8
Economic Well-Being

Cordelia Reimers

The social processes described in the preceding chapters—selective migration from the various countries of Latin America, family structure and household size, education, employment, and earnings—are important influences on the economic well-being of Hispanics in the United States. These processes vary considerably among Hispanic subgroups, leading to wide variation in their economic status. Building on those earlier chapters, this chapter examines the outcome of these processes as reflected in total household income, not just earnings, which were examined in Chapter 7. Household income is a more comprehensive measure of economic well-being than individual earnings because it includes the earnings of all household members, plus unearned income from public benefits and other sources. Thus, it gives a more complete picture of the economic resources available to Hispanics, which vitally affect their lives.1

As the earlier chapters have made clear, the Hispanic population is tremendously diverse, both across national-origin groups and across generations. Aggregate statistics for Hispanics as a group mainly reflect the

1  

The picture is still incomplete, however, because household income excludes fringe benefits (such as employer-provided health insurance), in-kind benefits (such as food stamps, Medicaid, and Medicare), capital gains on investments, and the services provided by assets (such as automobiles and owner-occupied houses). Some types of income are underreported, such as welfare benefits, business income, and dividends. Moreover, taxes and income diverted to other households (for example, remittances and child support) are not deducted. Finally, some households may not in fact pool income, as is implicitly assumed.



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Hispanics and the Future of America 8 Economic Well-Being Cordelia Reimers The social processes described in the preceding chapters—selective migration from the various countries of Latin America, family structure and household size, education, employment, and earnings—are important influences on the economic well-being of Hispanics in the United States. These processes vary considerably among Hispanic subgroups, leading to wide variation in their economic status. Building on those earlier chapters, this chapter examines the outcome of these processes as reflected in total household income, not just earnings, which were examined in Chapter 7. Household income is a more comprehensive measure of economic well-being than individual earnings because it includes the earnings of all household members, plus unearned income from public benefits and other sources. Thus, it gives a more complete picture of the economic resources available to Hispanics, which vitally affect their lives.1 As the earlier chapters have made clear, the Hispanic population is tremendously diverse, both across national-origin groups and across generations. Aggregate statistics for Hispanics as a group mainly reflect the 1   The picture is still incomplete, however, because household income excludes fringe benefits (such as employer-provided health insurance), in-kind benefits (such as food stamps, Medicaid, and Medicare), capital gains on investments, and the services provided by assets (such as automobiles and owner-occupied houses). Some types of income are underreported, such as welfare benefits, business income, and dividends. Moreover, taxes and income diverted to other households (for example, remittances and child support) are not deducted. Finally, some households may not in fact pool income, as is implicitly assumed.

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Hispanics and the Future of America experience of Mexicans, who constitute about 60 percent of all Hispanics. The U.S. Census Bureau publishes data annually on individual, family, and household income and poverty rates for Hispanics overall and separately for Mexicans, Puerto Ricans, Cubans, Central and South Americans (combined), and other Hispanics (U.S. Bureau of the Census, 2003, Summary Table 1, Detailed Tables 12.1–15.2).2 Scholars have produced a number of disaggregated analyses of family or household income based on the 1990 and earlier censuses and on Current Population Survey (CPS) data.3 However, the available studies usually do not identify the smaller national-origin groups (such as Dominicans, Colombians, Salvadorans, and Guatemalans) beyond a catch-all category, Central and South Americans. Moreover, they could not distinguish among the generations born in the United States, because parents’ birthplace is not in the decennial census and was not available in the CPS on a regular basis until 1994. This makes it difficult to trace the intergenerational changes in economic well-being for Latinos born in the United States in order to see how the course of assimilation is (or is not) proceeding. Nearly all of the earlier studies examined family income rather than household income, thus omitting nonrelatives’ income and ignoring nonfamily households. In addition, the earlier studies are becoming somewhat dated. Rather than simply review the findings of these older studies, this chapter takes advantage of the pooled 1998–2002 March CPS data that have been used in other chapters and are described in the appendix. This data set has detailed indicators of national origin and generation based on birthplace and parents’ birthplace. As in other chapters, this more “objective” measure of national origin enables us to go beyond the self-identified groups 2   The Census Bureau also published tables based on the 1990 census showing income and poverty rates for Hispanics by self-identified national origin for all the countries in Latin America, nativity, whether the foreign-born entered the United States in 1980 or later, and citizenship status (U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1993, Table 5). These tables have not yet been published for the 2000 census. 3   For example, see the chapter on “Earnings and Economic Well-Being” in Bean and Tienda (1987). Amidst a wealth of information, it shows changes from 1970 to 1980 in family income and poverty rates and in sources of income for Mexicans, Puerto Ricans, Cubans, Central/South Americans, other Hispanics, and black and white non-Hispanics by nativity, type of headship, family size, and age of head. Other studies of the changing American income distribution, such as Karoly (1993) and Levy (1995, 1998), have compared family incomes for Hispanics in the aggregate with black and white non-Hispanics. Chiswick and Sullivan (1995) provide a more detailed picture of mean household income in 1989 of the foreign-born by date of arrival, separating Mexicans from other Latin Americans. A Bean et al. (1994) study is one of the rare earlier studies that disaggregates Mexicans by generation in the United States, but it focuses on social indicators, such as education and naturalization, rather than economic outcomes.

