figure NHS-1). That in-
vestment has provided substantial spinoffs to the private sector, adding to
the knowledge base and innovation that have fueled US productivity and
prosperity.
In the wake of the September 11 attacks and the anthrax mailings, the
nation has looked to S&T to help meet the new challenges of homeland
security. Meanwhile, the US military is in the midst of a “transformation”
that depends on taking advantage of new and emerging technologies to
respond to the diffuse and uncertain threats that characterize the 21st
century.
The current pursuit of national and homeland security is taking place in
a profoundly different environment, however. The end of the Cold War and
This paper summarizes findings and recommendations from a variety of recently published
reports and papers as input to the deliberations of the Committee on Prospering in the Global
Economy of the 21st Century. Statements in this paper should not be seen as the conclusions of
the National Academies or the committee.
483
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484 RISING ABOVE THE GATHERING STORM
Outlays for Conduct of R&D in Billions
130
120
of Constant FY 2005 Dollars 110
100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
1949 1956 1963 1970 1977 1984 1991 1998 2005
Defense R&D Nondefense R&D
FIGURE NHS-1 Federal spending in defense and nondefense R&D, 1949-2005.
SOURCE: American Association for the Advancement of Science. Chart: Federal
Spending on Defense and Nondefense R&D. Washington, DC: AAAS, February
2005. Available at: http://www.aaas.org/spp/rd/histde06.pdf.
the increasing commercialization and globalization of the traditional sources
of S&T innovation for security have produced significant challenges for US
national and homeland security policies. Many proposals to ensure con-
tinuing US S&T leadership see defense funding as essential to supporting
this goal, requiring policies that would be able to serve both economic and
national and homeland security objectives.
Federal actions that have been proposed include the following:
• Raise the level of S&T spending to 3% of Department of Defense
(DOD) spending and restore DOD’s historical commitment to basic research
by directing 20% of its S&T budget to long-term research.
– Increase the budget for mathematics, the physical sciences, and en-
gineering research by 12% a year for the next 7 years within the research
accounts of the Department of Energy (DOE), the National Science Foun-
dation (NSF), the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST),
and the DOD.
– Within the DOD, set the balance of support for 6.1 basic research
more in favor of unfettered exploration than of research related to short-
term needs.
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485
APPENDIX D
• For homeland security R&D:
– Commit to increase the portion of support that the Department of
Homeland Security (DHS) devotes to basic research, perhaps by setting
targets to be achieved within 5-10 years as the most immediate needs are
satisfied.
– Undertake a comprehensive review to identify opportunities across
the entire federal homeland security R&D budget to support increased in-
vestments in basic and applied research.
– On the applied R&D side, search for technologies that can reduce
costs or provide ancillary benefits to civil society to ensure a sustainable
effort against terrorist threats.
• Conduct a review of the current military and dual-use export-
control systems to identify policies that narrowly target exports of concern
without needlessly burdening peaceful commerce; strengthen the multilat-
eral cooperation essential to any effective export-control regime; streamline
export classification, licensing, and reporting processes; and afford the Presi-
dent the authority and flexibility needed to advance US interests.
• Establish a new framework for coordinating multilateral export con-
trols based on harmonized export-control policies and enhanced defense
cooperation with close allies and friends.
• Assess whether the current system of the national laboratories that
carry out defense-related research has the structure, personnel, and resources
to provide the cutting-edge work and innovation to support national and
homeland security R&D needs.
• Create a new National Defense Education Act (NDEA) for the 21st
century. The new NDEA would include portable graduate fellowships, in-
stitutional traineeships, incentives to create professional science and engi-
neering (S&E) master’s programs, undergraduate loan forgiveness, grants
to support new and innovative undergraduate curricula, grants to expand
K–12 education outreach, summer training and research opportunities for
K–12 teachers, employer S&E and foreign-language educational tax breaks,
national laboratory and federal service professional incentives, and addi-
tional funds for program evaluation.
