4
Implementation Strategy for Maritime Security Partnerships

A clear understanding of the functions that must be performed to implement maritime security partnerships (MSP) and for which U.S. government executive departments or agencies have the responsibility and authority will facilitate that implementation. The functions are as follows:

  • Creation of policy and strategic guidance that sets objectives, establishes regulations, and assigns roles, responsibilities, and authorities for conducting operations;

  • Strategic and operational planning;

  • Resource allocation;

  • Development, management, and employment of the military and law enforcement forces; and

  • Performance assessment and feedback.

THE NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR MARITIME SECURITY

The National Strategy for Maritime Security (NSMS)1 provides broad strategic guidance for the development and coordination of MSP. It states as follows:

The infrastructure and systems that span the maritime domain, owned largely by the private sector, have increasingly become both targets of and potential conveyances for dangerous and illicit activities. Moreover, much of what occurs in the maritime domain with respect to vessel movements, activities, cargoes,

1

White House (George W. Bush). 2005. The National Strategy for Maritime Security, Washington, D.C., September.



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4 Implementation Strategy for Maritime Security Partnerships A clear understanding of the functions that must be performed to implement maritime security partnerships (MSP) and for which U.S. government executive departments or agencies have the responsibility and authority will facilitate that implementation. The functions are as follows: • Creation of policy and strategic guidance that sets objectives, establishes regulations, and assigns roles, responsibilities, and authorities for conducting operations; • Strategic and operational planning; • Resource allocation; • Development, management, and employment of the military and law enforcement forces; and • Performance assessment and feedback. THE NATIONAL STRATEgy FOR MARITIME SECuRITy The National Strategy for Maritime Security (NSMS)1 provides broad strate- gic guidance for the development and coordination of MSP. It states as follows: The infrastructure and systems that span the maritime domain, owned largely by the private sector, have increasingly become both targets of and potential conveyances for dangerous and illicit activities. Moreover, much of what occurs in the maritime domain with respect to vessel movements, activities, cargoes, 1White House (George W. Bush). 2005. The National Strategy for Maritime Security, Washington, D.C., September. 123

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124 MaRITIMe SeCURITY PaRTNeRSHIPS intentions, or ownership is often difficult to discern. The oceans are increas- ingly threatened by illegal exploitation of living marine resources and increased competition over nonliving marine resources.2 Unlike traditional military scenarios in which adversaries and theaters of action are clearly defined, these nonmilitary, transnational threats often demand more than purely military undertakings to be defeated.3 It also calls for assisting partners to maintain their maritime sovereignty and jurisdiction over the seas. Along with safety at sea, the activities associated with NSMS reflect the activities for MSP. The NSMS calls for building partner capabilities. Moreover, it states as follows: Preventing unlawful or hostile exploitation of the maritime domain requires that nations collectively improve their capability to monitor activity throughout the domain, establish responsive decision-making architectures, enhance maritime interdiction capacity, develop effective policing protocols, and build intergovern- mental cooperation. The United States, in cooperation with its allies, will lead an international effort to improve monitoring and enforcement capabilities through enhanced cooperation at the bilateral, regional, and global level, [by]: • Offering maritime and port security assistance, training, and consultation; • Coordinating and prioritizing maritime security assistance and liaison with- in regions; • Allocating economic assistance to developing nations for maritime security to enhance security and prosperity; • Promoting implementation of the Convention for the Suppression of Un- lawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation and its amendments and other international agreements; and • Expanding the International Port Security and Maritime Liaison Officer Programs, and the number of agency attachés.4 The NSMS calls for new diplomatic initiatives through international orga- nizations, coordinated by the Department of State, to include activities such as the following: • Implementing standardized international security and World Customs Or- ganization frameworks for customs practices and standards to ensure that goods and people entering a country do not pose a threat; • Expanding the use of modernized and automated systems, processes, and trade data to make vessel registration, ownership, and operation, as well as 2White House (George W. Bush). 2005. The National Strategy for Maritime Security, Washington, D.C., September, p. 2. 3White House (George W. Bush). 2005. The National Strategy for Maritime Security, Washington, D.C., September, p. 3. 4White House (George W. Bush). 2005. The National Strategy for Maritime Security, Washington, D.C., September, p. 12 and p. 15.

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125 IMPLeMeNTaTION STRaTeGY fOR MaRITIMe SeCURITY PaRTNeRSHIPS crew and cargo identification, more transparent and readily available in a timely manner; • Developing, funding, and implementing effective measures for interdicting suspected terrorists or criminals; • Developing and expanding means for rapid exchanges among governments of relevant intelligence and law enforcement information concerning suspected terrorist or criminal activity in the maritime domain; • Adopting streamlined procedures to verify nationality and take appropriate and verifiable enforcement action against vessels in a timely manner consistent with the well-established doctrine of exclusive flag state jurisdiction; • Expanding the U.S. government’s abilities to prescreen international cargo bound for the United States prior to lading; • Adopting procedures for enforcement action against vessels entering or leaving a nation’s ports, internal waters, or territorial seas when they are rea- sonably suspected of carrying terrorists or criminals or supporting a terrorist or criminal endeavor; and • Adopting streamlined procedures for inspecting vessels reasonably sus- pected of carrying suspicious cargo and seizing such cargo when it is identified as subject to confiscation.5 The NSMS does not alter the existing authorities or responsibilities of U.S. government department and agency heads or the chain of command for military forces. Interagency Supporting Plans In conjunction with the development of the NSMS, the departments of the U.S. executive branch developed specific supporting plans. Those most relevant to MSP include the following: • National Plan to Achieve Maritime Domain Awareness,6 • Global Maritime Intelligence Integration (GMII) plan,7 • Maritime Operational Threat Response (MOTR) Plan,8 and • International Outreach and Coordination Strategy.9 5White House (George W. Bush). 2005. The National Strategy for Maritime Security, Washington, D.C., September, p. 15. 6 Department of Homeland Security. 2005. National Plan to achiee Maritime Domain awareness for the National Strategy for Maritime Security, Washington, D.C., October. 7 See . Accessed September 26, 2007. 8 See . Accessed September 26, 2007. 9 U.S. Department of State (Condoleeza Rice). 2005. International Outreach and Coordination Strategy for the National Strategy for Maritime Security, Washington, D.C., November.