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Hispanics and the Future of America (Mexicans, Puerto Ricans, Cubans) in the CPS to distinguish Dominicans, Salvadorans and Guatemalans, Colombians, and Peruvians and Ecuadorians from other Central and South Americans. It also enables us to distinguish between immigrants who came to the United States as adults (the “1.0 generation”) and their children who were born abroad but grew up in the United States (the “1.5 generation”), and between those in the second generation whose parents were both born abroad (the “2.0 generation”) and those who have one parent born in the United States (the “2.5 generation”). Immigrants who came to the United States as children may resemble those who were born in the United States to two foreign-born parents more than they resemble immigrants who came as adults. Similarly, persons with one U.S.-born parent may resemble those with two U.S.-born parents (the “3+ generation”) more than they resemble those with two immigrant parents. It is useful to examine whether the data support this conjecture. Preliminary analysis of this data set revealed that the national-origin groups in Central America and in South America resemble each other enough in terms of economic status that they can be combined into these two groups, but that Central Americans and South Americans are quite different from each other and Dominicans differ from both. This chapter therefore treats these three groups separately, in addition to Mexicans, Puerto Ricans, and Cubans. To simplify the presentation, in this chapter I usually combine generations 1.0 and 1.5 (first-generation immigrants) and generations 2.0 and 2.5 (second-generation children of immigrants), while noting any significant differences within the first and second generations. The detailed tabulations are available in the appendix at the end of the chapter. Using this data set, this chapter presents a detailed portrait of the household incomes of Latinos in the United States at the turn of the 21st century, by national origin and generation in the United States. It reveals the diversity behind the aggregate numbers for household income, its sources, and poverty rates for Hispanic subgroups classified by national origin and generation, compared with black and white non-Hispanics who were born in the United States of U.S.-born parents.4 Such a portrait is not available anywhere in the existing literature. While giving a more nuanced picture of Hispanic well-being, it reveals more puzzles and raises more questions than can be answered here. The historical comparisons and mul- 4   Throughout this chapter, for the sake of brevity I often refer to third (or higher) generation non-Hispanic whites and blacks simply as “whites” and “blacks.” I use the terms “Hispanic” and “Latino” interchangeably. Although persons born in Puerto Rico are U.S. citizens by birth and thus are not immigrants, they are grouped with first-generation immigrants, and “U.S.-born” refers only to those born on the U.S. mainland.

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Hispanics and the Future of America tivariate analyses that would be necessary to explain all of the observed patterns are beyond the scope of this chapter and are not attempted here. I hope that the data presented in this chapter will stimulate further research to explain these patterns. Annual household income and poverty rates are considered first, followed by sources of income in earnings, public benefits, and other unearned income, such as rent, interest, child support, scholarships, and gifts. I also investigate the extent to which Hispanics compensate for low earning capacity by doubling up in an extended household, so that several workers can contribute their earnings. Hispanic subgroups with larger households may have more total income, but less income per person. For each national-origin group, I note changes across generations. Which outcomes show progress from the first to the second generation, and which do not? Are there any changes from the second to the third generation? A separate section is devoted to the elderly, who are a small fraction of the Latino population in the United States today but who will become more important in the future. I show that the economic status and sources of income of the various Hispanic subgroups are largely governed by their relative levels of education (which largely determine their earning capacity) and by family structure. The legal status of immigrants and phenotype also influence earning capacity. Thus, Mexican, Central American, Dominican, Puerto Rican, and recent Cuban immigrants are limited by lack of education, and in some cases by undocumented status and nonwhite appearance. Dominicans and Puerto Ricans are further limited by the prevalence of female-headed households. These underlying factors lead to striking similarities between Mexicans and Central Americans, between Puerto Ricans and Dominicans, and between Cubans and South Americans in their levels of household income and its sources. At the same time, they result in remarkable contrasts among these pairs of Hispanic-origin groups. WORKING-AGE HISPANIC HOUSEHOLDS Annual Income and Poverty Rates The incomes of Mexican Americans—by far the largest group of Latinos—are very low. Their median annual household income ranges from $30,000 (in 2002 dollars) for the immigrant generation to about $40,000 for those who were born in the United States (see Table 8-1). In each generation they rank lower than the other Hispanic national-origin groups except for Dominicans and Puerto Ricans. However, Mexicans who were born in the United States have higher household incomes than blacks, whose median income is only $32,000 per year. In contrast, the median