THE NATIONAL AND HOMELAND SECURITY R&D PORTFOLIO
With the end of the Cold War, US defense investment, already declining
in the wake of the Reagan Administration’s massive buildup, entered the
longest period of sustained decline since the end of World War II, with deep
cuts in funding for weapons procurement and R&D. September 11 and the
wars in Afghanistan and Iraq have more than restored overall funding lev-
els, but serious concerns remain about the size and even more the mix of the
R&D portfolio. In recent years, more and more emphasis has gone to devel-
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486 RISING ABOVE THE GATHERING STORM
Billions of Constant FY 2005 Dollars
70
60
DHS Defense R&D
50
DOE Defense R&D
40
30 Other DOD R&D 6-4-
20
DOD S&T 6.1-6.3
10
0
1976
1978
1980
1982
1984
1986
1988
1990
1992
1994
1996
1998
2000
2002
2004
2006
FIGURE NHS-2 Trends in defense R&D, FY 1976-FY 2006.
SOURCE: American Association for the Advancement of Science. Chart: Trends in
Defense R&D: FY 1976-2006. Washington, DC: American Association for the
Advancement of Science, February 2005. Available at: http://www.aaas.org/spp/rd/
trdef06c.pdf.
opment as opposed to research (see Figure NHS-2). The portion of the
DOD R&D budget devoted to basic research (the “6.1” account) has de-
clined in constant dollars from 3.3% in FY 1994 to an estimated 1.9% in
FY 2005 (see Figure NHS-3).1 In addition, within that account there has
been increasing emphasis on research that appears more likely to yield short-
term payoffs rather than the more open exploration that has been so impor-
tant to past advances. The President’s budget request for FY 2006 called for
a 13% cut in the 6.1 account, which by July 2005 the House of Representa-
tives had partially restored to a 4% decrease. The House also called for a
4.2% gain in applied research (the “6.2” account) rather than the 15%
reduction called for by the President’s budget request, although the gain
would come largely in the form of earmarks.2
Beyond meeting the immediate perceived R&D needs of the US mili-
tary, broad service policy documents, such as Joint Vision 2010 and 2020,
look toward substantial expansions in the breadth and depth of S&T to
support US strategy.3 The transformation goals set forth in DOD’s 2001
1Funding for the 6.2 “applied research” account has gone up and down but now is 5.5% in
FY 2005 compared with 7.6% in FY 1994. Constant dollar and percentage calculations by
the Council on Competitiveness based on American Association for the Advancement of Sci-
ence, “Historical Table: Trends in DOD ‘S&T,’ 1994-2005.”
2American Association for the Advancement of Science. “Update on R&D in FY 2006 DOD
House Appropriations.” July 2005.
3National Research Council. Assessment of Department of Defense Basic Research. Wash-
ington, DC: The National Academies Press, 2005.
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487
APPENDIX D
DOD 6.1 Expenditures
20
1,600 6.1 Percentage of Total DOD Budget
6.1 Percentage of DOD S&T Budget
18
1,400
Millions of Constant 2004 Dollars
16
1,200
14
1,000
12
Percent
800 10
8
600
6
400
4
200
2
0 0
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
FIGURE NHS-3 Department of Defense (DOD) 6.1 expenditures, 1994-2005, in
millions of constant 2004 dollars.
SOURCE: National Science Board. Science and Engineering Indicators 2004. NSB
04-01. Arlington, VA: National Science Foundation, 2004.
Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) also depend on continuing to exploit
the enhanced capabilities that can emerge from advances in S&T; the report
called for significantly increasing S&T spending within the DOD budget.4
Achieving these goals will require a return to the traditional strong
support for basic and applied research, in particular in the physical sciences
and engineering. These goals also will demand initiatives in new and emerg-
ing areas of S&T, such as those called for by the QDR and a recent Defense
Science Board study.5 In addition, these changes are considered essential to
sustaining the role that defense research has played in improving the broader
health of the US S&T enterprise.
Among the actions that have been proposed for the federal government
are these:
4Department of Defense. Quadrennial Defense Review Report. Washington, DC: Depart-
ment of Defense, 2001.
5Defense Science Board. The Defense Science Board 2001 Summer Study on Defense Science
and Technology. Washington, DC: Defense Science Board, 2001.
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488 RISING ABOVE THE GATHERING STORM
• Raise the level of S&T spending to 3% of DOD spending6 and re-
store DOD’s historical commitment to basic research by directing 20% of
its S&T budget to long-term research.7
• Increase the budget for mathematics, the physical sciences, and engi-
neering research by 12% a year for the next 7 years within the research
accounts of DOE, NSF, NIST, DOD.
• Within DOD, set the balance of support for 6.1 basic research more in
favor of unfettered exploration than of research related to short-term needs.