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126 MaRITIMe SeCURITY PaRTNeRSHIPS Of the lead organizations involved in MSP, the Department of Defense (DOD) and the U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) have the largest forces and manage the largest resources. Their operational responsibilities have motivated sophisticated planning, resource allocation, and force development, management, and employ- ment processes. Current Directives and guidance National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD) 41 mandates the “coordi- nation of United States Government maritime security programs and initiatives to achieve a comprehensive and cohesive national effort involving appropriate Federal, State, local, and private sector entities . . . ensuring seamless, coordi- nated implementation of authorities and responsibilities relating to the security of the Maritime Domain by and among Federal departments and agencies.” 10 It established the Maritime Security Policy Coordinating Committee (MSPCC) to “review existing interagency practices, coordination, and execution of U.S. policies and strategies relating to maritime security, and recommend specific improvements to all of them as warranted.” It states that the “MSPCC, in consul- tation with the relevant regional and functional policy coordinating committees of the federal government, and without exercising operational oversight, shall act as the primary forum for interagency coordination of the implementation of this directive.” NSPD 41 also directed the secretaries of Defense and Homeland Security to draft the NSMS, which was promulgated by the President in September 2005, 11 and to prepare supporting plans. Neither NSPD 41 nor the NSMS alters existing authorities or responsibilities of the department and agency heads to carry out operational activities or to provide or receive information. The agencies involved are responsible for conducting their individual opera- tions to implement the policies in the national strategy and plans. Implementing the visions represented in the NSMS and the supporting plans is a complex undertaking. NSPD 41 identifies the scope of participation to address domestic, international, public, and private components. The NSMS identifies the threats to maritime security as follows: • Countries that “provide safe havens for criminals and terrorists, who use these countries as bases of operations to export illicit activities into the maritime 10 National Security Presidential Directive NSPD-41/Homeland Security Policy Directive HSPD- 13, December 21, 2004. Available at . Accessed June 26, 2007. 11White House (George W. Bush). 2005. The National Strategy for Maritime Security, Washington, D.C., September. See . Accessed June 26, 2007.

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127 IMPLeMeNTaTION STRaTeGY fOR MaRITIMe SeCURITY PaRTNeRSHIPS domain and into other areas of the globe.”12 For the purposes of this study, this includes states that lack the ability to enforce national and international laws in areas over which they have jurisdiction (recognizing that all criminal activities occur in all states). • Proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and their means of delivery, with particular concern that those weapons will become available to organizations that use terrorism to pursue their objectives. • Terrorist attacks from or in the maritime domain (including ports and offshore facilities) or that use the maritime domain to foster and support their activities. • Cyberattacks on information systems that are integral to maritime operations. • Criminal activities, including smuggling people, drugs, weapons, and other contraband, as well as piracy and armed robbery against vessels, particu- larly in the pay of terrorists and in regions where there is little or no maritime law enforcement capacity. • Environmental destruction and management of maritime resources that contribute to aggressive actions. • Illegal seaborne migration, which tactic also may be used by terrorists to enter a target country. The NSMS also calls for minimizing damage and expediting recovery in the case of a natural disaster such as Hurricane Katrina and assisting the partners to maintain sovereignty of the seas over which they have jurisdiction. Finding: Extensive coordination among essentially all U.S. government agencies is required to implement the National Strategy for Maritime Security and associ- ated plans. However, the committee found little evidence of any broad coordina- tion of activities by these agencies following the introduction of the NSMS. u.S. PARTICIPATION IN MSP The NSMS provides a basis for bringing together all of the federal govern- ment’s relevant departments and agencies in order to meet the maritime security challenges described above. It can also provide a framework for coordinating all maritime security initiatives with foreign governments and international organiza- tions as well as soliciting international support for enhanced maritime security. Under the MSP concept, the United States will be able to work with its partners in developing regional maritime security capabilities based on the needs and expec- tations of countries in various regions of the world. The MSP concept provides 12White House (George W. Bush). 2005. The National Strategy for Maritime Security, Washington, D.C., September, p. 3.