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Hispanics and the Future of America TABLE 8-1 Median Real Annual Income and Per Capita Income of Households, in 2002 Dollars, 1997–2001 Pooled National Origin (Birthplace) Households with Head Under Age 65 Generation 1st: Foreign-Born 2nd: U.S.-Born, Foreign-Born Parent 3+: U.S.-Born, Both Parents U.S.-Born*   Median Total Household Income (2002 $) Mexico $29,799 $40,676 $39,306 Central America 33,626 49,138   Puerto Rico 27,592 36,989 35,553 Dominican Republic 24,379 37,941   Cuba 39,733 62,545   South America 42,889 52,085   All Hispanics (self-identity)* 31,470 40,505 39,903 Black non-Hispanics (self-identity)*     31,775 White non-Hispanics (self-identity)*     54,752   Median Income Per Capita (2002 $) Mexico $7,775 $12,994 $13,312 Central America 9,993 20,151   Puerto Rico 10,308 13,059 13,053 Dominican Republic 7,726 13,739   Cuba 14,581 22,678   South America 14,729 20,316   All Hispanics (self-identity)* 9,071 13,570 13,901 Black non-Hispanics (self-identity)*     13,388 White non-Hispanics (self-identity)*     22,480 *The samples for Hispanics overall and for 3+ generation Mexicans, Puerto Ricans, and black and white non-Hispanics are identified by the “subjective” Spanish-origin and race questions in the CPS. SOURCE: Pooled March CPS files, 1998–2002, using household weights. Results for Hispanics are shown only for cells with at least 90 observations. household headed by a third (or higher)-generation white non-Hispanic has an annual income of $55,000. Dominicans and Puerto Ricans have even lower incomes than Mexicans. Immigrants from the Dominican Republic have the lowest median household incomes among first-generation Latinos ($24,000). Puerto Ricans born on the island are just a little higher ($28,000). By the second genera-

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Hispanics and the Future of America tion, these groups are better off than blacks, although their median household incomes are still lower than that of U.S.-born Mexicans. In contrast, Cubans and South Americans are much better off than other Hispanic subgroups of the same generation. Among households headed by working-age Latino adults who were born abroad, South Americans have the highest median total income ($43,000), but among those who were born in the United States of foreign-born parents, Cubans take the lead with $63,000, which is even higher than white non-Hispanics’ $55,000. Central Americans are an intermediate group, with incomes between those of Mexicans and Cubans and South Americans. Income per person is a better measure of economic well-being, because a household’s income must support everyone living there. By this measure, Mexicans are as low as or even lower than Dominicans and Puerto Ricans (see Table 8-1), because they have larger households. In the immigrant generation, for example, Mexicans’ median per capita income ($7,800) is 25 percent less than Puerto Ricans, even though Mexicans’ median total household income is 8 percent higher. Members of half the households headed by first-generation Mexicans and Dominicans are living on less than a third of the income available to half of third (or higher)-generation whites.5 Both total and per capita household incomes increase monotonically across generations for all nationalities, with the largest jumps occurring between the first and second generations.6 Mexicans’ income per person, for example, increases by two-thirds from the immigrant to the second generation.7 When the first and second generations are disaggregated further, one finds that immigrants who arrived as children and grew up in the United States have higher incomes than those who arrived as adults, and the U.S.-born with one U.S.-born parent have higher incomes than those with two foreign-born parents (see Appendix Table A8-1). All U.S.-born Latino 5   Foreign-born Salvadorans and Guatemalans are worse off than other Central Americans in terms of per capita income, although their total household incomes are similar, as shown in Appendix Table A8-1. 6   The slight drops observed between the second and the third (and higher) generations of Mexicans and Puerto Ricans could result from the shift from parents’ birthplace to self-identification. In the 2.5 generation, who have one mainland-born parent, income is slightly lower for those who identify themselves as Puerto Ricans than for those whose other parent was born in Puerto Rico (author’s tabulation, not shown). This suggests that, when island-born Puerto Ricans intermarry with non–Puerto Ricans, the children who have higher incomes disproportionately identify with their non–Puerto Rican parent’s national origin. This selective loss of the more successful in later generations could bias downward measures of intergenerational progress for those of Puerto Rican ancestry. 7   These estimates of income by generation are defined by the generational status of the householder. On an individual level, the distinction among generations is blurred, as second-generation persons grow up in first-generation households and share their economic status.

