. "5 Analysis of Current and Prior Building Protection Programs and Studies." Protecting Building Occupants and Operations from Biological and Chemical Airborne Threats: A Framework for Decision Making. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press, 2007.
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Protecting Building Occupants and Operations from Biological and Chemical Airborne Threats: A Framework for Decision Making
federal organizations responsible for emergency response and law enforcement during the 2002 Winter Olympics in Salt Lake City, Utah.
Building protection features were retrofitted (the building was about four years old at the time) into a six-story commercial building totaling approximately 16,700 m2 (180,000 ft2) of floor space plus three levels of underground parking. OCC and JOC occupied the fifth and sixth floors of about 5600 m2 (60,000 ft2). A detailed description of the Smart Building is given in a six-volume series of reports (see Allen et al., 2006, for an executive summary and listing of the reports). The protection features of the Smart Building system were in place from two months prior to the 2002 Winter Olympics and the Paralympics to two months after the events. The system protected about 50 occupants on the fifth and sixth floors, and its estimated total cost was $22.2 million over its four years of operation. The protection system has since been dismantled and the building restored to its original configuration.
The building protection system consisted of collective protection (CP)1 for the fifth and sixth floors and a multiple sensor system that could trigger a change in ventilation system for the first to fourth floors. Therefore, the Smart Building protection system for the fifth and sixth floors can be regarded as a high-level passive protection system (LP-2). Although the heating, ventilating, and air-conditioning (HVAC) system for the first to fourth floors included only standard particle filters and no gas-phase chemical filtration, the sensor-activated responses were LP-4. In addition, physical security systems were installed and response training and plans implemented for the entire building. Entry to the fifth and sixth floors involved additional security and passage through a decontamination air lock in the event that contaminated (or potentially contaminated) personnel had to gain entry to OCC.
The key elements in the implementation of the CP system for the fifth and sixth floors were building modifications to eliminate air leakage into those floors and the mechanical system of the collective protection air handlers that supply chemical- and aerosol-filtered air. Building modifications that provide LP-1 and LP-2 focused on finding and, to the extent feasible, eliminating leakage between the CP floors and the outside and between the CP region and the floors below. These modifications reduced the airflow requirements to maintain the positive indoor-outdoor pressure gradient and the infiltration from the floors below. The existing HVAC system was also modified so that it serviced only the lower four floors. An entirely separate air-handling system for maintaining the CP overpressurization was installed to provide about 560 m3 min−1 (20,000 ft3 min−1) of air that was filtered by a high-efficiency particulate (HEPA) air filter and activated carbon filter units to maintain the CP overpressurization units. The design requirement was to maintain overpressurization at the building shell for wind loads
Collective protection is the provision of a contaminant-free area where personnel can function without individual protective equipment, such as a mask and protective garments (DOD, 2005).