4
Changing Defense Planning and Defense Materials Needs

According to the legislation governing the National Defense Stockpile (NDS), its purpose is “to provide for the acquisition and retention of stocks of certain strategic and critical materials and to encourage the conservation and development of sources of such materials within the United States and thereby to decrease and to preclude, when possible, a dangerous and costly dependence by the United States upon foreign sources for supplies of such materials in times of national emergency.”1 Strategic and critical materials are defined as “materials that (A) would be needed to supply the military, industrial, and essential civilian needs of the United States during a national emergency and (B) are not found or produced in the United States in sufficient quantities to meet such need.”2 A national emergency is defined as a general declaration of emergency with respect to the national defense made by the President or by the Congress. The NDS legislation specifically states that the stockpile is not to be used for economic stabilization.

Following World War II, the historical context for the NDS mission was a national emergency in which U.S. defense forces were fighting a global war against Soviet aggression. Today the United States faces a very different type of threat, and the military forces have changed markedly in strategy, force structure, equipment, and technology. This chapter discusses changes in the strategic threats and U.S. force planning and describes why the committee believes the NDS has been unable

1

50 U.S.C. 98, Section 2 (b).

2

50 U.S.C. 98, Section 12 (1).



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4 Changing Defense Planning and Defense Materials Needs According to the legislation governing the National Defense Stockpile (NDS), its purpose is “to provide for the acquisition and retention of stocks of certain strategic and critical materials and to encourage the conservation and development of sources of such materials within the United States and thereby to decrease and to preclude, when possible, a dangerous and costly dependence by the United States upon foreign sources for supplies of such materials in times of national emer- gency.”1 Strategic and critical materials are defined as “materials that (A) would be needed to supply the military, industrial, and essential civilian needs of the United States during a national emergency and (B) are not found or produced in the United States in sufficient quantities to meet such need.”2 A national emergency is defined as a general declaration of emergency with respect to the national defense made by the President or by the Congress. The NDS legislation specifically states that the stockpile is not to be used for economic stabilization. Following World War II, the historical context for the NDS mission was a national emergency in which U.S. defense forces were fighting a global war against Soviet aggression. Today the United States faces a very different type of threat, and the military forces have changed markedly in strategy, force structure, equipment, and technology. This chapter discusses changes in the strategic threats and U.S. force planning and describes why the committee believes the NDS has been unable 1 50 U.S.C. 98, Section 2 (b). 2 50 U.S.C. 98, Section 12 (1). 

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m a nag i n g m at e r i a l s twenty-first century military  for a to adapt to them. (A more detailed discussion of the evolution of defense planning is in Appendix B.) CHANGES IN DEFENSE PLANNING Significant shifts in defense planning, strategy, and processes have taken place since the end of the Cold War and today’s Global War on Terror (GWOT). Begin- ning with the first Bush administration’s Base Force concept in 1989 through today’s Transformational Efforts and Capabilities-Based Planning, the Depart- ment of Defense (DoD) has steadily adjusted its strategic course and capabilities to address the changed threat and meet the challenges posed by the global security environment. U.S. defense planning historically has been based on an enumeration of likely war-fighting scenarios. Thus, in the early days of the Cold War, defense planners calculated their risk analyses based on the need to be able to respond to two and one-half conflicts at one time (that is, possible wars with the Soviet Union in Europe and with the People’s Republic of China in Asia and a half-war with another regional state, in the event Vietnam). For the most part, successive administrations relied on this basic conflict-counting strategy (Kaplan, 2005). President Nixon’s strategy presumed the need to respond to one and one-half conflicts simultane- ously, for example. The recent history of defense planning, and the history most pertinent to understanding the NDS and its relevance to defense needs, breaks down into two turning-point periods—1990-2001 and post-9/11. 1990-2001 With the fall of the Berlin Wall came the recognition that U.S. defense planning and force structuring would need fundamental realignment with concentration on addressing regional rather than global conflict while maintaining a minimal force and preserving a hedge capacity to rebuild defenses for global warfare in the event of a resurgent superpower rivalry (Larson et al., 2001). As such, the defense strategy for the 1990s, as outlined in the 1992 National Military Strategy (NMS), called for a new, four-pronged approach based on strategic (nuclear) deterrence and defense, forward presence (that is, a smaller force than conceived under the previous for- ward defense strategy); crisis response (given the uncertainty surrounding the geographic location of future conflicts); and reconstitution (Powell, 1992). The last two prongs of the strategy explicitly allowed for a return to Cold- War-era force levels and capabilities if necessary. This was deemed a vital part of the defense strategy given domestic—that is, congressional—interest at the time in cutting defense spending in order to reap a “peace dividend,” a goal that Pentagon officials feared might cut too deep into military readiness (Jaffe, 1993). Interest-