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Hispanics and the Future of America subgroups have higher median total household incomes than blacks. However, because of their larger households, median per capita income of U.S.-born Mexicans and Puerto Ricans is at or slightly below that of blacks. Cubans who came to the United States in childhood have the same high median household income ($65,000) as U.S.-born Cubans whose parents were both born in Cuba (see Appendix Table A8-1). This is considerably more than double the income of Cubans who were adults when they arrived. In that 1.0 generation, Cubans are no better off than Mexicans. The sharp contrast between Cubans of the 1.0 and 1.5 generations no doubt reflects differences between the early and later cohorts of immigrants. The Cuban exiles who came as adults in the 1960s brought more skills and capital with them than the later cohorts (Alba and Nee, 2003, pp. 189–191). Many of them are now too old to be in our sample of working-age Cuban households, but their advantages were passed on to their children (the 1.5 generation), whose incomes are well above those of whites. Today’s working-age household heads of the 1.0 generation are mainly drawn from the less-skilled later cohorts. Central Americans’ median income jumps by almost 50 percent from the first to the second generation. This is also in part a cohort difference, as the Central American-born parents of second-generation household heads would have arrived in the United States even before the first wave of political exiles came from Nicaragua in the late 1970s and early 1980s. They are likely to have been idiosyncratic immigrants who were disproportionately drawn from their countries’ elites. First-generation Central Americans, in contrast, have mostly come to the United States in the past 20 years, many as undocumented refugees from the civil wars and violence there. They are not highly skilled and did not receive official refugee status or U.S. government aid (Alba and Nee, 2003, pp. 196–197). Lower median incomes are reflected in higher poverty rates and vice versa, with one exception: in the first generation, the Cubans’ poverty rate is as high as that of Central Americans, despite the fact that the Cubans’ median per capita income is much higher (Table 8-2). This indicates that there is greater inequality among the Cubans, as indicated by the contrast between the 1.0 and 1.5 generations discussed above. Within nationality and generation, poverty rates are higher among children than overall. Over half (54 percent) of Puerto Rican and nearly half (48 percent) of Dominican children who were born on those islands but are now on the mainland are being raised in poor families, as are 43 percent of Mexican-born children.8 8   These poverty rates are only a rough indication of the proportion of each group that faces serious hardship, because they do not take account of in-kind benefits such as food stamps, Medicaid, school lunches, and housing subsidies; by the same token, the official poverty threshold is unrealistically low.

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Hispanics and the Future of America TABLE 8-2 Poverty Rates, 1997–2001 Pooled National Origin (Birthplace) Fraction of Persons with Family Income Below Poverty Threshold Generation 1st: Foreign-Born, 2nd: U.S.-Born, Foreign-Born Parent 3+: U.S.Born Both Parents U.S.-Born*   All Ages Mexico 0.265 0.275 0.205 Central America 0.187 0.202   Puerto Rico 0.285 0.257 0.301 Dominican Republic 0.305 0.372   Cuba 0.179 0.126 0.052 South America 0.126 0.117   All Hispanics (self-identity)* 0.238 0.266 0.204 Black non-Hispanics (self-identity)*     0.250 White non-Hispanics (self-identity)*     0.081   Persons in Female-Headed Families Mexico 0.476 0.477 0.380 Central America 0.317 0.379   Puerto Rico 0.519 0.441 0.471 Dominican Republic 0.471 0.584   Cuba 0.374 0.343   South America 0.246 0.252   All Hispanics (self-identity)* 0.427 0.464 0.382 Black non-Hispanics (self-identity)*     0.394 White non-Hispanics (self-identity)*     0.211 *The samples for Hispanics overall and for 3+ generation Mexicans, Puerto Ricans, Cubans, and black and white non-Hispanics are identified by the “subjective” Spanish-origin and race questions in the CPS. SOURCE: Pooled March CPS files, 1998–2002, using person weights. Results for Hispanics are shown only for cells with at least 90 observations.

