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Maritime Security Partnerships 1 Introduction: Creating Maritime Security Partnerships in the Twenty-First Century BACKGROUND Recognizing the new international security landscape following the end of the Cold War and after the terrorist attack on the United States on 9/11/2001, the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO), ADM Michael Mullen, USN, called for a collaborative international approach to maritime security.1 Initially branded the “1,000-ship Navy,” this concept envisioned that U.S. naval forces would partner with “a diverse array of multinational, federal, state, local, and private sector entities to ensure freedom of navigation, the flow of commerce, and the protection of ocean resources.” Furthermore, this concept would bring all nations together to build a global maritime network—including the sharing of information among all participants—that would promote security on the seas and enable global, regional, and national prosperity through international cooperation. In response to a request from the former CNO,2 the Naval Studies Board of the National Research Council established the Committee on the “1,000-Ship Navy”—A Distributed and Global Maritime Network for the purpose of conducting a study to examine the technical and operational implications of the 1,000-ship Navy concept. The terms of reference for the study, the committee’s understanding and assumptions and its approach to addressing the terms of reference, and the organization and content of this report are outlined below. 1 Chief of Naval Operations (ADM Michael G. Mullen, USN), in remarks delivered at the 17th International Seapower Symposium, Naval War College, Newport, R.I., September 21, 2005. 2 ADM Michael G. Mullen, USN, Chief of Naval Operations, in a letter dated June 29, 2006, to Ralph J. Cicerone, President, National Academy of Sciences.
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Maritime Security Partnerships TERMS OF REFERENCE Conduct a study to examine the technical and operational implications of the 1,000-ship Navy concept as they apply to four levels of cooperative effort: (1) U.S. Navy, Coast Guard, and merchant shipping only; (2) U.S. naval and maritime assets with others in treaty alliances or analogous arrangements; (3) U.S. naval and maritime assets with ad hoc coalitions (examples to be postulated in the study); and (4) U.S. naval and maritime assets with others than the above that may now be friendly but could potentially be hostile, for special purposes such as deterrence of piracy or other criminal activity. Specifically, for each of these four levels, the study will: Examine previously established models and other possible operational concepts for the four levels of cooperation, to include both the NATO and Interpol models; Identify force structure and interoperability needs, to include information sharing and assurance; Examine the extent to which sensor technology, information and operational techniques must be held classified; and the utility, advantages and disadvantages of using civilian communications and encryption technologies; and Assess potential vulnerabilities and countermeasure susceptibilities to U.S. military forces inherent in the “1,000-ship Navy” concept, and the means to mitigate them. THE COMMITTEE’S UNDERSTANDING AND ASSUMPTIONS As the committee heard from various parties during its work, it became clear that ADM Mullen’s concept went well beyond cooperation with the navies of the world and put a premium on the sharing of information relevant for maritime domain awareness (MDA) rather than just having more ships in a literal sense. As a result, the committee began to use the term “maritime security partnerships” (MSP) for the purposes of this report. In addition, the committee came to understand that the U.S. government appears not to be well enough organized to pursue the MSP program at this point and must be particularly attentive to the sensitivities of the countries it wishes to enlist as partners. The United States is not popular in many places around the world, and some of its detractors think that any program it proposes is nothing but an attempt to extend its hegemony. They also fear that the United States is merely seeking intelligence for itself and will not share the information picked up by an MDA system. This prejudice can be overcome by making clear that MSP is not simply an extension of intelligence operations but is a real effort to bring stability and prosperity. The United States can at times appear to be too obsessed with terrorism and nuclear proliferation; this can be overcome by showing a real concern for local problems—for example, fisheries protection. The United States also has to make clear that it is not con-
