4
Redrawing Spatial Color Lines: Hispanic Metropolitan Dispersal, Segregation, and Economic Opportunity

Mary J. Fischer and Marta Tienda

In what might be a first for Georgia, students from one high school will attend three separate proms. Toombs County’s dubious distinction demonstrates the evolving arithmetic of race in America, where white plus black plus brown doesn’t add up to “one nation under God, indivisible, with liberty and justice for all.” (Dan Chapman, Atlanta Journal-Constitution, April 11, 2004)

Toombs County, Georgia—a little town about 200 miles southeast of Atlanta—made national news when its local high school sponsored three senior proms instead of its usual two.1 Principal Ralph Hardy, who is black, insisted that racism is not a serious problem at his school and that segregated proms are a matter of taste: “Latinos, blacks, and whites all prefer their own music and food.” A prime example of communities, mostly in the South, that have experienced unprecedented Hispanic population growth, Toombs instantiates the growing complexity of the long-standing struggle for racial integration as newcomers from Mexico, Central America, and South America alter the ethno-racial landscape, forcing multiculturalism in places previously colored black and white. Whether the Hispanicization of metropolitan America redraws spatial color lines in urban places long divided into black and white into three-way splits is an empirical question with far-reaching implications for social integration and civic engagement.

More than at any time in the past, Hispanics have consolidated their national presence owing to their unprecedented geographic dispersal buttressed by growing numbers (Zúñiga and Hernández-León, 2005). Histori-

1  

Several counties in Georgia allow their students to plan their own proms independent of the school, in part to avoid problems arising from interracial dating. Hispanic students exercised their right to hold a separate prom because of what they described as a racist environment in the school and the ambiguity of choosing between the black and white proms. In 2004, whites made up just over half of the student population (56 percent); blacks just under one-third, and Hispanics the remainder (about 12 percent).



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Hispanics and the Future of America 4 Redrawing Spatial Color Lines: Hispanic Metropolitan Dispersal, Segregation, and Economic Opportunity Mary J. Fischer and Marta Tienda In what might be a first for Georgia, students from one high school will attend three separate proms. Toombs County’s dubious distinction demonstrates the evolving arithmetic of race in America, where white plus black plus brown doesn’t add up to “one nation under God, indivisible, with liberty and justice for all.” (Dan Chapman, Atlanta Journal-Constitution, April 11, 2004) Toombs County, Georgia—a little town about 200 miles southeast of Atlanta—made national news when its local high school sponsored three senior proms instead of its usual two.1 Principal Ralph Hardy, who is black, insisted that racism is not a serious problem at his school and that segregated proms are a matter of taste: “Latinos, blacks, and whites all prefer their own music and food.” A prime example of communities, mostly in the South, that have experienced unprecedented Hispanic population growth, Toombs instantiates the growing complexity of the long-standing struggle for racial integration as newcomers from Mexico, Central America, and South America alter the ethno-racial landscape, forcing multiculturalism in places previously colored black and white. Whether the Hispanicization of metropolitan America redraws spatial color lines in urban places long divided into black and white into three-way splits is an empirical question with far-reaching implications for social integration and civic engagement. More than at any time in the past, Hispanics have consolidated their national presence owing to their unprecedented geographic dispersal buttressed by growing numbers (Zúñiga and Hernández-León, 2005). Histori- 1   Several counties in Georgia allow their students to plan their own proms independent of the school, in part to avoid problems arising from interracial dating. Hispanic students exercised their right to hold a separate prom because of what they described as a racist environment in the school and the ambiguity of choosing between the black and white proms. In 2004, whites made up just over half of the student population (56 percent); blacks just under one-third, and Hispanics the remainder (about 12 percent).

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Hispanics and the Future of America cally concentrated both regionally and in a few large metropolitan areas, Hispanics have scattered to nontraditional places since 1980, but with intensified force during the 1990s, redrawing ethno-racial landscapes along the way (see Chapter 3; Fischer et al., 2004; Logan, Stowell, and Oakley, 2002). Fueled by high levels of immigration from Mexico, Central America, and South America, the Hispanic geographic scattering presents the paradox of rising levels of regional and national integration combined with resegregation of old gateway cities and diverse settlement patterns in the new destinations (Alba and Nee, 1999; Logan, Stowell, and Oakley, 2002). Residential location is a powerful indicator of social position because many economic opportunities and social resources, such as affordable housing, quality schools, public safety, transportation, and recreational and social amenities are unequally distributed across space. Where people live also influences access to jobs that pay family wages, the likelihood that racial and ethnic groups will commingle in schools, places of worship, and commercial establishments—in short, the prospects for minority group integration. Accordingly, in this chapter we examine the implications of the Hispanic dispersal for segregation patterns, intergroup commingling, homeownership rates, and employment. Following a brief review of recent studies about race and ethnic residential segregation, we use the 100 largest metropolitan areas to document Hispanics’ unprecedented geographic dispersal to new urban destinations; to portray trends in spatial segregation using measures of evenness and exposure; and to consider the social significance of the new residential patterns based on changes in school segregation, home ownership, and employment outcomes. Throughout we systematically compare Hispanics with blacks in order to understand whether, where, and how their new urban choices alter black spatial arrangements. RESIDENTIAL DISPERSION AND METROPOLITANIZATION Historically Hispanics have been highly concentrated regionally according to national origin, but their residential patterns differ from those of blacks and non-Hispanic whites in their high levels of early urbanicity and lower levels of spatial segregation from whites. As early as 1970, four out of five Hispanics resided in metropolitan areas, mostly in central cities (Bean and Tienda, 1987, pp. 146–147). Their highly urbanized residential history differentiates them from non-Hispanic whites, whose nonmetropolitan presence remains comparatively strong. Hispanics’ metropolitanization experience also differs from that of blacks, whose mass exodus from the rural South after World War II resulted in very high levels of residential segregation (Massey and Denton, 1993; National Research Council, 1989).