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Hispanics and the Future of America Generation 1st: Foreign-Born 2nd: U.S.-Born, Foreign-Born Parent 3+: U.S.-Born, Both Parents U.S.-Born* Children Ages 0–17 0.426 0.342 0.268 0.296 0.248   0.536 0.363 0.356 0.481 0.422   0.312 0.178 0.044 0.187 0.131   0.399 0.331 0.269     0.353     0.106 Persons in Married-Couple Families 0.228 0.210 0.117 0.138 0.135   0.142 0.097 0.114 0.179 0.142   0.115 0.055 0.013 0.087 0.070   0.188 0.187 0.110     0.080     0.037

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Hispanics and the Future of America Not surprisingly, families headed by unmarried women are extremely likely to be poor, with poverty rates several times those of married-couple families of the same nationality and generation. This helps explain the very high poverty rates of Puerto Ricans and Dominicans. Controlling for headship status, one finds that Puerto Ricans have the highest poverty rate among the foreign-born female-headed families (52 percent), but Dominicans are highest among the U.S.-born (58 percent). Mexicans are second-poorest or a very close third among female-headed families. Among Latino married-couple families, Mexicans have the highest poverty rates regardless of generation. Disaggregation of the second generation reveals that, unlike household incomes, which increase from each generation to the next, poverty rates do not improve for any group but Cubans until the 2.5 generation, who have at least one parent born on the U.S. mainland. The contrast between intergenerational growth of income and stagnation of poverty rates indicates that inequality increases across generations. Cuban poverty rates drop between the 1.0 and the 1.5 generation, mirroring the jump in income discussed above. By the third generation, the Cubans’ poverty rate is even lower than that of white non-Hispanics’ (5 versus 8 percent). Public programs providing noncash benefits—Medicaid, Medicare, food stamps, school lunches, housing subsidies, and energy assistance—represent a significant addition to household resources for Hispanics. The valuation of Medicaid and Medicare coverage is problematic, however, because these values do not represent actual services received by the household, but are more like an imputed insurance premium. The groups with the lowest cash incomes tend to have the largest values of in-kind benefits. Excluding Medicaid and Medicare, the average value of the other noncash benefits (mainly food stamps) per household adds about 4 percent to the median Dominican immigrant household’s economic resources—about twice as much as for blacks—and no more than 3 percent for other subgroups.9 In sum, whereas Chapter 7 reports that Mexicans have the lowest education and earnings among Latino subgroups, Mexicans do not have the lowest total household income or the highest poverty rate in each generation; Dominicans or Puerto Ricans do. This paradox can be explained by the characteristics reported in Chapters 3 and 5: Mexican households are less likely to be female-headed, are more likely to be extended, and are concentrated in different locations than Puerto Ricans and Domini- 9   These percentages are derived by dividing the value in Appendix Table A8-7 by the value in Table 8-1.

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Hispanics and the Future of America cans. Mexicans do have the highest poverty rates among married-couple families, and they often share the bottom rung in per capita income. Household incomes rise from generation to generation for all groups, but so does inequality, so that poverty rates generally do not drop until the 2.5 generation, who have one U.S.-born parent. By this generation, all Latino nationalities except Dominicans are less likely to be poor than blacks. At the other extreme, Cubans who were born or grew up in the United States have per capita incomes on a par with whites. However, these U.S.-born Hispanics’ parents and grandparents who were born abroad were not necessarily comparable to today’s immigrants from the same country. This is because, as described in Chapters 2 and 3, changing political and economic conditions in the countries of Latin America have sent waves of exiles and emigrants to the United States whose characteristics have varied over time. These differences in economic well-being among Latino subgroups are broadly correlated with their earning capacities, as indicated by their education levels. The class backgrounds of the various cohorts of political refugees and economic migrants from each Latin American country affect the position they can achieve in the U.S. labor market and the advantages they can transmit to their children and grandchildren. Such advantages from education and class help explain the high incomes of South Americans and of Cubans whose parents came in the first wave of refugees. Legal status also affects the earnings of the first generation, as undocumented immigrants (who constitute a significant proportion of Mexicans, Central Americans, and Dominicans) are largely confined to marginal jobs and often cannot translate their skills into commensurate incomes. Phenotype may also play a role, as darker Hispanics are more likely to face racial discrimination in the United States than those who look like Europeans. In addition to education, legal status, and phenotype, which affect earning capacity, household structure also plays a major role, as the high female-headship rates of Puerto Ricans and Dominicans reduce their median household incomes. Sources of Household Income For a deeper understanding of why household incomes vary across nationalities and generations, it is useful to consider three sources of income: earnings, public benefits, and the incomes of extended household members (defined as persons of working age who are living in the household, other than the head and his or her spouse). The relative shares of income from these sources are influenced by three factors: first, the skills and earnings of the head and secondary earners, discussed in Chapter 7; second, household structure—that is, female headship and household ex-