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Maritime Security Partnerships cerned just with its own homeland defense but instead wants a comprehensive MDA system. Finally, the United States should deny that it needs to patrol the whole of the world’s oceans but does not have enough ships for the purpose—that is, that the MSP program is really meant for its own security. The committee came to understand that the goals of MSP are to foster dependable expectations of security and peaceful development and the ability to act in concert against common security challenges. Effective MSP would enable partner nations to act locally in their own self-interest, especially to protect national sovereignty, and in the general interest of law and order on the seas. The CNO identified some key components of the 1,000-ship Navy vision if it is to be successful: First, there must be incentives for participating nations to join in such a partnership. Since not all maritime threats are global, the regional and local interests of each country must be considered. The principle behind the 1,000-ship Navy is that it must serve every participant’s interests. Second, there must be low technological and operational barriers to entry for all nations (even those without formal navies) to achieve the broad participation needed to attain the goals. Third, by advancing security, MSP should improve economic efficiency and social cohesion. Finally, building trust among all nations, even those that have not traditionally been friendly, should be the overarching objective of such a partnership and will be crucial for realizing a coalition of the willing. To be successful, the activities of MSP must be conducted within the framework of international maritime laws and conventions. In practice, the vast majority of international agreements are bilateral. The aim of MSP is to build on those bilateral arrangements to bring about cooperative action, initially on a regional level and then on the global level, within the international framework. Understanding the Current Situation in the Maritime Domain Today On the one hand, the world today is continuing to grow its economy. Most of the products of the resulting global trade travel by sea (see Appendix B for a detailed discussion of the sea lanes of commerce). On the other hand, there are gaps in governance of the maritime domain that permit outlaws to pursue their political or criminal ends. The globalization of transportation, information, and finance facilitates the outlaws’ ability to cross borders and to exploit seams of lawlessness within and between countries. While most countries have armed forces and train them to defend against aggression by neighbors and to protect their territories, defense and law enforcement organizations around the world need to develop security relationships and capabilities to deal with nonstate
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Maritime Security Partnerships political and criminal elements. Maritime forces, which have a long tradition of cooperating with neighbors, international organizations, and legitimate merchant shipping for protection and safety at sea, may see the utility of partnerships to protect their own resources and cope with unlawful activities. The predominant challenges in the maritime domain today come from a range of hostile actions by nonstate actors, from stealing fish to smuggling drugs, people (including both illegal immigrants and slaves), and weapons of mass destruction, to piracy. There is also the possibility that extremists or other insurgents and terrorists may attack at sea.3 These nonstate actors respect no boundaries. They cross them easily (including by sea) to carry out their business. Pirates pose threats to general merchant shipping, particularly in straits or from the coastal areas of undergoverned states like Somalia. Smugglers and fishery poachers might be thought of as “evaders”—that is, they want to evade law enforcement authorities. Pirates, insurgents, and terrorists are attackers. Defending national resources and sovereignty against both evaders and attackers who use the sea requires intelligence about such activities both at sea and ashore. This in turn requires cooperation among military and law enforcement forces, both within countries and between countries. There is a great need to have a picture as comprehensive as possible of all activities that affect the maritime domain. From gathering tips ashore about evading or attacking activities to gaining a picture of normal activities and the routine reporting of both legal and illegal traffic at sea—all would set the stage for identifying anomalies in the traffic and taking appropriate action, much as does the Joint Interagency Task Force-South (JIATF-S) for drug traffic in the Caribbean. The Need for Maritime Security Partnerships Attackers and evaders challenge defense and law enforcement in the maritime domain. Beyond self-defense and pursuit of pirates, the authorities that deal with attackers and evaders are generally confined to their national territories or, in the case of maritime law enforcement authorities, to their own territorial waters, which range from the local waters of a country (12-mile zone, 24-mile contiguous zone, exclusive economic zone [EEZ], or a continental shelf) to the boundaries with neighboring country waters. Large portions of the sea, such as the seas of 3 The terrorist attacks at sea so far have been the attack on the USS Cole in Aden Harbor; the attack on the oil tanker MV Limburg as it awaited a pilot before entering the port in Mukkala, Yemen; the sinking of a Filipino ferry boat; a rocket attack on U.S. amphibious ships in the Jordanian port of Aqaba; and attacks by the Tamil Tigers (Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam) members of the long-standing rebellion in and around Sri Lanka. Also, note that in southeast Asia, particularly in the Indonesian and Filipino archipelagos, terrorists (Abu Sayyaf and Jemaah Islamiah) move people and supplies by sea from island to island. The Naval Studies Board recently conducted a study on the role of naval forces in the global war on terror (see National Research Council, 2007, The Role of Naval Forces in the Global War on Terror: Abbreviated Version, The National Academies Press, Washington, D.C.).