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Hispanics and the Future of America Unlike blacks, Hispanics forged their urban imprints through intrametropolitan moves, including flows across international borders. Despite a rise in racial integration during the 1990s, black–white residential segregation levels remain consistently above those of Hispanics nationally and in most metropolitan areas.2 Even as Hispanics became more spatially integrated with whites in 86 of 210 metropolitan areas, their residential separation from whites actually increased in 124 metropolitan areas (Logan et al., 2004). This paradox of rising and falling segregation across metropolitan areas appears related to Hispanics’ unprecedented geographic scattering to new regions of the country. Los Angeles, New York, Chicago, and Miami have continued to serve as prominent gateways to U.S. job and housing markets during the recent mass migration. At the same time, the 2000 decennial census confirmed what many local school boards and governments already knew: that Hispanics, and recent immigrants in particular, are changing the face of America by making historically unprecedented residential choices (Kandel and Cromartie, 2004; Suro and Singer, 2002; Zúñiga and Hernández-León, 2005). Table 4-1, which summarizes changes in the residential distributions of Hispanics compared with the total U.S. population, illustrates the recentness and rising intensity of their geographic dispersal. Already under way during the 1980s, the Hispanic scattering gained considerable momentum during the 1990s.3 Metropolitanization of the total U.S. population inched up over the past two decades, but Hispanics are still more likely to live in metropolitan areas than the typical U.S. resident. Already in 1980, the largest 100 metropolitan areas housed over 3 in 4 Hispanics, and they did so for only 62 percent of all U.S. residents by 2000. An additional 13 percent of all Hispanics resided in metropolitan areas that were not among the largest 100 compared with 18 percent of the total population. Only 11 percent of Hispanics lived in nonmetropolitan areas in 1980 compared with nearly one-fourth of all U.S. residents; by 2000, these shares fell to 8 and 20 percent, respectively. Despite the declining share of nonmetropolitan Hispanic residents, the nonmetropolitan Hispanic population has doubled since 1980 and currently is the most rapidly growing segment of rural and small-town America (Kandel and Cromartie, 2004). For ease of exposition and parsimony, we divide the 100 largest metropolitan areas into three strata: the Traditional Metros, New Hispanic Destinations, and a residual, designated Other Large Metros. The Traditional 2   During the 1990s, blacks became more spatially integrated with whites in 240 of 265 metropolitan areas (Logan et al., 2004). 3   Most of the analysis that follows focuses on the largest 100 metropolitan areas, but this tabulation also reports smaller metropolitan areas as well as nonmetropolitan areas.

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Hispanics and the Future of America Metros include 29 metropolitan areas located in the Southwest, as well as the past and current immigrant gateway cities of Miami, New York City, and Chicago. The stratum called New Hispanic Destinations represents 50 metropolitan areas outside the Southwest where the Hispanic presence rose appreciably since 1980. The remaining 21 Other Large Metros are those with relatively small Hispanic populations—less than 5 percent as late as 2000—including large rust belt cities with appreciable black populations, for example Philadelphia, Detroit, and St. Louis.4 Owing to faster demographic growth compared with native whites and blacks, the Hispanic proportion also increased in the largest 100 metropolitan areas, albeit unevenly. Between 1980 and 2000, Hispanic population shares rose from 18 to 30 percent in the Traditional Metros, while the black share declined slightly, from 14 to 12 percent of the stratum total. Hispanicization of the Traditional Metros is all the more impressive because many of these cities grew substantially during the period, with immigration driving up the foreign-born share of the population from 16 to 27 percent of the stratum total.5 The New Hispanic Destinations are of particular interest because of the number of places involved, their nationwide spread, their diverse growth rates, and the variable size of their black population. Unlike the Traditional Metros, where numerically dominant Hispanics further increased their population share over two decades, blacks remain numerically and proportionately dominant in both the New Hispanic Destinations and the Other Large Metros. In the New Hispanic Destinations, blacks outnumbered Hispanics by a ratio exceeding 6:1 in 1980, but by 2000, it plummeted to just under 2:1. By comparison, the black-to-Hispanic ratio in the Other Large Metros was higher both at the outset and the end of the period—8:1 in 1980 versus 4:1 in 2000. Still, the direction of change in population composition is clear. The New Hispanic Destinations and Other Large Metros differ from each other in another important way, namely the salience of immigration in population diversification. In the New Hispanic Destinations, the foreign- 4   Appendix Table A4-1 provides the detail for all 100 places corresponding to Table 4-1. Our strata are loosely based on the four-fold typology of Hispanic places of Suro and Singer (2002), which we have simplified into three categories that we think best represent the new Hispanic growth. We opted not to use the typology because it conflates growth of small and large places with relative changes in population composition. 5   The GeoLytics Census CD Neighborhood Change Database lacks tables by birthplace for Hispanics. Therefore, we are unable to examine the growth of Hispanic immigrants across metropolitan area types. However, as documented for the 2000 period, the majority of Hispanics in the New Hispanic Destinations are recent arrivals.

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Hispanics and the Future of America TABLE 4-1 Total and Hispanic Population Distribution and Composition According to Metropolitan Area Type, 1980–2000 Metropolitan Area Type 1980 Population Distribution Composition Total Hispanic % H % B % FB Traditional Hispanic Metros 23 61 18 14 16 New Hispanic Destinations 24 12 2 13 6 Other Large Metros 12 4 2 17 5 Top 100 (P)MSA subtotal 59 77 8 14 10 All Other Small Metros 18 12 5 9 5 Nonmetropolitan Areas 23 11 3 8 3 Total 100 100 6 12 7 N (000s) 226,542 14,609       NOTE: The “Total” and “Hispanic” columns represent group distribution; the % H, % B, and % FB columns are strata composition. MSA = metropolitan statistical area. FB = foreign-born. born population share doubled (from 6 to 12 percent), but in the Other Large Metros, the foreign-born share remained relatively stable over the period. Ethno-racial profiles of nonmetropolitan and small metropolitan areas were also reconfigured as the Hispanic and black shares evened out. The rising Hispanic presence—from 5 to 9 percent in the remaining metropolitan areas and from 3 to 6 percent in nonmetropolitan areas—balanced the proportions of blacks and Hispanics. Large numbers of Hispanics settling in nonmetropolitan areas are recent immigrants with low levels of education; a significant segment are undocumented (Kandel and Cromartie, 2004). Not only does the term “Hispanic” mask a great deal of within-group diversity, but also the ethnic make-up of the population varies considerably by metropolitan type. As the U.S. Hispanic population has become more diversified through immigration, the Cuban share of the total declined nationally and across all types of metropolitan areas, but especially the Traditional Metros and the New Hispanic Destinations. Concomitantly, the relative proportions of all “other” Hispanic nationalities rose from 19 to 27 percent in the Traditional Metros and from 34 to 37 percent of the Hispanics in the New Hispanic Destinations over the period (see Appendix table A4-2). Although the relative share of Puerto Ricans living in the Traditional Metros declined by half over the period, they still constituted over 1 in 3 Hispanics in the New York metropolitan area in 2000, down from nearly 60 percent in 1980. In the New Hispanic Destinations, no

