fied geospatial professionals who can support emergency response during disasters.
Finally, the committee found that funding for geospatial preparedness is insufficient and the funding that exists is often used ineffectively (Section 4.9):
RECOMMENDATION 12: To address the current shortfall in funding for geospatial preparedness, especially at the state and local levels, the committee recommends: (1) DHS should expand and focus a specifically designated component of its grant programs to promote geospatial preparedness through development, acquisition, sharing, and use of standard-based geospatial information and technology; (2) states should include geospatial preparedness in their planning for homeland security; and (3) DHS, working with the Office of Management and Budget, should identify and request additional appropriations and identify areas where state, local, and federal funding can be better aligned to increase the nation’s level of geospatial preparedness.
Besides these recommendations, the report also provides a set of more detailed guidelines for the assessment of geospatial preparedness in emergency management organizations in Chapter 5 and Appendix C. The list is not intended to be exhaustive, but rather to provide a basis for enhancing geospatial preparedness and for directing planning and investment.
In essence, the report paints a picture of technological abundance, but of geospatial data and tools that despite their power have not yet been applied systematically and appropriately to emergency management. It lists numerous institutional factors that have inhibited the effective deployment of technology and numerous reasons why organizations have failed to anticipate and plan for the particular circumstances created by disasters. The committee hopes that the recommendations made in this report, and the examples and guidelines that it provides, will help to create a world in which future responses to disasters will be faster and more effective.