ately from the original data, by verifying that peak renal uranium concentrations were estimated appropriately with the same model, by re-evaluating its interpretation of some studies, and by re-evaluating the dataset by considering the relevance of route of exposure and chemical form to those in the military-exposure scenarios. Depending on the outcome of that review and later calculations, the upper bound of the REG-0 range might need to be revised and the lower bound of the REG-1 range modified accordingly. Because of the uncertainties associated with such estimates, the Army should avoid setting REG values that suggest a great deal of precision, particularly for renal concentrations below 3 μg/g.
Cancer risk estimates should be calculated for levels II and III exposure to determine whether decontamination of vehicles perforated by DU munitions should be conducted to reduce the risk of fatal cancer from exposure of unprotected people.
For level II personnel working in vehicles perforated by DU munitions, the number of hours should be limited, and protective equipment, particularly respirators, should be used to reduce potentially important cumulative DU exposure.
If Gulf War level II personnel who had several hours of unprotected exposure to DU in perforated vehicles can be identified, they should receive health monitoring.