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Hispanics and the Future of America 1990 Population 2000 Population Distribution Composition Distribution Composition Total Hispanic % H % B % FB Total Hispanic % H % B % FB 24 62 24 13 22 25 59 30 12 27 24 12 4 14 8 26 16 7 15 12 11 3 2 17 5 11 4 4 17 7 59 77 12 14 13 62 79 16 14 18 18 13 6 9 7 18 13 9 10 13 23 10 4 9 3 20 8 6 9 6 100 100 9 12 9 100 100 13 12 12 248,710 22,354       281,422 35,306     SOURCE: Data extracted from the GeoLytics Census CD Neighborhood Change Database 1970–2000 Tract Data. single group comprises a clear majority, although Mexicans, whose share rose from 35 to 39 percent between 1980 and 2000, remain the largest single group. Understanding the paradox of rising Hispanic residential segregation against the backdrop of their unprecedented geographic dispersal requires comparisons with the experiences of other groups. For instance, how does an influx of Hispanics affect the spatial patterns of blacks, Asians, and whites? It is not clear whether the decline in black segregation levels results because Hispanics’ are sharing space with them, with whites, or with both. To examine this question, we use measures suited to portray spatial separation patterns in multiethnic contexts. Furthermore, considering how Hispanics’ urban dispersal results in spatial isolation provides clues about their socioeconomic integration prospects in both old and new settings. METROPOLITAN DIVERSIFICATION AND MULTIETHNIC SEGREGATION Two countervailing forces activated by population moves—assimilation and succession—produce patterns of residential segregation. Before the onset of mass immigration during the 1970s, spatial assimilation trumped residential succession as the dominant mechanism driving Hispanic residential segregation. With the exception of Puerto Ricans living in New York, in 1980 Hispanics were only moderately segregated from Anglos—in sharp

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Hispanics and the Future of America contrast with the apartheid levels experienced by blacks at the time (Massey, 1981).6 Segregation patterns began to change during the 1970s for two reasons. First, after nearly three decades of wage growth among unskilled workers, the wages of workers with college and high school educations began to diverge in the mid-1970s (Danziger and Gottschalk, 1995). Residential segregation tends to rise when the economy stagnates because immigrants and poor ethnics cluster into established neighborhoods where they can draw on social supports (Massey and Denton, 1987). Second, as the new era of mass migration gained momentum during the 1980s, residential clustering in ethnic and immigrant neighborhoods increased. Massey and Denton (1987) show that Hispanics’ average segregation level across the 60 largest metropolitan areas remained moderate during the 1970s, around .44, but that segregation rose in metropolitan areas in which Hispanic immigrants settled. As Los Angeles became the primary destination of new Latin American immigrants, Hispanic residential segregation from whites there approached that of New York City, historically the most segregated city for Hispanics. Chicago’s Hispanics also became more segregated from whites during the 1970s, as the volume of new immigrants rose (Bean and Tienda, 1987). A third possible mechanism for the rise in Hispanic residential segregation is discrimination in housing markets. Because Hispanics were not included in the Housing Discrimination Survey until 1989, when the Department of Housing and Urban Development conducted its second national audit, it is not possible to evaluate this mechanism before this date. However, the 1989 survey revealed that Hispanics experienced adverse treatment relative to whites in almost 25 percent of their attempts to secure rental housing and in slightly over 25 percent of their home-buying inquiries (Turner et al., 2002). A third housing audit study conducted in 2000 found a slight increase in the adverse treatment of Hispanics in the rental housing market and, for the first time, registered higher levels of rental housing discrimination than blacks (Turner et al., 2002). Because Hispanic immigrants are more likely than their native-born counterparts to seek rental housing, they probably account for most of the registered increase in housing discrimination. However, the 2000 study showed that Hispanics experienced declines in adverse treatment in the sales market. Several analyses of post-1980 residential patterns reveal lower levels of racial segregation in the most diverse metropolitan areas, yet without exception, blacks remained more spatially separated from whites than either 6   In general, indices of dissimilarity below .3 are considered low, those between .3 and .6 are considered moderate, and those in excess of .6 are high.

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Hispanics and the Future of America Hispanics or Asians. Frey and Farley’s (1996) study of segregation in 18 multiethnic metropolitan areas during the 1980s shows that segregation declined more rapidly for all groups in these contexts, as it did in places experiencing rapid growth in minority populations. Analyzing several hundred metropolitan areas, Logan et al. (2004) also showed a continuing decline in black–white segregation during the 1990s. Of the 255 metropolitan areas they examined, black–white segregation fell in all but 15 between 1980 and 2000. By contrast, aggregate Hispanic–white segregation remained relatively unchanged during the 1980s and registered a slight increase during the 1990s. However, this apparent stability concealed highly diverse experiences across areas, with some featuring greater integration and others resegregation. Informative binary comparisons with respect to whites in multiethnic settings cannot reveal whether and how color lines may be changing, and in particular whether a growing Hispanic presence in places historically divided along racial lines softens color boundaries in social space. Not surprisingly, segregation measures based on multiple groups yield different insights about intergroup relations. Iceland and colleagues (2002) show that Hispanics (and Asians) experienced increases in three types of segregation between 1980 and 2000, namely evenness (dissimilarity), exposure (p* isolation index), and clustering (spatial proximity). However, despite sustained declines over two decades, black segregation remains above that of Hispanics and Asians in all three dimensions. Moreover, the drop in black segregation was insufficient to alter hypersegregation, defined as high levels of spatial separation on several dimensions. In 2000, blacks were hypersegregated in 29 metropolitan areas compared with only two for Hispanics—Los Angeles and New York City (Wilkes and Iceland, 2004). It is therefore noteworthy that, except for Chicago, black hypersegregated metropolitan areas lack large Hispanic populations. It is conceivable that, except for the black hypersegregated metropolitan areas, population diversification facilitated the decline in racial residential segregation, particularly in locations that became more ethnically diverse. Because this is difficult to discern using segregation measures based solely on binary comparisons, several researchers have used multigroup entropy indices to examine the relationship between the growing diversity of places and patterns of segregation. Using entropy indices of overall diversity and segregation for all U.S. cities, Iceland (2003) concludes that increases in metropolitan area diversity between 1980 and 2000 resulted in higher segregation for all groups except blacks, which he (like Frey and Farley, 1996) interprets as evidence of a weakened racial divide.7 7   Not everyone has found increasing segregation for Hispanics. For instance, Fischer (2003) found declining Hispanic segregation levels based on the 50 largest metropolitan areas plus

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Hispanics and the Future of America Using two measures of segregation—the dissimilarity and isolation indices—Iceland and Lake (2004) show that Hispanic segregation from whites differs by nativity and ethnicity. Their empirical support for the spatial assimilation hypothesis is bolstered by evidence that native-born Hispanics are less segregated from whites than their foreign-born counterparts, and that recent immigrants are more segregated than longer term residents. Although binary comparisons based on measures of evenness are less informative by themselves because Hispanics increasingly reside in multiethnic urban places, they indicate that immigrants are more socially segregated from whites than the native born. To better appreciate the consequences of Hispanics’ urban dispersal for intergroup contact, we examined their residential segregation with respect to blacks, Asians, and whites using measures of evenness and exposure and comparing outcomes by types of metropolitan areas. The following section first portrays how Hispanic segregation patterns evolved since 1980 compared with blacks in the largest 100 metropolitan areas. Subsequently we consider the implications of spatial arrangements for social isolation, school segregation, home ownership, and labor market integration. Spatial Segregation by Types of Metropolitan Areas Although multigroup indicators of segregation are advantageous for assessing residential trends for Hispanics, to maintain comparability with many prior studies we also use the dissimilarity index (D), which measures evenness in the distribution of two groups across neighborhoods (census tracts) in a metropolitan area. Segregation is minimized when each tract reflects the same proportion of each group as their representation in the city as a whole. Equation (1) shows the dissimilarity index, where xi and yi are the numbers of X and Y group members in tract i, while X and Y are the metropolitan area totals. (1)     10 areas of high Hispanic concentration. The inconsistent conclusions of these two studies reflect differences in the sample of cities used (all cities versus the largest 60) and the methods. Fischer used the family income tables to calculate bivariate race and class multigroup entropy scores, while Iceland used the 100 percent person-level data to regress diversity on segregation measures.

