Maritime Security Partnerships (2008)

Below is the uncorrected machine-read text of this chapter, intended to provide our own search engines and external engines with highly rich, chapter-representative searchable text of each book. Because it is UNCORRECTED material, please consider the following text as a useful but insufficient proxy for the authoritative book pages.

Summary At the outset of his tenure as Chief of Naval Operations (CNO), ADM Michael G. Mullen, USN, adopted a progressive vision for the peacetime engage- ment of naval forces—namely, to enhance the stability and security of the mari- time environment. He called this vision “the 1,000-ship Navy.” To help develop the concept, ADM Mullen asked the Naval Studies Board, under the auspices of the National Research Council, to establish a committee that would examine the technical and operational implications of the 1,000-ship Navy. In response to the emphasis in the study’s terms of reference on the sharing of maritime infor- mation and on coordinated tactical action to help maintain order on the seas for all concerned, the committee has chosen to call this concept “maritime security partnerships” (MSP). In addition to discussions with senior naval personnel, combatant com- mander representatives, and other Department of Defense (DOD) elements, the committee surveyed a broad cross section of international organizations, foreign navies, U.S. government agencies, and private industry to understand the issues, opportunities, and common needs presented by MSP. Some key observations stand out from all the briefings that the committee received during the course of this study: • Governments of countries other than the United States tend to be con-   ADM Michael G. Mullen, USN, Chief of Naval Operations, in a letter dated June 29, 2006, to Ralph J. Cicerone, President, National Academy of Sciences.   As of this writing, the U.S. government was moving to replace the term “1,000-ship Navy” with “global maritime partnerships” (GMP).   See the summarized agendas of the meetings in the Preface.  

 MARITIME SECURITY PARTNERSHIPS cerned much more with the need for information on traditional maritime security concerns—smuggling, poaching, and piracy—rather than information on direct threats of external attack; • Most representatives of foreign governments and foreign and domestic commercial organizations expressed interest in collaborating on MSP; • A number of foreign countries and foreign and domestic commercial organizations might find it difficult to cooperate in MSP activities if these activi- ties were under the U.S. Navy, U.S. DOD (and its intelligence community), or even the U.S. federal government; they might be more receptive to collaboration if entities like the State Department or the U.S. Coast Guard (USCG)—along with the International Maritime Organization (IMO), a relevant international entity—played the key role(s); • The purposes of the partnerships set up under the MSP concept, often regional in scope, are expected to be the maintenance of law and security on the seas for all concerned; and, finally, • The partnerships will most likely need to offer full protection for propri- etary and country- or company-sensitive information. Why Maritime Security PartnershipS? Today’s interdependent global economy depends on free and uninterrupted use of the sea. The security and welfare of all nations are linked to a regime of law and order at sea that suppresses illicit activities such as drug smuggling and human trafficking and thwarts threats of piracy and terrorism. The U.S. Navy is well positioned to help other maritime forces and organizations maintain an orderly maritime domain. How the U.S. government and in particular the U.S. Navy should organize, operate, and seek to develop relationships with other gov- ernments in pursuit of this goal is the subject of this report. The complexity of the maritime domain and the diversity of interests at stake militate against relatively simple yet all-encompassing solutions, because the problem is much broader in scope than the naval force or forces of any single country or group of countries can deal with. MSP would need participation by many agencies involved in law enforcement, homeland security, and foreign policy. In addition to the foreign militaries, law enforcement agencies, local civil authorities, and the like with which the United States already liaises, commercial and nongovernmental actors—for example, shipping and insurance companies— would also need to be involved. More broadly, the committee envisions emerging maritime security partnerships to be grounded in international agreements like those for air traffic management, other law enforcement enterprises, financial transaction governance, and the safety of life at sea, with the last-mentioned coming under the IMO, an agency of the United Nations. 

