3
The Demographic Foundations of the Latino Population

Jorge Durand, Edward Telles, and Jennifer Flashman

The news that Hispanics have become the nation’s largest minority was no demographic surprise. Its fruition had been predicted at least 30 years ago. This news event, though, was important because the appearance of Latinos on the American scene could no longer be denied—neither in the nation’s vital economic or educational policies nor in politics. Nowhere. Once considered a sleeping giant, the Latino population has not only grown tremendously but also now constitutes a significant presence throughout most of the United States. Once confined to a small number of states, the Latino population has migrated to new regions, including much of the South, moved into new sectors of the economy, and become an important voting bloc in many states. Its impact is heightened by the fact that it is considerably younger than an aging non-Latino America, making its potential impact on America’s future all the greater.

This chapter reports on the factors that account for this growth. Overall, it describes how relatively high rates of immigration and fertility have shaped the growth and the creation of an especially youthful age structure among the Latino population. In particular, it examines how changing immigration policies, social networks, and other factors have led to immigration from Latin America and then how a changing labor market as well as immigration policies have affected migration patterns in the United States and prompted the regional dispersion of Latinos. These demographic foundations are fundamental for understanding nearly every aspect of Latino well-being covered in this book, including their spatial distribution and family structure, their position in the educational system and the labor



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Hispanics and the Future of America 3 The Demographic Foundations of the Latino Population Jorge Durand, Edward Telles, and Jennifer Flashman The news that Hispanics have become the nation’s largest minority was no demographic surprise. Its fruition had been predicted at least 30 years ago. This news event, though, was important because the appearance of Latinos on the American scene could no longer be denied—neither in the nation’s vital economic or educational policies nor in politics. Nowhere. Once considered a sleeping giant, the Latino population has not only grown tremendously but also now constitutes a significant presence throughout most of the United States. Once confined to a small number of states, the Latino population has migrated to new regions, including much of the South, moved into new sectors of the economy, and become an important voting bloc in many states. Its impact is heightened by the fact that it is considerably younger than an aging non-Latino America, making its potential impact on America’s future all the greater. This chapter reports on the factors that account for this growth. Overall, it describes how relatively high rates of immigration and fertility have shaped the growth and the creation of an especially youthful age structure among the Latino population. In particular, it examines how changing immigration policies, social networks, and other factors have led to immigration from Latin America and then how a changing labor market as well as immigration policies have affected migration patterns in the United States and prompted the regional dispersion of Latinos. These demographic foundations are fundamental for understanding nearly every aspect of Latino well-being covered in this book, including their spatial distribution and family structure, their position in the educational system and the labor

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Hispanics and the Future of America market, and their access to health care and the political system. A notable example of the importance of this population was its role in the recent presidential election: the Hispanic vote may have influenced the outcome (Cobble and Velaquez, 2004). Given the demographic destiny of the Latino population, that influence is likely to grow with its dispersion into new states and as immigrants become citizens and their children reach voting age. At the same time, the Latino population has become increasingly diverse by national origin. Mexicans continue to constitute the large majority of Latinos in the United States, driving the demographic behavior of Latinos in general as well as mainstream American attitudes toward the Hispanic group. However, many other groups have also become part of the new immigration from Latin America, as the previous chapter has shown. While Mexicans, Puerto Ricans, and Cubans constituted almost all Latinos in the United States just 30 years ago, Dominicans, Central Americans, and South Americans have doubled or tripled their numbers in the past two decades. This chapter also shows that Latino national groups vary greatly in their age structure and extent of regional dispersion. Specifically, Cubans have an old age structure and have become increasingly concentrated, two patterns that are unlike the rest of the Latino population, whereas Mexicans and Central Americans are especially young and have migrated throughout the United States. COMPONENTS OF GROWTH Demographic growth or decline is a result of births and deaths, also known as natural growth and net migration, which is the balance of immigration and emigration. The growth of the Latino population is mostly the result of two of these components, births or fertility and immigration. While many assume that the growth is due almost entirely to immigration, relatively high rates of Latino fertility now constitute roughly half of all population growth. That fertility is comprised largely of births to immigrants, but a sizeable component can also be attributed to the U.S.-born. Table 3-1 breaks down Latino population growth in the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s into that resulting from either immigration or fertility to both immigrants and the U.S.-born. The last row of the table shows that, in the 1990s, nearly half (48 percent) of Latino population growth was due to immigration, 28 percent can be attributed to fertility among immigrants, and the remaining 24 percent resulted from the fertility of U.S.-born Latinos. The same table also shows that, in relative terms, the share of Latino growth due directly to immigration in 1990–2000 declined compared with the decade before, when immigration accounted for fully 56 percent of growth. Even though immi-

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Hispanics and the Future of America TABLE 3-1 Percentage Components of Latino Population Growth by Decade, 1970–2000 Period Foreign-Born (%) U.S.-Born Children of Foreign-Born (%) U.S.-Born Children of U.S.-Born(%) (%) 1970–1980 40 21 39 100 1980–1990 56 27 17 100 1990–2000 48 28 24 100 SOURCE: Data from Table 5 of Bean et al. (2004). gration increased in the 1990s in absolute numbers, its share of total Latino population growth declined, although fertility to immigrants continued at about the same rate. In both the 1980s and 1990s, at least three-quarters of Latino population growth has been due to immigrants, either by their own migration or through their childbearing. Fertility went from accounting for 44 percent of all growth in the 1980s to representing 52 percent of growth in the 1990s. The growth from fertility to U.S.-born Latino parents represents the greatest growth share, increasing from 17 percent in the 1980s to 24 percent in the 1990s. This signals a reemergence of the so-called third generation, which begins to echo the presence of a large third generation, as in the period prior to 1980. Births to such parents had represented fully 39 percent of Latino growth in the 1970s but dropped steeply to less than half (17 percent) in the 1980s. ORIGINS OF LATIN AMERICAN IMMIGRATION The growth and increasing national diversity of immigration from Latin America was shown in Chapter 2, but in this chapter we seek to describe its sources. The volume and socioeconomic characteristics of the immigrant Latino population are largely related to economic and political factors and the social networks that have since perpetuated immigration. In the cases of Mexico and Puerto Rico, the current migration flows were initiated with intense labor recruitment, but once the process was set in motion, economic factors and social networks continued to fuel further immigration. In the Cuban case, the causes were, and continue to be, fundamentally political. For the Dominican Republic, political causes, including dictatorship and military intervention, played an important role at first but social and economic causes perpetuated the process. A similar process occurred in the cases of Guatemala, El Salvador, and Nicaragua, where immigration was political as well as economic. Finally, in the case of South America, socio-