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Hispanics and the Future of America A limitation of this binary measure is its inability to portray the overall status of segregation in multiethnic places. We minimize this bias by calculating segregation between minority groups (Hispanics and blacks in this case) and non-Hispanic whites (DH/W and DB/W), as well as between both blacks and Hispanics and all other groups (DH/O and DB/O). Because immigration is a driving force in Hispanic population growth and geographic dispersal, for comparative purposes we also compute segregation between foreign- and native-born residents (DFB/O).8 And, for the year 2000, we measure the degree to which foreign-born Hispanics are segregated from all others (DHFB/O).9 A second dimension of Hispanic segregation examined is exposure, (P*), which measures the degree of potential contact between the members of two groups within the census tracts of a city. When the probability of contact is calculated with respect to one’s own group, the exposure index measures isolation. Equation (2), the most commonly used measure of exposure, estimates the probability of contact between groups X and Y, where ti is the total population of tract i and the other components are the ame as Equation (1). (2) Table 4-2 portrays temporal and spatial variation in Hispanic segregation levels for the three metropolitan types and, for illustration of variation across metropolitan areas, selected metropolitan areas within each type (see also Appendix Table A4-2). Segregation indices for blacks and all foreign-born provide comparison benchmarks. In Traditional Metros, Hispanics were moderately segregated from all other groups in 1980 (.446) and slightly more segregated from whites (.476). By 2000, these differentials appear to be heading in opposite directions. Over the 20-year period, the level of Hispanic segregation from all other groups fell 1 percent, but during the same time period their separation from whites increased 3 percent. This indicates that Hispanic population growth raises their likelihood of sharing residential space with groups other than whites. We address this issue in further depth below, after describing how segregation trends vary across types of metropolitan areas. 8   Because the 1980 and 1990 data do not allow us to disaggregate the foreign-born into constituent race/ethnic groups, the foreign-born can be of any race/ethnicity. The foreign-born versus native entropy index therefore cannot be directly compared with the other entropy index calculations in Table 4-2 because there is no mutually exclusive relationship between the foreign-born measures and the other race/ethnic categorizations in the data. 9   This is the only year for which we have this detailed information at the tract level.

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Hispanics and the Future of America TABLE 4-2 Segregation Trends (D) by Metropolitan Area Type for Hispanics, Blacks, and the Foreign Born: 1980–2000 Metropolitan Area Type 1980 DH/O DH/W DB/O DB/W DFB/O Traditional Metros 0.446 0.476 0.621 0.654 0.279 New York, NY 0.537 0.649 0.715 0.813 0.294 Chicago, IL 0.621 0.636 0.862 0.878 0.389 Los Angeles, CA 0.508 0.570 0.766 0.811 0.333 Miami, FL 0.547 0.526 0.772 0.788 0.418 New Hispanic Destinations 0.375 0.405 0.689 0.699 0.274 Allentown, PA 0.596 0.602 0.616 0.630 0.252 Providence, RI 0.505 0.520 0.721 0.733 0.336 Grand Rapids, MI 0.447 0.474 0.754 0.758 0.234 Minneapolis, MN 0.409 0.423 0.686 0.694 0.261 Atlanta, GA 0.297 0.347 0.769 0.772 0.321 Raleigh-Durham, NC 0.287 0.312 0.479 0.480 0.391 Nashville, TN 0.363 0.392 0.654 0.655 0.355 Tulsa, OK 0.297 0.288 0.748 0.752 0.330 Other Large Metros 0.393 0.430 0.715 0.717 0.270 Total top 100 MSAs 0.399 0.431 0.675 0.690 0.275 NOTE: MSA = metropolitan statistical area. HH/O = Dissimilarity Hispanic vs others. HH/W = Dissimilarity Hispanic vs white. HB/O = Dissimilarity black vs others. The largest increases in Hispanic segregation occurred in the New Hispanic Destinations, where their residential separation from other groups rose 10 percent—from .375 in 1980 to .412 in 2000. Although Hispanic segregation from all others and whites remained lower in New Hispanic Destinations compared with Traditional Metros, the countervailing trends have produced some convergence between strata. Moreover, the average level of segregation in New Hispanic Destinations masks considerable variability across specific metropolitan areas, reflecting variation in their size, their preexisting minority populations, and the timing of the Hispanic influx. For instance, as Atlanta’s Hispanic population share increased tenfold between 1980 and 2000, their segregation from all other groups rose 56 percent, from .297 to .462. However, there does not appear to be a strict

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Hispanics and the Future of America Other Large Metros Small Metropolitan and Nonmetropolitan Areas 1980 2000 1980 2000 % FB Hisp % NB Hisp % FB Hisp % NB Hisp % FB Hisp % NB Hisp % FB Hisp % NB Hisp 0.7 1.2 4.9 2.3 2.8 3.4 12.9 3.5 0.3 0.9 1.4 2.1 0.9 2.9 4.1 3.2 0.5 1.3 1.2 2.4 1.0 2.3 5.4 2.9 0.4 1.1 1.0 1.8 0.9 2.1 2.4 2.5 0.3 0.9 0.8 1.5 0.7 2.2 4.0 3.3 0.4 0.8 0.6 1.9 0.5 2.4 1.6 3.7 0.3 1.3 0.3 1.5 0.6 2.7 1.6 3.2 0.2 0.9 0.4 2.0 0.3 2.1 1.2 3.0 0.3 0.5 0.3 1.6 0.5 1.7 1.0 3.0 0.4 0.8 0.5 1.3 0.4 2.3 1.6 3.0 0.3 0.9 0.5 1.6 0.5 2.3 1.2 3.4 0.3 1.4 0.3 2.0 0.5 3.1 0.8 4.1 0.5 1.2 1.2 2.1 0.9 2.7 3.8 4.2 0.4 1.1 0.8 1.8 0.9 2.5 2.7 3.4 respectively. Hispanic employment in these low-skill industries also surged in the New Hispanic Destinations, particularly for the foreign-born, which rose more than six-fold while the native-born share working in these industries only doubled. A similar change occurred in the smaller metropolitan areas and nonmetropolitan areas, where foreign-born Hispanics more than quadrupled their representation not only in the low-skilled personal and repair services and in construction, but also in agriculture and mining. The