Summary  Unifying Concept for MSP—TO ACHIEVE Maritime Domain Awareness information sharing The effort to improve the security of some legitimate and important maritime enterprises is seriously impeded by the lack of adequate maritime security frame- works in many regions of the world. Individuals or groups who want to disrupt trade along these routes by taking advantage of the tradition of anonymity often found at sea can engage in illegal and threatening activities. To adequately surveil all the commercially critical sea lanes, choke points, natural resource locations, and potential smuggling routes and to maintain links to maritime security forces are major challenges. Some of the questions that need to be answered are these: Who will pay for the costs of such systems? Who will create and coordinate the policies behind the surveillance, information exploitation and distribution, and response plans? The unifying concept for maritime security partnerships is information shar- ing. Using the vocabulary that has been adopted in the U.S. initiatives responding to the National Strategy for Maritime Security (NSMS), the information to be shared is referred to as maritime domain awareness (MDA). A comprehensive MDA system would permit identification of threatening activities and anomalous behavior. Achieving such a system where it does not now exist—and strengthen- ing it where there is already a foundation—must be viewed as a critical step in building regional partnerships. It is important to recognize that some regions have established networks to achieve maritime domain awareness by sharing information. For example, the Malacca Strait Security Initiative partnering Singapore, Indonesia, and Malaysia is already operational; the Gulf of Guinea network, still in its formative stage, has generated great interest among potential partners; the Joint Interagency Task Force-South that addresses concerns about drugs and other law enforcement matters in the Caribbean region is functioning effectively. There is a worldwide patchwork of capabilities in support of MDA systems but no overarching MDA architecture. Current arrangements, some of them multilateral, for sharing MDA information constitute an inefficient assortment lacking broad application; excep- tions are the IMO-sanctioned Automatic Identification System (AIS) and Long- Range Identification and Tracking (LRIT) reporting systems for commercial ships. It will take a major effort to coordinate all the existing capabilities, extend them, and disseminate the information on a timely basis to those maritime law enforcement organizations that can take necessary and appropriate action, while still respecting commercial and national sensitivities and proprietary interests.   The Department of Homeland Security’s 2005 National Plan to Achieve Maritime Domain Aware- ness (Washington, D.C., October, p. 1) defines MDA as “the effective understanding of anything associated with the maritime domain that could impact the security, safety, economy, or environment of the United States.” 

 MARITIME SECURITY PARTNERSHIPS Mobilizing the U.S. government to assist other nations in creating more com- prehensive MDA and building, connecting, and enlisting the capabilities of the maritime law enforcement organizations will probably be a long process that needs continuous work and attention. At the same time, however, this process would build trust and transparency, contribute to global unity and cooperation, and help to prevent conflict. The committee’s investigations and deliberations are the basis for the find- ings and recommendations it offers. The committee recognizes the need to bal- ance the demands of maritime security with those of other government missions and priorities. It also recognizes that competing priorities, costs, and missions might stand in the way of the implementation of improvements in maritime secu- rity. The committee views all of the recommendations as complementary to one another, and once they have been translated into potential actions with specific costs, they need to be prioritized and compared to other investments. key preREquisite for MSP—trust in relationships The premise behind the MSP concept is that by improving its situational awareness of what is happening in maritime areas of potential importance to its interests, a state directly improves its own security and therefore ought to be will- ing to share relevant data with those states it perceives to have congruent interests. Relationship building and information sharing during normal times may also mean that in a time of crisis, the state will be able to call on, or access, individu- als or information that can address an emerging problem. The ease and trust with which information or individuals can be accessed will be directly related to the success of the state’s past relationships. Three critical elements are needed to achieve local, regional, or global suc- cess in establishing new maritime security partnerships or improving existing ones: • A cadre of trained, proactive specialists, military and civilian, who are able to operate linguistically and culturally in the context of U.S. planning and coordinating functions within the region; • Secure, persistent, and adequate funding for specific near-term opportuni- ties for expanded military-to-military exchanges; and • A robust coordinating authority at the highest levels of the U.S. govern- ment that can arrange appropriate governance at all levels (see Chapter 4). It could bring disparate program elements in from across the different agencies and ensure a proactive, coordinated effort to overcome regional challenges or meet urgent local needs. Regional approaches to either specific or general concerns seem to work the best when congruent interests and stakes are clear or the legacies of past habits 