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cHanging defense Planning d e f e n s e m at e r i a l s n e e d s  and ingly, as explained in the NMS, the stockpiling of critical materials was an integral part of this plan:3 Preserving the potential for expansion of air, ground, and maritime forces will require extraordinary foresight and political courage to lay away infrastructure, stockpile critical materials, protect the defense industrial base, sustain a cadre of quality leaders, and invest in basic science and high-payoff technologies. Reconstitution also requires important decisions based on early strategic warning. and A key element in responding to this challenge is Graduated Mobilization Response. This national process integrates actions to increase our emergency preparedness posture in response to warning of crisis. These actions are designed to mitigate the impact of a crisis and to reduce significantly the lead time associated with responding to a full scale national security emergency. However, before the base force plan of the first Bush administration could be implemented, world events had overtaken the expectations underlying U.S. strategy: The Soviet Union and its influence on Eastern Europe had collapsed, U.S. forces had effected regime change in Panama, and a new front had opened in the Middle East with Saddam Hussein’s invasion of Kuwait. This new strategic environ- ment, unforeseen by DoD strategists, was therefore not reflected in the NDS, which by law is mandated to base its analysis on DoD strategy. A new strategic approach was adopted only when the Clinton administration took over. In response to new global security challenges the Clinton administration con- ducted a fundamental bottom-up review (BUR). The end result of this review was a strategy for winning two nearly simultaneous major regional conflicts (MRCs)— North Korea and Iraq (Aspin, 1993). While there was no further mention of the need to maintain a reconstituting capability or a stockpile, the BUR, like its predecessor, contained an explicit hedge approach: . . . sizing our forces for two major regional conflicts provides a hedge against the possibility that a future adversary might one day confront us with a larger-than-expected threat, and then turn out, through doctrinal or technological innovation, to be more capable than we expect, or enlist the assistance of other nations to form a coalition against our interests.4 Broad dissatisfaction with the two-MRC construct led to a fresh review of U.S. defense strategy and posture 4 years later. The 1997 quadrennial defense review (QDR) adopted a longer-term outlook, assessing security and defense needs through 2015. The result was a strategy designed to “shape the international secu- rity environment in ways favorable to U.S. interests, respond to the full spectrum of crises when directed, and prepare now to meet the challenges of an uncertain future” (DOD, 1997). Nonetheless, the force structure outlined to achieve these 3 NMS (Powell, 1992), pp. 7-8 and 24-25. 4 See http://www.fas.org/man/docs/bur/part02.htm. Accessed November 2007.

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m a nag i n g m at e r i a l s twenty-first century military  for a aims was familiar, with the two MRCs renamed major theater wars (MTWs) in overlapping time frames. Added to the two-MTW strategy was the need also to respond to smaller scale contingencies that might arise (as did Bosnia and Kosovo). Additionally, building on the BUR’s support for enhanced allied assistance and supply, DoD continued to expand its case for a national defense industrial base with the ability to trade and resource globally as an essential element of long-term U.S. national security.5 This new, more global approach, however, was not formally reflected in the legislation governing the NDS. Rather, DoD adopted a more expan- sive view of the clause in the Strategic and Critical Stock Piling Act that reads “a dangerous and costly dependence by the United States upon foreign sources for supplies” to allow global sourcing, given changing world economic dynamics. It appears that DoD and congressional views of how the NDS should operate have diverged over time, with the Pentagon focused on trading globally in order to stay far ahead economically, technologically, and militarily of any and all future com- petitors, while legislators tended to emphasize a reliance on domestic supply (for example, the Buy American Act and the Berry Amendment). A review of NDS reports to Congress from the 1990s (detailed in Chapter 6) shows that long periods of time elapsed between changes in the DoD strategy sce- narios and the ensuing stockpile recommendations (Table 4-1). Post-9/11 Period Another key turning point in defense strategy and resource planning was the 00 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR). Following the terrorist attacks of 9/11, the first version of the 00 QDR, which came out shortly thereafter, had to be hastily revised to further emphasize homeland defense (Box 4-1). The main innovation stemming from this review was the adoption of a capabilities-based approach in place of the traditional threat-based strategy. In other words, rather than focus on trying to anticipate and identify probable future threats (that is, state or nonstate actors), the capabilities-based approach is designed to assure a force structure ready to meet any potential threat regardless of its origin, geography, or timing. The defense strategy outlined in the 00 QDR therefore took a four- pronged approach to dealing with a range of concerns, threats, and possible con- flicts. As this new force-planning structure evolved, it would come to be known as the 1-4-2-1 strategy: 5 For a comprehensive argument outlining DoD’s interests in supporting a dual-use, globally sourced defense industrial base, see DSB (1999).

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cHanging defense Planning d e f e n s e m at e r i a l s n e e d s  and TABLE 4-1 Comparison of Changes in DoD Strategy, the Approach to Stockpiling (if Any), the Impact on the Assumptions Made in the Stockpile Requirements Analysis, and the Number of Requirements Reported to Congress DoD Strategy DoD Stockpile Reports to Congress Stockpile Stockpile Number of Reported Elements Approach Assumptions Stockpile Requirements Base Force Strategic deterrence Reconstitution Indefinite duration 1989: 48 requirements (1989- and defense included as an conflict reported 1992) explicit part Forward presence of strategy to Requirements 1992: 20 requirements hedge against modeled for first 3 reported Crisis response potential years resurgence of Reconstitution Soviet Union 1-year warning time (1989-1991) 3-year mobilization (1993-) after nonnuclear, conventional conflict Bottom-Up 2 MRCs Not addressed 7-9 years warning 1993: 7 requirements Review (1995-) reported (1993- Prepositioning of 1997) military supplies 2-4 years 1995: 3 requirements overseas mobilization reported 3-year conflict (3-4 months intense; 2 years+ stalemate; 3- 4 months wrap-up) QDR 2 MTWs Not addressed Little warning 1997: 6 requirements (1997- 1-year conflict reported 2001) (1999-) 1999: 3 requirements 3-year regeneration reported period 2001 QDR 1-Defend the Not addressed Little warning 2001: 4 requirements (2001- homeland 1-year conflict reported 2005) 4-Deter forward in (1999-) 4 critical regions 2003: 3 requirements 2-Swiftly defeat 2 3-year regeneration reported adversaries nearly period simultaneously 2005: 3 requirements 1-Win 1 decisively Catastrophic U.S. reported incident added continued