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Hispanics and the Future of America economic factors have been predominant in immigration to the United States, although political violence in Colombia and Peru has been an important push factor for migration from those countries. For more than a century, Mexican immigration to the United States was distinguished by two components: a migration that settled and another between Mexico and the United States that was circular, largely facilitated by the porosity of the border. Similar phenomena occurred in the case of the Puerto Ricans, who could easily go back and forth between Puerto Rico and the mainland, facilitated by low airfares and the fact that they are U.S. citizens. According to Massey, Durand, and Malone’s (2002) theory of cumulative causation, each act of migration, especially through the large volume of return migration, alters the social context in which subsequent migration decisions are made, thus increasing the chances of future migration. Immigration from Mexico and Puerto Rico has advanced considerably through such social networks, although Puerto Rican immigration has slowed as the networks have already incorporated a large part of the eligible population in the immigration process. The other national groups are arguably at earlier stages. Demographic, political, and economic factors in Latin America also help to account for the large increases in immigration from that region in the 1980s and 1990s. In the 1970s, many countries began birth control programs, as a demographic transition with continuing high fertility rates and decreasing mortality rates led to sharp population growth. The effects of Latin America’s baby boom began to be felt in the labor force, as new entrants to the labor force had increasing difficulty finding work and thus opted for migration abroad. At the same time, the 1970s and 1980s were turbulent political times, especially in Central America, where civil wars and other types of armed conflict generated intense emigration (Hamilton and Stoltz Chinchilla, 2001; Menjivar, 2000). Finally, it is important to recognize the continuing attraction of the United States, as Latin American countries struggle economically. Practically all Latin American countries have suffered recurring economic crises, currency devaluation, and runaway inflation that have left millions of people in poverty, many of them from sectors of the middle class who seek to maintain a decent quality of life through migration. The effect of neoliberal economic policies has been mixed across countries, with Chile being a successful case while Peru, Argentina, and Ecuador have had negative experiences thus far (Huber and Solt, 2004; Walton, 2004). Effects of U.S. Immigration Law on Immigration from Latin America If economic, political, and social factors provoked and perpetuated immigration from our southern neighbors, the history of immigration law

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Hispanics and the Future of America may be most responsible for the diversity of Latino immigration in terms of legal status, class selectivity, and destination. With the exception of Puerto Rico, migratory flows from Latin American countries to the United States have been shaped, to varying degrees, by the opportunities, limitations, and exceptions that different laws and regulations concerning migration have offered since the turn of the 20th century. Among the national-level immigration laws that have been ratified in the United States, three deserve special attention because of their direct effects upon migration from Latin America: The 1965 reform known as the Immigration and Nationality Act, and its numerous subsequent corrections; The 1986 Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA); and The 1996 Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRAIRA). In addition, there has been special legislation related to the specific cases of Cubans and Central Americans. The Immigration Act of 1965, also known as the Hart-Celler Act, established an annual limitation of 170,000 visas from all Eastern Hemisphere countries with no more than 20,000 per country. The civil rights revolution in the 1960s sought to mitigate discrimination based on race and ethnicity, and thus the 1965 law sought to revoke the previous immigration policy, which favored European immigration and severely impeded Asian immigration. By replacing the old quotas with numerical country ceilings that were uniform across all Eastern Hemisphere countries, the change effectively eliminated the restrictions on immigration from Asia (Jasso and Rosenzweig, 1990). It also stressed family reunification as grounds for admission, along with a very inclusive definition of family relationships. Thus the 1965 act’s legacy is to have opened the door to large-scale immigration from the Eastern Hemisphere. This law also ended the Bracero Program and created a general visa policy for the Western Hemisphere with no numerical limits. In 1968, a limit of 120,000 visas for the Western Hemisphere was set, although this amendment does not determine fixed, per-nation quotas. For 10 years, Mexicans secured roughly half of all the Western Hemisphere visas under the quota. However, with a 1976 amendment, a quota of 20,000 visas per country was established and continues to the present (Jasso and Rosenzweig, 1990; Reimers, 1992, p. 87). Consequently, this law greatly reduces the number of legally authorized immigrants who can come from Mexico and effectively increases the number of immigrants that can come from the rest of Latin America. Given historically high levels of legal Mexican immigration for the past century or