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Hispanics and the Future of America increasing concentration of Hispanic workers, and particularly recent immigrants, in rapidly growing unskilled industries, suggests both that the residential dispersal will continue well into the 21st century and possibly even gain momentum as high-tech and professional services employ unskilled workers for their labor needs. CONCLUSIONS The unprecedented Hispanic geographic scattering, which began during the 1970s and gained considerable momentum during the 1990s, is a significant agent of urban social transformation both because of its pace and the sheer number of persons and places involved. In addition to its potential for reconfiguring racially divided space, Hispanics’ spatial scattering has broad ramifications for intergroup relations and the contours of ethnic stratification more generally. Ethno-racial diversification of the largest 100 metropolitan areas during the 1980s and 1990s was accompanied by real declines in the spatial segregation of blacks, even as Hispanic segregation levels rose. However, changes in spatial separation differed appreciably across types of metropolitan areas. With one-third of all residents of Hispanic origin and 1 in 4 residents foreign-born, the Traditional Metros are among the most diverse, and they exhibit moderate segregation levels. Blacks and Hispanics are about equally segregated from other groups. Hispanics in these metropolitan areas average high levels of neighborhood isolation, which translates into relatively low exposure to blacks and Asians and only moderate contact with non-Hispanic whites. New Hispanic Destinations are experiencing rapid diversification and have moderate overall levels of segregation. Hispanics in these metropolitan areas are highly integrated with whites. The different spatial outcomes in these metropolitan areas compared with the Traditional Metros reflect several factors, including the pace of change, the large share of foreign-born among the newcomers, and the fact that blacks outnumber Hispanics by a 2:1 ratio. The consequences of the Hispanic scattering for school segregation, homeownership, and employment are mixed because they are very much in flux. Immigration from Mexico, Central America, and South America not only was a driving force behind the Hispanic dispersal, but also transformed the ethno-racial composition of urban employment. In the largest 100 metropolitan areas, not only did the Hispanic share of total employment rise, but the foreign-born share also surpassed native-born workers in these urban areas. More generally, the Hispanic dispersal was accompanied by and facilitated changes in the industrial distribution of employment, as the expansion of construction and personal and repair services—industries viewed as immigrant niches in the Traditional Metros—allowed for the

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Hispanics and the Future of America absorption of unskilled immigrant labor and lured unskilled immigrants to the New Hispanic Destinations. Hispanic homeownership rates have risen slightly since 1980, but school segregation levels have been on the rise, particularly in the South—even without accounting for “soft” segregation. Whether high schools support one prom or several depends not only on settlement patterns, but also on whether black, Hispanic and white students interact socially within and beyond the school halls. Soft segregation as evidenced by Toombs County, Georgia, is not even broached by the vast literature about rising school segregation in the midst of increased residential diversity. Given the momentum of the Hispanic geographic dispersal and its broad reach across states and metropolitan areas, failure to reverse trends in resegregation could produce deleterious consequences for the well-being of the burgeoning second generation. Although vestiges of long-standing regional concentration will persist for the foreseeable future, Hispanics’ residential makeover is a potential harbinger of changes in intergroup relations. But much depends on how the newcomers are received in the nontraditional hubs. Many suburbanites welcome the new immigrants as hard-working people, but in other places the newcomers experience a backlash of discrimination. The consequences of Hispanics’ changing spatial imprints will shape their futures in myriad ways, still to be played out and tallied even as they reshape the U.S. urban landscape. Our descriptive foray into the contours and consequences of Hispanics’ changing residential configuration cannot establish any causal connection with declines in racial segregation, but we do offer suggestive evidence to support the buffering hypothesis. Our work sets the stage for exploring the causal underpinnings of the changing urban ethno-racial landscape. In addition to developing a multivariate strategy to test this hypothesis in a causal framework, future research seeking to better understand the consequences of the Hispanics unprecedented geographic scattering should employ techniques that account for increasingly multiethnic character of the urban landscape, such as the entropy index. REFERENCES Alba, R., and Nee, V. (1999). Rethinking assimilation theory for a new era of immigration. In C. Hirschman, P. Kasinitz, and J. DeWind (Eds.), Handbook of international migration (pp. 137–160). New York: Russell Sage Foundation. Bean, F.D., and Tienda, M. (1987). The Hispanic population of the United States. New York: Russell Sage Foundation. Black, A.N., Jr. (1992). Segregation and desegregation. In E.F. Borgatta and M. Borgatta (Eds.), Encyclopedia of sociology: Volume 4 (pp. 1728–1738). New York: Macmillan.

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Hispanics and the Future of America Chapman, D. (2004, April 11). Equal but separate in Lyons; The big dance: Hispanic, black, and white students at Toombs County High School all will hold their own proms. Atlanta Journal-Constitution. Coleman, J.S. (1990). Equality and achievement in education. Boulder, CO: Westview Press. Coleman, J.S., et al. (1966). Equality of educational opportunity. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office. Danziger, S., and Gottschalk, P. (1995). America unequal. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press/Russell Sage Foundation. Ferg-Cadina, J.A. (2004, May). Black, white, and brown: Latino school desegregation efforts in the pre- and post-Brown v. Board of Education era. Washington, DC: Maldef. Fischer, C.S., Stockmayer, G., Stiles, J., and Hout, M. (2004). Distinguishing the geographic levels and social dimensions of U.S. metropolitan segregation. Demography, 41, 37–59. Fischer, M.J. (2003). The relative importance of income and race in determining residential outcomes in U.S. urban areas. Urban Affairs Review, 38(5), 669–696. Frey, W.H., and Farley, R. (1996). Latino, Asian, and black segregation in U.S. metropolitan areas: Are multiethnic metros different? Demography, 33(1), 35–51. Iceland, J. (2003). Beyond black and white: Metropolitan residential segregation in a mutli-ethnic America. Social Science Research, 33(2), 248–271. Iceland, J., and Lake, C. (2004). The effect of immigration on residential segregation in U.S. metropolitan areas, 2000. Boston, MA: Population Association of America. Iceland, J., Weinberg, D.H., and Steinmetz, E. (2002). Racial and ethnic residential segregation in the United States: 1980–2000. (U.S. Census Bureau, Series CENSR-3.) Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Commerce. Kandel, W., and Cromartie, J. (2004). New patterns of Hispanic settlement in rural America. (Rural Development Research Report No. 99, Economic Research Service.) Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Agriculture. Kelley, D., and Chavez, C. (2004, 15 February). California dreaming no more. Los Angeles Times, A1. Logan, J.R. (2003). American newcomers. Albany, NY: Lewis Mumford Center, SUNY-Albany. Logan, J.R., Stowell, J., and Oakley, D. (2002). Choosing segregation: Racial imbalance in American public schools, 1990–2000. Albany, NY: Lewis Mumford Center for Comparative Urban and Regional Research, SUNY-Albany. Available at: http://mumford1.dyndns.org/cen2000/SchoolPop/SPReport/SPDownload.pdf. Logan, J.R., Stults, B., and Farley, R. (2004). Segregation of minorities in the metropolis: Two decades of change. Demography, 41, 1–22. Massey, D.S. (1981). Hispanic residential segregation: A comparison of Mexicans, Cubans, and Puerto Ricans. Sociology and Social Research, 65, 311–322. Massey, D.S., and Denton, N.A. (1987). Trends in the residential segregation of blacks, Hispanics, and Asians: 1970–1980. American Sociological Review, 52, 802–825. Massey, D.S., and Denton, N.A. (1993). American apartheid. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Morenoff, J.M., and Tienda, M. (1997, May). Underclass neighborhoods in temporal and ecological perspective: An illustration from Chicago. Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 551, 59–72. National Research Council. (1989). A common destiny: Blacks and American society. Committee on the Status of Black Americans. G.D. Jaynes and R.M. Williams, Jr. (Eds.). Washington, DC: National Academy Press. Orfield, G., and Lee, C. (2004). Brown at 50: King’s dream or Plessy’s nightmare? Harvard Civil Rights Project. Available: http://www.civilrightsproject.harvard.edu/research/reseg04/brown50.pdf [accessed July 9, 2004].

