geographically dispersed U.S. interests should there be aggressive efforts by adversaries to carry out threats of bioterrorism.
The projected funding levels will enable the U.S. government, acting through BTRP as well as other programs, to continue its global leadership in addressing the dual-use dilemma associated with advancements in biological science and biotechnology. Such advancements are intertwined with important public health, agriculture, and scientific issues. Also, BTRP has repeatedly demonstrated that it not only can accomplish specific objectives in the U.S. government’s efforts to prevent the proliferation of biological weapons but can also encourage partner governments and other international governments to expand their support of programs that complement BTRP. BTRP is by far the largest U.S. government biological nonproliferation program, and it is the only program that is growing. Thus, it should play an even more important role in reducing the likelihood of bioterrorism in an important geographical region. In general the committee supports the program priorities selected by BTRP for future years. However, this chapter suggests several modified approaches in the development and implementation of BTRP, with special emphasis on new models to improve the effectiveness of research collaboration
DOD has announced that BTRP plans to use the funds requested for FY 2008 for the following activities:
Russia: Support planned cooperative research projects to improve vaccines and to identify better antiviral medications for smallpox. About $5.2 million has been allocated for this purpose. However, Russian policies that are unacceptable to DOD and lack of BTRP access to locations believed to be sites for repositories of dangerous pathogens limit the program, and no funding will be sought for FY 2009 and beyond other than for the possible continuation of smallpox-related research.
Georgia: Continue construction of a Central Reference Laboratory (CRL), which will secure all dangerous pathogens in the country and will provide a capability to characterize pathogens and validate diagnoses. Within the CRL, the pathogen repositories (one for human and one for veterinary pathogens) and an accompanying small suite of laboratory space will be built to Biosafety Level 3 (BSL-3) standards.
Uzbekistan: Continue construction of epidemiological monitoring stations and provide training for personnel to respond to and rapidly diagnose disease outbreaks. Collaborative research projects will continue to be developed and implemented.
Kazakhstan: If tax issues can be resolved, initiate work on a CRL, continue to construct/renovate epidemiological monitoring stations, and provide training for personnel to respond to and rapidly diagnose disease outbreaks. Collaborative research projects will continue to be developed and implemented.
Azerbaijan: Construct/renovate four epidemiological monitoring stations and provide training for personnel to respond to and rapidly diagnose disease outbreaks. Continue to develop and implement cooperative research projects.
Ukraine: Construct/renovate five epidemiological monitoring stations. Continue to provide diagnostics and epidemiological equipment and training to respond