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Maritime Security Partnerships Indonesia and the Philippines, are archipelagic. They constitute national territory but are extremely difficult to police thoroughly. Straits and other confined seas (e.g., the Mediterranean) of importance to transit (i.e., they bear heavy merchant traffic) pose other problems of law enforcement and may require country-to-country cooperation if the nonstate threats are significant. In addition, the countries may be concerned about threats approaching from a distance—for example, the United States is concerned about terrorists approaching from across the Atlantic. Altogether, the defense and law enforcement activities of various countries are manifestations of their sovereignty, but at the same time the authorities are largely confined to their national territory. Clarifying authority and extending it to act against attackers and evaders at sea through bilateral and regional arrangements, consistent with international laws and conventions, is an essential goal of MSP. For the purposes of MSP, one is not just talking about national navies. The enforcers include anything that floats, flies out to sea as part of detection and enforcement, or supports both boats and aircraft from the shore (including port authorities, radar stations, and so on). The law enforcement authorities may include national governments and their security and defense ministries (one such entity is the Guardia Finanzia in Italy), including port authorities; coastal patrols (12-mile and 24-mile zones); capabilities that extend out to the 200-mile limit for EEZ protection; and the more distant warding off of perceived threats (e.g., the international maritime interception operation such as the one in the Persian Gulf or the Operation Active Endeavor of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in the Mediterranean, and so on). Organizations of this kind may have different names depending on the country and its history. They include navies, coast guards, customs, harbor police, and any other authorities that float on the water or conduct surveillance over the waters. Many countries, and particularly those engaged heavily in international commerce, have the capabilities to police their own waters. Many cooperate in the current patchwork of international cooperation for regulating maritime traffic. As much as three-quarters of the world may be adequately governed in this respect. But there are countries and areas, particularly in Africa, with offshore fisheries and where international trade is growing, that suffer from inadequate governance. Particularly neglected in these countries is the enforcement of laws in the maritime domain. Such countries need help. Those needing help with protection are the countries, their borders and coastlines, their fisheries, and the general merchant marine—all of which will have a stake in cooperating with the protector organization to be able to continue their peaceful pursuits. Active patrols and enforcement responses are also likely to deter those who might be contemplating unlawful activities in the various maritime areas. Altogether, these rather scattered threats are ubiquitous and mobile and able to cross borders (most are evaders, not attackers). International cooperation is needed to ensure the protection of the maritime domain against these threats
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Maritime Security Partnerships and unlawful activities. At a minimum, information must be shared between one sovereign state and another to facilitate the pursuit of lawbreakers. Two or more neighboring countries may form joint or coordinated patrols. Port authorities around the world are in communication about ships that break regulations by, for example, spreading pollution. Regional and global information sharing is essential for dealing with these challenges. Understanding the Various Levels of Cooperation for Governance of the Maritime Domain The study’s terms of reference called for the committee to examine the technical and operational implications of the 1,000-ship Navy concept as they apply to four levels of cooperative efforts: (1) U.S. Navy, Coast Guard (USCG), and merchant shipping only; (2) U.S. naval and maritime assets with others in treaty alliances or analogous arrangements; (3) U.S. naval and maritime assets with ad hoc coalitions (examples to be postulated in the study); and (4) U.S. naval and maritime assets with others than the above that may now be friendly but could be hostile, for special purposes such as deterrence of piracy or other criminal activities. As the committee went about its task by gathering information from representatives of the U.S. Navy, the USCG, merchant shipping, foreign countries, and other organizations—government and nongovernment, including industry, both domestic and international—it came to understand that the maritime domain is not an ungoverned space, particularly because it extends along coastlines. There is already a good deal of regulation of ships (see the rules set forth in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea [UNCLOS] and by the International Maritime Organization [IMO]) and much cooperation between various maritime authorities locally, regionally, and globally. The United States has long been promoting cooperation, starting during the Cold War and continuing afterwards, and including, in the case of the Navy, troop and vessel deployments overseas. Navies and other maritime organizations have natural relations with one another, given their association with the sea. There is also a lot of cooperation among legitimate seagoing business entities—merchant marines, fishing fleets, and so on. It tends to be piecemeal, however, and merchant marines are especially sensitive to protecting their competitive positions in trade. There are several levels of sophistication and modernity in the countries and their maritime organizations (navies and other organizations involved in law enforcement in territorial waters) that would be involved in MSP, and generally there is close cooperation between them. At the high end are the navies that can venture out globally; the committee assumes their territorial capabilities are as good. Most are close allies of the United States, with which they have long-standing cooperation.
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Maritime Security Partnerships There are other very capable navies that do not roam the world (except perhaps on show-the-flag visits) but generally stay in their own regions, which presumably contributes to the general stability of those regions and also supplements their territorial defenses. Some are close allies of the United States; others have tenuous relations in the maritime domain. The MSP initiative offers a way to engage these countries in cooperative security endeavors. Other reasonably developed countries may have capable coastal navies and maritime enforcement organizations that police and protect their own waters. Their participation in MSP would be local and in nearby international waters, and they would benefit from information sharing and coordination with their neighbors for these purposes. Finally, there are those underdeveloped countries that have limited or no capabilities, even for coastal patrols. These are countries that have less control of their maritime domains but are perhaps responsible for the greater part of unlawful activities. If they are to participate in MSP, they would need more capable vessels and support from outside for information capabilities. All of these levels of international cooperation require MDA to function and enforcers able to respond in a timely way, as appropriate. For the system to work, they must share, as well as consume, information. Many, if not most, countries want to know the location of all the ships within their jurisdictions, particularly those heading in their direction or already in their sovereign waters. It may be that the best way to make MSP a reality will be to gather, process, and then arrange to share this information with those who need it in order to conduct enforcement actions. A critical aspect of law enforcement is interceptions and boardings, which in turn bring up a very important concern for MSP, which is respect for sovereignty and for ensuring that actions taken by any of the maritime entities are legal. There is a certain tension between freedom of the seas and the maintenance of lawful order in sovereign waters. Outside sovereign waters, there are few restraints on the passage of vessels. The right of innocent passage—which the United States especially defends given the ubiquity of its Navy in its deployments around the world—is central. As discussed in Chapter 3, the right to stop and board a merchant ship is restricted. Another challenge is building the capabilities of the less capable states, especially those in sub-Saharan Africa, where the United States has become especially worried about the security of expanding oil production and shipment from the Gulf of Guinea area. The near-lawless coasts of East Africa are also of concern. Boat people are making their way from West Africa to Europe through way stations like the Cape Verde Islands. The United States and the other advanced nations are going to have to convince the developing countries to give these maritime security efforts priority along with efforts to achieve economic and social development. The costs of building and sustaining the countries’ capabilities in