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Hispanics and the Future of America Generation* 1.0: Arrived as Adult 2.0: U.S.-Born, Both Parents Foreign-Born 2.5: U.S.-Born, 1 Parent U.S.-Born 3+: U.S.-Born, Both Parents U.S.-Born** Fraction Receiving SSI 0.240 0.153 0.126 0.120 0.226       0.350       0.453 0.074 0.048   0.214       0.130       0.252 0.137 0.135 0.116       0.139       0.035 Fraction Receiving Medicaid 0.392 0.279 0.269 0.247 0.385       0.527       0.656 0.100 0.120   0.371       0.282       0.415 0.254 0.306 0.235       0.273       0.096

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Hispanics and the Future of America APPENDIX TABLE A8-13 Mean Shares of Household Income by Source: Income of Extended-Household Members, 1997–2001 Pooled National Origin (Birthplace) Households with Head Age 65 Or Older Generation 1st: Foreign-Born 2nd: U.S.-Born, Foreign-Born Parent 3+: U.S.-Born, Both Parents U.S.-Born*   Fraction of Household Income Mexico Head’s children & grandchildren** 0.187 0.134 0.124 Other relatives of head 0.021 0.027 0.011 Unmarried partner of head 0.001 0.002 0.004 Other nonrelatives 0.009 0.014 0.008 Central America Head’s children & grandchildren** 0.151     Other relatives of head 0.034     Unmarried partner of head 0.004     Other nonrelatives 0.010     Puerto Rico Head’s children & grandchildren** 0.087     Other relatives of head 0.015     Unmarried partner of head 0.001     Other nonrelatives 0.010     Dominican Republic Head’s children & grandchildren** 0.139 0.072   Other relatives of head 0.024 0.011   Unmarried partner of head 0.000 0.000   Other nonrelatives 0.022 0.014   Cuba Head’s children & grandchildren** 0.057     Other relatives of head 0.037     Unmarried partner of head 0.006     Other nonrelatives 0.004     South America Head’s children & grandchildren** 0.124     Other relatives of head 0.021     Unmarried partner of head 0.001     Other nonrelatives 0.020    

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Hispanics and the Future of America National Origin (Birthplace) Households with Head Age 65 Or Older Generation 1st: Foreign-Born 2nd: U.S.-Born, Foreign-Born Parent 3+: U.S.-Born, Both Parents U.S.-Born*   Fraction of Household Income All Hispanics (self-identity)* Head’s children & grandchildren** 0.125 0.131 0.108 Other relatives of head 0.026 0.030 0.009 Unmarried partner of head 0.002 0.002 0.003 Other nonrelatives 0.010 0.014 0.007 Black non-Hispanics (self-identity)* Head’s children & grandchildren**     0.111 Other relatives of head     0.015 Unmarried partner of head     0.003 Other nonrelatives     0.010 White non-Hispanics (self-identity)* Head’s children & grandchildren**     0.047 Other relatives of head     0.007 Unmarried partner of head     0.002 Other nonrelatives     0.006 *The samples for Hispanics overall and for 3+ generation Mexicans and black and white non-Hispanics are identified by the “subjective” Spanish-origin and race questions in the CPS. **Includes parents, who contribute 0.6 percent or less for each group. SOURCE: Pooled March CPS files, 1998–2002. Means are simple averages across households, using household weights. Households with zero or negative total income, or containing persons with negative income from any source, are excluded. Results for Hispanics are shown only for cells with at least 90 observations. Box indicates combined groups.

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Hispanics and the Future of America APPENDIX TABLE A8-14 Sample Sizes: Households National Origin (Birthplace) Households with Head Under Age 65 Generation 1st: Total Foreign-Born 1.0: Arrived as Adult Mexico 9,837 6,002 El Salvador, Guatemala 1,618 1,143 Other Central America 933 666 Puerto Rico 1,941 878 Dominican Republic 947 648 Cuba 1,048 643 Colombia 616 477 Peru, Ecuador 700 506 Other South America 574 416 Hispanics (self-identity)* 18,440 11,523 Black non-Hispanics (self-identity)* White non-Hispanics (self-identity)* National Origin (Birthplace) Households with Head Age 65 or Older Generation 1st: Total Foreign-Born 1.0: Arrived as Adult** Mexico 605 477 El Salvador, Guatemala 46 32 Other Central America 92 71 Puerto Rico 418 278 Dominican Republic 123 113 Cuba 520 485 Colombia 78 75 Peru, Ecuador 42 40 Other South America 81 77 Hispanics (self-identity)* 1,992 1,645 Black non-Hispanics (self-identity)* White non-Hispanics (self-identity)* *The samples for Hispanics overall and for 3+ generation Mexicans, Puerto Ricans, Cubans, and black and white non-Hispanics are identified by the “subjective” Spanish-origin and race questions in the CPS. **Persons who were born before 1932 and entered the United States before 1950 are omitted because one cannot tell whether they belong to generation 1.0 or 1.5. They are included in the foreign-born total in column 1. SOURCE: Pooled March CPS files, 1998–2002.