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Hispanics and the Future of America more, a long common border with the United States and persistently great socioeconomic inequality between the two countries, the tightening of immigration restrictions for Mexico has generated greater levels of undocumented immigration. This system of hemispheric limits soon was in crisis because of the almost 360,000 Cuban refugees who were allowed to enter the country between 1965 and 1978, a fact that came to modify the established ceiling for the Western Hemisphere. A case involving the exceptional number of visas given to Cubans was taken to court. The judge in that case, known as Silva versus Levi, ruled that the rights of 145,000 people, primarily Mexicans, had been violated. As a result, visas that came to be known as Silva Cards (Cartas Silva) were issued to the victors in the lawsuit (Reimers, 1992) and the immigration law was eventually reformed in 1980 to separate refugees from the per-country quota system. In the next stage, the 1986 IRCA greatly affected the legal status of some 2.7 million undocumented migrants. This law outlined two amnesty programs, which included a general program named the Legally Authorized Worker (LAW) program for undocumented immigrants who had resided five years or more in the United States, and the Special Agricultural Workers (SAW) program for those who had worked in agriculture during the past six months. Fully 70 percent of those taking advantage of the LAW program and 81 percent of the SAW program were Mexicans. To some degree, Central Americans had a more difficult time qualifying for these programs, since many of these new immigrants did not meet the residency requirements (Donato, Durand, and Massey, 1992; Durand, 1998; Massey et al., 2002). The major impact of this law was to improve the legal status of Latino immigrants in general (and Mexicans in particular), by regularizing the situation of most existing undocumented migrants. Legalization allowed Latinos to become more geographically dispersed throughout U.S. territory, because it permitted unrestricted movement. Undocumented workers tend not to move very far from their workplaces, because when traveling they become conspicuous and risk greater exposure to being detained by the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS). However, once they were able to secure legal papers through IRCA, more than 3 million individuals were able to travel with greater ease to look for work or new opportunities in other areas. The economic crisis in California that resulted from the end of the Cold War and the decline of the local aerospace industry led to further immigration away from that state. At the same time, many immigrants who had taken advantage of the IRCA programs found better wages and opportunities in other states. The 1990s economic recovery in the rest of the United States increased the demand for workers (Donato et al., 1992).

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Hispanics and the Future of America The IIRAIRA of 1996 constituted a serious blow to the community of Latin American origin because it restricted a wide range of support programs and services to which the migrant population had previously had access, regardless of legal status. Undocumented workers consequently suffered, substantial hurdles were placed to prevent the entrance of refugees, and resident immigrants with work permits who were not citizens were penalized. In many ways, this federal law contained many of the same elements as California’s Proposition 187, which voters in that state passed in 1994, although it avoided California’s ban on K–12 education and emergency services for the undocumented, which had been ruled unconstitutional by the U.S. Supreme Court (Hood and Morris, 2000; Weintraub, 1997). Nevertheless, as so often happens, laws bring unexpected consequences. In this case, the new restrictions on the immigrant community actually fostered the empowerment of that very group, as the number of applications for naturalization soon rose substantially. The year 1996 was a landmark in this regard, as the number of Mexican migrants who applied for naturalization tripled compared with the year before—an interesting development given this particular group’s traditional reluctance to change its nationality, although it was expected from the amnesty program under IRCA. Similar patterns emerged among immigrants from Cuba, the Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala, Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru. Figure 3-1 shows that the number of naturalizations for immigrants from Latin America increased from 65,000 in 1991 to 529,000 in 1996. Three factors were particularly responsible for the change in the number of naturalizations: (1) the 1986 IRCA legislation allowed residents to naturalize, (2) the 1996 IIRAIRA law placed restrictions on social benefits for illegal immigrants, and (3) the constitutional reforms in several Latin American nations, such as Mexico, Argentina, Costa Rica, and Peru, allowed migrants to acquire a new nationality without losing their original one. Of course, naturalization data are affected by bureaucratic rhythms, particularly the time required to process applications, but the large increase between the first and second half of the 1990s is indisputable. As in much of the data on Hispanics, the Mexican case drives these results. There were 22,000 naturalizations from that country in 1991, 254,000 in 1996, and an average of 150,000 in subsequent years. In synthesis, there were no restrictions on immigration for Latin Americans prior to 1965. Hemispheric restrictions began in 1968 and by country in the hemisphere in 1976. Regardless of the quota system, this legislation did not impede the growth of the Latino population through immigration, although it clearly fueled increased diversification of national origins. Also, the 1986 IRCA legislation had transformed earlier undocumented Hispanics into permanent immigrants and encouraged greater geographical mobil-

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Hispanics and the Future of America FIGURE 3-1 Number of Hispanics naturalizing each year from 1991 to 2002. SOURCE: U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service (2002). ity within the country (Massey et al., 2002). The 1996 law stirred the Latino community to action, as many individuals decided to apply for naturalization in order to avoid losing a number of rights they had enjoyed up to that time. These changes consequently have implications for the nature of Latino political participation in the United States, as Chapter 11 discusses. These different migration laws not only affected the Latino immigrant population directly, but also brought them into direct contact with governmental institutions and the U.S. legal system. Through personal procedures and collective social struggles—especially of a legal nature—Latinos began to interact with a variety of U.S. institutions. In short, they became more politically integrated as they learned how to operate in North American society. This dynamic of institutional interaction can be better appreciated through the analysis of some specific cases (Georges, 1990; Hamilton and Stoltz Chinchilla, 2001; Pessar, 1995). U.S. immigration laws have treated specific Latin American countries distinctly, which may help explain why particular countries have sent more immigrants than others. For example, the only country to have ever experienced a guest-worker program on a large scale is Mexico. Without question, migration from Mexico has been subject to more exceptions to U.S. immigration law than that of any other country, beginning in 1917, when Mexican immigrants were exempted from the clause that required migrants to pass a literacy test (Cardoso, 1980; Jasso and Rosensweig, 1990). From 1942 to 1964, the Bracero Program allowed about 5 million Mexican agricultural workers to enter the United States to work legally on a seasonal

