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Appendix C
Risk: A Guide to Controversy
BARUCH FISCHHOFF
FOREWORD BY THE COMMITTEE
This appendix was written by Baruch Fischhoff to assist in the
deliberations of the National Research Council's Committee on Risk
Perception and Communication. It describes in some detail the
complications involved in controversies over managing risks in which
risk perception and risk communication play significant roles. It
addresses these issues from the perspective of many years of research
in psychology and other disciplines. The text of the committee's
report addresses many of the same issues, and, not surprisingly,
many of the same themes, although the focus of the report is more
general. The committee did not debate all points made in the guide.
Even though this appendix represents the views of only one member,
the committee decided to include it because we believe the guide to
be a valuable introduction to an extremely complicated literature.
PREFACE
This guide is intended to be used as a practical aid in applying
general principles to understanding specific risk management contro-
versies and their associated communications. It knight be thought of
as a user's guide to risk. Its form is that of a "diagnostic guide," show-
ing participants and observers how to characterize risk controversies
211
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212
APPENDIX C
along five essential dimensions, such as "What are the (psychologi-
cal) obstacles to laypeople's understanding of risks?"and "What are
the limits to scientific estimates of riskiness?" Its style is intended
to be nontechnical, thereby making the scientific literature on risk
accessible to a general audience. It is hoped that the guide will help
make risk controversies more comprehensible and help citizens and
professional risk managers play more effective roles in them.
The guide was written for the committee by one of its members.
Its substantive contents were considered by the committee in the
course of its work, either in the form of published articles and books
circulated to other committee members or in the form of issues
deliberated at its meetings. As a document, the guide complements
the conclusions of the committee's report.
CONTENTS
I INTRODUCTION
Usage, 215
Some Cautions, 216
214
II THE SCIENCE 217
What Are the Bounds of the Problem?, 217
What Is the Hard Science Related to the Problem?, 224
Adherence to Essential Rules of Science, 236
How Does Judgment Affect the Risk Estimation
Process?, 238
Summary, 253
III SCIENCE AND POLICY
Separating Facts and Values, 254
Measuring Risk, 257
Measuring Benefits, 262
Summary, 268
, · - - - - .
254
IV THE NATURE OF THE CONTROVERSY 269
The Distinction Between "Actual" and "Perceived" Risks
Is Misconceived, 270
Laypeople and Experts Are Speaking Different
Languages, 272
Laypeople and Experts Are Solving Different Problems, 273
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APPENDIX C
Debates Over Substance May Disguise Battles Over
Form, and Vice Versa, 275
Laypeople and Experts Disagree About What
Is Feasible, 277
I,aypeople and Experts See the Facts Differently, 278
Summary, 280
V STRATEGIES FOR RISK COMMUNICATION..
Concepts of Risk Communication, 282
Some Simple Strategies, 283
Conceptualizing Communication Programs, 286
Evaluating Communication Programs, 291
Summary, 298
213
.282
VI PSYCHOLOGICAL PRINCIPLES IN COMMUNICATION
DESIGN..e..ee..e..ee.e..eeeeee...e.e.e....eeeeeeeeeeeee.eee 299
People Simplify, 299
Once People's Minds Are Made Up, It Is Difficult to
Change Them, 300
People Remember What They See, 301
People Cannot Readily Detect Omissions in the
Evidence They Receive, 301
People May Disagree More About What Risk Is Than
About How Large It Is, 302
People Have Difficulty Detecting Inconsistencies in
Risk Disputes, 303
Summary, 304
VII C O N C L U SIO N 305
Individual Learning, 305
Societal Learning, 307
BIBI,IOGRAPHY 309
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I
INTRODUCTION
Risk management is a complex business. So are the controversies
that it spawns. And so are the roles that risk communication must
perform. In the face of such complexity, it is tempting to look for
simplifying assumptions. Made explicit, these assumptions might be
expressed as broad statements of the form, "what people really want
is . . ."; "all that laypeople can understand is . . .~; or ~industry's
communicators fad! whenever they...." Like other simplifications in
life, such assumptions provide some short-term relief at the price of
creating long-term complications. Overlooking complexities eventu-
ally leads to inexplicable events and ineffective actions.
On one level this guide might be used like a baseball scorecard
detailing the players' identities and performance statistics (perhaps
along with any unique features of the stadium, season, and rivalry).
Like a balIgame, a risk controversy should be less confusing to specta-
tors who know something about the players and their likely behavior
under various circumstances. Thus, experts wright respect the pub-
lic more if they were better able to predict its behavior, even if
they would prefer that the public behave otherwise. Sirn~larly, un-
derstanding the basics of risk analysis might make disputes among
technical experts seem less capricious to the lay public.