Summary  of cooperation can be reviewed to support present agreements. Often there is near-universal agreement on the desired outcome, especially where there is strong leadership on the part of major powers and the states that are most affected. But for most maritime security purposes, the committee realizes that “all issues are local.” In some cases, relationships that are formed to address a specific immediate issue start out on an ad hoc basis, but if they are successful they become formal- ized programs over time. The U.S. government’s response to the tsunami in the Indian Ocean in late 2006 is an example of an ad hoc relationship that was formed to respond to catastrophic devastation. Some programs of cooperation do not succeed directly but rather set the stage for later programs under more auspicious political conditions. For example, the USCG’s Caribbean support tender has become a “circuit rider” throughout the region, providing training and maintenance support. A unique aspect of this pro- gram was the personal cooperative relationships developed by the international crew of approximately 50. The crew comprised the captain and a small cadre of officers and enlisted men from the USCG and individuals from member coun- tries’ officer corps and enlisted units, all of whom sailed on the vessel for a year. After they returned to their own countries, many assumed positions of leadership. Competition for assignment of a national to this vessel was great. Finding: Most information-sharing relationships start out as an individual bilat- eral agreement between the United States and one other country. The greatest gains in the intermediate term come from expanding bilateral relationships and agreements. In many cases, the base on which to build will be military-to-mili- tary relationships that can be expanded to include other groups—military and civilian, government and nongovernment—that are important to the maritime security task. Recommendation 1: The Chief of Naval Operations, working with the combat- ant commanders, the Commandant of the Coast Guard, and the Commandant of the Marine Corps, should commit to transforming bilateral relationships into broader, more substantiative and inclusive maritime security partnerships through some or all of the following means: • Forward presence; • Increased language and cultural awareness;   The Caribbean support tender is a U.S. ship dedicated to promoting cooperation with partner nations by visiting countries to conduct maritime training, maintenance assistance, and logistics support.   The identification of specific officers and offices in the government with specific recommended actions is intended to reflect those most closely aligned in terms of the existing structures of organi- zational responsibilities. 

 MARITIME SECURITY PARTNERSHIPS • Expeditionary training teams; • Ongoing analysis of gaps in capacity with plans for follow-up capacity- building steps; • Tools and resources appropriate for the particular geography of an area— for example, shallow draft vessels such as the HSV-2 Swift rather than larger and deeper draft combat vessels; • Maritime domain awareness—information-sharing systems that will even- tually be expandable to include both unclassified and classified information; and • Funding for Phase Zero. Exercises and exchanges are a fundamental vehicle for building trust, which will lead to nation-to-nation cooperation. Information sharing can be facilitated through combatant commander (COCOM) maritime operations centers and head- quarters to develop awareness and to develop relationships with partner nations. Training for cooperation lends itself readily to war gaming, another effective vehicle. Face-to-face gaming with foreign partners will address the issues of cooperation before matters reach the point of actual engagement. The instruments of operational cooperation range from equipment and sys- tems to the training of U.S. and partner nation personnel in the COCOM’s area of responsibility. Clearly, all of these partners must have the equipment and soft- ware systems to interface with an information-sharing database and/or to feed the database. Data standards for sharing must be developed. Finding: The continued training of U.S. and partner nation personnel in a mari- time security partnership is critical to long-term success and to building the rela- tionships and trust that eventually result in the establishment of maritime security partnerships with as many countries as possible. Recommendation 2: To educate and train U.S. and partner nation personnel so that they can support and extend maritime security partnerships, the Chief of Naval Operations should: • With the active support of the leaders of the Marine Corps and the Coast Guard, ask the combatant commanders to support and extend maritime security partnerships through continued and even expanded formal educational and bilat- eral/multilateral training exercises for these personnel; • Require that maritime security training become a significant part of the core curriculum at every level of professional education for maritime service;   The traditional four phases of a military campaign identified in Joint publications are deter/engage, seize initiative, decisive operations, and transition. Phase Zero encompasses all activities prior to the beginning of Phase I—that is, everything that can be done to prevent conflicts from developing in the first place. 