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Hispanics and the Future of America Papademetriou, D., and Ray, B. (2004). From homeland to home: Immigrants and homeownership in urban America. (vol. 1, issue I, March). Washington, DC: Fannie Mae. Reardon, S.F., and Yun, J.T. (2001). Suburban racial change and suburban school segregation, 1987–95. Sociology of Education, 74, 79–101. Reardon, S.F., and Yun, J.T. (2003). Integrating neighborhoods, segregating schools: The retreat from school desegregation in the South, 1990–2000. North Carolina Law Review, 81, 1563–1596. Suro, R., and Singer, A. (2002). Latino growth in metropolitan America: Changing patterns, new locations. Survey Series, Census 2000. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution. Taeuber, K. (1975). Demographic perspectives on housing and school segregation. Wayne Law Review, 21, 833–850. Taeuber, K., Sorensen, A., and Hollingsworth, L., Jr. (1975). Indexes of racial residential segregation for 109 cities in the United States, 1940 to 1970. Sociological Focus, 8, 125–142. Tienda, M., and Niu, S. (2004, October). Capitalizing on segregation, pretending neutrality: College admissions and the Texas top 10% law. Paper presented at the Seminar on 50 years after Brown, Princeton University. Tienda, M., and Wilson, F. (1991). Migration, ethnicity, and labor force activity. In J.M. Abowd and R.B. Freeman (Eds.), Immigration, trade and the labor force (pp. 135–163). Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press. Turner, M.A., Ross, S.L., et al. (2002). Discrimination in metropolitan housing markets: National results from Phase I HDS 2000. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development. Wilkes, R., and Iceland, J. (2004). Hypersegregation in the twenty-first century. Demography, 41, 23–36. Zúñiga, V., and Hernández-León, R. (Eds.) (2005). New destinations: Mexican migration in the United States. New York: Russell Sage Foundation.

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Hispanics and the Future of America APPENDIX TABLE A4-1 Racial/Ethnic Composition Measures: 100 Largest Metropolitan Statistical Areas, 1980–2000 Metropolitan Statistical Area 1980 1990 2000 % H % B % FB % H % B % FB % H % B % FB Traditional Hispanic Metros 18.0 13.6 16.6 24.0 12.8 22.4 29.8 12.4 26.8 Albuquerque, NM MSA 36.1 2.0 4.7 37.0 2.5 7.0 41.6 2.5 8.9 Austin, TX MSA 17.5 9.3 5.4 20.5 9.0 8.9 26.2 8.0 15.6 Bakersfield, CA MSA 21.6 5.2 8.6 28.0 5.3 13.8 14.5 6.0 19.4 Chicago, IL PMSA 8.1 20.0 12.0 12.1 21.7 14.8 17.1 18.9 18.5 Dallas, TX PMSA 8.9 16.0 5.0 14.5 15.8 9.8 23.0 15.1 18.9 Denver, CO PMSA 11.5 5.3 5.4 13.0 5.7 6.4 18.8 5.5 13.2 El Paso, TX MSA 61.9 3.8 22.3 69.6 3.5 27.4 78.2 3.1 30.2 Fort Worth–Arlington, TX PMSA 7.3 10.4 4.8 11.3 10.6 6.3 18.2 11.2 11.4 Fresno, CA MSA 29.0 4.8 11.0 35.5 4.6 18.2 44.0 5.1 20.6 Houston, TX PMSA 14.6 18.7 9.0 21.4 18.1 14.2 29.9 17.5 21.4 Jersey City, NJ PMSA 26.1 12.6 29.2 33.3 12.7 36.2 39.8 13.5 43.3 Los Angeles–Long Beach, CA PMSA 27.6 12.6 23.6 37.8 10.5 33.7 44.6 9.8 36.8 McAllen, TX MSA 81.3 0.2 20.0 85.2 0.1 28.0 88.3 0.5 31.5 Miami, FL PMSA 35.7 17.3 39.2 49.2 19.1 48.8 57.3 20.3 55.7 New York, NY PMSA 17.7 23.1 26.7 22.1 23.2 32.9 25.1 24.6 39.0 Newark, NJ PMSA 6.7 20.9 13.7 10.3 22.4 17.3 13.3 22.3 21.4 Oakland, CA PMSA 10.6 15.0 15.1 13.1 14.2 16.2 18.5 12.7 24.0 Orange County, CA PMSA 14.8 1.3   23.0 1.4   30.8 1.7 29.9 Phoenix–Mesa, AZ MSA 14.1 3.2 6.3 16.3 3.3 8.4 25.1 3.7 15.2 Riverside–San Bernardino, CA PMSA 18.6 5.1 8.8 26.5 6.5 15.5 37.8 7.7 19.2 Sacramento, CA PMSA 8.7 6.0 8.4 11.6 6.7 11.3 14.4 7.7 14.8 San Antonio, TX MSA 44.9 6.8 8.0 47.6 6.5 10.2 51.2 6.6 12.8 San Diego, CA MSA 14.8 5.5 13.9 20.5 6.0 18.7 26.7 5.7 23.7 San Francisco, CA PMSA 11.2 8.5 16.9 14.5 7.4 30.5 16.8 5.3 35.7

