and the private sector is important, and the integration of efforts needs continuing attention. While the histories of governmental control and the current configurations of the private sector vary considerably when considering the United States and Russia, improved understanding of the role of government in each country is critical if effective cooperative efforts are to be undertaken.

Finally, the emergency response systems in Russia and the United States are of critical importance in limiting damage from terrorist attacks. In many respects these systems should be multipurpose and capable of responding to all types of emergencies. However, there are unique problems posed by terrorist attacks, including the possibility of multiple attacks at one target or at dispersed targets and the design of attacks to cause fear as well as death and physical damage. The accumulation of experience around the world in responding to attacks can be valuable to all governments.

Several of the many topics that might be considered in developing cooperative programs were singled out for special attention, for example:

• Reciprocal observation of and participation in simulations of terrorist attacks. Simulations have been held and are being planned in both countries. Opportunities to participate in such exercises would be an excellent way to share experiences in the practical aspects of coping with terrorism.

• Joint development of methodologies and standards for vulnerability assessments, priority ranking of critical facilities, and assessments of adequacy of protection. Each of these topics is at the heart of efforts to counter terrorist attacks in urban areas. In-depth cooperation focused on any one of the topics should uncover lessons learned of mutual interest.

• Cooperation in the development of sensors and other technical means for monitoring facilities and transportation. Both countries have strong technical capabilities of direct relevance to counterterrorism efforts, particularly in the field of sensors. A review of selected arrays of sensors that each country has developed but that are not excessively sensitive and the operating experience using these sensors would be a good first step in developing cooperative programs.

• Improving understanding of government-private sector collaboration. Specialists in each country have difficulty understanding how the government structure and the private sector function in the other country. Since the role of government is central to almost all counterterrorism activities and since much of the burden of implementing preventive strategies falls on the private sector, improved familiarity with organizational responsibilities and practical experiences would be of benefit to many specialists in the two countries.