Summary  • Adopt as a critical long-term goal the broadening of participation in mari- time professional education to ensure representation from all of the relevant U.S. civilian and military agencies; and • Cooperate with the Secretary of the Navy and join in the present Coast Guard plan under the Department of Homeland Security to design and fund an institute of maritime studies that would encompass specialized studies in mari- time security within the framework of an existing university program. Critical for the longer-term ability of the CNO to implement MSP will be the establishment within the maritime services of a clear professional career track for officers and civilian officials with wide-reaching international expertise and experience. Appropriate models are the foreign area officer (FAO) programs of the Army and, to a lesser extent, the Air Force and the Marine Corps. Finding: There appears to be a shortage of qualified FAOs within the U.S. naval services. Such FAOs could provide invaluable aid in developing the capabilities of regional maritime security forces that would allow them to move their countries toward participation in regional and, later, global maritime information sharing. Recommendation 3: The Chief of Naval Operations should mandate the expan- sion of a robust foreign area officer (FAO) program within the Navy to meet the needs of staffing and expanding maritime security partnerships. In addition, the Commandant of the Coast Guard should establish an FAO program and the Com- mandant of the Marine Corps should expand its present limited FAO program for the development of bilateral and multilateral relationships. The law enforcement authority and legal skills that would be needed to carry out countersmuggling and counterterrorist activities in coastal waters do not usu- ally exist aboard naval vessels. Naval vessels engaged in counter-drug-smuggling missions carry USCG law enforcement detachments (LEDETs) that actually board intercepted vessels that are suspected of smuggling drugs and, if needed, arrest their crews. Using personnel from the Naval Criminal Investigative Service (NCIS) or other law enforcement personnel could be equally effective, but addi- tional training and equipment might be needed to gain ship boarding capabilities as well as to clarify the legal authorization. Finding: The inclusion of U.S. Coast Guard personnel, the Naval Criminal Inves- tigative Service, or other law enforcement detachments or personnel on selected U.S. Navy ships could extend U.S. capabilities to respond to suspected smuggling or terrorist activities. Recommendation 4: The Chief of Naval Operations should ask the Coast Guard, the Naval Criminal Investigative Service, or another law enforcement entity to provide legal personnel for selected U.S. Navy ships. 

 MARITIME SECURITY PARTNERSHIPS In order to realize theater engagement or Navy MSP goals, the USCG could be asked to forward-deploy additional vessels to specific areas of the world. These vessels would work for the COCOMs on missions accepted by the USCG. For instance, low-end USCG vessels might be the appropriate maritime component command for a military operation. The USCG’s “sovereignty expertise” might be the right answer for the Navy/COCOM, allowing them to gain access that they could not otherwise obtain. Such actions could pave the way for greater trust and cooperation between countries, including between their military counterparts. Finding: The forward deployment of U.S. Coast Guard vessels can enhance and strengthen the engagement activities and thus increase the number of partnerships. Recommendation 5: The Chief of Naval Operations should ask the Commandant of the Coast Guard to forward-deploy Coast Guard cutters to locations that offer opportunities for the joint enforcement of maritime security. These cutters would help to attain Navy and combatant commander engagement goals and would be the correct security assets to employ to meet theater cooperation goals. Relatively speaking, the total effort required to expand the scope and depth of MSP is not large. Indeed, some of the overall funding can come from direct or in-kind contributions of the strategic partners themselves. MSP are based on the win-win concept—that is, they are of benefit both to relationships and to the flows of activity and information that sustain them. But at least for the initial period, the 1,000-ship Navy concept requires the Office of Management and Budget to scrutinize Navy programs and budgets not only to identify programs but also to include the funding needed for implementation of the MSP. Finding: Secure, continuing funding is a key ingredient for sustaining and deep- ening maritime security partnerships. Recommendation 6: To sustain and deepen maritime security partnerships (MSP) and to make such programs robust and stable, the Chief of Naval Opera- tions should: • Establish and assign to a specific office the coordination authority for pro- grams and budgets for MSP in the Navy, throughout the Department of Defense (DOD), and across the federal agencies. This should include enhanced opportu- nities for professional education and for the necessary equipment and support services; • Request that the Defense Security Cooperation Agency work with the State Department to significantly enhance the portfolio of international military education and training funds (e.g., those under Sections 1206 and 1208 of the National Defense Authorization Act of 2006, and COCOM Initiative Funds) for 