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12 MaRITIMe SeCURITY PaRTNeRSHIPS regional maritime security frameworks based principally on bilateral agreements and consistent with international law and United Nations conventions. The Spectrum of Maritime Security and the u.S. Navy Maritime security for the Navy today has evolved from conventional mari- time operations against a peer competitor to dealing with an environment rife with asymmetric threats and supporting law enforcement functions in the mari- time domain. The recognition that nations have common interests in maritime security and can work together to develop peaceful change has led to the Chief of Naval Operations’ (CNO’s) concept of the “1,000-ship Navy,” whereby the United States enters into some form of maritime partnership with willing seafar- ing nations across the world. Only by working together can countries protect their interests in the maritime domain from the complex challenges they face today. Although this idea represents a cultural change from its classical warfighting missions, the Navy has a rich tradition of operating in green and brown waters all over the world. The variety of Navy missions with the potential to achieve maritime security is illustrated in Figure 4.1. The Navy, the uSCg, and Law Enforcement Increasingly the Navy is involved in a variety of joint operations with the USCG and law enforcement agencies of the U.S. government. In many instances the Navy finds itself supporting the USCG units as well as other agencies, because the USCG has better access in many parts of the world and possesses law enforcement authorities. White hulls are accepted where gray hulls are not in some parts of the maritime domain, allowing the USCG to take the lead in a vari- ety of initiatives in support of maritime security requirements. The employment of USCG units in conjunction with other law enforcement agencies and foreign maritime partners can provide a significant capability in some maritime environ- ments. For the USCG the spectrum of maritime security activities will provide operational challenges across the law enforcement domain (see Figure 4.1). The International Impact of MSP MSP is an international association of maritime nations that participate in international commerce and have a stake in security and freedom of the seas. Such partnerships are necessary in today’s world to confront the complex shared challenges and to maintain stability. Partners in the maritime domain would assist all countries in using the sea for lawful purposes as well as legitimate commerce. A partnership would not be led by any one country and membership would be voluntary, with the goal of building partner capacity through shared maritime security, situational awareness, and information.

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Illegal Immigration MIO Counterdrug Illegal Fishing UN Sanctions Migrant Interdiction Maritime Crimes Naval Warfare WMD Environmental/ International Kinetic Oil Spill Crimes EMIO/GWOT Blockade Customs/Smuggling/ Piracy Defense of Oil Bunkering Slave Trade U.S. Persons Safety/Navigation and Assets at Sea Port Security USCG, DEA, Customs, DOD Support to LEA DOT, DOE, FBI, and so Military on Traditional DOD Focus Law Enforcement Agencies FIGURE 4.1 Spectrum of activities for maritime security. NOTE: DEA, Drug Enforcement Agency; DOE, Department of Energy; FBI, Federal Bureau of Investigation; EMIO, Expanded Maritime Intercept Operation. For additional definitions, see Appendix G. 129 Figure 4-1, editable, b&w, broadside R01141

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130 MaRITIMe SeCURITY PaRTNeRSHIPS Partners should recognize and support the vital role of international orga- nizations that engage in maritime security and law enforcement issues. As well, maritime nations will more readily accept the United States as a partner in main- taining free and open use of the maritime domain when the U.S. Senate ratifies the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). This topic is discussed in greater detail in Appendix C. Our nation’s stature with organizations such as the International Maritime Organization (IMO), the International Labor Organization (ILO), Interpol, and Lloyd’s would also be enhanced. The World Meteorological Organization with its 180 member nations is another place where there are already international agreements in place for navigation, hydrographic surveys, and foreign student educational exchange programs. In the private sec- tor, nongovernmental organizations, shipping companies, and other commercial assets could all support the role of the international community. If the vision of MSP is to be realized, the efforts of many will have to be combined. The International Reaction to the “1,000-Ship Navy” Idea The concept of a 1,000-ship Navy gained widespread attention from the attendees at the 2006 International Sea Power Symposium hosted by the CNO. 13 Since then, leaders of maritime forces from around the world have reacted favorably to this concept and have crafted their comments based on a regional perspective as well as on the contribution that MSP can achieve in the maritime commons. The comments tend to follow certain themes depending on the particu- lar challenges that confront naval leaders today. Many of the leaders indicate that terrorism, the proliferation of WMD, transnational criminal and piracy threats, globalization, competition for resources, demographic shifts, and the impact of climate change are all concerns that they face. They generally support appropri- ate information exchange and the ability to work more closely in peacekeeping and stability operations while maintaining the capability to respond to regional challenges as they arise. The need to respect national characteristics and cultures as well as regional desires was commented on. The point was made that the sea cannot be commanded. Also, there needs to be an interagency approach to maritime security at the international level to get the proper support for elements operating in the regional maritime domains. While many world naval leaders have expressed support for the 1,000-ship Navy, there is no assurance that their governments are committed to active par- ticipation. Personal relationships at the diplomatic, military, and law enforcement levels are essential to building trust. Knowledgeable and trusted foreign area officers (FAOs) will prove invaluable in convincing regional navies that they must work to guide their countries toward participation in the now regional and later 13 Chief of Naval Operations (ADM Michael G. Mullen, USN) in remarks delivered at the 17th International Seapower Symposium, Naval War College, Newport, R.I., September 21, 2005.