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Hispanics and the Future of America basis (Calavita, 1992). In 1965, these former guest-workers (braceros) were offered the opportunity to legalize their migratory status if their employers or relatives were willing to support their applications, as there were no fixed limits or country quotas for Western Hemisphere nations. It was not until 1978 that Mexico had to adapt to the quota system that the United States established at the world level (20,000 visas). This controlled migratory flow primarily involved people who tended to settle in particular cities, especially Los Angeles (Ortiz, 1996). Mexicans used the family reunification measures to bring their relatives into the country. According to Jasso and Rozenweig (1990), in 1985, 22.7 percent of spouses sponsored by native-born U.S. citizens were from Mexico, whereas the next highest group, Fillipinos, stood at 4.9 percent. Later still, in 1986, Mexican immigrants were also the main beneficiaries of the IRCA reforms, through which perhaps 2.3 million people succeeded in regularizing their migratory status. Finally, in the 1990s, almost 80,000 H2A and H2B visas were issued to Mexicans to enter the country legally as temporary agricultural and service workers, despite the fact that those particular visas had traditionally been granted to migrant workers from the Caribbean (Portes and Rumbaut, 1990; Smith-Nonini, 2002) (see Box 3-1). Finally, the U.S. government initiated the Diversity Visa Program, also known as the Green Card Lottery, in 1990. It offers 55,000 visas each year to citizens of “under-represented countries” in order to facilitate immigration from countries other than those that send large numbers of migrants. This is the easiest and most cost-effective way to secure an immigration visa, because persons chosen under this system have the right to migrate with their families to the United States. In some cases, they are given pre- BOX 3-1 H2A and H2B Visas The H2A temporary agricultural visa is a nonimmigrant visa that allows foreign nationals to enter the United States to perform agricultural labor or services of a temporary or seasonal nature. Limits are not fixed and vary annually. The maximum annual limit has been 120,000. The H2B nonimmigrant visa program permits employers to hire foreign workers to come to the United States and perform temporary nonagricultural work, which may be one-time, seasonal, peak load, or intermittent. There is a 66,000 per year limit on the number of foreign workers who may receive H2B status during each fiscal year (October through September). The process for obtaining H2B certification is similar to, but less extensive and time-consuming than, permanent certification.

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Hispanics and the Future of America paid airfare. In Latin America, citizens of Colombia, the Dominican Republic, El Salvador, and Mexico are considered ineligible. Cuba became a special case beginning in 1959, both with respect to the entry of refugees and to the systems of quotas, lotteries, deportations, and regularization. What is most notable in the Cuban case is the series of advances and retreats that have characterized the migratory policies of the U.S. and Cuban governments, which open and close their doors as a function of changing political conjunctures. The Cuban government allowed several thousand emigrants to leave the island freely from the harbor at Camarioca in 1965, and in 1980 some 124,000 more were permitted to leave the country from the port of Mariel and were eventually received as refugees by the United States (Portes and Stepick, 1993). Beginning in the Johnson administration, air travel from Cuba was allowed, making it possible for 360,000 more Cubans to enter the country (Reimers, 1992, p. 124). Between 1961 and 1988, almost half a million Cubans (486,426) became permanent residents (Jasso and Rosenzweig, 1990). In the Cuban case, there has even been legislation (the Law of Adjustment) related to the so-called raft people, who are granted refuge only if they succeed in reaching American soil, a right that is denied to those who are captured or rescued while still at sea. Dominicans also received preferential treatment after the fall of Trujillo, who governed as president from 1930 to 1961 and exercised an almost exclusively personal authority over the issuing of passports (Grasmuck and Pessar, 1991). During the 1965 U.S. invasion, President Johnson liberalized the authorization of visas as a kind of escape valve designed to diffuse social conflicts, so from 1965 to 1966 the number of resident visas increased by 74 percent. Those who benefited most were young men who had supported the opposition movement (Georges, 1990). Later, the economic reforms instituted by the Balaguer regime spurred an intense flow of migrants to the United States. Many of these Dominican migrants entered the country with legitimate tourist visas and then simply stayed on indefinitely, while others opted for an indirect emigration route that took them first to Puerto Rico, where they crossed the dangerous Strait of La Mona (Duany, 1990). During their stay in Puerto Rico, many Dominicans worked in agriculture or the informal economy, although others considered their time on the island as simply a stopover on their journey to the United States (Duany, Hernandez Angueira, and Rey, 1995). Central American countries, such as Nicaragua and, to a lesser extent, El Salvador and Guatemala, have also benefited from special regularization programs. In the 1980s, President Reagan’s support for the contras (antisandinistas) was manifested, among many other ways, by a very liberal policy for issuing tourist visas to Nicaraguans, many of whom later became illegal immigrants but were finally granted refugee status. After several

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Hispanics and the Future of America years of legal struggles, Nicaraguans were granted refugee status in 1997, thereby earning the right to reside in the United States on a permanent basis, thanks to legislation called the Nicaraguan Adjustment and Central American Relief Act (NACARA). This particular act was also utilized by some Salvadoran, Guatemalan, and Cuban migrants (Menjivar, 2000). Nonetheless, there was a clear reluctance to recognize most Salvadorans and Guatemalans as refugees even if they were fleeing civil wars, so they were classified as economic immigrants. Many of them were deported in the 1980s, while a few received asylum and others launched lawsuits with the support of a variety of nongovernmental and religious organizations (Hamilton and Stoltz Chinchilla, 2001). Finally, in 1990, a form of temporary protection was granted (temporary protected status, or TPS1), which gave those migrants permission to work, although it did not grant them permanent residence status, as had been the case with the Nicaraguans. This measure was renewed several times until 1997, when the courts established a legal status designed to protect all migrants who found themselves in similar situations. In this way, many Salvadorans and Guatemalans succeeded in regularizing their migratory status (Menjivar, 2000). If IRCA was for Mexicans the means of legal recourse that allowed many undocumented migrants in their communities to legalize their situation, for Central Americans the legislative processes provided by NACARA and TPS were fundamental to their establishing permanent residence on American soil. Finally, migrants from South American countries depend mostly on the established quota system that allows them to enter the United States as tourists, although once there, they often take advantage of the family reunification provisions. Few South Americans have petitioned for refugee status, and there have been no cases of special legislation or programs related to these nations. Nonetheless, the number of migrants that decide to remain in the United States after their visas expire is increasing, adding to the ranks of undocumented migrants. Undocumented Immigration In effect, the limits on immigration from Latin America, which began in 1978, along with the growing demand for low-wage labor have led to the growth of an undocumented population. The Latino population in the United States today includes a high proportion of undocumented migrants, a situation that made regularization programs so significant in the past. In practice, there are now two main modalities of undocumented migration. 1   The TPS provides nationals of certain regions or nationalities residing in the United States a temporary stay of removal and work authorization due to armed conflict or other extraordinary conditions in their home country.