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m a nag i n g m at e r i a l s twenty-first century military 0 for a TABLE 4-1 Continued DoD Strategy DoD Stockpile Reports to Congress Stockpile Stockpile Number of Reported Elements Approach Assumptions Stockpile Requirements 2006 QDR 1-Defend the Not addressed (2006- homeland 2010) 4-Respond to the spectrum of conflict 2-Swiftly defeat 2 adversaries nearly simultaneously 1-Win 1 decisively Prepositioned stocks Stockpile routine defense articles such as helmets, body armor, and night vision devices for use by coalition partners NOTE: The table shows NDS assumptions significantly lag changes in DoD strategy and that requirements have been reduced to near zero. Table 6-4 gives more details on the requirements reported. 1 Defend the United States, 4 Deter forward in 4 critical regions (Europe, northeast Asia, east Asian lit- toral, southwest Asia), 2 Swiftly defeat two adversaries nearly simultaneously, and 1 Win one decisively—that is, potential regime change.6 The strategy also maintained the need to be able to respond to small-scale contingencies but added a “force generation capacity” and a strategic forces reserve. This is the defense planning strategy that currently underlies the most recent IDA analysis for the NDS. The latest iteration of defense planning as outlined in the most recent 00 6 The 1-4-2-1 construct is formally referenced in the 2004 National Military Strategy (Myers, 2005), a product of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in support of the National Security Strategy (a White House document) and implementing the 2005 National Defense Strategy (from OSD). IDA’s analysis adds a “1” to the 1-4-2-1 construct: one smaller scale contingency. The 2005 National Defense Strategy, however, states the need to also conduct a limited number of lesser contingencies (Rumsfeld, 2005).

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cHanging defense Planning d e f e n s e m at e r i a l s n e e d s  and BOX 4-1 Homeland Defense As described in the National Strategy for Homeland Security (Office of Homeland Security, 2002), the strategic objectives of homeland security in order of priority are to “prevent terrorist attacks within the United States; reduce America’s vulnerability to terrorism; and minimize the damage and recover from attacks that do occur.”a Recovery includes the full range of efforts to build and maintain various financial, legal, and social systems to recover from all forms of terrorism. The United States must be prepared to protect and restore institutions needed to sustain economic growth and confidence, rebuild destroyed property, assist victims and their families, heal psychological wounds, and demon-­ strate compassion, recognizing that we cannot automatically return to the preattack norm. The strategy aligns and focuses homeland security functions into six critical mission areas: intelligence and warning, border and transportation security, domestic counterterror-­ ism, protecting critical infrastructure, defending against catastrophic terrorism, and emergency preparedness and response. The first three mission areas focus on preventing terrorist attacks (the first strategic objective); the next two on reducing the nation’s vulnerabilities (the second); and the final one on minimizing the damage and recovering from attacks that do occur (the third). The U.S. military has ongoing and emergency roles in each of these mission areas. DoD contributes to homeland security through its military missions overseas, homeland defense, and support to civil authorities. There are three circumstances under which DoD could be involved in improving security at home. In extraordinary circumstances and coordinated, as appropriate, with the National Security Council, the Homeland Security Council, and other federal agencies, it could carry out domestic military missions such as combat air patrols or maritime defense. Second, DoD could be involved during emergencies by, for example, responding to an attack or to forest fires, floods, tornadoes, or other catastrophes, providing capabilities that other agencies do not have. It could also take part in limited-­scope missions where other agencies have the lead—for example, security at a special sporting event. Third, in response planning, DoD has responsibility for the infrastructure protection plan, vulnerability assessment, and threat warning for the defense industrial base. These specific homeland security missions may have an impact on the NDS in the follow-­ ing areas: Major military operations in the United States requiring a surge of logistics support, • such as wide-­area infrastructure protection or extensive disaster relief. Disruption (by physical attack, natural disaster, pandemic illness) of vulnerable criti-­ • cal supply nodes, such as a mineral processing plant, a transportation center, or a consolidated supply depot that would impact military logistics. aOffice of Homeland Security, 2002. p. viii.

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m a nag i n g m at e r i a l s twenty-first century military  for a QDR (DoD, 2006) is a modified 1-4-2-1 approach, where the “4” now refers to the need to respond to a spectrum of challenges that are irregular, traditional, cata- strophic, or disruptive, as depicted in Figure 4-1.7 The 00 QDR expands on the fundamental strategy set out in the 2005 National Defense Strategy, the source of the new quadrangular approach to dealing with old and new security challenges. The 2005 strategy also outlines “four guidelines [that] structure our strategic planning and decision-making.” These are an active, layered defense; continuous transformation; a capabilities-based approach; and managing risks (Rumsfeld, 2005). The 00 QDR also assumes both a steady-state and a surge force capacity, but unlike the earlier Base Force strategy, it does not discuss the need for a materials stockpile for these purposes. Stockpile Implications of a Transformed Military The evolving defense scenarios outlined above have had significant impact on the kinds of defense systems required by the military and, by extension, the materials needs of the services and the stockpiling of the most critical of those materials. Considering the 00 QDR, discussed in the preceding section, the traditional (nation-state adversaries) challenge is the most conventional threat that the stockpile is meant to address, because it assumes a straightforward, pre- dictable buildup of forces and a definable operational campaign. The other chal- lenges (irregular, catastrophic, disruptive) are much more unpredictable in terms of impact and response time. Our adversaries may attack vulnerable nodes and links in our military supply chain and disrupt our operational effectiveness and sustainability. These new challenges need to be reflected in future stockpile analysis as part of the materials supply chain. In addition, the 00 QDR outlines a number key differences in DoD strategy under the aegis of transformation. A few differences that might impact a future stockpiling activity include the following changes to the force structure (DoD, 2006, pp. vi-vii): • From a peacetime tempo – to a wartime sense of urgency. • From responding after a crisis starts (reactive) – to preventive actions so problems do not become crises (proactive). • From a time of reasonable predictability – to an era of surprise and uncertainty. • From peacetime planning – to rapid adaptive planning. • From static defense, garrison forces – to mobile, expeditionary operations. 7 The 1-4-2-1 construct does not appear in the QDR document. However, as in the earlier QDR process, Pentagon officials use this shorthand in describing the present strategy. For the formal document (which was due in 2005 but was delayed), see Office of the Secretary of Defense, 00 Quadrennial Defense Review (DoD, 2006).