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131 IMPLeMeNTaTION STRaTeGY fOR MaRITIMe SeCURITY PaRTNeRSHIPS global sharing of maritime information. Therefore, it seems prudent for the CNO, CMC, and CCG to ensure that the cadre of service foreign area officers becomes expert on the governance of the maritime domain. DOD and DHS Force Planning for MSP DOD planning to support operations for MSP would start when requests for assistance are received from the combatant commanders (COCOMs), through their naval component commanders, to support their theater engagement plans. DOD, as well as the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the USCG, would also provide assistance to the State Department and the various federal agencies and departments, as appropriate, in support of the national maritime strategy. Navy assets are routinely provided to the COCOMs in response to requests for contingency planning, exercises with allies, and forward presence deployments. Ships that are out on normal deployments could be tasked to sup- port maritime security missions, respond to humanitarian disasters, or take part in stability operations in the littorals. Any of these could be carried out in response to a request for assistance from the U.S. ambassador in a given country. USCG assets could also be assigned similar missions. One of the best examples of this would be the deployment of one USCG cutter to the Gulf of Guinea for an extended period of time to support the U.S. European Command (EUCOM) activ- ities in that region. The key questions are these: What assets are available to carry out the tasking? What capabilities are needed? Are there ships available with the necessary equipment? An available Aegis cruiser, for example, has a tremendous warfighting capability but may be totally unsuited for that specific mission. The need for advance planning for such missions is obvious if DOD and the COCOMs want to maximize the impact of their maritime security operations. Optional Capabilities for Maritime Security Operations In addition to normal deployments, where ships may be tasked to carry out specific missions, other emerging deployment concepts could fit into the MSP effectively. Such deployments could be coordinated through the naval component commander in the U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM), the U.S. Southern Com- mand (SOUTHCOM), EUCOM, and the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM). Hospital Ships Two U.S. hospital ships had a tremendous impact in the regions where they were recently deployed. Such deployments improve relationships with the countries where the visits take place and build trust. The USNS Mercy, which deployed to Southeast Asia and the Indian Ocean in 2006, had a mixed crew made up of U.S Navy and security personnel. Also part of the crew were members of

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132 MaRITIMe SeCURITY PaRTNeRSHIPS nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), U.S. medical staff, and medical teams from other countries trained to carry out medical and dental tasks in the host country. This was a first time for many NGOs onboard a U.S. ship. The results of this effort were extremely positive in the countries where the Mercy visited. The second deployment was that of the USNS Comfort, which operated in countries around the Caribbean and South America for 4 months during 2007. The crew consisted of Navy, Air Force, and Air Guard personnel, as well as NGOs, Public Health Service specialists, a band, and linguists. Of note here is the extensive planning before each deployment by the Navy, the other federal agencies, the COCOMs, and the country teams in each country that hosted the visit. The suc- cess of the hospital ship deployments could be repeated by assigning a similar mission to hospital-configured amphibious ships such as the LHA (amphibious assault ship, general purpose), the LHD (amphibious assault ship, multipurpose), and the LPD (amphibious transport dock). The ability to conduct Phase Zero Stability Operations with these kinds of assets will do a lot to strengthen relations with other countries, but they have to be carefully planned and coordinated to suit the regions where they will operate. The Global fleet Station Concept This new CNO initiative, still under development, has the potential for provid- ing excellent service in support of partnership and enabling activities in different parts of the world. Global Fleet Station is a persistent sea base of operations from which to coordinate and employ adaptive force packages in an area of interest. Global Fleet Station offers a means to improve regional maritime security through bilateral and multilateral cooperative efforts and efforts with NGOs. Two early applications of this concept have had positive results. The first deployment was to the Caribbean in support of SOUTHCOM requirements and to try out the concept. The results were very encouraging. At the same time the USCG had a support ten- der on station in the Caribbean that carried out a variety of maintenance tasks in support of host countries in the region. The second deployment under this concept will be a landing ship dock that will go to the Gulf of Guinea to replace a USCG cutter for an extended period of time. This deployment has been planned carefully by host nations in the region, EUCOM, the various agencies, the State Department, and the Navy. It will have another mixed crew comprising Navy personnel, training teams, medical personnel, and other experts who will work in various countries in the region. These kinds of deployments will play a significant role in support of regional initiatives within the MSP. SHORTFALLS IN OPERATIONAL FuNCTIONS NSPD 41 and the associated strategies and plans address only policy formu- lation and coordination, but MSP also involves operational functions:

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133 IMPLeMeNTaTION STRaTeGY fOR MaRITIMe SeCURITY PaRTNeRSHIPS • Strategic and operational planning; • Resource allocation; • Development, management, and employment of the military and law enforcement forces and other capabilities needed to provide maritime security; 14 and • Performance assessment and feedback. Table 4.1 indicates the organizational leads for these functions, where they have been clearly identified, for each activity of the MSP. As the table shows, respon- sibilities for setting the policies for the various activities to be conducted under MSP are spread widely across the U.S. government. Moreover, no agency has been designated to conduct strategic and operational planning for MSP, to iden- tify the resources needed and develop the capabilities to implement them, or to conduct the force management to schedule and employ the military and law enforcement forces involved. Finding: Major gaps in roles and responsibilities exist between, on the one hand, the agencies with responsibilities and authorities for setting policy and establishing regulations and, on the other hand, the maritime forces responsible for enforcing these regulations. The current roles and responsibilities for various maritime security activities include the following: • Countering the proliferation of WMD. A separate Policy Coordinating Committee is responsible for policy on the proliferation of WMD. Also, within the DOD, the commander of the U.S. Strategic Command is assigned principal responsibility for this mission by the President in the Unified Command Plan; the Special Forces Command has the forces trained for sophisticated operations to recover WMD, and the regional COCOMs are allocated the naval and, occasion- ally, the USCG forces that would be involved in interdicting WMD at sea. • Countering terrorism. The National Counter Terrorism Center is respon- sible for “leading the USG [U.S. government] in Counterterrorism Intelligence and Strategic Operational Planning in order to combat the terrorist threat to the US and its interests.”15 • Countering cyberattacks. Like the maritime domain, the vast majority of cyberspace is privately owned. DHS is leading U.S. government efforts to secure 14 Force development, management, and employment are used by DOD to describe the capabilities needed for the forces to conduct assigned missions from current to anticipated missions decades in the future, the management of current forces over the next several years with respect to personnel and unit rotation policies, and the actual employment of forces in operations and training for future operations. 15 Mission statement of the National Counterterrorism Center, see . Ac- cessed August 29, 2007.