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Hispanics and the Future of America 1.5: Arrived as Child 2.0: U.S.-Born, Both Parents Foreign-Born 2.5: U.S.-Born, 1 Parent U.S.-Born 3+: U.S.-Born, Both Parents U.S.-Born* 3,834 1,493 1,324 5,545 474 57 226   267 77 105   1,065 1,047 272 466 299 98 32   405 180 115 49 139 53 21   194 50 25   158 58 48   6,915 3,131 1,856 7,848       21,628       142,207 1.5: Arrived as Child** 2.0: U.S.-Born, Both Parents Foreign-Born 2.5: U.S.-Born, 1 Parent U.S.-Born 3+: U.S.-Born, Both Parents U.S.-Born* 15 492 186 487 0 7 57   0 5 13   17 52 7 20 1 0 3   2 3 8 6 0 1 9   1 1 0   0 7 6   36 573 203 815       4,975       33,760

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Hispanics and the Future of America APPENDIX TABLE A8-15 Sample Sizes: Households with Nonnegative Income (for Tables 8-3, 8-4, 8-6, Appendix Tables A8-3, A8-4, A8-6, A8-9, A8-11, and A8-13 on Shares of Income) National Origin (Birthplace) Households with Head Under Age 65 Generation 1st: Total Foreign-Born 1.0: Arrived as Adult Mexico 9,624 5,877 El Salvador, Guatemala 1,579 1,118 Other Central America 917 655 Puerto Rico 1,882 850 Dominican Republic 905 622 Cuba 1,010 623 Colombia 593 460 Peru, Ecuador 684 496 Other South America 549 400 Hispanics (self-identity)* 17,959 11,237 Black non-Hispanics (self-identity)* White non-Hispanics (self-identity)* National Origin (Birthplace) Households with Head Age 65 or Older Generation 1st: Total Foreign-Born 1.0: Arrived as Adult** Mexico 583 460 El Salvador, Guatemala 46 32 Other Central America 90 69 Puerto Rico 408 271 Dominican Republic 120 110 Cuba 498 463 Colombia 77 74 Peru, Ecuador 41 39 Other South America 80 76 Hispanics (self-identity)* 1,927 1,589 Black non-Hispanics (self-identity)* White non-Hispanics (self-identity)* *The samples for Hispanics overall and for 3+ generation Mexicans, Puerto Ricans, Cubans, and black and white non-Hispanics are identified by the “subjective” Spanish-origin and race questions in the CPS.

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Hispanics and the Future of America 1.5: Arrived as Child 2.0: U.S.-Born, Both Parents Foreign-Born 2.5: U.S.-Born, 1 Parent U.S.-Born 3+: U.S.-Born, Both Parents U.S.-Born* 3,746 1,454 1,289 5,393 460 56 217   262 73 99   1032 1,022 265 452 283 94 32   387 175 109 47 133 52 20   188 47 25   149 52 48   6,720 3,040 1,812 7,615       20,979       136,630 1.5: Arrived as Child** 2.0: U.S.-Born, Both Parents Foreign-Born 2.5: U.S.-Born, 1 Parent U.S.-Born 3+: U.S.-Born, Both Parents U.S.-Born* 14 475 182 468 0 7 55   0 5 13   16 52 7 20 1 0 3   2 3 8 5 0 0 9   1 1 0   0 5 6   34 553 200 782       4,868       32,525 **Persons who were born before 1932 and entered the United States before 1950 are omitted because one cannot tell whether they belong to generation 1.0 or 1.5. They are included in the foreign-born total in column 1. SOURCE: Pooled March CPS files, 1998–2002.