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cHanging defense Planning d e f e n s e m at e r i a l s n e e d s  and Irregular Challenges Catastrophic Challenges Traditional Challenges Disruptive Challenges Irregular Catastrophic Nonstate and state actors employing Terrorist or rogue state employment of WMD unconventional methods to counter stronger or methods producing WMD-like effects against state opponents (erode our power) American interests (paralyze our power) Examples: terrorism, insurgency, civil war, and Examples: attack on homeland, global markets, or emerging concepts like unrestricted warfare key ally that would generate a state of shock and Likelihood: very high; strategy of the weak preclude normal behavior Likelihood: moderate and increasing Traditional Disruptive States employing military forces in well-known Competitors employing technology or methods forms of military competition and conflict that might counter or cancel our current military (challenge our power) advantages (capsize our power) Examples: conventional air, sea, and land Examples: technological—bio, cyber, or space forces and nuclear forces of established nuclear war, ultraminiaturization, directed-energy, other— powers diplomatic blackmail, cultural or economic war Likelihood: currently decreasing due to historic Likelihood: low, but time works against the United capability overmatch and expanding qualitative States lead FIGURE 4-1 Top: QDR responses to the spectrum of challenges. SOURCE: 2006 QDR, p. 19. Bottom: Types of challenges in the QDR strategic environment. SOURCE: Henry (2006).

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m a nag i n g m at e r i a l s twenty-first century military  for a • From separate military Service concepts of operation – to joint and combined [inter- national] operations. • From exposed forces forward – to reaching back to the continental United States to support expeditionary forces. • From broad-based industrial mobilization – to targeted commercial solutions. • From vertical structures and processes (stovepipes) – to more transparent, horizontal integration (matrix). • From the U.S. military performing tasks – to a focus on building partner capabilities. The committee believes that the current NDS approach is unable to effectively adapt to these trends. An important change in military planning in recent years that is relevant to the concept of a materials stockpile is that the idea of reconstituting (and mobilizing the domestic industrial base). This activity is no longer mentioned in the current strategy documents. Rather, it is taken for granted in DoD that needed supplies can be acquired from the global marketplace in sufficient quantity and in time. However, this approach is at odds with the NDS approach as originally mandated by Congress. The fact is that the NDS and its supporting legislation remain focused on an outdated, low-probability mission of national mobilization and reconstitution. The pressing requirement is to support a transforming military that is conducting expeditionary operations against changing threats around the world without the benefit of national mobilization. The committee believes that the NDS mission of supporting national mobilization and reconstitution is disconnected from current national defense strategies and operational priorities. DEFINING TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY DEFENSE MATERIALS NEEDS Military (land, sea, and air) combat and support systems have seldom been static in terms of technology. The quantity and type of materials needed to sup- port military systems continue to change dynamically with the introduction of new systems—such as Stryker Brigades, Littoral Combat Ships, converted cruise- missile-firing submarines, unmanned vehicles, and advanced tactical aircraft—and upgrades of fielded systems. All of these different systems are linked by so-called “net-centric” warfare networks, which are highly dependent on rapidly evolving computer, information, and communication technology. Looking beyond immediate needs, the future systems of the twenty-first century military will also need to demonstrate multifuctionality, self-diagnosis and self- healing, low cost, low maintenance, environmental acceptability, and high reliability. Some trends in warfare can be expected to continue: The need will increase for a precision strike force that can maneuver rapidly and effectively and survive an attack,

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cHanging defense Planning d e f e n s e m at e r i a l s n e e d s  and all while distant from its command post and base. In addition, the force must be able to conceal its activities from an enemy while detecting enemy activities. Advances in information technology will increase coordination among forces, and global aware- ness—through real-time networked sensors and communications—will facilitate command and control and enable precision strikes. With the use of unmanned vehicles, military power will be delivered remotely and casualties will be reduced. Fighting in urban areas will increase, requiring entirely different strategies and equipment, and guerilla warfare will require new strategies and weapons. A comprehensive, service-by-service assessment of current and future defense materials needs was beyond the scope and the time and resources available to the committee. However a number of studies over the last 5 years have considered how new threats, new adversaries, and emerging disruptive technologies have led to new challenges to which the nation and, specifically, the Departments of Defense and Homeland Security must respond. For summaries of a number of key reports, see Appendix C. The needs identified below are based on the conclusions of those reports. Meeting the Materials Needs for Today’s Rapidly Changing Military Technology The production and supply of many if not most of the advanced materials that the military will continue to deploy into the twenty-first century will depend on minerals such as those for which the United States is already highly import-depen- dent. These materials are many and varied. Even ubiquitous technologies, such as those found in computer systems, are reliant on materials and minerals that are high on the USGS import reliance list (Table 4-2). It was not possible as part of the current study to do a comprehensive assess- ment of materials needs, current or future, or to fully digest the various criti- cal materials definitions, including the DoD’s Military Critical Technologies List (MCTL). As an example, the committee asked the chapter chairs from the com- mittee that wrote Materials Research to Meet st Century Defense Needs (NRC, 2003) two questions: (1) Have there been any major changes in the R&D envi- ronment or defense needs that would affect that report’s outcomes if they were revisited today? and (2) What are the critical raw materials that are crucial to the materials identified in that report which if their supply was disrupted would pose a significant risk to national security? In response, the chapter chairs uniformly said that the materials R&D directions foreseen in the 2003 report are still largely correct. They also identified some minerals and materials as being important for specific applications (both directly and indirectly defense related). These inputs, along with the committee’s own expertise in materials and defense needs as well as inputs from some published sources, are summarized in Table 4-3. The table also shows the import reliance data for these materials in 2006 where available.