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Hispanics and the Future of America San Jose, CA PMSA 17.5 3.3 14.4 21.0 3.5 24.9 24.0 2.8 35.1 Stockton, CA MSA 19.3 5.5 11.7 23.5 5.2 16.4 30.5 6.7 20.7 Tucson, AZ MSA 20.9 2.7 8.0 24.4 2.9 10.8 29.3 3.0 13.6 Vallejo, CA PMSA 9.9 8.7 8.2 13.6 10.0 12.7 19.1 11.7 17.2 Ventura, CA PMSA 21.4 2.1 13.9 26.5 2.2 18.7 33.4 1.9 20.4 New Hispanic Destinations 2.4 12.9 5.8 3.8 13.8 7.5 7.0 14.8 12.4 Albany, NY MSA 1.0 3.6 5.3 1.8 4.6 5.3 2.7 6.1 6.3 Allentown, PA MSA 2.5 1.5 5.1 4.2 1.8 6.1 7.9 3.0 7.9 Atlanta, GA MSA 1.1 24.5 2.8 2.0 25.8 4.8 6.5 28.9 11.4 Baltimore, MD PMSA 0.9 25.5 4.0 1.3 25.7 4.6 2.0 27.4 6.8 Bergen–Passaic, NJ PMSA 7.0 7.1 20.0 11.6 7.5 21.1 17.3 8.1 28.1 Birmingham, AL MSA 0.7 28.8 1.2 0.4 27.0 1.2 1.8 30.1 3.4 Boston, MA–NH PMSA 2.3 5.3 11.5 4.5 6.8 14.0 5.9 7.0 18.4 Charlotte, NC–SC MSA 0.8 20.5 2.3 0.9 19.9 2.8 5.1 20.5 10.2 Columbus, OH MSA 0.7 11.2 2.6 0.8 11.9 2.5 1.8 13.4 6.4 Fort Lauderdale, FL PMSA 3.9 11.1 11.8 8.6 14.9 16.9 16.7 20.5 26.8 Gary, IN PMSA 7.2 19.6   7.9 19.2 3.7 10.5 19.7 4.8 Grand Rapids, MI MSA 2.1 6.3 4.1 3.3 5.8 3.6 6.3 7.3 6.5 Greensboro–Winston Salem, NC MSA 0.6 19.2 1.6 0.8 19.3 1.5 5.0 20.2 6.2 Greenville, SC MSA 0.7 17.1 2.0 0.7 17.2 2.1 2.7 17.5   Harrisburg, PA MSA 1.1 6.1 3.1 1.7 6.5 3.0 3.1 7.8 3.9 Hartford, CT MSA 4.3 6.8 12.0 7.6 10.0 12.9 9.6 9.5 23.3 Indianapolis, IN MSA 0.8 12.8 1.8 0.9 13.7 1.8 2.7 13.9 4.6 Jacksonville, FL MSA 1.9 21.7 3.9 2.5 19.8 4.8 3.8 21.7 6.6 Kansas City, MO-KS MSA 2.4 12.9 2.5 2.9 12.7 2.6 5.2 12.8 4.6 Knoxville, TN MSA 0.6 6.9 2.0 0.5 6.0 1.9 1.3 5.8 2.9 Las Vegas, NV–AZ MSA 7.6 9.9 9.2 11.2 9.3 10.1 20.6 8.1 19.1 Little Rock, AR MSA 0.9 20.3 2.1 0.8 19.9 2.0 2.1 21.9 3.1 Louisville, KY–IN MSA 0.6 13.0 1.4 0.6 13.0 1.4 1.6 13.9 3.7

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Hispanics and the Future of America Metropolitan Statistical Area 1980 1990 2000 % H % B % FB % H % B % FB % H % B % FB Memphis, TN–AR–MS MSA 1.0 40.1 1.6 0.8 40.5 1.9 2.4 43.4 5.0 Middlesex–Somerset–Hunterdon, NJ PMSA 4.4 5.3   7.1 6.5 14.7 11.2 8.0 22.0 Milwaukee, WI PMSA 2.5 10.8 4.6 3.6 13.6 4.4 6.3 15.7 6.8 Minneapolis–St. Paul, MN–WI MSA 1.1 2.3 3.7 1.5 3.6 4.5 3.3 5.3 8.4 Monmouth–Ocean, NJ PMSA 2.5 6.1   3.7 5.8 9.0 5.7 5.8 9.5 Nashville, TN MSA 0.6 16.1 1.5 0.8 15.4 2.3 3.3 15.6 6.7 Nassau-Suffolk, NY PMSA 4.0 6.2 9.8 6.3 7.0 11.3 10.3 8.5 15.6 New Haven, CT PMSA 3.7 10.4 9.0 6.2 11.7 9.0 9.8 13.1 8.5 Norfolk–Virginia Beach–Newport News, VA–NC MSA 1.5 28.5 4.5 2.3 28.2 5.7 3.1 30.9 6.7 Oklahoma City, OK MSA 2.3 9.0 3.0 3.5 10.4 4.7 6.7 10.6 9.6 Omaha, NE–IA MSA 2.2 7.5 3.7 2.6 8.3 2.8 5.5 8.3 7.3 Orlando, FL MSA 3.5 12.9 6.8 8.9 12.0 11.9 16.5 13.9 18.5 Portland–Vancouver, OR–WA PMSA 2.0 2.6 5.8 3.5 3.1 7.6 7.4 2.7 13.1 Providence, RI-MA MSA 2.0 2.3 9.7 4.8 4.1 10.0 7.9 4.0 18.7 Raleigh–Durham, NC MSA 0.8 24.7 3.3 1.2 24.9 4.8 6.1 22.7 11.3 Richmond, VA MSA 0.9 29.0 2.4 1.0 29.0 3.6 2.3 30.2 6.1 Seattle–Bellevue, WA PMSA 4.9 1.0 8.1 5.8 0.9 10.2 10.8 1.1 15.2 Salt Lake City, UT MSA 1.7 6.8 4.0 2.2 4.3 4.9 6.6 6.0 10.0 Sarasota, FL MSA 2.0 3.6 6.3 2.8 4.0 6.5 5.2 4.4 9.6 Springfield, MA MSA 4.4 5.2 9.3 9.1 6.2 10.6 12.5 6.7 13.5 Tacoma, WA PMSA 2.7 6.2 8.6 3.6 7.0 8.7 5.5 7.0 11.1 Tampa–St. Petersburg–Clearwater, FL MSA 5.1 9.2 7.5 6.7 8.8 8.9 10.4 10.2 12.1 Tulsa, OK MSA 1.5 7.8 1.7 2.0 8.2 2.5 4.8 8.8 5.5 Washington, DC–MD–VA–WV PMSA 2.9 26.7 9.5 5.7 26.2 14.8 8.8 26.0 20.9