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Hispanics and the Future of America tial segregation. Table 3-4 shows the Latino populations of the top 20 states in 1990 and 2000. The top 9 states remain in roughly the same order over the course of the decade, but the next 11 states reveal Latino growth in places where they were few before. The table shows growth in new states that had only small Latino populations in 1990. Between 1990 and 2000, the Hispanic population more than tripled in Nevada, grew four times in Georgia, and nearly quintupled in North Carolina. It doubled in several others. The new geography of the Latino population in the United States of the past two decades cannot be generalized for all Latinos. While Mexicans, Central Americans, Puerto Ricans, and Dominicans have dispersed in the past two decades, other national groups have not. Cubans, for example, have increased their residential concentration in Florida, from 60 percent in 1980 to 74 percent in 2000. As an example of residential stability, nearly 50 percent of Ecuadorians resided in New York in both 1980 and 2000. TABLE 3-4 Latino Population (1000s) in 1990 and 2000 and Percentage Growth for Top 20 States in 2000 State 1990 2000 % Growth California 7,688 10,967 42 Texas 4,340 6,670 53 New York 2,214 2,868 29 Florida 1,574 2,683 70 Illinois 904 1,530 69 New Jersey 740 1,117 51 Arizona 668 1,066 59 New México 579 765 32 Colorado 424 736 73 Washington 215 442 106 Georgia 109 435 299 Massachusetts 288 429 49 Pennsylvania 232 394 70 Nevada 124 394 218 North Carolina 77 379 392 Virginia 160 330 106 Michigan 202 324 60 Connecticut 213 320 50 Oregon 113 275 143 Maryland 125 228 82 SOURCE: U.S. Census Bureau, Census (2000) Summary File 1. Census of Population (1990), General Population Characteristics (CP-1-1).

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Hispanics and the Future of America The primacy of California and New York as Latino states is weakening, even though they continue to be the main ports of entry for immigrants from Latin America. In 1980, California was the residence of 58 percent of the Mexican population, but it fell by 15 percentage points to 43 percent in 2000. Similarly, 72 percent of Salvadorans lived in California in 1980 but only 44 percent in 2000. Guatemalans went from 58 percent in California in 1980 to 44 percent in 2000. California continues to be the principal place of residence for these three national groups, but the trend away from concentration in that state is substantial. Similarly, New York was the state of residence for 47 percent of Puerto Ricans in 1980 but only 31 percent in 2000. At the same time, the total population of Puerto Ricans in New York declined. Just under 8 of 10 (77 percent) Dominicans lived in New York, but by 2000 only about 6 of 10 (59 percent) did. Finally, Cuban New Yorkers constituted 10 percent of all Cuban Americans in 1980 but only 4 percent in 2000. Thus, Latinos are moving away from the two traditional ports of entry. This includes both Latinos who first go to these states and then move to other states as well as a large number who are moving directly from their countries of origin to less traditional states. The movement of these populations into these new regions has much to do with the profound structural changes that have taken place in U.S. labor markets, the availability of cheaper housing in the new regions, and processes of social and geographic mobility that affected the black and white populations (Durand and Massey, 2003; Hernández-León and Zúñiga, 2000; Stull, Broadway, and Griffith, 1995). For example, Latinos—and especially Mexicans—began to emigrate from Los Angeles to the state of Nevada in the 1980s in search of better wages. In the space of just 20 years, they have practically come to control the service industries linked to hotels, casinos, and restaurants, jobs that were previously held by native black and white workers and before that by Polish and Italian immigrants (Durand, 1994; Martinez Curiel, 2003). In addition to higher wages, Nevada offers migrants other advantages, such as ample opportunities to work double shifts and to bring their families, due to the availability of work for both men and women. Moreover, the arrival of Latinos in Nevada coincided with the recovery of the construction industry, which pursued a new phase of hotel and casino development. Perhaps the most important industrial development for immigrants in the South is in the poultry industry, especially in chicken, duck, and turkey processing (Kandel and Parrado, 2004). There, processes of industrial conversion have been characterized by the relocation of plants to rural areas outside the cities and by efforts to reduce production costs, especially those of labor. As part of this process, older workers have been indemnified and labor unions dissolved, thus opening the way for the hiring of cheap, easily