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m a nag i n g m at e r i a l s twenty-first century military  for a TABLE 4-2 Minerals in a Typical Computer System Element or Computer Component Compound Used Mineral Source of Element CRT monitor, Zn, S Sulfur, hemimorphite, zincite, smithsonite, franklinite phosphorescent coating, Ag Silver, pyrargyrite, cerargyrite transition metal Cl Halite Al Bauxite Cu Chalcopyrite, boronite, enargite, cuprite, malachite, azurite, chrysocolla, chalcocite Au Gold Y Euxenite Eu Euxenite K, F, Mg, Mn Alunite, orthoclase, nephelite, leucite, apophullite; Fluorite, cryolite, vesuvianite, lepidolite, dolomite, magnesite, espomite, spinel, olivine, pyrope, biotite, talc, pyroxenes Cd Greenockite As Realgar, orpiment, niccolite, cobalite, arsenopyrite, tetrahedrite Gd, Tb Monazite, bastnäsite. cerite, gadolinite, monazite, xenotime, euxenite Ce Monzanite, orthite CRT monitor glass Pb Galena, cerussite, anglesite, pyromorphite Si Quartz Plastic case, keyboard Ca Calcite, gypsum, apatite, aragonite Ti Rutile, ilmenite, titanite P Apetite, pyromorphite, wavellite Liquid crystal display Pb Galena, cerussite, anglesite, pyromorphite (LCD) monitors Si Quartz Fe Hematite Sn Cassiterite In Sphalerite (commonly found with zinc) Metal case Fe Magnetite, limonite

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cHanging defense Planning d e f e n s e m at e r i a l s n e e d s  and TABLE 4-2 Continued Element or Computer Component Compound Used Mineral Source of Element Flat-screen plasma display Si Quartz monitors Pb Galena, cerussite, anglesite, pyromorphite Zn, S Sulfur, hemimorphite, zincite, smithsonite, franklinite Ag Silver, pyrargyrite, cerargyrite Cl Halite Al Bauxite Cu Chalcopyrite, boronite, enargite, cuprite, malachite, azurite, chrysocolla, chalcocite Au Gold Y Euxenite Eu Euxenite K, F, Mg, Mn Alunite, orthoclase, nephelite, leucite, apophullite; fluorite, cryolite, vesuvianite, lepidolite, dolomite, magnesite, espomite, spinel, olivine, pyrope, biotite, talc, pyroxenes Cd Greenockite As Realgar, orpiment, niccolite, cobalite, arsenopyrite, tetrahedrite Gd, Tb Monazite, bastnäsite. cerite, gadolinite, monazite, xenotime, euxenite Ce Monzanite, orthite Printed circuit boards, Si Quartz computer chips Cu Chalcopyrite, boronite, enargite, cuprite, malachite, azurite, chrysocolla, chalcocite Au Gold Ag Silver, pyrargyrite, cerargyrite Sn Cassiterite, Al Bauxite NOTE: The list shows 66 individual minerals that contribute to the typical computer. This list does not purport to be complete but is presented to show the reader that there are many many minerals involved in the manufacture of a commonplace everyday good such as the computer or, indeed, the television. The path connecting the mineral to the finished good can be long and indirect, and in practice, many of these minerals pass through one or more phases in which they are converted into complex organo- metallic compounds or inorganic gas precursors before being used in the manufacture of the compo- nents listed. Also there are other materials in addition to those listed here. All that notwithstanding, it should be evident from this table that the manufacture of such commonplace items as computers and televisions is dependent on the availability of a wide range of minerals. SOURCE: http://mine-engineer.com.

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m a nag i n g m at e r i a l s twenty-first century military  for a TABLE 4-3 Uses of Selected Strategic and Critical Materials and Import Reliance (Where Available) Net Import Material/Metal Uses Reliance (%) Aluminum Aluminum alloys in airplanes, aerospace, marine applications, 44 food cans Arsenic Semiconductors, pyrotechnics, insecticides 100 Beryllium Military optics and guidance systems Ea Bismuth Magnets, nuclear reactors, thermoelectrics, ceramic glazes 96 Cerium Catalytic converter substrates NAb Chrome Specialty steels NA Chromium Steels, catalysts, magnetic tape, plating 75 Cobalt Specialty steels; medium- or high-temperature fuel cells 81 Columbium Specialty steels 100 Copper Wire, electromagnets, circuit boards, switches, magnetrons 40 Europium and Display phosphors NA others Gadolinium Magnetic refrigeration NA Gallium Optoelectronics, integrated circuits, dopant, photovoltaics 99 Indium Semiconductors, metal organics, light-emitting diodes 100 Lanthanum Catalytic converter substrates NA Lithium Batteries >50 Magnesium Airplanes, missiles, autos, photography, pharmaceuticals 54 Manganese Specialty steels 100 Molybdenum Specialty steels E Neodymium High-strength magnets; laser dopant NA Nickel Specialty steels; superalloys for jet engine parts 60 Platinum Catalytic converters—reduction of carbon monoxide and 80c hydrocarbons Quartz crystals Electronic and photonic devices 100 (high purity) Rhenium Specialty steels; high-temperature alloys and coatings 87 Rhodium Reduction of oxides of nitrogen in catalytic converters NA Samarium High-strength magnets NA Scandium Refractory ceramics, aluminum alloys 100 Selenium Photovoltaics, solar cells, rectifiers, surge protectors, NA xeroradiography Silicon Photovoltaics, semiconductors, microprocessors, alloys, <50 electronic and photonic devices. Strontium Medium- or high-temperature fuel cells 100 Tantalum Specialty steels; electronic capacitors 87 Tin Superconducting magnets, solder, alloys, electronic circuits 79 Titanium mineral Alloys: jet engine compressor components; aircraft structural NA concentrates members; medical devices; power generation equipment; chemical and petrochemical refining and manufacture; and oil and gas extraction and recovery

