B
U.S. Defense Strategy

U.S. defense planning historically has been based on an enumeration of likely warfighting scenarios. Thus, in the early days of the Cold War, defense planners based their risk analyses on the need to be able to respond to two and one-half conflicts at one time—that is, war with the Soviet Union in Europe, possible conflict with Communist China in Asia, and a “half war” with another regional state—Vietnam, as it turned out. This additive regional conflict approach was first proposed by Secretary of Defense McNamara during the Johnson administration. For the most part, successive administrations would maintain this conflict-counting strategy1: President Nixon’s strategy presumed the need to respond to one and one-half conflicts simultaneously, for example, while President Clinton’s strategy evolved into what became known as “two regional conflicts nearly simultaneously.” The two distinct periods that substantially stray from this general approach were the years following the end of the Cold War and the Bush administration’s post-9/11 force planning strategy.

RESPONDING TO THE END OF THE COLD WAR: THE BASE FORCE (1989-1992)

With the fall of the Berlin Wall came the recognition that U.S. defense planning, strategizing, and force structure would need fundamental realignment. Both the initial and revised approaches, conceived largely by General Powell during the first

1

Fred Kaplan, “The doctrine gap: Reality vs. the Pentagon’s new strategy,” Slate (July 6, 2005). Available online at http://www.slate.com/id/2122010/



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B U.S. Defense Strategy U.S. defense planning historically has been based on an enumeration of likely warfighting scenarios. Thus, in the early days of the Cold War, defense planners based their risk analyses on the need to be able to respond to two and one-half conflicts at one time—that is, war with the Soviet Union in Europe, possible conflict with Communist China in Asia, and a “half war” with another regional state—Vietnam, as it turned out. This additive regional conflict approach was first proposed by Secretary of Defense McNamara during the Johnson administration. For the most part, successive administrations would maintain this conflict-count- ing strategy1: President Nixon’s strategy presumed the need to respond to one and one-half conflicts simultaneously, for example, while President Clinton’s strategy evolved into what became known as “two regional conflicts nearly simultaneously.” The two distinct periods that substantially stray from this general approach were the years following the end of the Cold War and the Bush administration’s post- 9/11 force planning strategy. RESPONDING TO THE END OF THE COLD WAR: THE BASE FORCE (1989-1992) With the fall of the Berlin Wall came the recognition that U.S. defense planning, strategizing, and force structure would need fundamental realignment. Both the initial and revised approaches, conceived largely by General Powell during the first 1 Fred Kaplan, “The doctrine gap: Reality vs. the Pentagon’s new strategy,” Slate (July 6, 2005). Avail- able online at http://www.slate.com/id/2122010/ 