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Hispanics and the Future of America controlled workers (Griffith, 1995). New opportunities for employment have also emerged on the East Coast, especially in industries related to fish products. Fish, seafood, and crab processing plants have also gone through a process of conversion in which unionized black workers have been replaced by Latino migrants (Smith-Nonini, 2000). Opportunities for employment also opened up in cities, especially in construction, the service sector, and manufacturing industries. The opening up of labor markets in the construction industry in Atlanta during the period leading up to the 1996 Olympic games is a particularly well-known case, because this sector had been a well-remunerated and specialized niche practically reserved for whites (Rosenfeld and Tienda, 1999). Over time, new Latino migrants have entered the construction industry and have come to occupy higher and better paid positions in it. In fact, many Latinos have become construction contractors themselves. Another example, also from the state of Georgia, is the revitalized carpet industry—in the city of Dalton—that hires only Latino migrants of Mexican and Central American origin, as Hernández-León and Zúñiga (2000) have documented. Mexicans have gained a reputation as good workers in the agricultural labor markets in the South and on the East Coast, which have traditionally been dominated by black, poor white, and Caribbean workers. Today, almost the entire tobacco harvest depends on temporary workers who arrive from Mexico with H2A visas (see Box 3-1). Similarly, Mexican workers have begun to predominate in the agricultural belt between Florida and New Jersey by moving in a south-to-north direction in accordance with changing harvesting seasons (Griffith, 2000). Finally, in the Midwest—especially in Minnesota, Iowa, and Nebraska—the growth of the Latino population has come largely as a response to the restructuring of the meat and poultry processing industries. As in the South, meat processing plants have been relocated outside the cities, many black and white workers have been laid off, and labor unions have been broken (Stull et al., 1995). These recently hired Latino workers have joined groups of earlier migrants who have lived and worked in this region since the 1920s and whose main points of reference are the cities of Chicago, Gary, Detroit, and St. Paul (Durand and Arias, 2000; Valdés, 1982, 1991, 2000). Using the index of dissimilarity at the state level, Table 3-5 summarizes the extent of segregation or, alternatively, dispersion for several Hispanic subgroups across the 50 states. Dissimilarity indexes range from 0 to 100, in which 0 indicates complete dispersion into the general U.S. population and 100 indicates complete segregation. The table shows changes in state distribution from 1980 to 2000 and levels for foreign- and native-born in 2000. The first row shows the extent of dissimilarity for Hispanics with non-Hispanics since 1980 and reveals stability in the extent of segregation

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Hispanics and the Future of America TABLE 3-5 Dissimilarity Indexes at the State Level Between Hispanics and Hispanic Subgroups with the Remaining U.S. Population for 1980, 1990, and 2000 and by Foreign or U.S. Birth in 2000 Ethnicity 1980 1990 2000 U.S.-Born 2000 Foreign-Born 2000 Hispanic 48.9 48.6 43.8 45.8 40.6 Mexican 65.5 65.0 57.0 58.4 52.7 Puerto Rican 57.2 54.3 52.6 50.7 55.7 Cuban 63.2 64.6 65.2 51.8 73.3 Dominican n.a. 75.0 73.2 72.4 74.0 Central American n.a. 48.7 40.5 41.5 41.8 South American n.a. 47.3 45.6 43.0 48.3 Other Hispanic n.a. 38.2 41.2 44.1 39.7 NOTE: n.a. = not available. SOURCE: Integrated Public Use Microdata Series (U.S. Census Bureau, 2000). by state, when Hispanics are viewed as a single group. However, for subgroups, the patterns over time vary substantially. Mexican geographical dispersion remained fairly constant from 1980 to 1990 but then markedly dropped from 65 to 57, which reflects their recent emergence in nontraditional states. The last two columns show that dispersion is greater among the foreign-born. Thus, the cross-sectional evidence for 2000 demonstrates that Mexicans are bucking the trend of many other immigrant groups, who concentrate in the traditional ports of entry of earlier immigrants and then they or their descendants disperse, as they become incorporated into American society. In contrast, the dispersal of Mexicans is now being created in the immigrant generation, which is settling in new destinations and, to a great extent, eschewing traditional ones. These trends may have major implications for the way that Latinos are perceived and incorporated by American society in the future, as their geographic isolation diminishes. Puerto Rican dispersion has increased slowly but steadily since 1980. Dominicans, for which no data are available in 1980, also became slightly more dispersed between 1990 and 2000. However, Cubans, the most concentrated subgroup in a single state, have continued to steadily increase their geographic isolation in each of the last two censuses. For all the Caribbean groups, immigrants are clearly more concentrated in fewer states than the U.S.-born, and this is especially true for Cubans. Thus, Puerto Ricans, Dominicans, and Cubans follow the traditional path of regional concentration followed by dispersion for later generations, and this is especially true for Cubans. Foreign-born Cubans, despite having been in the United States for a relatively long time compared with other immigrant groups, registered a full 73.3 dissimilarity rate, indicating extremely high concentration of immigrants, perhaps because of an exceptionally success-

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Hispanics and the Future of America ful ethnic enclave in Southern Florida (Portes and Stepick, 1993). Still, U.S.-born Cubans had a rate of only 51.8, suggesting substantial movement of their children out of that state. For the other groups, only 1990 and 2000 data are available. Rates of Central American segregation across states, like those for Mexicans, dropped sharply from 1990 to 2000. Central Americans registered the greatest dispersion among all of the subgroups. Dominicans and South Americans have registered barely noticeable declines in segregation, while Central Americans are increasingly dispersed, registering the lowest segregation by state among all Hispanic subgroups. South Americans as a whole follow the traditional path of dispersion by generation, while generational differences for Central Americans are small, suggesting a pattern that is between the traditional immigrant-native settlement path and the new settlement path of the Mexicans. Thus, the increasing distribution of Hispanics, as a group, is driven mostly by the new geographical trends in settlement among Mexican and Central American immigrants. THE FUTURE The Hispanic population is likely to continue its growth trend for at least the near future, especially considering that Latin America immigration has not ebbed. The labor market and political incentives appear to continue firmly in place. Based on the most likely future immigration scenario, in which immigration continues at about the current rate, Jeffrey Passel (2003) of the Urban Institute predicts that the Hispanic population will grow from 35 million in 2000 to 101 million by 2050, nearly a three-fold increase. Consequently, the Hispanic component will constitute fully 24.6 percent of the U.S. population, nearly double its 12.5 percent in 2000, meaning that Latinos are likely to account for about 45 percent of U.S. population growth in the next 50 years. Even if immigration were to suddenly end, the youthful composition and higher fertility rates of Latinos ensure continued growth. Even if there were no immigration after 2000, the Latino population would still increase to 63 million in 2050 or to about 20 percent of the U.S. population. The extent to which immigration will continue at the same rate depends partly on the actions of the U.S. government to effectively conduct border control, as it has suggested in recent years. Also, immigration from Latin America may begin to slow, as new entrants to the labor force of sending countries begin to ebb as a result of rapidly decreasing fertility over the past 20 years. Finally, immigration may also decrease in an optimistic scenario in which Latin American economies recuperate and their labor force needs begin to increase. Currently, 40 percent of the Latino population is foreign-born. However, under the middle immigration scenario, the share of immigrants among