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Maritime Security Partnerships maritime law enforcement and connecting them to an MDA information system will have to be underwritten. The insufficiency of governance in many of these countries and their lack of financial resources present substantial difficulties. The United States would also have to reset priorities in its always constrained military assistance budget if it is to support the effort. Considerations in Improving Law Enforcement in the Maritime Domain In summarizing its understanding of the scope of MSP, the committee notes that the top layer is the maritime domain—the seawaters of the earth (but not the rivers or internal bodies of water). Then, given that both legal and illegal waterborne traffic crosses boundaries (except, perhaps, in the case of countries with long coastlines, like the United States or India, where there is much intracoastal trade traffic), the second layer comprises the many nations that front the maritime domain. It is this layer that must take coordinated action against attackers and evaders. In arranging a system of partnerships for surveillance, information-sharing, and law enforcement, there are many technical problems to solve.4 The third layer involves cooperation in enforcement. The three layers of cooperation are shown in Figure 1.1. In these three layers several considerations are at play: Location of threats. Threats are everywhere. They may come from the local ports and country waters or from anywhere around the world. This consideration takes into account that the greater part of the world maritime trade moves all over the world. Even fishing vessels may operate well beyond a country’s territorial waters. Extent of regulation. There is some confusion over this consideration—namely, is the maritime domain an ungoverned space, an anarchic space, or a regulated space? Much of international law was developed to govern the maritime domain, but the means of enforcement are often limited. In general, the massive world trade that moves by sea is hardly ever disturbed, even the movement of oil out through the Persian Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz. Piracy currently seems to be limited to particular areas and so far is a minor irritant. Smuggling in its various forms goes on as it has throughout history. So far terrorists have hardly struck at sea (their three recent attempts have been in ports or at the entrance to them). But the maritime space is vast and the surveillance poor except in the close approaches to major ports. One way to reduce the space in which trouble could 4 See National Research Council, 2000, Network-Centric Naval Forces: A Transition Strategy for Enhancing Operational Capabilities, National Academy Press, Washington, D.C.; National Research Council, 2005, FORCEnet Implementation Strategy, The National Academies Press, Washington, D.C.; National Research Council, 2006, C4ISR for Future Naval Strike Groups, The National Academies Press, Washington, D.C.; National Research Council, 2007, Distributed Remote Sensing for Naval Undersea Warfare: Abbreviated Version, The National Academies Press, Washington, D.C.
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Maritime Security Partnerships FIGURE 1.1 Maintaining order in the maritime domain. occur is to fill the gaps in regulations through international efforts, especially through the IMO. Capabilities of individual countries. The third set of considerations varies from highly capable governments with excellent maritime capabilities all the way to not very capable governments with poor or nonexistent maritime capabilities. While surveillance and information-sharing capabilities can be made available worldwide, it is the countries themselves that are ultimately responsible for moving about on the surface of the seas to carry out enforcement. One objective of MSP is to increase the capability and coordination of these enforcers as well as their numbers to achieve greater coverage in the areas where attackers and evaders operate. Depth of information. The fourth set of considerations ranges from maximum MDA, which would entail knowing the location of every vessel in the world, down to the specific cases of stopping ships and boarding them for inspections as circumstances admit. There is a substantial element of deterrence to be realized from having a total system in place and recognized as such. Those who wish to take advantage of the vastness of the seas to conduct their nefarious activities might think again if they risked being detected and intercepted even across sovereign boundaries. As seen in the Strait of Malacca and the Strait of Singapore, where patrols have been stepped up, there has already been a reduction in the incidence of piracy. Severity of threat. A threat that is carried out could have global consequences or local consequences. Terrorists might seize a merchant ship and load
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Maritime Security Partnerships a nuclear weapon on it to be fired when in range, or they might poach on local fisheries, depriving the people of their livelihoods and a critical source of protein. MSP could help by affording facilities for surveillance or providing information to serve both global and local purposes, including recognition on the part of participants that threats can move from one part of the maritime domain to another. Congruity of strategic interests. This consideration ranges from a general interest in uniting all the organized maritime protection services in the world in order to share information and assist one another as necessary, all the way down to organizing local police and enforcement actions. The broadest possible cooperation and sharing builds trust among countries and enables them to work together