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m a nag i n g m at e r i a l s twenty-first century military  for a Bush administration, concentrated on the need to address a regional or global con- flict while maintaining a minimal force and preserving a hedge capacity to rebuild defenses for global warfare in the event of a resurgent superpower rivalry.2 As such, the defense strategy outlined in the 1992 National Military Strategy (NMS) called for a new, four-pronged approach3: strategic deterrence and defense, forward pres- ence (a smaller force than conceived under the earlier forward defense strategy), crisis response (given the geographic uncertainty surrounding future conflicts), and reconstitution. The last two prongs of the strategy were linked in that in times of crisis, including the potential for a reconstituted Soviet threat, they would explicitly allow returning to Cold-War-era force levels and capabilities if necessary. This was deemed a vital part of the defense strategy given domestic (i.e., congressional) interest at the time in cutting defense spending in order to reap a “peace dividend,” a goal that Pentagon officials feared might cut too deep into military readiness.4 As explained in the NMS (1992, pp. 7-8 and 24-25, italics added), the stockpiling of critical materials was an integral part of the plan: This ‘reconstitution’ capability is intended to deter such a power from militarizing and, if deterrence fails, to provide a global warfighting capability. Reconstitution involves forming, training, and fielding new fighting units. This includes initially drawing on cadre-type units and laid-up military assets; mobilizing previously trained or new manpower; and activating the industrial base on a large scale. Reconstitution also involves maintaining technology, doctrine, training, experienced military personnel, and innovation necessary to train the competitive edge in decisive areas of potential military competition. . . . Preserving the potential for expansion of air, ground, and maritime forces will require extraordinary foresight and political courage to lay away infrastructure, stockpile critical materials, protect the defense industrial base, sustain a cadre of quality leaders, and invest in basic science and high-payoff technologies. Reconstitution also requires important deci- sions based on early strategic warning. A key element in responding to this challenge is Graduated Mobilization Response. This national process integrates actions to increase our emergency preparedness posture in response to warning of crisis. These actions are designed to mitigate the impact of a crisis and to reduce significantly the lead time associated with responding to a full scale national security emergency. 2 Eric V. Larson, David T. Orletsky, and Kristin J. Leuschner, Defense Planning in a Decade of Change: Lessons from the Base Force, Bottom-Up Review, and Quadrennial Defense Review (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, 2001); Lorna S. Jaffe, The Development of the Base Force - (Joint History Office, Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, July 1993). Available online at http://www. dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/history/baseforc.pdf. 3 Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, National Military Strategy (Washington, D.C.: Defense Technical Information Center, 1992). Available at http://stinet.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=AD A338837&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf. 4 Jaffe, op. cit.

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aPPendix b  FIGURE B-1 Schematic depicting the expected spectrum of conflict. SOURCE: NMS (1992). The schematic depicting the expected spectrum of conflict is shown as Figure B-1. In addition to explicitly including a reconstitution phase as part of the defense strategy, the Base Force was distinct in that it was “determined principally by the need to protect and promote U.S. interests in regions vital to the United States . . .” rather than by sheer military capability to fight a chosen number of expected con- flicts as earlier and subsequent defense plans have been.5 But the plan would be overcome by events. By the time the Base Force could be implemented, U.S. forces had conducted regime change in Panama, the Soviet Union and its hold on Eastern Europe had collapsed, and a new front had opened in the Middle East with Saddam Hussein’s invasion of Kuwait. 5 Larson et al., op. cit., p. 12, fn 28: “Although it was not designed on this basis, the Base Force would, however, be assessed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in terms of its ability to fight one or more MRCs.”

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m a nag i n g m at e r i a l s twenty-first century military  for a THE BOTTOM-UP REVIEW—1993-1997 The Clinton administration would ultimately maintain the regional focus adopted in the Base Force construct but revert to sizing the force based on the capability needed to win a select number of geographic conflicts. To determine the appropriate strategy, capabilities, and force structure in the wake of the Cold War and the successful but conventional Gulf War I, Secretary of Defense Aspin con- ducted a fundamental bottom-up review (BUR). The end result of this review was initially a win-hold-win strategy involving two major regional conflicts (MRCs). This was soon adjusted to a somewhat more robust strategy, winning two nearly simultaneous MRCs (for instance, North Korea and Iraq).6 Like its predecessor, the BUR contained an explicit hedge approach: . . . sizing our forces for two major regional conflicts provides a hedge against the possibil- ity tha]t a future adversary might one day confront us with a larger-than-expected threat, and then turn out, through doctrinal or technological innovation, to be more capable than we expect, or [to] enlist the assistance of other nations to form a coalition against our interests. There was no further mention, however, of the need to maintain a reconstitut- ing capability. Rather, with the advent of the new doctrine Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA),7 which was based on enhanced information and communications technologies, U.S. defense planning and sourcing began to assume an explicitly international character. Moreover, as part of an expanded forward presence con- cept, the strategy required prepositioning of military equipment and supplies to facilitate a rapid American military response should a crisis occur. 1997 QDR—1997-2001 Broad dissatisfaction with the two-MRC construct led to a fresh review of U.S. defense strategy and posture 4 years later. The  Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) adopted a longer-term outlook, assessing security and defense needs through 2015. The result was a strategy designed to shape the international security envi- ronment in ways favorable to U.S. interests, respond to the full spectrum of crises when directed, and prepare now to meet the challenges of an uncertain future.8 6 Les Aspin, Report on the Bottom-Up Review, OSD, DoD (October 1993). Available at http://www. fas.org/man/docs/bur/index.html. 7 For further information see Steven Metz and James Kievit, Strategy and the Revolution in Military Affairs: From Theory to Policy (1995). Available at http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/ssi/stratrma. pdf. Accessed December 2007. 8 Office of the Secretary of Defense,  Quadrennial Defense Review. Available at http://www.fas. org/man/docs/qdr/.