Funding for R&D for homeland security is a much more recent enter-
prise. The majority of US homeland security R&D funding actually occurs
outside DHS (see Table NHS-1).8 After annual increases of more than $200
million in each of its first 3 years, the FY 2006 budget request for DHS
R&D slowed to a 3.6% increase, or $44 million, for a total of $1.3 billion.
To date, both the House and the Senate have essentially retained the re-
quested levels, but each has made changes in how the funds would be allo-
cated. Efforts to consolidate all DHS R&D programs into the department’s
Directorate for S&T are scheduled to be completed in FY 2006.9
Basic research is at present a relatively small portion of the federal
homeland security R&D portfolio. The priority is instead on efforts to use
S&T to develop and field new methods and measures to increase security as
quickly as possible.10 The primary exception is the biodefense program, in
particular the very large National Institutes of Health research program.
The question of the balance across the homeland security R&D portfo-
lio is an open issue. If more funding for basic research is a goal, options for
the federal government include the following:
• Commit to increase the portion of support that DHS devotes to basic
research, perhaps by setting targets to be achieved within 5-10 years as the
most immediate needs are satisfied.
• Undertake a comprehensive review to identify opportunities across
6Ibid., p. 41.
7Council on Competitiveness. Innovate America. Washington, DC: Council on Competi-
tiveness, 2004.
8American Association for the Advancement of Science. “Table 4: Federal Homeland Secu-
rity-Related R&D by Agency.” March 2005.
9American Association for the Advancement of Science. “R&D Funding Update on R&D in
the FY 2006 DHS Budget.” 2005.
10For a comprehensive examination of the potential contributions of science and technol-
ogy, see National Research Council. Making the Nation Safer: The Role of Science and Tech-
nology in Countering Terrorism. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press, 2002.
Guides to the additional reports and current projects of the National Academies related to
homeland security may be found at http://www.nationalacademies.org/subjectindex/sec.html.
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TABLE NHS-1 US Homeland Security R&D Funding, by Agency, FY 2002 to FY 2006
FY 2002 FY 2003 FY 2004 FY 2005 FY 2006 Change FY 05-06
Actual Actual Actual Estimate Budget Amount %
Agriculture 175 155 40 161 172 11 6.8%
Commerce 20 16 23 73 82 9 11.9%
Department of Defense 259 212 267 362 394 32 8.7%
Department of Energy 50 48 47 92 81 –12 –12.5%
Department of Homeland Security 266 737 1,028 1,243 1,287 44 3.6%
Environmental Protection Agency 95 70 52 33 94 61 185.1%
Health and Human Services 177 1,653 1,724 1,796 1,802 6 0.4%
- National Institutes of Health 162 1,633 1,703 1,774 1,781 6 0.4%
National Aeronautics and Space Adm. 73 73 88 88 92 4 4.5%
National Science Foundation 229 271 321 326 329 3 1.0%
Transportation 106 7 3 0 0 0 —
All Other 48 47 32 42 92 50 118.8%
Total Homeland Security R&D 1,499 3,290 3,626 4,216 4,425 208 4.9%
(Total Homeland Security Spending) 32,881 42,447 40,834 46,015 49,943 3,928 8.5%
NOTE: American Association for the Advancement of Science, based on Office of Management and Budget (OMB) data from OMB’s 2003 Report
to Congress on Combating Terrorism and Budget of the US Government FY 2006. Figures adjusted from OMB data by AAAS to include conduct
of R&D and R&D facilities, and revised estimates of DHS R&D. Figures do not include non-R&D homeland security activities, nor do they
include DOD R&D investments in overseas combating terrorism. Funding for all years includes regular appropriations and emergency supplemen-
tal appropriations.
SOURCE: American Association for the Advancement of Science. Guide to R&D Funding Data: Historical Data. Washington, DC: American Asso-
ciation for the Advancement of Science, 2005. Available at: http://www.aaas.org/spp/rd/guihist.htm.
489
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490 RISING ABOVE THE GATHERING STORM
the entire federal homeland security R&D budget to support increased in-
vestments in basic and applied research.
• On the applied R&D side, search for technologies that can reduce
costs or provide ancillary benefits to civil society to ensure a sustainable
effort against terrorist threats.
NEW SOURCES OF INNOVATION FOR SECURITY:
THE TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER DILEMMA
Traditionally, US government programs were the primary driver for
research into new defense-related technologies. DOD relied on a dedicated
domestic industrial base, supported largely by the results of generous DOD-
funded R&D in the commercial sector and universities.