when needed. A final note on the committee’s understanding of why the United States is especially interested in MSP for the new era: It believes that 9/11 and the newly discovered need for homeland defense against Islamic extremists led the nation to take a greater interest in the maritime domain. American fears were compounded by the fear that such extremists might acquire and use nuclear weapons. This fear goes beyond the long-standing American concern for nonproliferation. The United States prefers that any such attacks take place as far away as possible. As the United States had long done, but more so as it moved onto the world scene after World War II and during the Cold War, it assumed responsibility for reducing conflict and unlawful activities around the world in the interest of general stability and rising prosperity for all peoples. Now with the spread of globalization and the attendant growth in mobility and communications, the United States finds a reason for reorienting its maritime outlook for both homeland defense and for the worldwide security of the maritime domain, especially against smaller and more scattered threats. If many other countries also perceive the need for such a reorientation, there may be a good rationale for expanding MSP. Figure 1.2 arrays these considerations, from local through regional to global arrangements along one axis and from independent country efforts in their own sovereign waters to fully integrated efforts with other countries and international organizations along the other. For illustrative purposes a number of the organizations and international conventions that operate in the maritime domain to date are shown. Understanding How to Implement an MSP Program The committee understands that there are some general guidelines to be followed in implementing a program for MSP: Achieving MSP is a matter of communicating among the governments and maritime organizations of different countries, the international organizations
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Maritime Security Partnerships FIGURE 1.2 Maritime security partnerships. NOTE: A list of acronyms is supplied in Appendix G. that have cognizance over maritime affairs, and the maritime companies whose protection is the intent of all this regulation and law enforcement. First of all, the U.S. government must organize itself for this effort. The U.S. Navy obviously proposed the 1,000-ship Navy, but it is not just a Navy effort, especially given the many maritime organizations (navies, coast guards, and so forth) that would be involved around the world and given the diplomatic efforts required to arrange the cooperation. On the U.S. side the effort must be a U.S. government interagency one, especially given the participation of the USCG. In short, the Navy enlists the Secretary of Defense, who in turns gets approval from the President, who then directs other U.S. departments and government agencies (State, USCG, Commerce, and others) to participate. The State Department, in turn, approaches other countries and international organizations, as appropriate, to enlist them. The countries instruct their various maritime organizations to consult with the U.S. organizations to decide on the most satisfactory arrangements and a course of execution. In addition, the State Department, along with other cognizant U.S. organizations, opens consultations with the relevant international organizations, like the IMO (the USCG would be the working contact here). The U.S. country teams, the U.S. combatant commanders (COCOMs), and probably the USCG will play significant roles. They will advise on the best way to approach countries. The COCOMs can use their theater security coopera-
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Maritime Security Partnerships tion (TSC) plans to provide exercises, training, and equipment to other countries to support them in policing the maritime domain. The USCG may be best positioned to deal with the variety of coastal and port maritime law enforcement organizations. In the long run, the U.S. Navy will be developing a cadre of foreign area officers (FAOs) who can serve on country teams in the security assistance organizations and liaise with local maritime organizations, especially those in the less-developed countries. Organizing and extending an MSP program is going to be an evolutionary, organic process—it will not be possible to design a complete architecture all at once from the beginning. However, the program can be based for the most part on existing cooperative arrangements. The goal of MSP should be to enable countries to act locally to solve their own problems, then to begin talks and work toward regional associations, and finally to tie the regional associations into a broader, globally networked, maritime-information-sharing cooperative. This process is illustrated in Figure 1.3. An informal model of organization, similar to that of the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), should generally be followed. While there might be FIGURE 1.3 Current and emerging international maritime security partnerships.