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aPPendix b  Nonetheless, the force structure outlined to achieve these aims was familiar, with the two MRCs renamed “major theater wars” in overlapping time frames. Added to the two-MTW strategy was the need to also respond to smaller scale contingen- cies that might arise, such as conflicts in places like Bosnia or Kosovo. Addition- ally, building on the BUR’s support for enhanced allied assistance and supply, the DoD continued to expand its case for needing a national defense industrial base with the ability to trade and source globally as an essential element of long-term U.S. national security.9 However, Congress, a naturally more conservative group, never fully signed on to this need to trade globally in order to stay economically, technologically, and militarily far ahead of any and all future competitors. This conceptual divide persists today (as evidenced in the discrepancy between the law and practice governing the NDS) and is likely to play in any debate over the need to maintain the NDS. 2001 QDR—2001-2005 (POST-9/11) On coming into office, Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld was intent on trans- forming the military as a means of implementing and making the RMA doctrine permanent across DoD. Yet, the need to respond to September 11-type attacks would also impact the approach adopted in the congressionally mandated the 00 QDR, which came out shortly thereafter and had to be hastily revised to further reflect homeland defense. The main innovation stemming from that the QDR was the adoption of a capabilities-based approach rather than a traditional threat-based approach. In other words, rather than focus on trying to anticipate and identify probable future threats (posed by state or nonstate actors) the capabilities-based approach is designed to assure a force structure ready to meet any threat regard- less of its origin, geography, or timing. Accordingly, the defense strategy outlined in the 00 QDR focused on a new approach to dealing with a range of concerns, threats, and possible conflicts: Defend the United States; • Deter aggression and coercion forward in critical regions; • Swiftly defeat aggression in overlapping major conflicts while preserving • for the President the option to call for a decisive victory in one of those 9 For a comprehensive argument outlining DoD’s interest in supporting a dual-use, globally sourced defense industrial base, see Defense Science Board, Final Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Globalization and Security, December 1999. Available at http://www.acq.osd.mil/dsb/reports/ globalization.pdf.

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m a nag i n g m at e r i a l s twenty-first century military 0 for a conflicts, including the possibility of regime change or occupation [note: a modified version of the 2 MTW approach]; and Conduct a limited number of smaller-scale contingency operations.10 • As this new force-planning structure evolved, it became known as the 1-4-2-1 strategy: 1 Defend the United States, 4 Deter forward in 4 critical regions (Europe, northeast Asia, east Asian lit- toral, southwest Asia), 2 Swiftly defeat two adversaries nearly simultaneously, and 1 Win one decisively—that is, potential regime change.11 The strategy also maintained the need to be able to respond to small-scale contingencies but gave more emphasis to a “force generation capacity” and a stra- tegic forces reserve. This is the defense planning strategy that currently underlies the most recent IDA analysis for the NDS. 2006 QDR—2006-2010 The latest iteration of defense planning as outlined in the most recent QDR is a modified 1-4-2-1 approach, where the 4 now refers to the need to respond to a spectrum of challenges that are irregular, traditional, catastrophic, or disruptive, as depicted in Figure B-2.12 The present QDR expands on the fundamental strategy set out in the 2005 National Defense Strategy (NDSt). The 2005 NDSt, Secretary Rumsfeld’s only published NDSt, is the source of this new quadrangular approach to dealing with 10 Office of the Secretary of Defense, 00 Quadrennial Defense Review, p. 17. Available at http:// www.comw.org/qdr/qdr2001.pdf. 11 The 1-4-2-1 construct is formally referenced in the 2004 National Military Strategy, a product of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in support of the National Security Strategy (a White House document) and implementing the 2005 National Defense Strategy (from OSD). IDA’s analysis appends a “1” to the 1-4-2-1 construct, adding “1 smaller scale contingency.” The 2005 NDS, however, states the need to also “conduct a limited number of lesser contingencies.” See Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, National Military Strategy of the United States of America 00: A Strategy for Today; A Vision for Tomorrow (March 2005) and Office of the Secretary of Defense, National Defense Strategy of the United States of America (March 2005), referred to hereinafter by the acronym NDSt to distinguish it from NDS. 12 The 1-4-2-1 construct does not appear in the QDR document. However, as in the earlier QDR pro- cess, Pentagon officials use this shorthand to describe the present strategy. For the formal document (which was due in 2005 but was delayed), see Office of the Secretary of Defense, 00 Quadrennial Defense Review. Available online at http://www.defenselink.mil/qdr/report/Report20060203.pdf.