That Cold War model no longer exists because of the deep cuts in US
defense research investment already discussed and the dramatic increases in
private-sector R&D investment, particularly in the high-technology areas
such as information and communications technologies essential to transfor-
mation. The US government has attempted to come to terms with this new
situation through a variety of initiatives to enable it to take advantage of
innovation from the commercial sector that could “spin on” to enhance
military capabilities.
The dramatic consolidation and increasing globalization of many sec-
tors of the traditional defense industrial base also have encouraged US ef-
forts to find ways to enhance technology cooperation with close friends and
allies. In the decade following the end of the Cold War, the 15 major US
defense contractors shrank to four huge firms (see Figure NHS-4).11 Many
US defense firms have embraced a global business model, and non-US firms,
primarily from Europe, have gained access to the US defense market on
their own or in cooperation with US companies.12
These fundamental changes in the sources and structures of innovation
for national security have also made it easier for US adversaries to gain access
to knowledge and technology that could improve their capabilities.13 Policies
to draw on innovation from firms in the commercial sector with global mar-
11A. R. Markusen and S. S. Costigan. The Military Industrial Challenge. In A. R. Markusen
and S. S. Costigan, eds. Arming the Future: A Defense Industry for the 21st Century. New
York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1999. P. 8.
12“Transformed? A Survey of the Defence Industry.” The Economist, July 20, 2002; K.
Hayward. “The Globalization of Defence Industries.” Survival (Summer 2001).
13See, for example, National Intelligence Council. Mapping the Global Future: Report of the
National Intelligence Council’s 2020 Project. Washington, DC: National Intelligence Council,
December 2004; Defense Science Board Task Force on Globalization and Security. Final Re-
port. Washington, DC: Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Technol-
ogy, 1999.
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FIGURE NHS-4 US defense mergers in the 1990s.
SOURCE: A. R. Markusen and S. S. Costigan. Arming The Future. New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1999. P. 8.
Figure 1-1.
491
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492 RISING ABOVE THE GATHERING STORM
kets and international workforces or to enhance international technology
cooperation potentially clash with longstanding US efforts to control the leak-
age of technology. September 11 and increasing concerns for terrorism—
especially using nuclear, chemical, or biologic agents—have exacerbated these
tensions. Faced with adversaries who are far less technologically sophisti-
cated or who are relying on technology to make rapid advances in their capa-
bilities—and for whom a much broader range of US technologies is thus
potentially relevant than for a technologically advanced opponent like the
Soviet Union—there is a natural inclination to broaden the scope of US con-
trol efforts to cover as much as possible that could be of use.
There is increasing concern that current policy initiatives serve neither
technology transfer and cooperation on the one hand nor proliferation pre-
vention on the other.14 In part, this is because technology-transfer policy is
being pursued largely through a policy apparatus constructed during the
Cold War that critics from many quarters charge has never genuinely ad-
justed to the new threats facing the United States. According to critics, con-
tinued reliance on this apparatus—in particular, the current export-control
regime for military and so-called dual-use goods and technologies—might
do relatively little to prevent others from gaining access to US products and
know-how while damaging the capacity of the United States to draw on
innovation in the commercial sector for both economic and national- and
homeland-security objectives.
While critics generally share profound dissatisfaction with the current
system, there is little consensus within or among the federal government,
Congress, and the affected communities about remedies for the situation.
These disputes are not new, but they take on particular force now because
of the depth and extent of the disputes and because of their potential impact
on efforts to promote the health and capacity of the US S&T enterprise.
For the federal government, there are a number of possible options,
including these:
• Conduct a review of the current US military and dual-use export-
control systems to identify policies that narrowly target exports of concern
without needlessly burdening peaceful commerce; strengthen the multilat-
14See, for example, Defense Science Board Task Force on Globalization and Security, 1999;
Center for Strategic and International Studies. Technology and Security in the 21st Century:
US Military Export Control Reform. Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International
Studies, 2001; Government Accountability Office. Defense Trade: Arms Export Control Sys-
tem in the Post-9/11 Environment. GAO-05-234. Washington, DC: Defense Science Board,
February 16, 2005; Government Accountability Office. Defense Trade: Arms Export Control
Vulnerabilities and Inefficiencies in the Post-9/11 Security Environment. GAO-05-468R.
Washington, DC: Defense Science Board, April 7, 2005.