Summary  countries deemed key for MSP development. This activity—the implementation of a network of MSP—should also set a high priority on the institutionalization of an international legal training program; • Task the Navy’s International Programs Office to place high priority on funding the transfer of equipment, software, and services to support and intensify existing MSP and to develop new bilateral and multilateral MSP; • Together with the appropriate officials at the State Department and other agency partners in MSP, request more funds for use by the maritime services, the State Department, and other relevant government agencies for training and support of MSP initiatives or for activities at the International Maritime Organiza- tion and other relevant international organizations and multilateral frameworks to maintain and expand information-sharing programs and protocols; • Propose to the appropriate parts of DOD the setting aside of a portion of research, development, test, and evaluation funds over the next 5 years to be committed under the Office of Manpower and Personnel guidance to the specific goal of improving technologies and techniques for easy, reliable information sharing and the continuous availability of common maritime operational pictures on as broad a basis as possible. These would subsume but go beyond the already programmed funding for MDA only that is now appropriated to the Office of Naval Research (see Chapter 3). Key Enabler for msp—systems and Technologies for Information Sharing Information sharing is the key to building trust and provides a basis for deci- sions and actions. The resulting transparency arguably contributes to the shared security interests of the United States and its current and potential partners. More specifically, in the committee’s view: • Maritime security around the globe will be advanced by strengthening existing partnerships and building new ones, with MDA information sharing a key enabler. • It is in the interest of both the United States and its partner nations to extend information sharing as widely as possible within regions, subregions, and beyond, noting that threats to security typically cross regional and subregional boundaries. • The related objectives of extending reach and maximizing inclusiveness suggest that both the information to be shared and the system architecture for its sharing must exhibit certain attributes: a focus on the sharing of unclassified information and on the use of commercial, Internet-based sharing mechanisms.   Pursuant to Executive Order 12958, “classified information” refers to official information that has been determined to require protection against unauthorized disclosure in the interest of national security and that has been so designated. “Unclassified information” refers to information that has not 

10 MARITIME SECURITY PARTNERSHIPS • Beyond information sharing—viewed here as having value in and of itself and as a building block when forming new partnerships—there is, of course, the matter of taking endgame action to interdict illegal or threatening activities. In this regard, strengthened information sharing can be expected to enhance coordi- nation among maritime partners. • Effective information-sharing architectures and systems are operating today at the classified and unclassified levels. The committee reviewed baseline U.S. operational and developmental infor- mation-sharing systems and related planning and research efforts, emphasizing the technical engineering mechanisms to advance MSP initiatives with nontra- ditional partners. The committee’s findings and recommendations related to sys- tems and technologies for MDA information sharing are presented below. Finding: Effective information-sharing architectures and systems are operating today at the classified and unclassified levels. Navy and combatant commander (COCOM) efforts with nontraditional partners rely on the Internet model and use of commercial products, including for information protection. However, there is no known, concerted effort to ensure that the Navy’s technical efforts are fully connected to or fully leveraged by COCOM or other initiatives. This less than satisfactory level of effort could lead to interoperability problems or could distract COCOM or other operational elements from their mission focus. Recommendation 7: The Chief of Naval Operations and the Secretary of the Navy should jointly charter and fund an activity, led by the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Communication Networks (N6) and supported by appropriate laboratory/system command/program executive office (PEO) expertise, to pro- vide responsive, dedicated technical support across the full range of interagency initiatives for the design, engineering, and fielding of information technology (IT) infrastructure that would enable information sharing for maritime security. The activity called for by this recommendation would support combatant commanders, Navy operational elements, other U.S. government organizations, and—through them—foreign partners. It would: • Develop information-sharing design templates and a catalog of imple- been determined to warrant classification; however, some unclassified information may be approved for public release, whereas other such information, such as International Traffic in Arms Regulations information, may not. Some maritime information that does not pertain to U.S. national security, such as Automatic Identification System reports, can be considered as publicly available and can therefore be freely shared (subject only to constraints imposed by international agreements, such as IMO, as opposed to U.S. policy). When referring to such information, the U.S. Navy has coined the term “not classified,” apparently to convey the notion of useful information sharing without the potential complexities of codified protection requirements. The term “unclassified,” as used in this report, is viewed as encompassing “not classified” information. 