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aPPendix b  Irregular Challenges Catastrophic Challenges Traditional Challenges Disruptive Challenges FIGURE B-2 2006 QDR responses to the spectrum of challenges. SOURCE: OSD (2006, p. 19). security challenges old and new. Arguably two of the four types of challenges are most likely to impact the National Defense Stockpile (NDS): traditional challenges (nation-state adversaries) and disruptive challenges (revolutionary technology and associated military innovation). The remaining challenges—irregular (terrorist incidents) and catastrophic (use of weapons of mass destruction)—also hold the potential to impact the NDS but are expected to be temporary. The 2005 NDSt also outlines four guidelines that structure DoD’s strategic planning and decision making: • Active, layered defense, • Continuous transformation, • Capabilities-based approach, and Managing risks.13 • 13 National Defense Strategy of the United States of America (2005, p. iv).

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m a nag i n g m at e r i a l s twenty-first century military  for a With regard to risks, the NDSt states that DoD will consider the full range of risks associated with resources and operations and manage clear trade-offs across the Department. In addition, the 00 QDR outlines a number key differences in DoD strategy under the aegis of Transformation. A few of the differences relating to force struc- ture might impact the NDS: • From responding after a crisis starts (reactive) – to preventive actions so problems do not become crises (proactive) . . . . • From static defense, garrison forces – to mobile, expeditionary operations . . . . • From separate military Service concepts of operation – to joint and combined operations . . . . • From exposed forces forward – to reaching back to CONUS to support expedition- ary forces . . . . • From broad-based industrial mobilization – to targeted commercial solutions . . . . • From vertical structures and processes (stovepipes) – to more transparent, hori- zontal integration (matrix) . . . . • From the U.S. military performing tasks – to a focus on building partner capabilities.14 With regard to the concept of a stockpile, the 00 QDR, on pages 89 and 90, cites the need to revise U.S. law and regulations to allow greater global sourcing of defense supplies: Recent legislative changes remove some of the impediments to helping partners engaged in their own defense, but greater flexibility is urgently needed. The Department will seek to: • Establish a Defense Coalition Support Account to fund and, as appropriate, stockpile routine defense articles such as helmets, body armor and night vision devices for use by coalition partners. [italics added] • Expand Department authority to provide logistics support, supplies and services to allies and coalition partners, without reimbursement as necessary, to enable coalition operations with U.S. forces. • Expand Department authority to lease or lend equipment to allies and coalition part- ners for use in military operations in which they are participating with U.S. forces. • Expand the authorities of the Departments of State and Defense to train and equip foreign security forces best suited to internal counterterrorism and counter-insurgency operations . . . . 14 Office of the Secretary of Defense, 00 Quadrennial Defense Review, pp. vi-vii.