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493
APPENDIX D
eral cooperation essential to any effective export-control regime; streamline
export classification, licensing, and reporting processes; and afford the Presi-
dent the authority and flexibility needed to advance US interests.15
• Establish a new framework for coordinating multilateral export con-
trols based on harmonized export-control policies and enhanced defense
cooperation with close allies and friends.16
THE ROLE OF THE NATIONAL LABORATORIES IN
NATIONAL AND HOMELAND SECURITY
Over the course of the Cold War, the United States created a system of
national and federal laboratories, some devoted exclusively to research re-
lated to national security and some serving multiple roles. The DOE, for
example, maintains 10 national laboratories that are managed through con-
tracts with universities and private firms.17 The DOD maintains a much
larger system. Other laboratories maintained by such agencies as National
Aeronautics and Space Administration may also conduct defense-related
work. DHS has turned to some of the existing DOE laboratories to support
its new R&D enterprise;18 it also is creating the National Bioterrorism
Analysis and Countermeasures Center to handle its large biodefense-
research portfolio. Some of these laboratories do a mix of classified and
unclassified research, and others carry out only unclassified work, in some
cases to ensure the maximal openness for their basic-research programs.
Since the end of the Cold War, questions have arisen periodically about
the continuing relevance of the national laboratory system. Periodic reviews
of the DOE laboratories, for example, have proposed substantial changes,
including consolidation of the laboratories and significant changes in man-
agement structures.19 More general concerns include how to ensure the qual-
ity of scientific personnel in the laboratories and whether measures should
15Center for Strategic and International Studies. Technology and Security in the 21st Cen-
tury: US Military Export Control Reform. Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and Interna-
tional Studies, 2001.
16Henry L. Stimson Center and Center for Strategic and International Studies. Enhancing
Multilateral Export Controls for US National Security. Washington, DC: The Henry L. Stimson
Center, 2001.
17See, for example, http://www.energy.gov/engine/content.do?BT_CODE=ST_SS16.
18See http://www.dhs.gov/dhspublic/display?theme=27&content=3000/.
19See, for example, Department of Energy. Task Force on Alternatives Futures for the De-
partment of Energy National Laboratories (the “Galvin Commission”). Washington, DC: Sec-
retary of Energy Advisory Board, 1995; General Accounting Office. Department of Energy
National Laboratories Need Clearer Vision and Better Management. GAO/RCED-95-10.
Washington, DC: General Accounting Office, January 1995; National Research Council. Main-
taining High Scientific Quality at Los Alamos and Livermore National Laboratories. Wash-
ington, DC: The National Academies Press, 2004.
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494 RISING ABOVE THE GATHERING STORM
introduce greater competition to increase the incentives for the laboratories
to draw on the best personnel and ideas in the private sector.20
Options for the federal government to address these issues include an
initial effort to:
• Assess whether the current system of the national laboratories that
carry out defense-related research has the structure, personnel, and resources
to provide the cutting-edge work and innovation to support national and
homeland security R&D needs.
NATIONAL DEFENSE EDUCATION ACT
Adopted by Congress in 1958, the original NDEA was intended to boost
education and training in security and national-defense-related fields. NDEA
was a response to the launch of Sputnik and the emerging threat to the
United States posed by the Soviet Union. NDEA was funded with approxi-
mately $400 million to $500 million (in constant 2004 dollars). NDEA
provided funding to enhance research facilities; fellowships to thousands of
graduate students pursuing degrees in science, mathematics, engineering,
and foreign languages; and low-interest loans for undergraduates in these
areas.
By the 1970s, the act had been largely superseded by other programs,
but its legacy remains in the form of several federal student-loan programs.21
The legislation ultimately benefited all of higher education as the notion of
defense was expanded to include most disciplines and fields of study.22
The DOD workforce is critical to our nation’s security planning. This
workforce, however, has experienced a real attrition of more than 13,000
personnel over the last 10 years. At the same time, DOD projects that its
workforce demands will increase by more than 10% (by 2010). Indeed,
several major studies23 since 1999 argue that the number of US graduates in
20See, for example, National Research Council. National Laboratories: Building New Ways
to Work Together—Report of a Workshop. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press,
2005; and the suggestions about personnel in Defense Science Board. The Defense Science
Board 2001 Summer Study on Defense Science and Technology. Washington, DC: Defense
Science Board, 2001.
21Association of American Universities. A National Defense Education Act for the 21st
Century. Renewing Our Commitment to US Students, Science, Scholarship, and Society.