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cHanging defense Planning d e f e n s e m at e r i a l s n e e d s  and TABLE 4-3 Continued Net Import Material/Metal Uses Reliance (%) Tungsten Specialty steels 71 Yttrium Laser rods, superalloys 100 Zinc Batteries, galvanizing, paints, metal organics, pharmaceuticals 63 aE, net exporter. bNA, not available. cData for platinum group metals (platinum, rhodium, ruthenium, iridium, and osmium). SOURCE: Based on data from the committee analysis and the following: Gassner (2007); Herring (2007); Lipsitt (2007); Marder (2007); Pfahl (2007); Phillips (2007); Sloter (2007). Import reliance data from USGS (2007). Emerging and Future Materials Needs Turning to future defense systems, it is expected that these would employ advanced materials that are self-healing, that can interact independently with the local environment, and that can monitor the health of a structure or component during operation (DSB, 2002). Some advanced materials could serve as hosts for embedded sensors and integrated antennas. Others could deliver high performance in structures by protecting against corrosion, fouling, erosion, and fire; controlling fractures; and serving as fuels, lubricants, and hydraulic fluids. The next 20 years will present the materials community with daunting challenges and opportuni- ties. Material producibility, cost, and availability requirements will be much more demanding than they are today. On the other hand, spurred by the rapid pace of advances in electronics and computation, the performance, life span, and maintain- ability of materials will be greatly enhanced. Some high-priority military areas where it has been recommended that DoD focus its activities are defending against biological warfare; finding and correctly identifying difficult targets; supporting high-risk operations with systems capable of high-risk tactical operations; missile defense; affordable precision munitions that are resilient to countermeasures; enhanced human performance; rapid deploy- ment and employment of forces globally against responsive threats; and the rapid delivery, anywhere, of “global effects.” In addition, the continuing stewardship of the U.S. strategic nuclear arsenal and efforts to counteract the proliferation of nuclear materials across the globe remain a national security priority of the high- est order. Also, since September 11, 2001, there has been a refocusing of the nation’s atten- tion, to national and homeland security. The highest priority is given to developing

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m a nag i n g m at e r i a l s twenty-first century military 0 for a and utilizing robust systems for protecting, controlling, and accounting for nuclear weapons and special nuclear materials at their sources; ensuring the production and distribution of treatments and preventatives for pathogens; designing, testing, and installing coherent, layered security systems for all transportation modes; protect- ing energy distribution services; reducing the vulnerability of ventilation systems and improving the effectiveness of air filtration in them; deploying technologies and standards that would allow emergency responders to reliably communicate with one another; and ensuring that trusted spokespersons will be able to inform the public promptly and with technical authority whenever the technical aspects of an emergency dominate the public’s concerns (NRC, 2002). Meeting the defense needs of the country in the twenty-first century will rely on R&D in materials and processes to improve existing materials and achieve breakthroughs in new materials and combinations. According to a recent report (NRC, 2003), some of the materials needed are these: • Lightweight materials that provide functionality equivalent to that of their heavier analogues; • Materials that enhance protection and survivability; • Stealth materials; • Electronic and photonic materials for high-speed communications; • Sensor and actuator materials; • High-energy-density materials; and • Materials that improve propulsion technology. Any consideration of a future stockpile must also be forward-looking, taking into account what new kinds of technologies are likely to be entering the market. The committee thought about these issues carefully, and—based on the above assessments of current and future needs, presentations by outside experts, and the committee’s own experience of materials and defense needs—came up with a list of materials and technologies that could have a conspicuous impact on defense capabilities. The committee stresses that this list is speculative. It does not wish to imply that all, or indeed any, of these materials are the most critical ones now or ever. But with the rapid pace of current research, some of them may be available to defense systems manufacturers in the not too distant future and may turn out to be important to defense systems. The materials mentioned below, or indeed anywhere in this chapter or report, are not discussed with the intent that they necessarily be considered for inclusion in a stockpile, nor are these issues and topics discussed in any specific priority order. They are meant purely to illustrate the diverse and complex web of technologies and materials on which defense systems may depend.

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cHanging defense Planning d e f e n s e m at e r i a l s n e e d s  and • Fuel cells are likely to be an important energy technology in future military systems. Some of the materials on the USGS import reliance list (Figure 3-4) are used as catalysts in fuel cells; some of them are platinum-based. Others, such as strontium and cobalt, are used as key materials in medium- or high-temperature fuel cells. Because fuel cells are one potential solution to the energy problem and will likely become of greater importance in future years, in the ideal case the United States would not depend on foreign sources for the materials used in them. In practice, criticality would likely depend on which technologies are the most fruitful and on the demand for fuel cells employing those particular technologies. • Information technology applications are critically dependent on silicon, gallium (99 percent of which is imported from China, Japan, Ukraine, or Russia), indium (100 percent imported from China, Canada, Japan, or Russia), and arsenic (100 percent from China, Morocco, Mexico, or Chile). Others materials are important but much less so. The imported materials are the backbone of optoelectronics and solid-state photonic materials, with no other technology competing seriously for this market. • Tantalum is important for electronic capacitors. Its main sources are Australia and Africa. • The metals critical for turbine engines (shown with import reliance data from the USGS) are these: nickel, 60 percent; tungsten, 66 percent; chromium, 75 percent; cobalt, 81 percent; tantalum, 87 percent; and rhenium, 87 per- cent. The two most important alloying elements for aluminum alloys are magnesium, 54 percent, and silicon, 60 percent. • Organic low and high molecular weight compounds are synthesized from basic chemical building blocks whose supply is not vulnerable. However, the situation is more complex and the supply more prone to vulnerability for functional organic materials containing covalently bonded metals. The synthetic routes of production very often require metal-containing cata- lysts. It is anticipated that hybrid organic-inorganic devices will be a focus of development, raising the same material availability issues that pertain to conventional semiconductor technologies (Karasz, 2007). Overall, a wide range of metals is in play with these organics; although often used in very small amounts, they are important. While it would be speculative to provide a comprehensive list of the metals that might be required, many transition and rare earth metals would be among them, including many of the metals on the USGS list. • Activated materials based on pellet-type media that use activated carbon and sodium permanganate-impregnated alumina are being developed by one company with the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers to develop products that permanently eradicate odorous, corrosive, toxic, and hazardous gases