More ambitiously, such a guide might be used to facilitate ef-
fective action by the parties in risk controversies, like the Baseball
Abstract (James, 1988) in the hands of a skilled manager. For ex-
ample, the guide discusses how to determine what the public needs
to know in particular risky situations. Being able to identify those
needs may allow better focused risk communication, thereby using
the public's limited time wisely and letting it know that the com-
municators really care about the problems that the public faces.
Similarly, understanding the ethical values embedded in the defi-
nitions of ostensibly technical terms (e.g., risk, benefit, voluntary)
can allow members of the public to ask more penetrating questions
about whose interests a risk analysis serves. Realizing that different
actors use a term like "risks differently should allow communicators
to remove that barrier to mutual understanding.
214
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APPENDIX C
215
USAGE
The guide's audience includes all participants and observers of
risk management episodes involving communications. Its intent is
to help government officials preparing to address citizens' groups,
industry representatives hoping to site a hazardous facility without
undue controversy, local activists trying to decide what information
they need and whether existing communications meet those needs,
and academics wondering how central their expertise is to a particular
episode.
The premise of the guide is that risk communication cannot be
understood in isolation. Rather, it is one component of complex
social processes involving complex individuals. As a result, this
fuller context needs to be understood before risk communication can
be effectively transmitted or received. That context includes the
following elements and questions:
The Science. What is the scientific basis of the controversy?
What kinds of risks and benefits are at stake? How well are they
understood? How controversial is the underlying science? Where
does judgment enter the risk estimation process? How well is it to
be trusted?
Science and Policy. In what ways does the nature of the
science preempt the policymaking process (e.g., in the definition of
key terms, like "risk" and "benefit"; in the norms of designing and
reporting studies)? To what extent can issues of fact and of value be
separated?
· The Nature of the Controversy. Why is there a perceived
need for risk communication? Does the controversy reflect just a
disagreement about the magnitude of risks? Is controversy over risk
a surrogate for controversy over other issues?
Strategies for Risk Communication. What are the goals of
risk communication? How can communications be evaluated? What
burden of responsibility do communicators bear for evaluating their
communications, both before and after dissemination? What are
the alternatives for designing risk communication programs? What
are the strengths and weaknesses of different approaches? How can
complementary approaches be combined? What nonscientific infor-
mation is essential (e.g., the mandates of regulatory agencies, the
reward schemes of scientists)?
· Psychological Principles in Communication Design. What are
the behavioral obstacles to effective risk communication? What kinds
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216
APPENDIX C
of scientific results do laypeople have difficulty understanding? How
does emotion affect their interpretation of reported results? What
presentations exacerbate (and ameliorate) these problems? How does
personal experience with risks affect people's understanding?
SOME CAUTIONS
A diagnostic guide attempts to help users characterize a situa-
tion. To do so, it must define a range of possible situations, only one
of which can be experienced at a particular time. As a result, the
attempt to make one guide fit a large universe of risk management
situations means that readers will initially have to read about many
potential situations in order to locate the real situation that interests
them. With practice, users should gain fluency with a diagnostic
approach, making it easier to characterize specific situations. It is
hoped that the full guide will be interesting enough to make the full
picture seem worth knowing.
At no time, however, will diagnosis be simple or human behavior
be completely predictable. All that this, or any other, diagnos-
tic guide can hope to do is ensure that significant elements of a
social-political-psychological process are not overlooked. For a more
detailed treatment, one must look to the underlying research lit-
erature for methods and results. To that end, the guide provides
numerous references to that literature, as well as some discussion of
its strengths and limitations.
To the extent that a guide is useful for designing and interpreting
a communication process, it may also be useful for manipulating that
process. In this regard, the material it presents is no different than
any other scientific knowledge. This possibility imposes a responsi-
bility to make research equally available to all parties. Therefore,
even though this guide may suggest ways to bias the process, it
should also make it easier to detect and defuse such attempts.
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II
THE SCIENCE
By definition, all risk controversies concern the risks associated
with some hazard. However, as argued in the text of the report and
in this diagnostic guide, few controversies are only about the size of
those risks. Indeed, in many cases, the risks prove to be a side issue,
upon which are hung disagreements about the size and distribution
of benefits or about the allocation of political power in a society. In
all cases, though, some understanding of the science of risk is needed,
if only to establish that a rough understanding of the magnitude of
the risk is all that one needs for effective participation in the risk
debate. Following the text, the term ~hazard" is used to describe
any activity or technology that produces a risk. This usage should
not obscure the fact that hazards often produce benefits as well as
risks.