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Hispanics and the Future of America the population will decline to 24 percent. The children of immigrants or the second generation currently represents 28 percent of Latinos, but by 2050 their population will quadruple and will represent 39 percent. The so-called third generation (and beyond) will grow from 32 to 37 percent. Regarding the national composition of the Latino population, the order by population size is likely to change in the near future as Dominicans and other national populations that have become part of the new immigration stream overtake the Cuban and Puerto Rican populations, which grew less than 20 percent each decade since 1980. Dominican immigrants, for example, grew at about 100 percent in each of the past two decades. Cuban immigration has had only intermittent immigration for the past 30 years. Similarly, Puerto Rican immigration cannot grow much, since a large portion of the island’s population is already engaged in the immigration process to the mainland, making the pool of potential immigrants relatively small. Like Dominicans, the Mexican population also doubled in the 1980s and then again in the 1990s. The Central American countries of El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras grew even more. Latin American immigrant populations, which seem to be small today, may grow in size, depending on the expansion of networks and especially the relative opportunities between their countries and the United States. This is particularly true for South Americans, who constitute the majority of the Latin American population and are only beginning to participate in the immigration process to the United States. Brazil, in particular, with a population of 170 million but less than 1 million immigrants in the United States, may potentially become a leading sender of immigrants to the United States, especially if conditions in that country greatly deteriorate. Brazilians are Latin Americans, and whether we consider them part of the Latino/Hispanic population will depend on how their identity in the United States is shaped, how others will consider them, especially the U.S. Census Bureau, and especially whether we use a Latino or Hispanic label. For now, the small size of that population makes their inclusion of little consequence. It is hard to tell whether the growing spread of Latino populations is likely to continue, although we are inclined to think that they are. Apparently, these immigrants are gaining footholds in such nontraditional places as the South, but it is probably too early to tell how solid they will become. The experience of Cubans and Vietnamese, who were relocated throughout the United States but the majority of whom later resettled in one metropolitan area, may be telling. However, those immigrants were refugee populations, and decisions about their settlement were made by others. Today’s Latino populations seem to be choosing these destinations for the economic opportunities they provide. With the integration process experienced by most immigrants and their descendants, the more common trend is residential dispersion, especially by the second and third generation.

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Hispanics and the Future of America An issue that is likely to increase in importance, especially with the emergence of a third generation, is identification as Latino or Hispanic. The data presented in official statistics depend on persons identifying as Latinos, Hispanic, or in one of the national subgroups. This does not seem to be a major issue for immigrants from Latin American countries. However, many of these second- and third-generation descendants of Latino immigrants may no longer identify as Latino or Hispanic, especially if their parents or grandparents include non-Latinos. The ability to identify as white rather than Latino may be especially appealing to light-skinned people and children of mixed marriages, given the higher status of (non-Hispanic) whites in American society. Eschbach and Gomez (1998), for example, found that as many as 20 percent of high school students identified as Hispanic in a survey during their sophomore year and as white in a survey two years later. These trends will surely vary by national group and the place of settlement. The experience in the South, with its historically important black–white dichotomy, will be especially interesting. For the labor force, Passel expects the Latino labor force to grow from representing 11.5 percent of the labor force in 2000 to 25 percent in 2050. This is the middle immigration assumption, but the Latino share would increase under all of the immigration scenarios. Under the no-immigration assumption, the Latino labor force would still increase by 82 percent, while the non-Latino labor force would shrink. Regarding the educational composition of the labor force, Latinos with a college education will grow from 10 to 25 percent, which is greater than that for the overall labor force. At the end, the number of those without a high school diploma will shrink from 39 to 17 percent of the Latino workforce. CONCLUSION This chapter has emphasized differences among national groups, but we have also sought to stress commonalities where they occur. In addition, there are some signs that Latinos have begun to adapt and incorporate themselves in the United States as a pan-ethnic group. Despite class, race, and national differences, Latinos have found ways to coalesce to some extent based on a shared language and cultural traits and especially because of a common identity forged by categorization by U.S. natives as a single racial or ethnic group. The extent to which a Latino or Hispanic identity forms largely depends on similar interests and structural foundations, such as a common geography. The historically separate regional concentration of particular national groups represents a prime reason for separateness, but the growing dispersion of various national groups into overlapping places presents growing opportunities for pan-Latino identity. For now, though, Latinos tend to favor identities based on national origin.