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m a nag i n g m at e r i a l s twenty-first century military  for a from airstreams by chemisorption (Jones, 2007). These materials are cur- rently used in several commercial applications but could one day prove to be important for homeland defense needs. • Nanotechnology, the engineering of functional systems at the molecular or atomic scale, has the potential to affect the manufacture of a wide range of materials and products, including pharmaceuticals, catalysts and other chemicals, aerospace materials, materials for health care applications, elec- tronic materials, and so on. The materials required for nanotechnology as it is applied in defense systems will grow in criticality. • Smart structures and materials are materials that can sense external stimuli and can be designed to respond in real or near-real time. They could be used in sensing systems, vibration control, actuators, self-repairing structures, artificial sphincters (Luo et al., 2003), and smart variable resistance devices using magnetorheological fluid dampers (Dong et al., 2006). • Biomimetics is the study of the structure and functioning of biological substances as models for the design of materials and manufacturing. The potential of biomimetics for sensor platforms (in defense), drug delivery systems (health care), autonomous biorobots (space exploration), and other applications appears great. • Microelectromechanical systems (MEMS) are made by integrating a diverse family of complementary technologies such as sensors, actuators, mechani- cal structures, and electronics into a system that can sense mechanical, thermal, chemical, biological, optical, and magnetic measurements on the micron scale. • The supply of low-end electronic parts now comes almost entirely from foreign countries (Phillips, 2007). Even though these devices are relatively unsophisticated, they are not readily reverse engineered. Hence there is no guarantee against what might be termed “Trojan” components that could compromise an important defense system. Also, there could be concern about the reliability of supply of the front-end or raw materials/minerals that serve the manufacturing processes, and that concern might motivate the United States to hold a reserve of such materials. • Tellurium may become significant in the near future. It is used in chalco- genide glasses for missile nose cones and to focus infrared light. It is used to alloy with steels or copper in ceramics and blasting caps to make them more workable. Organic tellurides are antioxidants. Bismuth telluride is used in thermoelectric devices, cadmium telluride may be used in solar panels, and zinc telluride is used in solid-state x-ray detectors. • Rare earth element (REE) metals have good magnetic, thermal, and electri- cal properties and are widely used in weapons and other military appli- cations. REEs are used in electronics, communications, optics, catalysts,

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cHanging defense Planning d e f e n s e m at e r i a l s n e e d s  and and petroleum refining. Sometimes yttrium, scandium, and thorium are included with REEs. Appendix D describes REEs in more detail. • Rare metals are produced, in general, as by-products during the extraction of other metals, so if those other metals are no longer mined, for whatever economic or environmental reasons, these valuable by-products are also lost. For example, rhenium (Re) is a by-product of molybdenum roasting and is used in very high temperature nickel-base alloys for jet engines. • Composites have great strength and a high stiffness-to-weight ratio and are becoming more important in airplanes and lighter, mobile applications. Because of how they are made, they are readily adapted to the embedment of sensors, actuators, and the like. Composites will probably become even more important with the advent of nanotechnology, the development of improved self-healing properties, and the development of future wireless equipment (NRC, 2003). • Advanced ceramics are being used more often in lightweight body armor, infrared missile domes, coatings for aircraft engine components, and space applications. The efforts to reduce the costs of using advanced ceramics in defense systems are likely to result in their greater use. • Powder metallurgy and the use of particulate materials allow molding parts at relatively modest temperatures and in shapes that are close to those final shape of the finished product, markedly reducing the amount of wastage during milling. The use of these materials makes parts more cost effective while maintaining durability, corrosion resistance, and life cycle. Both the automotive and military industries will benefit from these developments. In 1937, when the stockpile was established, the United States only had to be concerned about maintaining a supply of raw materials since it had the technol- ogy to process and manufacture any engineered material or product as long as the raw materials were available. Today, the United States also has to be concerned about whether it has the capacity to produce or obtain sophisticated engineered materials. CONCLUSIONS The global security environment, the U.S. national defense strategy, the struc- ture and operation of the U.S. military, and its material and technology require- ments have all changed markedly since the end of the Cold War when the NDS was at the height of its operation. The most critical contextual changes are these: The United States faces a volatile, complex, global environment as terror- • ism, weapons of mass destruction, failed states, and near-peer competitors