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Hispanics and the Future of America APPENDIX TABLE A8-16 Sample Sizes: Children and Elderly Persons National Origin (Birthplace) Persons Under Age 18 Generation 1st: Total Foreign-Born 1.0: Arrived as Adult** Mexico 3,755   El Salvador, Guatemala 378   Other Central America 327   Puerto Rico 623   Dominican Republic 303   Cuba 161   Colombia 196   Peru, Ecuador 193   Other South America 194   Hispanics (self-identity)* 6,212   Black non-Hispanics (self-identity)* White non-Hispanics (self-identity)* National Origin (Birthplace) Persons Age 65 or Older Generation 1st: Total Foreign-Born 1.0: Arrived as Adult*** Mexico 1,226 997 El Salvador, Guatemala 135 118 Other Central America 165 134 Puerto Rico 639 427 Dominican Republic 205 189 Cuba 920 859 Colombia 153 150 Peru, Ecuador 116 113 Other South America 146 139 Hispanics (self-identity)* 3,699 3,136 Black non-Hispanics (self-identity)* White non-Hispanics (self-identity)* *The samples for Hispanics overall and for 3+ generation Mexicans, Puerto Ricans, Cubans, and black and white non-Hispanics are identified by the “subjective” Spanish-origin and race questions in the CPS. **By definition, there are no children under 18 in generation 1.0.

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Hispanics and the Future of America 1.5: Arrived as Child 2.0: U.S.-Born, Both Parents Foreign-Born 2.5: U.S.-Born, 1 Parent U.S.-Born 3+: U.S.-Born, Both Parents U.S.-Born* 3,749 11,268 4,215 9,032 378 1,654 553   327 722 342   623 1,064 987 1,536 303 948 296   161 438 369 165 196 396 195   193 457 249   194 203 237   6,206 16,994 5,969 12,670       21,987       123,072 1.5: Arrived as Child 2.0: U.S.-Born, Both Parents Foreign-Born 2.5: U.S.-Born, 1 Parent U.S.-Born 3+: U.S.-Born, Both Parents U.S.-Born* 36 765 281 761 0 12 81   1 12 19   29 79 19 39 2 0 3   5 12 9 11 0 1 10   1 1 0   1 7 7   71 908 302 1,287       7,015       50,006 ***Persons who were born before 1932 and entered the United States before 1950 are omitted because one cannot tell whether they belong to generation 1.0 or 1.5. They are included in the foreign-born total in column 1. SOURCE: Pooled March CPS files, 1998–2002.

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Hispanics and the Future of America APPENDIX TABLE A8-17 Sample Sizes: Persons, by Family Structure National Origin (Birthplace) Persons in Single Female-Headed Families Generation 1st: Total Foreign-Born 1.0: Arrived as Adult** Mexico 4,187 2,064 El Salvador, Guatemala 939 514 Other Central America 599 359 Puerto Rico 1,617 578 Dominican Republic 928 539 Cuba 628 421 Colombia 358 249 Peru, Ecuador 378 224 Other South America 230 157 Hispanics (self-identity)* 9,913 5,104 Black non-Hispanics (self-identity)* White non-Hispanics (self-identity)* National Origin (Birthplace) Persons in Married-Couple Families Generation 1st: Total Foreign-Born 1.0: Arrived as Adult** Mexico 19,714 10,236 El Salvador, Guatemala 2,753 1,715 Other Central America 1,736 1,023 Puerto Rico 2,418 1,074 Dominican Republic 1,216 729 Cuba 2,221 1,465 Colombia 1,186 807 Peru, Ecuador 1,279 837 Other South America 1,100 692 Hispanics (self-identity)* 34,031 18,879 Black non-Hispanics (self-identity)* White non-Hispanics (self-identity)* *The samples for Hispanics overall and for 3+ generation Mexicans, Puerto Ricans, Cubans, and black and white non-Hispanics are identified by the “subjective” Spanish-origin and race questions in the CPS.

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Hispanics and the Future of America 1.5: Arrived as Child 2.0: U.S.-Born, Both Parents Foreign-Born 2.5: U.S.-Born, 1 Parent U.S.-Born 3+: U.S.-Born, Both Parents U.S.-Born* 2,052 3,411 1,832 5,983 414 446 268   225 237 151   984 1,317 619 1,125 383 661 132   189 188 143 44 106 145 56   153 146 62   72 44 65   4,635 6,543 2,927 8,736       31,757       83,583 1.5: Arrived as Child 2.0: U.S.-Born, Both Parents Foreign-Born 2.5: U.S.-Born, 1 Parent U.S.-Born 3+: U.S.-Born, Both Parents U.S.-Born* 9,385 11,715 4,923 13,400 1,032 1,325 714   699 638 373   1,241 1,504 893 1,150 480 532 200   725 689 410 210 379 398 201   441 448 249   403 284 251   14,897 17,437 6,497 18,304       27,357       321,544 **Persons who were born before 1932 and entered the United States before 1950 are omitted because one cannot tell whether they belong to generation 1.0 or 1.5. They are included in the foreign-born total in column 1. SOURCE: Pooled March CPS files, 1998–2002.