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Maritime Security Partnerships mechanisms for coordinating surveillance, transferring information, and so on, there would be no central headquarters or staff beyond existing organizations such as the IMO. Rather, any organization that handles the information arrangements would be acting like a telephone exchange. Maximum advantage would be taken of existing arrangements, alliances, and governmental and international organizations. Several international models for MSP cooperation already exist, as shown in Figure 1.2. The COCOMs already have working relationships and programs under their TSC programs. At the same time, as these MSP arrangements unfold, it is likely to become apparent that some of the international legal conventions, especially those that relate to boardings, whether in sovereign or international waters, will need to be clarified and extended in their authorities. This would take a more formal process—one, for instance, that accords with IMO procedures. THE COMMITTEE’S APPROACH TO ADDRESSING THE TERMS OF REFERENCE As outlined earlier in this chapter, as the study progressed, the committee refined its understanding of the four levels of cooperation for maritime security described in the terms of reference. It became evident to the committee that these four levels of an effort for maritime security are already in operation in various parts of the world. For example, at the first level, the U.S. Navy, the USCG, and merchant shipping are already cooperating on MDA initiatives, where much of the current activity entails the installation of automatic identification systems (AISs) on all vessels over 300 GT. At the second level of cooperation—U.S. naval and maritime assets with those of other countries with which it has treaty alliances or analogous arrangements—the Joint Task Force-150 Combined Enterprise Regional Information Exchange System (CENTRIXS) shares secret information among traditional NATO members and coalition maritime partners in Operation Enduring Freedom. At the third level of cooperation—U.S. naval and maritime assets with ad hoc coalitions—the Cooperating Nations Information Exchange System (CNIES) is being used by JIATF-S and 11 cooperating nations in South and Central America in efforts to suppress illicit maritime drug traffic. At the fourth level of cooperation—U.S. naval and maritime assets with others than those above that may now be friendly but could become hostile, for special purposes such as deterrence of piracy or other criminal activity—demonstration networks for the sharing of unclassified, commercially available AIS (and other) information with and among nontraditional partners are in progress in the Gulf of Guinea Initiative between U.S. naval forces in Europe. In reviewing the existing and emerging international partnerships, it became clear that one size does not fit all in the matter of information sharing and enabling technical mechanisms for maritime security. Differences are traceable to:
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Maritime Security Partnerships Differing levels of trust, The distinction between bilateral and multilateral arrangements, A focus on coordinated tactical-level action rather than information sharing, and Differing levels of technological maturity and sophistication. Also, the center of gravity for current maritime partnerships resides in bilateral arrangements for the coordinated execution of tactical actions supporting common security interests (e.g., interdiction). Thus, as the study progressed, the committee discovered that a different organizing principle was more appropriate to the complexity of the 1,000-ship Navy concept as it is being developed and implemented. The committee’s approach was to add value to the ongoing efforts and respond to the spirit of the CNO’s request while at the same time addressing the four levels of cooperative effort for maritime security and the four tasks (the four bullets) in the terms of reference. Furthermore, discussions with the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Information, Plans, and Strategy (N3/N5) at the committee’s first meeting encouraged a broader approach to the study, one that would address the more important question of how to achieve MSP. This carried the effort beyond the question of how to support MSP technically and operationally and concentrated instead on how to attract the wide range of participants suggested in the terms of reference. With this in mind the committee used a somewhat more complicated set of bilateral and multilateral models of cooperation to address the tasks in the terms of reference. ORGANIZATION AND CONTENT OF THIS REPORT With the understandings, assumptions, and approach specified above, the committee organized its response to the terms of reference as follows. Chapter 2 examines previously established models and other possible operational concepts for different levels of cooperation, including both the NATO and the Interpol models called for in the first bullet item of the terms of reference. It goes on to discuss the agreements, laws, and treaties for building partnerships; concludes that trust between partners is key to success in MSP; and provides recommendations for building and expanding the partnerships, both domestic and international, that are needed for successful implementation of MSP. Chapter 3 addresses the second, third, and fourth bullet items of the terms of reference. It goes on to conclude that improved information systems and technologies and the associated exchange mechanisms for information sharing are key to achieving success in implementation of MSP and recommends such improvements.
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Maritime Security Partnerships Chapter 4 discusses the roles and responsibilities of the U.S. Navy and others, creates an implementation strategy for MSP, including force structure (second bullet in the task statement), and recommends mechanisms for improved governance of maritime security. Appendixes A through G provide supplemental and study-process-related information.