Summary 11 menting products (these might be different for partners within the U.S. govern- ment, those within formal alliances, those in ad hoc coalitions, and those with whom information-sharing arrangements are independent of formal alliance or coalition agreements); • Assemble and engineer starter kits in support of operational initiatives; • Include available tools for communications, collaboration, and consulta- tion within the broader design template, MSP catalogs, and the starter kits effort outlined above; • Explore potential value-added upgrades for the future and recommend upgrades and backward compatibility approaches; • Emphasize the sharing of unclassified MDA information, suitably pro- tected to respect privacy and law enforcement concerns; and • Perform an end-to-end information protection analysis to ensure that the protection meets the expectations of the partners for the several networks in operation or under development. These measures would increase coherence among inherently distributed regional or subregional initiatives. Finding: There is a range of technical options for improved ocean surveillance, some of them near term, that should be less costly than fielding large, new sen- sor systems. Some of them exploit data from a growing inventory of commercial remote-imaging sensors and satellites, others entail maritime-directed upgrades to existing over-the-horizon radars and/or national reconnaissance systems, and, finally, still others involve coastal radar surveillance of the near-in waters of partner states. Recommendation 8: The Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) should direct the Director of Naval Intelligence (N2) and the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Communication Networks (N6), and the Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research, Development, and Acquisition should direct the appropriate laborato- ries, system commands, and program executive offices to increase their efforts to investigate, analyze, and help field, if appropriate, the most cost-effective combinations of capability across the potentially promising approaches to per- sistent, improved broad ocean surveillance that are identified in Chapter 3. To facilitate this initiative, the CNO should (1) seek a higher level of representation at the National Reconnaissance Office, where decisions are made on U.S. sensor performance goals, and (2) leverage its newly expanded role in the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) to encourage the inclusion of maritime surveillance features in the next generation of commercial remote sensors from which the ODNI expects the agencies, particularly the nongovernmental agencies, to contract for products. 