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13 MaRITIMe SeCURITY PaRTNeRSHIPS Coordinating such assistance across the involved agencies to address strategic objectives for even one foreign country remains a daunting task. Of the lead organizations involved in MSP, the DOD and the USCG have the largest forces and manage the largest resources. Their operational responsibilities have motivated sophisticated planning, resource allocation, and force develop- ment, management, and employment processes. FOuNDATIONS OF MARITIME SECuRITy PARTNERSHIPS The DOD’s theater security cooperation (TSC) plans address the set of operational functions needed for DOD’s participation in MSP. The concepts and implementation of TSC have evolved over the last decade. With the end of the Cold War, government and academic institutions sought to understand and adapt to the new security environment. At the National Defense University Pacific Symposium in 1991, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs introduced the notion of cooperative vigilance as one approach to Asia-Pacific security.30 The notion was an adaptation of coop- erative vigilance among animal herds and flocks of birds, whereby members alternate their watch duties for the group. A conference of some of the nation’s most prominent foreign policy and arms control scholars at Stanford University in April 1992 proposed that cooperative engagement to achieve multinational security should replace Cold War concepts of national security. 31 ADM Charles R. Larson, USN, the Commander in Chief of PACOM, began institutionalizing cooperative engagement within his command. This approach applied “military assets, funds, and programs to achieve three objectives: forward presence, strong alliances, and crisis response. . . . The forward deployment of the U.S. forces in the region contributes significantly to maintaining stability, enhances our diplomatic influence, and promotes an environment conducive to the growth of our economic interests there.” The intent was to “seize the opportunity offered in this new era to shape a better world—one built on shared ideas, interests, and responsibilities” and “engenders [the building of] coalitions for collective action in time of crisis.”32 This approach became a national strategy with the publication of the 1996 on each sale (even if financed by the United States) to cover the Services’ costs of administering each case, as well as DSCA’s own costs. DSCA and its Defense Cooperation Offices in the countries need to urge the countries, the U.S. Navy, the selling American companies, and the COCOMs to make sure the equipment and information capabilities sold to the countries are interoperable with United States and other international systems. 30 See Seng Tan and Amitay Acharya. 2004. asia-Pacific Security Cooperation: National Interests and Regional Order, M.E. Sharpe, Armonk, N.Y., p. 227. 31 See . Accessed August 28, 2007. 32 Charles Larson. 1993. “Cooperative Engagement,” Joint force Quarterly, Issue 2 (Autumn), p. 82.

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139 IMPLeMeNTaTION STRaTeGY fOR MaRITIMe SeCURITY PaRTNeRSHIPS national security strategy “Engagement and Enlargement.”33 In conjunction with this strategy, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs and the COCOMs began formal- izing their theater engagement plans. In 2001, the new administration put a somewhat different emphasis on this effort, changing “theater engagement plans” to “theater security cooperation plans,” which initially emphasized the more tra- ditional aspects of international military-to-military interactions. However, the global war on terrorism restored the emphasis on interactions involving nontra- ditional security challenges and the perceived value of humanitarian assistance in promoting the U.S. image and values. The COCOMs prepare TSC plans to carry out the missions assigned in the Security Cooperation Guidance provided by the Secretary of Defense. According to the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review, the Security Cooperation Guidance will be incorporated into the Contingency Planning Guidance, signed by the President, which directs COCOM planning. As with the previous theater engagement plans, TSC plans are carefully coordinated with mission performance plans of the U.S. ambassador in each country and between the policy organizations within DOD and DoS. Each subordinate military service and functional component com- mander recommends to the COCOM which interactions with foreign nations, from leader and ship visits, to medical, dental, and other humanitarian visits, to major military exercises, should be included in the theater plan. In practice, the Navy component commanders (the four-star area fleet commanders) have received approval for their proposed uses of assigned and allocated Navy forces approved within the TSC plans. Such plans guide DOD’s authorized activities in connection with MSP, including the new emphasis on working with the maritime industries. Obtaining u.S. Forces for MSP Activities The main thrust of this report is to support the establishment of mechanisms by which the U.S. government in general and the U.S. Navy in particular can help other nations improve their own maritime security situation. The vehicle for this support is the greatly increased collection and distribution of MDA information. Responsibility for an adequate response to emerging threats to U.S. maritime interests rests primarily with the naval forces. This section addresses the impact of the MSP initiative on U.S. naval force planning. By law, all military combat forces must be assigned to a COCOM. Naval forces are assigned principally to U.S. Joint Forces Command and PACOM. Though forces are assigned to COCOMs, they are also apportioned for major contingency plans and allocated to COCOMs to conduct exercises and operations and to respond to humanitarian crises as required.34 33 See . Accessed July 28, 2007. 34Adaptive Planning Overview, see . Accessed August 5, 2007.