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Hispanics and the Future of America One issue we have dealt with in this chapter but that does not arise in many of the subsequent chapters, largely because of the lack of data, is the issue of illegal status. Many Latinos continue to confront serious problems in their everyday lives because of their illegal and lower class status, and this may have particularly important implications for their future. Most Latinos are in the working class, have low levels of education, and receive low salaries, characteristics that impede their ability to assimilate into the country they have chosen. However, the undocumented among them especially suffer from these and also from the lack of access to formal institutions. The demographic foundations today have important implications for the future of the Latino population in various social dimensions, as the rest of the book shows. The demographic trends outlined in this chapter have large and direct implications for all of the issues treated in subsequent chapters. Such demographic characteristics as population growth, concentration in young ages, significant rates of naturalization, and dispersion into new locales are important for understanding education, family life, labor force participation, voting, the criminal justice system, and health care. The changing geography of Latinos should also focus the attention of the public on their situation in places where they never existed before. The dispersion of the Latino population into new states may also suggest changing prospects for assimilation into American society. However, the next chapter shows that this dispersion has been accompanied by a resegregation in the cities of the new areas. REFERENCES Bean, F.D., Telles, E.E., and Lindsay Lowell, B. (1987). Undocumented migration to the United States: Perceptions and evidence. Population and Development Review, 13(4), 671–689. Bean, F.D., Lee, J., Batalova, J., and Leach, M. (2004). Immigration and fading color lines in America. In E. Carnevale, M.M. Kent, and A. Tarmann (Eds.), The American people. New York: Russell Sage Foundation. Calavita, K. (1992). Inside the state: The Bracero Program, immigration, and the INS. New York: Routledge. Cardoso, L. (1980). Mexican emigration to the United States, 1897–1931. Tucson: University of Arizona Press. Cobble, S., and Velaquez, J. (2004, December). Looking back, looking forward. The Nation, p. 11. Donato, K.M., Durand, J., and Massey, D.S. (1992). Changing conditions in the U.S. labor market: Effects of the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1996. Population Research and Policy Review, 11(2), 93–115. Duany, J. (1990). Los dominicanos en Puerto Rico: Migración en la semi-periferia. San Juan, Mexico: Ediciones el Huracán.

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Hispanics and the Future of America Duany, J., Hernández Angueira, L., and Rey, C.A. (1995). El barrio Gandul: Economía subterránea y migración indocumentada en Puerto Rico. San Juan, Mexico: Ediciones Nueva Sociedad. Durand, J. (1994). Más allá de la línea: Patrones migratorios en el Occidente de México. México D.F. CONACULTA. Durand, J. (1998). Política, modelo y patrón migratorios: El trabajo y los trabajadores mexicanos en Estados Unidos. San Luis Potosí, El Colegio de San Luis, Serie Cuadernos del Centro. Durand, J., and Arias, P. (2000). La experiencia migrante: Historia e iconografía de la migración México Estados Unidos. Guadalajara, Mexico: Universidad de Guadalajara. Durand, J., and Massey, D.S. (2003). Clandestinos: Migración México Estados Unidos en los albores del siglo XXI. México D.F., Editorial Miguel Angel Porrua. Durand, J., Massey, D.S., and Charvet, F. (2000). The changing geography of Mexican immigration to the United States: 1910–1996. Social Science Quarterly, 81(1), 1–15. Eschbach, K., and Gomez, C. (1998). Choosing Hispanic identity: Ethnic identity switching among respondents to High School and Beyond. Social Science Quarterly, 79(1), 74–90. Georges, E. (1990). The making of a transnational community. New York: Columbia University Press. Grasmuck, S., and Pessar, P.R. (1991). Between two islands. Dominican international migration. Los Angeles: California University Press. Grenier, G., and Pérez, L. (2003). The legacy of exile: Cubans in the United States. Boston, MA: Allyn and Bacon. Griffith, D. (1995). Hay trabajo: Poultry processing, rural industrialization and the latinization of low-wage labor. In D.D. Stull, M.J. Broadway, and D. Griffith (Eds.), Any way you cut it: Meat processing and small town America (pp. 129–151). Lawrence: University Press of Kansas. Griffith, D. (2000). Work and immigration: Winter vegetable production in South Florida. In R. Tardanico and M.B. Rosenberg (Eds.), Poverty or development (pp. 139–178). New York: Routledge. Hamilton, N., and Stoltz Chinchilla, N. (2001). Seeking community in global city: Guatemalans and Salvadorans in Los Angeles. Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press. Hernández-León, R., and Zúñiga, V. (2000). Making carpet by the mile: The emergency of a Mexican immigrant community in an industrial region of the U.S. historic South. Social Science Quarterly, 81(1), 49–65. Hood, M.V., III, and Morris, I.L. (2000). Brother, can you spare a dime? Racial/ethnic context and the Anglo vote on Proposition 187. Social Science Quarterly, 81(1), 194–206. Huber, E., and Solt, F. (2004). Successes and failures of neoliberalism. Latin American Research Review, 39(3), 150–164. Jasso, G., and Rosenzweig, M.R. (1990). The new chosen people: Immigrants in the United States. New York: Russell Sage Foundation. Kandel, W., and Parrado, E. (2004). U.S. industrial transformation and new Latino migration. Prepared for publication by the Migration Policy Institute, Washington, DC, based upon a presentation at the 2003 Annual Meeting of the Population Association of America, Minneapolis, MN, May 1-3. Available: http://www.migrationinformation.org/Feature/display.cfm?ID=217 [accessed January 2006]. Martin, J.A., Hamilton, B.E., Ventura, S.J., Menacker, F., and Park, M.M. (2002). Births: Final data for 2000. (National Vital Statistics Reports, vol. 50, no. 5.) Hyattsville, MD: National Center for Health Statistics. Martínez Curiel, E. (2003). Hasta que la muerte nos separe. Guadalajara, Mexico: Universidad de Guadalajara.

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Hispanics and the Future of America FIGURE A3-1 Age–sex composition of persons of Central American origin by nativity, 1998–2002. SOURCE: Data from Current Population Surveys, 1998–2002. FIGURE A3-2 Age–sex composition of persons of South American origin by nativity, 1998–2000. SOURCE Data from Current Population Surveys, 1998–2002.