12 MARITIME SECURITY PARTNERSHIPS Finding: In many parts of the world, U.S. naval component commanders are well positioned to encourage coastal nations to improve their own maritime surveil- lance capabilities. To this end there are some relatively low-cost, high-payoff improvements for which the Navy could provide not only technical assistance (an example would be the selection and siting of coastal radars) but also mate- rial assistance by such means as the Section 1206 funding mechanism.  In some places such programs are well under way, but many more opportunities could be productively pursued. Recommendation 9: The Chief of Naval Operations, in coordination with the combatant commanders, should direct the Director of Naval Intelligence (N2) and the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Communication Networks (N6), and the Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research, Development, and Acquisition should direct the appropriate laboratories, system commands, and program execu- tive offices to ensure that naval component commanders have the appropriate expertise and other assets to facilitate an outreach program to coastal states that would benefit from improved maritime surveillance capabilities. Finding: Research and demonstration programs sponsored by various agencies have produced good work that addresses some of the technology gaps in the cur- rent analysis and fusion of maritime domain awareness information. Much of the technology being developed to analyze and fuse data on maritime entities is in the early stage, in prototype form. However, as reflected in Navy efforts ongoing as of this writing, there are commercial off-the-shelf and potentially releasable government off-the-shelf analysis and fusion tools and software that offer early, useful capabilities for maritime security partnerships. Recommendation 10: To leverage analysis and fusion technology and tools, the Chief of Naval Operations should assign the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Communication Networks (N6) (along with the relevant laboratories and systems commands) to take responsibility for maritime domain awareness-related analyze-and-fuse technologies, either for their short-term application as part of a starter kit (in releasable government or commercial off-the-shelf form) or for longer-term advanced research with identification of transition opportunities. Given that these efforts are of long-term importance, independent of the purposes of current supplementals, the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Resources, Requirements, and Assessments (N8) should work on funding maritime domain awareness efforts in the mainstream of the Navy budget.   Section 1206 funding, named for the section of the 2006 National Defense Authorization Act that authorizes it, is designed to help other countries build capacity within their national military forces. The authority allows DOD, in consultation with the State Department, to spend up to $200 million a year to help other countries. 

Summary 13 Finding: There is a need—unsatisfied today—for a systematic, analytical approach to optimizing the design of the end-to-end system for the collection and analysis of maritime security information and its follow-up. Satisfying this need would require a range of technical support from the Department of Defense and interagency arena to foreign partners. Recommendation 11: The Chief of Naval Operations and the Secretary of the Navy should jointly propose a Navy-led and Navy-housed executive agent on the technical aspects of an information-sharing system for the U.S. interagency maritime security partnerships initiative. This agent would provide systems engi- neering and operations analysis resources with technical support to International Maritime Organization initiatives. This mission-driven, enterprise-level systems engineering and analysis capability would be an extension of the Maritime Domain Awareness Executive Agent role already assigned to the Navy by the Department of Defense. It would support not only the U.S. elements but also, under the auspices of ongoing initiatives, its foreign partners. Implementation Strategy for MSP—Roles and Responsibilities Across U.S. Government Agencies The trend during the past two decades toward globalization in the exploita- tion of natural resources and in the manufacturing sector has meant an increasing need for maritime transport. This need in turn results in growing coastal trade, transoceanic commerce, shipbuilding, port expansion, fuel consumption, and competition for offshore resources—including fish stocks—all of which have a significant impact on national and international governance related to maritime safety, control, and security. The governance burden, especially as regards secu- rity, is already straining U.S. resources for protecting the country’s own waters and ports. It is time to act on this understanding and prepare the nation and its prospective partners to deal with the growing task of maritime governance. Establishing a regime such as that implied for MSP is an extensive and exceedingly complex task that needs to involve departments and agencies across the U.S. government. It needs to engage other participants in ways that transcend formal military and political alliances, and it needs to be seen by other countries not as a U.S. military initiative but as a way of fostering law and order at sea and thus the security of all participants. It is not clear that the existing Maritime Security Policy Coordinating Committee—despite some positive steps at the policy level—has adequate authorities or mechanisms to fully realize MSP objec- tives as part of the national strategy. The situation bears a strong resemblance to the situation that faced the nation with respect to air transportation before the establishment of the Federal Aviation Administration and the International Civil Aviation Organization. 

14 MARITIME SECURITY PARTNERSHIPS Finding: The Chief of Naval Operations’ initial 1,000-ship Navy concept has become a much larger concept of maritime security partnerships, attracting much international recognition and interest. It has grown beyond a U.S. Navy initia- tive into a critical matter for all agencies of the U.S. government that deal with international maritime relationships and trade. Recommendation 12: The Chief of Naval Operations should recommend the appointment of an independent third party such as a presidential commission on maritime security governance tasked to recommend ways of strengthening the nation’s maritime security policy, to define the roles and responsibilities of various U.S. government agencies and departments to better implement maritime security partnerships both domestically and internationally, and to move forward as suggested in the 11 other recommendations of this report.