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140 MaRITIMe SeCURITY PaRTNeRSHIPS COCOMs request forces to support joint training and TSC plans. The U.S. Joint Forces Command recommends the forces to be allocated for the proposed deployments and exercises, the Global Force Management Board reviews and coordinates these recommendations, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff then recommends the forces to be deployed to the Secretary of Defense, who then signs deployment orders for those forces not assigned to the COCOM. COCOMs can deploy assigned forces within their area of operations without the Secretary of Defense signing deployment orders. To support adaptive planning and global force management, the DOD has issued an instruction that “establishes policy and assigns responsibility under Ref- erence (a) [Strategic Planning Guidance (SPG) FY 2006-2011, March 1, 2004] for developing standardized force structure data that will provide on-demand information in a net-centric environment.”35 As agreed with the DHS, the USCG will make data on the readiness of its forces available to support global force management. Finding: COCOM Theater Security Cooperation plans provide the foundation for conducting the operational functions that are not incorporated into NSPD 41 or its supporting plans. However, no similar procedures exist across the other government agencies that have authority or responsibilities for MSP activities that go beyond the DOD. u.S. Navy Role The concept originally called the 1,000-ship Navy has gained support from some 24 other chiefs of navies, a sign that the U.S. Navy can lead the U.S. participation in this maritime security effort. However, the CNO’s concept of the 1,000-ship Navy addresses a litany of problems that beg for solutions. The problems go well beyond the interests of the Navy—in fact, they affect every cabinet-level department in the U.S. government. MSP must be an international initiative whereby countries participate on the basis of their national interests as well as regional policy agreements and maritime law. There is currently no single agency or department that can effectively speak for the President and the nation’s maritime concerns. Responsibilities are fragmented. Authority is often exercised but decisions are not coordinated, so the result is less than optimal. If there is to be a professional, comprehensive, internationally respected entity of the U.S. government dealing with maritime affairs, it needs to be able to undertake many responsibilities: • Foster maritime commerce, 35 DODI 8260.03, “Organizational and Force Structure Construct (OFSC) for Global Force Man- agement (GFM),” August 23, 2006, p. 1. Available at . Accessed August 5, 2007.

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141 IMPLeMeNTaTION STRaTeGY fOR MaRITIMe SeCURITY PaRTNeRSHIPS • Represent the United States to all international and regional maritime organizations, • Establish maritime agreements on behalf of the United States, • Represent the U.S. interest in all matters pertaining to the UNCLOS and maritime law enforcement, • Develop and field systems to give the United States effective MDA, • Formulate top-level policy for the establishment and sustainment of mari- time aids to navigation, • Set policy for maritime traffic rules and systems, • Establish and maintain a uniform national policy for U.S. access to other countries’ ports and for U.S. port security, • Provide policy oversight for the safe operation and security of U.S. flag vessels, • Establish and maintain uniform standards for training and certification of mariners, • Provide oversight of standards for maritime vessel construction, and • Enforce maritime environmental standards. The policy pronounced by the President in December 2004 for the imple- mentation of a comprehensive NSMS called for the creation of the MSPCC at the National Security Council (NSC). Finding: The MSPCC and its parent, the NSC, have not yet met the requirements of the 2004 mandate, as the discussion above indicates, nor have they developed even short-term initiatives to give the nation a robust capability for MDA. A new, invigorated approach must be undertaken to meet national maritime needs. STRATEgIC INTERACTION WITH INTERAgENCy INITIATIvES Interagency support for U.S. participation in the MSP is crucial if the con- cept is to work; however, the support has been sporadic so far. Initiatives within the NSC and DoS are being coordinated but have to be resolved if the Navy, the USCG, and law enforcement agencies are to be effective when operating in the maritime domain in support of the NSMS requirements in different regions of the world. Several interagency initiatives and programs are part of this effort, but they work independently rather than together at the moment. Several of the more important interagency initiatives present obvious coordination challenges (also see Figure 4.2): • Proliferation Security Initiatie (PSI). This initiative seeks to stop the shipments of WMD to and from states and nonstate actors worldwide. Seventy countries have indicated support for PSI, while 20 are actively participating in this effort.