White Paper. Washington, DC: Association of American Universities, 2005. Available at:
http://www.aau.edu/education/NDEAOP.pdf.
22M. Parsons. “Higher Education Is Just Another Special Interest” The Chronicle of Higher
Education 51(22)(2005):B20. Available at: http://chronicle.com/prm/weekly/v51/i22/
22b02001.htm.
23See, for example, the National Science Board’s companion paper to Science and Engineer-
ing Indicators 2004. Arlington, VA: National Science Foundation, 2004.
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495
APPENDIX D
critical areas is not meeting national, homeland, and economic security
needs (see Figure NHS-5). Science, engineering, and language skills con-
tinue to have very high priority across government and industrial sectors.
Many positions in critical-skills areas require security clearances, mean-
ing that only US citizens may apply. While over 95% of undergraduates are
US citizens, in many of the S&E fields less than 50% of those earning PhDs
are US citizens. Retirements also loom on the horizon: over 60% of the
federal S&E workforce is over 45, a large proportion of whom are em-
ployed by DOD (see Table NHS-2). DOD and other federal agencies face
increased competition from domestic and global commercial interests for
top-of-their-class, security-clearance-eligible scientists and engineers.
To ensure adequate human resources in fields important for homeland
security, the National Research Council in the report Making the Nation
Safer recommended that there be a human-resource development program
similar to the NDEA.24 National weapons laboratories have instituted spe-
cific programs to recruit and hire critically skilled people to staff nuclear-
stockpile stewardship programs—for which US citizenship is a primary
consideration—including graduate and postdoctoral internship programs,
programs involving local high schools and universities, and support for
current employees to gain additional training (see Table NHS-3). Human-
resources offices are attempting to solve workforce problems through a
number of independent actions. Many agencies now have direct-hire
authorities and can offer significant signing bonuses in special cases. A
recent Government Accountability Office report indicates these multi-
approach programs are a major reason that DOD laboratories currently
do not have significant problems locating the necessary people to fill
critical-skills positions.25
DOD has proposed, as part of the department’s 2006 appropriations,26
to create and fund NDEA 2005 (see Figure NHS-6). This program would
extend a 2004 pilot SMART program and, as with the original NDEA,
would provide scholarships and fellowships to students in critical fields of
science, mathematics, engineering, and foreign languages. It would expand
24National Research Council, 2002.
25Government Accountability Office. National Nuclear Security Administration: Contrac-
tors’ Strategies to Recruit and Retain and Critically Skilled Workforce Are Generally Effective.
GAO-05-164. Washington, DC: Government Accountability Office, 2005.
26See H.R. 1815, National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006 § Sec. 1105.
Science, Mathematics, and Research for Transformation (SMART) Defense Education Pro-
gram—National Defense Education Act (NDEA), Phase I. Introduced to the House on April
26, 2005; on June 6, 2005, referred to Senate committee; status as of July 26, 2005: received in
the Senate and read twice and referred to the Committee on Armed Services.
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496 RISING ABOVE THE GATHERING STORM
US Citizen Science & Engineering
60%
Specialist Retirements Outlook
50%
40%
30%
20%
10%
0%
Same as Slightly Significantly
Today Worse Than Worse Than
Today Today
Unfilled Requisitions for US Citizens
1,200
1,000
800
600
400
200
0
m
ec
d
/W
h
uc
h
ys
ro
W
at
at
In
ec
at
he
M
M
Ae
Ph
El
S/
N
H
M
M
h/
C
C
Field of Study
Unfilled Requisitions for US Citizen Science
3,500
and Engineering Specialists
3,000
2,500
2,000
1,500
1,000
500
0
BS MS PhD
By Degree
FIGURE NHS-5 Unfilled requisitions for US citizen scientists and engineers, by
degree and field.
NOTE: Aero = Aerospace, Chem = Chemical, H/W = Hardware, S/W = Software, Elec
= Electrical, Ind = Industrial, Mat = Materials, Mech = Mechanical, Nuc = Nuclear,
Ch/Mat = Chemical/Materials, Phys = Physical.
SOURCE: E. Swallow. Chair, National Defense Industry Association Space
Division and Chair, Industry Study on Critical Workforce Issues. Presentation at the
National Defense Industry Association meeting, April 2005. Available at: http://
proceedings.ndia.org/4340/swallow.pdf.