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aPPendix b  The 00 QDR, on page 38, also assumes both a steady-state and surge force capacity, but there is no discussion of the need for a stockpile or material reserve for these purposes: Conduct and Win Conventional Campaigns • Steady-state – deter inter-state coercion or aggression through forward deployed forces, enable partners through theater security cooperation, and conduct presence missions. These activities include day-to-day presence missions, military-to-military exchanges, combined exercises, security cooperation activities and normal increases in readiness during the seasonal exercises of potential adversaries. • Surge – wage two nearly simultaneous conventional campaigns (or one conventional campaign if already engaged in a large-scale, long-duration irregular campaign), while selectively reinforcing deterrence against opportunistic acts of aggression. Be prepared in one of the two campaigns to remove a hostile regime, destroy its military capacity and set conditions for the transition to, or for the restoration of, civil society. HOMELAND DEFENSE As described in the White House’s National Strategy for Homeland Security (2002), the strategic objectives of homeland security are, in order of priority, as follows: • Prevent terrorist attacks within the United States; • Reduce America’s vulnerability to terrorism; and • Minimize the damage and recover from attacks that do occur. Recovery includes the full range of efforts to build and maintain various finan- cial, legal, and social systems to recover from all forms of terrorism. The United States must be prepared to protect and restore institutions needed to sustain eco- nomic growth and confidence, rebuild destroyed property, assist victims and their families, heal psychological wounds, and demonstrate compassion, recognizing that we cannot automatically return to the preattack norm. The National Strategy for Homeland Security aligns and focuses homeland security functions into six critical mission areas: intelligence and warning, border and transportation security, domestic counterterrorism, protecting critical infra- structure, defending against catastrophic terrorism, and emergency preparedness and response. The first three mission areas focus on preventing terrorist attacks; the next two on reducing our nation’s vulnerabilities; and the final one on minimizing the damage and recovering from attacks that do occur. The U.S. military has ongoing and emergency roles in each of these mission areas. DoD contributes to homeland security through its military missions over- seas, homeland defense, and support to civil authorities. There are three circum-

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m a nag i n g m at e r i a l s twenty-first century military  for a stances under which DoD would be involved in improving security at home. In extraordinary circumstances, it would conduct military missions such as combat air patrols or maritime defense operations. Plans for such contingencies will con- tinue to be coordinated, as appropriate, with the National Security Council, the Homeland Security Council, and other federal departments and agencies. Second, DoD would be involved during emergencies such as responding to an attack or to forest fires, floods, tornadoes, or other catastrophes. In these cir- cumstances, the Department may be asked to act quickly to provide capabilities that other agencies do not have. It would also take part in limited-scope missions where other agencies have the lead—for example, security at a special event like the Olympics. Third, in response planning, DoD has responsibility for the infra- structure protection plan, vulnerability assessment, and threat warning for the defense industrial base. The importance of military support to civil authorities as the latter respond to threats or acts of terrorism is recognized in Presidential decision directives and legislation. Military support to civil authorities pursuant to a terrorist threat or attack may take the form of providing technical support and assistance to law enforcement; assisting in the restoration of law and order; loaning specialized equipment; and assisting in consequence management. The U.S. Northern Com- mand is the military command that has direct responsibility for the following: • Conducting operations to deter, prevent, and defeat threats and aggres- sion aimed at the United States and its territories and interests within the assigned area of responsibility and • Providing defense support for civil authorities, as directed by the President or Secretary of Defense, including consequence management operations. 15 These specific homeland security missions may have an impact on the National Defense Stockpile in the following areas: • Major military operations in the United States requiring a surge of logistics support, such as wide-area infrastructure protection or extensive disaster relief. • Disruption (physical attack, natural disaster, pandemic illness) of vulner- able critical supply nodes, such as a mineral processing plant, a transpor- tation center, or a consolidated supply depot that would impact military logistics. 15 See Web site of the U.S. Northern Command at http://www.northcom.mil. Accessed December 2007.