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142 USCG-Model Maritime Agency/Code CSI PSI USCG-ITP DOE-Megaports FBI-Legal attaches DOS-ATA DOS-Group of 8 DOS-EXBS ISPS Illegal Immigration Counterdrug Illegal Fishing MIO Migrant Interdiction Naval Warfare Maritime Crimes UN Sanctions Kinetic Environmental/ International WMD Oil Spill Crimes Blockade Defense of EMIO/GWOT Customs/Smuggling/ Piracy U.S. Persons Oil Bunkering and Assets at Slave Trade Sea Safety/Navigation Port Security USCG, DEA, Customs, Military DOD Support to LEA DOT, DOE, FBI, and so on Law Enforcement Traditional DOD Focus Agencies FIGURE 4.2 Supporting interagency initiatives. NOTE: PSI, Proliferation Security Initiative; CSI, Container Security Initiative; ITP, Interna- tional Training Programs (USCG); ATA, Antiterrorism Assistance; EXBS, Export Control and Border Security; ISPS, International Shipping and Port Security; EMIO, Expanded Maritime Intercept Operation; GWOT, global war on terror; DOT, Department of Transportation. Figure 4-2, editable, b&w, broadside R01141

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143 IMPLeMeNTaTION STRaTeGY fOR MaRITIMe SeCURITY PaRTNeRSHIPS • antiterrorism assistance (aTa). This initiative is located in the Diplomatic Security Services Training Directorate of DoS. ATA provides training and equip- ment based on onsite needs assessments for foreign law enforcement and civilian security organizations. • Regional Maritime Security Program (RMSP). This program is jointly coordinated by PACOM and DoS. It is a capacity-building program that is focus- ing on enhancing cooperative security and maritime law enforcement capabilities in the East Asia and Pacific regions. • export Control and Border Security (eXBS) assistance. This initiative is a key tool in stemming the proliferation of WMD and related weapons and technologies. It works to ensure that the manufacturers and suppliers have proper control over the export of munitions, dual-use goods, and related technologies. It also tries to ensure that transit and transshipment countries have the tools to interdict illicit shipments across their territories. • Group of eight. The G-8 Lyon-Roma Group has devised methodology and a checklist for auditing port and maritime security. The procedure has been adopted by the IMO as an international self-assessment checklist. • Model Maritime agency/Code. This model maritime service code can identify the legal authority that a multimission maritime service needs to function effectively. Developed by the USCG, it has been presented to over 20 countries. • International Training Program (ITP). Provides training programs at USCG schools as well as mobile training teams for members of the international maritime community. • Container Security Initiatie (CSI). This initiative proposes a security regime to ensure that all containers that pose a risk for terrorism are identified and inspected at foreign ports before they are loaded on vessels destined for the United States. • Organization of american States (OaS) port security assistance. U.S. missions to the OAS and working with the OAS, the Inter-American Committee Against Terrorism (CICTE), the Inter-American Committee on Ports (CIP), and the Maritime Administration (MARAD) offer assistance to OAS member states to enhance security at their ports in order to comply with the dictates of the IMO. • Megaports Initiatie. This initiative helps countries with major interna- tional ports to enhance their ability to screen cargo at those ports. It also works to improve radiation detection equipment as well as train personnel in the use of such equipment. • fBI legal attachés. Legal personnel are located in over 50 key cities worldwide and are providing coverage for over 200 countries, territories, and islands. Each office is established through an agreement with the host nation and is normally located in the U.S. embassy in that nation. • International Ship and Port facility Security (ISPS) Code. ISPS is another IMO initiative implemented in the United States by the USCG, which encourages bilateral or multilateral discussions with other nations to exchange information

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144 MaRITIMe SeCURITY PaRTNeRSHIPS on enforcement requirements for international maritime security standards. The USCG works closely with U.S. trade partners to promote reasonable implemen- tation and enforcement of the ISPS Code for enhanced maritime security (see Figure 4.2). • automatic Identification System (aIS). This is another IMO initiative that allows for ship tracking and monitoring for the Vessel Tracking System (VTS). The International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS) agreements now require AIS on all ships of 300 GT and over engaged in international voyages as well as all passenger ships regardless of size. The Navy is putting AIS on all of its ships. • faO expertise. The special skills required of foreign area officers (FAOs) are put to use working with the many programs related to MDA. A career FAO, whether or not he or she comes from one of the sea services, is expected to have assignments in headquarters offices both stateside and abroad. Demonstrated excellence in the leadership of maritime operations should ultimately allow the FAO to be assigned at the three-star level as director of any office or agency tasked with establishing maritime partnerships. Potential Solutions to the Poor Outlook A review of the diverse interagency/interdepartment programs, plans, needs, and initiatives described above predicts that it will be very difficult to find a common basis for achieving MSP. Furthermore, a detailed analysis of the require- ments to implement any maritime security partnership by the U.S. government turns up a quagmire of bureaucratic and political hurdles that cannot be overcome using traditional organizational tools. This makes it unlikely that the departments and agencies of the U.S. government will be able to execute the President’s NSMS. Several alternatives could be pursued to implement and strengthen MSP both domestically and internationally, among them the following: • Maintain the current roles and responsibilities for maritime security within the various agencies and departments of the government but improve on inter- agency coordination mechanisms. Coordination could begin without bureaucratic delay if the NSC would put into effect the already established maritime security coordinating policy. This could be expedited by making the NSC responsible, in accordance with its charter, for an up-to-date report on the implementation status of NSPD 41. • Assign one agency as the lead for maritime security and increase its role, responsibility, and authority for interagency coordination for maritime security. The lead agency could be the DoS, the USCG within the DHS, or the Navy within the DOD. Because of the broad scope of the maritime problem and the need for consistent national policies, only DoS has the breadth of experience to

