1986 Covering, dominance, and institution-free properties of social choice. Am. J. Polit. Sci. 283-314.

With R. T. Page. Common knowledge, consensus, and aggregate information. Econometrica 54:109-127.

1987 With K. Collier, P. C. Ordeshook, and K. C. Williams. Retrospective voting: An experimental study. Public Choice 53:101-130.

With N. Schofield. Generalized symmetry conditions at a core point. Econometrica 55:923-934.

1991 An experiment test of a stochastic game model of committee bargaining. In Contemporary Laboratory Research in Political Economy, ed. T. Palfrey, pp. 139-167. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. 1992

With T. R. Palfrey. An experimental study of the centipede game. Econometrica 60:803-836.

1993 With M. El-Gamal and T. R. Palfrey. A Bayesian sequential experimental study of learning in games. J. Am. Stat. Assn. 88:428-435.

1995 With T. R. Palfrey. Quantal response equilibria for normal form games. Games Econ. Behav. 10:6-38.

With R. Boylan. Voting over economic plans. Am. Econ. Rev. 85(4):860-871.

1996 With A. McLennan. Computation of equilibria in finite games. In Handbook of Computational Economics, vol. 1., eds. H. Amman, D. Kendrick, and J. Rust, pp. 87-142. Amsterdam: Elsevier.

1998 With T. R. Palfrey. Quantal response equilibria for extensive form games. Exp. Econ. 1:9-41.



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