Understanding the science associated with a hazard requires a
series of essential steps. The first is identifying the scope of the prow
lem under consideration, in the sense of identifying the set of factors
that determine the magnitude of the risks and benefits produced by
an activity or technology. The second step is identifying the set of
widely accepted scientific "facts" that can be applied to the problem;
even when laypeople cannot understand the science underlying these
facts, they may at least be able to ensure that such accepted wisdom
is not contradicted or ignored in the debate over a risk. The third
step in understanding the science of risk is knowing how it depends
on the educated intuitions of scientists, rather than on accepted hard
facts; although these may be the judgments of trained experts, they
still need to be recognized as matters of conjecture that are both
more likely to be overturned than published (and replicated) results
and more vulnerable to the vagaries of psychological processes.
WHAT ARE THE BOUNDS OF THE PROBLEM?
The science learned in school offers relatively tidy problems.
The typical exercise in, say, physics gives all the facts needed for its
solution and nothing but those facts. The difficulty of such problems
for students comes in assembling those facts in a way that provides
the right answer. (In more advanced classes, one may have to bring
some general facts to bear as well.)
217
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218
APPENDIX C
The same assembly problem arises when analyzing the risks
and benefits of a hazard. Scientists must discover how its pieces
fit together. They must also figure out what the pieces are. For
example, what factors can influence the reliability of a nuclear power
plant? Or, whose interests must be considered when assessing the
benefits of its operation? Or, which alternative ways of generating
electricity are realistic possibilities?
The scientists responsible for any piece of a risk problem must
face a set of such issues before beginning their work. Laypeople
trying to follow a risk debate must understand how various groups of
scientists have defined their pieces of the problem. And, as mentioned
in the report, even the most accomplished of scientists are laypeople
when it comes to any aspects of a risk debate outside the range of
their trained expertise.
The difficulties of determining the scope of a risk debate emerge
quite clearly when one considers the situation of a reporter assigned
to cover a risk story. The difficult part of getting most environ-
mental stories is that no one person has the entire story to give.
Such stories typically involve diverse kinds of expertise so that a
thorough journalist might have to interview specialists in toxicology,
epidemiology, economics, groundwater movement, meteorology, and
emergency evacuation, not to mention a variety of local, state, and
federal officials concerned with public health, civil defense, education,
and transportation.
Even if a reporter consults with all the relevant experts, there
is no assurance of complete coverage. For some aspects of some
hazards, no one may be responsible.
For example, no evacuation plans may exist for residential areas
that are packed "hopelessly" close to an industrial facility. No one
may be capable of resolving the jurisdictional conflicts when a train
with military cargo derails near a reservoir just outside a major
population center. There may be no scientific expertise anywhere for
measuring the long-term neurological risks of a new chemical.
Even when there is a central address for questions, those occu-
pying it may not be empowered to take firm action (e.g., banning or
exonerating a chemical) or to provide clear-cut answers to personal
questions (e.g., "What should ~ do?" or "What should ~ tell my
children?"~. Often those who have the relevant information refuse to
divulge it because it might reveal proprietary secrets or turn public
opinion against their cause.
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APPENDIX ~
219
Having to piece together a story from multiple sources, even
recalcitrant ones, is hardly new to journalists. What is new about
many environmental stories is that no one knows what all of the
pieces are or realizes the limits of their own understanding.
Experts tend to exaggerate the centrality of their roles. Toxi-
cologists may assume that everyone needs to know what they found
when feeding rats a potential carcinogen or when testing ground-
water near a landfill, even though additional information is always
needed to make use of those results (e.g., physiological differences
among species, routes of human exposure, compensating benefits of
the exposure).
Another source of confusion is the failure of experts to remind
laypeople of the acknowledged limits of the experts' craft. For exam-
ple, cost-benefit analysts seldom remind readers that the calculations
consider only total costs and benefits and, hence, ignore questions
of who pays the costs and who pays the benefits (Bentkover et al.,
1985; Smith and Desvousges, 1986~.
Finally, environmental management is an evolving field that is
only beginning to establish comprehensive training programs and
methods, making it hard for anyone to know what the full ni~.t`~,re in
and how their work fits into it.
~_ ~
An enterprising journalist with a modicum of technical knowI-
edge should be able to get specialists to tell their stories in fairly
plain English and to cope with moderate evasiveness or manipula-
tion. However, what is the journalist to do when the experts do
not know what they do not know? One obvious solution is to talk to
several experts with maximally diverse backgrounds. Yet, sometimes
such a perfect mix is hard to find. Available experts can all have
common limitations of perspective.