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145 IMPLeMeNTaTION STRaTeGY fOR MaRITIMe SeCURITY PaRTNeRSHIPS be assigned as lead agency; however; it lacks operational resources. The USCG also has broad experience and acceptance and could satisfy many of the needs of the partnerships. The Navy has ownership of the MSP concept but, along with DOD, presents a military front, which may be undesirable. DOD and the Navy also lack law enforcement authority. • Establish a new agency for maritime security as a standalone agency or within one of the departments. A new agency speaking as a single voice on maritime matters would have a broader mandate on maritime security, including commercial and environmental aspects. It might not, however, fit well under DHS. A new agency would have the advantage of attracting new leadership. The analogy to the establishment of the FAA should be looked at carefully because at that time the air was the new domain. While each of the above alternatives has advantages and disadvantages, the committee believes the optimal approach would be to find a body of leaders who can cut across bureaucratic lines. The 1,000-ship Navy concept espoused by the CNO is based on many of the ideas required for a successful NSMS. The 1,000- ship Navy is the core from which that strategy will grow. However, the Navy with its vast network of international contacts and linkages still falls short in its ability to mount the necessary effort. A novel and extraordinary approach is needed to break through the international barriers abroad and interagency barriers at home. The deficiencies that exist across U.S. government entities mean that no single individual short of the President could coordinate and, especially, com- mand across all the agencies involved, and he or she could not keep up with the effort nor could one or two subordinates. The committee’s inclination is to urge that there be an independent, third-party study of the maritime problem focusing on security and probably on other aspects of the maritime domain, including the alternatives just outlined above. Hence, the CNO should exploit his access to the Commander in Chief by asking him to appoint a body of leaders with authority to find a solution that accords with his NSMS. A Presidential Commission Previously, when significant changes in government structure were needed, a Presidential Commission with appropriate terms of reference was set up.36 Such a commission must draw heavily on the expertise found in several places. Govern- 36The historical precedent is the 1955-1957 Presidential Committee, which recommended the establishment of the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) so as to “consolidate all the essential management functions necessary to support the common needs of the military and civil aviation of the United States.” The rationale for the FAA was similar organizationally and functionally to the current need to remedy the shortfalls in roles, responsibilities, and authority for maritime security. Back then, after some years of start-up problems and trial and error, the consolidation of organizational and func- tional responsibility in a single agency worked very well for the nation and indeed for the world.

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146 MaRITIMe SeCURITY PaRTNeRSHIPS ment, industry, trade organizations, labor unions, and academia all are potential contributors. There needs to be international representation or, at a minimum, consultation with other countries, especially in view of the anticipated interac- tions with the Law of the Sea. Coordination at the Strategic Level There is a critical need for coordination at the strategic level for all programs and initiatives that come under the umbrella of U.S. programs supporting the partnerships and maritime security. Neither the Navy nor the USCG can operate effectively within the MSP without support from other U.S. agencies and depart- ments that provide the policy framework from which to execute assignments across the spectrum of maritime security (see Figure 4.2). There is a need to identify and establish various levels of support and coordination for individual countries as well as entire regions based on different levels of partnership and needs. Operational and Tactical Support To effectively translate strategic decisions in Washington it will be necessary to designate the level of support to a specific country or region. It will require the coordination of domestic partners and resources. At the local level the U.S. ambassador and his country team would coordinate all the U.S. programs related to maritime security and safety in that country. If either the Navy or the USCG deploys units to work on maritime security missions in a specific region, those units must coordinate their activities with those of the country teams to ensure that they are supporting the local requirements as well as the COCOM’s Theater Engagement Plan. FINDINg AND RECOMMENDATION The trend during the past two decades toward globalization in the exploita- tion of natural resources and in the manufacturing sector has meant an increasing need for maritime transport. This need in turn results in growing coastal trade, transoceanic commerce, shipbuilding, port expansion, fuel consumption, and competition for offshore resources—including fish stocks—all of which have significant impact on national and international governance related to maritime safety, control, and security. The governance burden, especially as regards secu- rity, is already straining U.S. resources for protecting the country’s own waters and ports. It is time to act on this understanding and prepare the nation and its prospective partners to deal with the growing task of maritime governance. Establishing a regime such as that implied for MSP is an extensive and exceedingly complex task that needs to involve departments and agencies across

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147 IMPLeMeNTaTION STRaTeGY fOR MaRITIMe SeCURITY PaRTNeRSHIPS the U.S. government. It needs to engage other participants in ways that tran- scend formal military and political alliances, and it needs to be seen by other countries not as a U.S. military initiative but as a way of fostering law and order at sea and thus the security of all participants. It is not clear that the existing MSPCC—despite some positive steps at the policy level—has adequate authority or mechanisms to fully realize MSP objectives as part of the national strategy. The situation bears a strong resemblance to the situation that faced the nation with respect to air transportation before the establishment of the FAA and the International Civil Aviation Organization. Finding: The Chief of Naval Operations’ initial 1,000-ship Navy concept has become a much larger concept of maritime security partnerships, attracting much international recognition and interest. It has grown beyond a U.S. Navy initia- tive into a critical matter for all agencies of the U.S. government that deal with international maritime relationships and trade. Recommendation 12: The Chief of Naval Operations should recommend the appointment of an independent third party such as a presidential commission on maritime security governance tasked to recommend ways of strengthening the nation’s maritime security policy, to define the roles and responsibilities of various U.S. government agencies and departments to better implement maritime security partnerships both domestically and internationally, and to move forward as suggested in the 11 other recommendations of this report.

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