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m a nag i n g m at e r i a l s twenty-first century military  for a threaten its security at home and abroad across the full spectrum of attack modes. A smaller U.S. military is operating at a higher wartime tempo around the • globe while transforming itself into a responsive, flexible expeditionary force. The material needs of the military are changing in scale, form, and content • as the military forces are transformed into smaller, flexible, responsive force packages. New technology is an essential part of military transformation, as advanced systems must be fielded with short development times. These new technologies are dependent on a broad range of high-technology materials that are sourced from around the globe. While defense strategy and resource planning have been adjusted to take • into account the changing global political and economic environment, the role the NDS plays in this strategy and in DoD’s added mission—homeland defense—is unclear. NDS is not configured to be responsive to the current, pressing logistical needs of the military, where new military systems are dependent on very different materials and where surge requirements for high-priority systems may be unmet because of shortfalls in materials and industrial feedstock. The inability of the NDS to adapt to these contextual changes is manifested in, first, serious time lags between the time U.S. defense strategy is evolved and the time when any associated updating of NDS analysis is attempted and, second, a policy disconnect between DoD force planning becoming a capability-based process and the obsolete analytical methods used to specify materials requirements for the NDS. The conflicting views on the advisability of global sourcing held by legislators and by DoD policy makers exacerbate these disconnects. The committee concludes that the NDS • Is not capable, given its current legislative mandate and approach, of meet- ing the pressing needs of the U.S. military as it operates in today’s volatile environment. • Has not been responsive to changing material requirements as new tech- nology options are introduced into military systems. • Appears not to be integrated into the force structure planning of DoD. REFERENCES Aspin, Les. 1993. Report on the Bottom-up Review. Available from http://www.fas.org/man/docs/bur/index.html. Accessed June 14, 2007. Defense Science Board (DSB). 2002. Defense Science and Technology. Available from http://www.acq.osd.mil/dsb/ reports/sandt.pdf. Accessed June 2007.

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cHanging defense Planning d e f e n s e m at e r i a l s n e e d s  and DSB Task Force on Globalization and Security. 1999. Final Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Globalization and Security. Department of Defense (DoD). 1997. Quadrennial Defense Review (). Available at http://fas.org/man/docs/ qdr/. Accessed June 2007. DoD. 2006. Quadrennial Defense Review Report (00). Available from http://www.defenselink.mil/qdr/report/ Report20060203.pdf. Accessed June 2007. Dong, S., K.Q. Lu, J.Q. Sun, and K. Rudolph. 2006. Smart rehabilitation devices: Part I—Force tracking control. Journal of Intelligent Material Systems and Structures 17 (6):543. Gassner, J. 2007. Written communication to study director M. Moloney from former member of NRC Commit- tee on Materials Research for Defense After Next (DAN) and co-chair of the Panel on Energy and Power Materials. Washington, D.C. Henry, R. 2006. Defense transformation and the 2005 Quadrennial Defense Review. Parameters Winter 2005-2006. Herring, I.L. 2007. Critical minerals/elements. Paper read at meeting of the Committee on Critical Mineral Impacts on the U.S. Economy. Copy provided to the Committee on Assessing the Need for a Defense Stockpile. Jaffe, Lorna S. 1993. The Development of the Base Force: -. Joint History Office, Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense. Jones, K. 2007. Clean air solutions. U.S. Business Review. Kaplan, Fred. 2005. The Doctrine Gap: Reality vs. the Pentagon’s New Strategy. Available at http://www.slate.com/ id/2122010. Accessed June 14, 2007. Karasz, F.E. 2007. Written communication to study director M. Moloney from former member of NRC Com- mittee on Materials Research for Defense After Next (DAN) and chair of the Panel on Functional Organic and Hybrid Materials. Larson, Eric V., David T. Orletsky, and Kristin J. Leuschner. 2001. Defense Planning in a Decade of Change: Les- sons from the Base Force, Bottom-Up Review, and Quadrennial Defense Review. Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation. Lipsitt, H.A. 2007. Written communication to study director M. Moloney from former member of NRC Com- mittee on Materials Research for Defense After Next (DAN) and chair of the Panel on Structural and Multifunctional Materials. Luo, Y., T. Takagi, and K. Matsuzawa. 2003. Thermal responses of shape memory alloy artificial anal sphincters. Smart Materials and Structures 12 (4):533-540. Marder, J.M. 2007. Critical Mineral Resources and Economic Consideration. Paper read at meeting of the Commit- tee on Critical Mineral Impacts on the U.S. Economy. Copy provided to the Committee on Assessing the Need for a Defense Stockpile. Myers, Richard B. 2005. National Military Strategy of the United States of America 00: A Strategy for Today; A Vision for Tomorrow. Washington, D.C.: Joint Chiefs of Staff, Department of Defense. National Research Council (NRC). 2002. Making the Nation Safer: The Role of Science and Technology in Counter- ing Terrorism. Washington, D.C.: The National Academies Press. NRC. 2003. Materials Research to Meet st Century Needs. Washington, D.C.: The National Academies Press. Office of Homeland Security. 2002. National Strategy for Homeland Security. Available at http://www.whitehouse. gov/homeland/book/nat_strat_hls.pdf. Accessed November 2007. Pfahl, R.R. 2007. Written communication to study director M. Moloney from former liaison of the National Materials Advisory Board to the NRC Committee on Materials Research for Defense After Next (DAN). Washington, D.C. Phillips, J.M. 2007. Written communication to study director M. Moloney from former member of NRC Com- mittee on Materials Research for Defense After Next (DAN) and co-chair of the Panel on Electronic and Photonic Materials, Washington, D.C. Powell, Colin L. 1992. National Military Strategy of the United States. Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense. Rumsfeld, Donald H. 2005. National Defense Strategy of the United States of America. Washington, D.C.: Depart- ment of Defense. Sloter, L.G. 2007. National Defense Stockpile: DoD Research & Engineering Issues. Paper read at meeting of the Committee on Assessing the Need for a Defense Stockpile. United States Geological Survey (USGS). 2007. Mineral Commodity Summaries 00. Reston, Va.: USGS.