Another solution is to use a checklist of issues that need to
be covered in any comprehensive environmental story. Scientists
themselves use such lists to ensure that their own work is properly
performed, documented, and reported. Such a protocol does not
create knowledge for the expert any more than it would provide an
education to the journalist. It does, however, help users exploit all
they know-and acknowledge what they leave out.
Some protocols that can be used in looking at risk analyses are
the causal model, the fault tree, a materials and energy flow diagram,
and a risk analysis checklist.
me, ~,, _
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220
HAZARD \
CAU SAL )
SEQUENCE /
~ ,
Lit
APPENDIX C
HUMAN HUMAN
NEEDS WANTS
;C>
FOOD l l SHOPPING
__ _ _
MODIFY
CHANGE
LIFE
STYLE
CHOICE OF
TECH
NOLOGY
USE AUTO"
MOBILE
MODIFY
USE
PUBLIC
TRANSIT
INITIATING
EVENT
LOSE
CONTROL
. . ..
BLOCK BLOCK
;
WARNING MEDIAN
SIGNS DIVIDERS
OUTCOM E
HEAD-ON
COLLISI ON
_ _
_: _
1 .
BLOCK
OCCUPANT
RESTRAINT
CONSE
QUENCES
HEAD
INJURIES
1 2 3 4 5 6
| TIME ~
HIGHER OR
DER CONSE
QUENCES
DEATH
~ _
BLOCK
EMER
GENCY
MEDICAL
AID
FIGURE II.1 The causal chain of hazard evolution. The top line indicates
seven stages of hazard development, from the earliest (left) to the final stage
(right). These stages are expressed generically in the top of each box and in
terms of a sample motor vehicle accident in the bottom. The stages are linked by
causal pathways denoted by triangles. Six control stages are linked to pathways
between hazard states by vertical arrows. Each is described generically as well
as by specific control actions. Thus control stage 2 would read: "You can
modify technology choice by substituting public transit for automobile use and
thus block the further evolution of the motor vehicle accident sequence arising
out of automobile use." The time dimension refers to the ordering of a specific
hazard sequence; it does not necessarily indicate the time scale of managerial
action. Thus, from a managerial point of view, the occurrence of certain
hazard consequences may trigger control actions that affect events earlier in
the hazard sequence. SOURCE: Figure- Bick et al., 1979; caption Fischhoff,
Lichtenstein, et al., 1981.
The Causal Mode]
The causal mode! of hazard creation is a way to organize the
full set of factors leading to and from an environmental mishap, both
when getting the story and when telling it. The example in Figure Il.1
is an automobile accident, traced from the need for transportation
to the secondary consequence of the collision. Between each stage,
there is some opportunity for an intervention to reduce the risk
of an accident. By organizing information about the hazard in a
chronological sequence, this scheme helps ensure that nothing is left
out, such as the deep-seated causes of the mishap (to the left) and
its long-range consequences (to the right).
Applied to an "irregular event" at a nuclear power station, for
example, this protocol would work to remind a reporter of such (left-
handed) causes as the need for energy and the need to protect the
large capital investment in that industry and such (right-h~nded)
consequences as the costs of retooling other plants designed like the
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APPENDIX C
221
affected plant or the need to burn more fossil fuels if the plant is taken
off line (without compensating reductions in energy consumption).
The Fault Tree
A variant on this procedure is the fault tree (Figure IT.2), which
lays out the sequence of events that must occur for a particular
accident to happen (Green and Bourne, 1972; U.S. Nuclear Regu-
latory Commission, 1983~. Actual fault trees, which can be vastly
more involved than this example, are commonly used to organize
the thinking and to coordinate the work of those designing complex
technologies such as nuclear power facilities and chemical plants. At
times, they are also used to estimate the overall riskiness of such fa-
ciTities. However, the numbers produced are typically quite imprecise
(U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 1978~.
In effect, fault trees break open the right-handed parts of a
causal mode! for detailed treatment. They can help a reporter to
RELEASE OF
RADI OACTIVE
WASTES TO BIOSPHERE
r
1
1
IMPACT OF
lARGE METEORITE OR
NUCLEAR WEAPON
1
TRANSPORTATION
BY
GROUNDWATER
VOLCANIC
ACTIVITY
l | | EROSION UPLIFT | I ACCIDENTAL I I r~
FA GLACIAL EALING OF
| STREAM l l DRILLING l AMINE THAW
PLASTIC SUDDEN RELEASE
DEFORMATION OF STORED
l AND ROCK PRESSURE RADIATION ENERGY
FIGURE II.2 Fault tree indicating the possible ways that radioactivity could
be released from deposited wastes after the closure of a repository. SOURCE:
Slovic and Fischhoff, 1983.
OCR for page 309
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A psychological perspective.
Representative terms from entire chapter:
low low low