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Hispanics and the Future of America West Palm Beach, FL MSA 4.9 13.7 10.8 7.8 11.9 13.9 12.4 13.8 20.0 Wichita, KS MSA 2.9 7.5 4.1 4.1 7.4 3.9 7.4 7.8 6.9 Wilmington, DE–MD PMSA 1.6 14.0 4.6 2.4 14.7 4.2 4.7 17.8   Other Large Metros 1.7 15.8 5.4 2.1 16.7 5.2 2.9 17.5 6.5 Akron, OH PMSA 0.5 9.1 3.5 0.6 9.9 3.5 0.8 11.0 4.3 Ann Arbor, MI PMSA 1.4 11.0 6.0 2.1 11.0 6.1 3.1 7.3 6.8 Baton Rouge, LA MSA 1.8 27.9 2.2 1.4 29.5 1.8 1.8 31.9 3.2 Buffalo, NY MSA 1.3 9.3 6.8 1.8 10.0 5.6 2.9 11.7 5.9 Charleston, SC MSA 1.4 31.7 3.2 1.5 30.1 3.9 2.4 30.8 4.4 Cincinnati, OH–KY–IN PMSA 0.6 12.3 2.4 0.6 13.1 2.3 1.1 13.0 3.3 Cleveland, OH PMSA 1.8 16.2 6.9 1.9 19.3 6.8 3.3 18.5 6.0 Columbia, SC MSA 1.3 28.8 3.1 1.3 30.2 3.2 2.4 32.1 4.6 Dayton, OH MSA 0.6 12.6 2.6 0.8 13.2 2.6 1.2 14.2 3.2 Detroit, MI PMSA 1.6 20.3 6.8 1.9 21.4 5.9 2.9 22.9 8.5 Honolulu, HI MSA 7.2 2.2 18.1 6.8 3.0 18.6 6.7 2.4 23.3 Mobile, AL MSA 1.1 28.7 1.6 0.9 27.3 2.1 1.4 27.4 2.2 New Orleans, LA MSA 4.0 32.2 5.0 4.3 34.5 4.6 4.4 37.5 6.4 Philadelphia, PA–NJ PMSA 2.5 18.7 6.5 3.6 18.8 7.2 5.1 20.1 8.8 Pittsburgh, PA MSA 0.5 7.3 3.8 0.6 8.1 2.7 0.7 8.1 3.3 Rochester, NY MSA 2.0 8.0 6.2 3.1 9.1 6.6 4.3 10.3 9.9 Scranton, PA MSA 0.4 0.6 3.1 0.8 1.0 2.6 1.2 1.4 2.8 St. Louis, MO-IL MSA 0.9 17.0 2.7 1.1 17.3 2.5 1.5 18.3 3.6 Syracuse, NY MSA 1.0 4.8 4.8 1.4 5.8 4.8 2.1 6.5 4.9 Toledo, OH MSA 2.8 10.6 2.8 3.3 11.2 3.0 4.4 12.8 3.9 Youngstown, OH MSA 1.3 10.5 4.4 1.5 11.0 3.5 1.8 10.3 3.1 Top 100 MSA Averages 8.4 13.8 7.2 11.8 13.9 9.3 15.8 14.3 12.3 NOTE: MSA = metropolitan statistical area; PMSA = primary metropolitan statistical area; H = Hispanic; B = black; FB = foreign-born. SOURCE: Data extracted from the GeoLytics Census CD Neighborhood Change Database 1970–2000 Tract Data.

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Hispanics and the Future of America APPENDIX TABLE A4-2 Hispanic Subgroup Composition by Metropolitan Area Type, 1980–2000 Metropolitan Area Type 1980 Population Composition (%) N (000s) HISP MEX PR CUB OTH Traditional 9,363.5 18.0 60.2 13.8 6.9 19.0 Hispanic Metros New York, NY 1,465 17.7 1.8 59.9 4.7 33.6 Chicago, IL 581 8.1 63.0 22.3 3.2 11.5 Los Angeles, CA 2,065 27.6 79.6 1.8 2.2 16.4 Miami, FL 580 35.7 2.2 7.9 70.0 20.0 New Hispanic Destinations 1,268.5 2.4 35.1 23.2 7.5 34.1 Allentown, PA 14 2.5 8.0 70.8 1.8 19.4 Providence, RI 22 2.0 7.2 19.0 3.0 70.8 Grand Rapids, MI 18 2.1 71.2 9.6 3.9 15.4 Minneapolis, MN 23 1.1 63.4 5.9 2.4 28.4 Atlanta, GA 23 1.1 32.6 11.3 16.9 39.3 Raleigh-Durham, NC 5.3 0.8 42.9 7.5 7.1 42.5 Nashville, TN 5.5 0.6 49.1 5.7 4.5 40.6 Tulsa, OK 10 1.5 59.3 4.7 4.0 32.0 Other Large Metros 484.6 1.7 25.0 37.2 4.0 33.8 Top 100 (P)MSA 11,116.6 8.4 55.4 16.1 6.9 21.6 NOTE: N= Hispanic population absolute size (000s). HISP = Hispanics as a percent of that city’s population. MEX = % of Hispanics that are Mexican. PR = % of Hispanics that are Puerto Rican. CUB = % of Hispanics that are Cuban. OTH = % of Hispanics that are other. MSA = metropolitan statistical area.

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Hispanics and the Future of America 1990 Population Composition (%) 2000 Population Composition (%) N (000s) HISP MEX PR CUB OTH N (000s) HISP MEX PR CUB OTH 14,416.5 24.1 63.4 9.9 5.7 21.0 21,516.8 29.8 62.0 6.6 4.1 27.3 1890 22.1 3.5 48.8 3.5 44.2 2,338 25.1 9.2 35.7 2.0 53.1 735 12.1 69.5 17.4 2.0 11.1 1,415 17.1 75.0 10.7 1.2 13.1 3351 37.8 76.2 1.2 1.4 21.2 4,245 44.6 71.7 0.9 0.9 26.5 950 49.2 2.4 7.2 59.2 31.2 1,292 57.3 2.9 6.2 50.4 40.5 2,223.2 3.8 33.1 24.3 6.9 35.7 5,022.4 6.8 38.8 18.9 4.8 37.5 29 4.2 5.6 72.8 2.0 19.6 50 7.9 7.0 66.3 1.5 25.2 31.5 4.8 4.7 28.6 2.3 64.4 94 7.9 6.3 28.9 1.2 63.6 23 3.3 72.1 11.6 3.7 12.6 69 6.3 68.0 7.4 2.4 22.2 37.5 1.5 64.6 7.9 3.3 24.2 98 3.3 65.9 5.4 1.9 26.8 57 2.0 39.8 13.9 11.0 35.3 267 6.5 61.5 7.1 3.4 28.0 9 1.2 41.3 14.8 6.3 37.6 72 6.1 66.2 5.8 2.0 26.0 8 0.8 48.1 12.5 5.7 33.7 41 3.3 63.0 7.3 2.9 26.8 14.5 2.0 67.4 7.2 2.2 23.2 39 4.8 72.3 4.9 1.3 21.5 586.5 2.0 23.5 45.0 3.7 27.8 1,050.4 2.9 27.4 42.3 3.2 27.1 17,226.2 11.8 57.7 13.2 5.8 23.3 27,589.6 15.9 56.4 10.2 4.2 29.2