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497
APPENDIX D
TABLE NHS-2 Percentage of Federal S&E Workforce Over the Age of 45,
1999-2002
1999 2000 2001 2002
(percent) (percent) (percent) (percent)
Total S&Es 44.2 43.5 43.1 43.4
All sci 26.1 25.4 25.6 26.9
Comp/Math 45.5 43.9 44.0 45.3
Life sci 11.4 11.2 11.0 10.9
Physical sci 26.7 26.2 26.1 26.2
Social sci 20.4 20.4 19.7 19.6
All eng 66.7 66.4 66.2 66.7
Aerospace 44.7 43.6 43.0 42.8
Chemical 62.3 63.6 65.7 67.6
Civil 61.8 61.3 60.6 60.1
EE&Comp 79.3 79.1 78.5 79.1
Industrial 81.1 80.2 79.4 79.4
Mechancial 88.2 88.2 88.4 89.2
Other eng 54.6 55.1 55.5 55.9
SOURCE: Based on National Science Foundation. Federal Scientists and Engineers: 1998-
2002. NSF 05-304. Arlington, VA: National Science Foundation, 2005. Table 11.
on the original act in providing scholarships to undergraduates, including
those pursuing associate degrees. The program would cover tuition, room
and board, internships, tutors, and travel for all students. DOD requires a
service commitment on completion of studies.
DOD has requested $10.3 million in its FY 2006 budget request for this
program. SMART was initiated in 2005 as a pilot program and funded at
$2.5 million. The program has generated considerable interest among stu-
dents: SMART currently funds 25 students, but DOD vetted over 600 ap-
plications.27
Possible actions include:
• Create a new NDEA for the 21st century to promote the education
and training of students in science, technology, engineering, mathematics,
and foreign languages. The new NDEA would include portable graduate
fellowships, institutional traineeships, incentives to create professional S&E
27J. Brainard. “Defense Department Hopes to Revive Sputnik-Era Science-Education Pro-
grams” The Chronicle of Higher Education 51(36)(2005):A18. Available at: http://chronicle.
com/prm/weekly/v51/i36/36a01802.htm.
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498 RISING ABOVE THE GATHERING STORM
TABLE NHS-3 National Weapon Laboratories Personnel Recruitment
Programs
Program Sponsor
Pre-College (K–12) Materials World Modules Army
STARBASE OSD-RA
eCybermission Army
Undergraduate Awards to Stimulate and Support AFOSR with NSF
Undergraduate Research Education
(ASSURE)
Research Assistantships in DARPA with Semiconductor
Microelectronics Industries Association
Science, Mathematics, and Research AFOSR
for Transformation (SMART)
Graduate National Defense Science and NDSEG
Engineering Graduate Fellowships
Naval Research—S&T for Navy with NSF
Americas Readiness (N-STAR)
SMART AFOSR
NOTE: OSD-RA = Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs, AFOSR =
Air Force Office of Scientific Research, DARPA = Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency.
SOURCE: B. Berry, Acting Deputy Undersecretary for Laboratories and Basic Science. “STEM
Education Act” presentation at STARBASE Directors’ Conference, April 7, 2005. Available
at: http://www.starbasedod.com/resources/SME%20Briefing-STARBASE%20Directors%
20Conf%204-7-05v5%20wo%20Backup.ppt.
master’s programs, undergraduate loan forgiveness, grants to support inno-
vative undergraduate curricula, grants to expand K–12 education outreach,
summer training and research opportunities for K–12 teachers, employer
S&E and foreign-language educational tax breaks, national-laboratory and
federal service professional incentives, and additional funds for program
evaluation.28
28National Research Council, 2002; R. M. Sega, Director of Defense Research and Engi-
neering, DOD. Testimony Before the Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and Capabilities of
the Senate Armed Services Committee, March 9, 2005. Available at: http://armed-
services.senate.gov/statemnt/2005/March/Sega%2003-09-05.pdf; Association of American
Universities, 2005. White Paper.
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499
APPENDIX D
FIGURE NHS-6 DOD strategy for proposed National Defense Education Act
(NDEA) within its current portfolio of workforce programs.
SOURCE: E. Swallow. Chair, National Defense Industry Association Space Division
and Chair, Industry Study on Critical Workforce Issues. Presentation at the National
Defense Industry Association meeting, April 2005. Available at: http://proceedings.
ndia.org/4340/swallow.pdf.
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