Maritime Security Partnerships (2008)

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D Specific Reference Information Interpol Interpol is the world’s largest international police organization, with a mem- bership of most of the world’s countries. It was founded in 1923 to facilitate cross-border police cooperation and to support organizations (both governmen- tal and nongovernmental) whose mission is to prevent or combat international crime. Its objective is to facilitate international police cooperation even where diplomatic relations do not exist between particular countries. Interpol, operating through each country’s national crime bureau (FBI for the United States), gives law enforcement entities around the world instant access to its databases. Each Interpol member can in turn offer access to its databases on a consultative basis to groups such as border patrols or customs authorities by expanding existing multilateral agreements. Interpol ensures its continuing existence by developing services and training at all levels of technical sophistication for its membership, using an established global operation in over 200 sites around the world. Interpol’s databases and ser- vices ensure that police worldwide have access to the information and consulta- tive and field support services they need to prevent and investigate crime. The IMO and its Automated Identification System and Long-Range Identification and Tracking System The International Maritime Organization (IMO) is a permanent global orga- nization founded in 1948 and having members in approximately 167 countries. Members include all of the major coastal states and ship-owning nations. It also has as members governments and NGOs that recognize and adhere to the 192 

APPENDIX D 193 agreements of the IMO. The Automated Identification System (AIS) and the Long-Range Identification and Tracking (LRIT) system are two examples of the multilateral agreements facilitated by the IMO. The AIS (line of sight, 25 nmi) and the LRIT (out to 1,000 nmi from shore) system provide a global capability for monitoring the identification, location, track, and contents of ships on the seas. IMO has established global multilateral agreements that all parties comply with if they wish to use the AIS and LRIT ship tracking systems. Under the IMO charter, once a majority of the membership has agreed to the terms and condi- tions of an agreement, all IMO members must abide by it. In this way, the IMO organizing body relied on the desire of member nations to maintain their member- ship to persuade them to ratify the agreement. This condition of membership has streamlined the review process for a number of international agreements, thereby benefiting the organization as a whole rather than getting caught up in an endless list of the concerns of individual members. Finally, in its international role, the IMO commits itself to offer consultative services on demand to member nations. These services include, but are not lim- ited to, data collection, the development of data standards, limited data sharing, support services, and rules enforcement. Lloyd’s of london For over 300 years Lloyd’s of London has been managing risk for its clients in a number of markets, including maritime matters. It is a commercial organi- zation that continues to find innovative ways of recognizing, quantifying, and managing business and environmental risks. Information collection and selective sharing are at the core of its business. It does this through various contracts, or bilateral agreements, with its cus- tomers that quantify the terms and conditions of the particular situation. Its orga- nization consists of more than 225 syndicates and brokers working cooperatively and continuously with clients to assess their risks and place the appropriate information and management tools in the marketplace to counteract unexpected circumstances. Lloyd’s has contract partners in nearly every country in the world and in more than 85 percent of the companies on the Dow Jones and Fortune 500. It is regarded as a commercial entity that has ties and operations with both government and commercial interests. The involvement of Lloyd’s in the Malacca Strait incident of 2005 is an example of the critical role of the Lloyd’s network and other commercial mari- time players in cooperative solutions to issues of maritime safety and security. It was the raising of insurance rates for shipping in the region due to piracy and terrorist activities that brought the security issue to the boiling point and led to sharpened interest among shippers and insurers acting with and pressuring the coastal states to improve regional cooperation in dealing with the security of 

194 MARITIME SECURITY PARTNERSHIPS the vessels at sea. That incident also stimulated investment from countries such as the United States, Australia, and Japan that allowed the infrastructure to be developed. USNS Comfort Deployment The deployment of the USNS Comfort to the Caribbean during the summer and fall of 2007 is an excellent example of cooperation and good will leading to bilateral agreements between nations that could improve maritime security. The deployment of Comfort for 4 months to 13 countries throughout the Caribbean basin was intended to provide medical, dental, and engineering assistance to the local populations as well as to train and share information with the health min- istries in those countries. It followed on the heels of a similar highly successful deployment of the USNS Mercy to the Indonesian archipelago in 2006 with the same basic missions. It falls within the initial cooperation and bilateral agreement quadrant of the model (see Figure 2.1 in Chapter 2 of this report) and has great potential for increasing cooperation and information sharing in the future. Planning conferences were held for agencies in Washington, D.C., and SOUTHCOM and for the appropriate government ministries and their militaries in the host nations. Details were coordinated, dates and locations were estab- lished, and levels of support, training, and involvement were offered to those countries based on local requirements and desires. The USNS Comfort was able to deal with the basic medical and dental problems faced by the people of the region. The ship’s crew consisted of Navy, USCG, Air Force, and Air Guard medical personnel as well as representatives of the U.S. Public Health Service and NGOs. Such deployments can strengthen existing relationships with people and can serve as building blocks for better cooperation and information sharing with the respective governments, improving the maritime security situation in the region. Proliferation Security Initiative The Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), established in 2003 in response to the fear that WMD might be spreading through covert transport of materials and delivery systems, represents a mixed form of intensive multilateral information sharing. PSI has no formal organizational structure or legal basis in an interna- tional treaty or UN convention. It relies on bilateral and multilateral agreements among a group of 15 to 20 core supporters and some broad declarations of sup- port informally (and mainly secretly) pledged by a larger group of states, involv- ing, in all, nearly 80 states. The core supporters subscribe to a Statement of PSI Principles, which includes a commitment to improve constraints at borders, ports, in the air, on land, and at sea by exploiting national legislation and an implied willingness to take action such as interdiction, in port or on the sea. PSI exercises 

APPENDIX D 195 have been held with groups of countries throughout the maritime commons; regular meetings and gaming among the core countries represent ongoing efforts at further consultation and the convergence of legislation and action. There also have been a number of (largely unpublicized) actions under PSI. PSI is reinforced by bilateral arrangements on specific issues. The United States, for example, has concluded agreements with seven flag states supporting the U.S. right, after a formal request, to board ships on the high seas. Together with the fleets of the core states, the fleets of these seven account for more than 70 percent of the world’s total. PSI is now an agreement within (although not referenced by) two broad UN Security Council resolutions: 1540 (against nuclear terrorism and proliferation) and 1718 (action against nuclear developments in North Korea). PSI also will gain status as support grows for relevant amendments to the IMO Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation. PSI’s information sharing is specific and purpose driven, and it generally takes place in limited bilateral or multilateral channels suitable for intelligence data. Actions are often military and involve a range of government agencies, including the military. States can agree to take action or not, depending on their own national laws and interests. A number of key countries (India, China, Indo- nesia, and South Korea) remain outside PSI. Gulf of Guinea initiative The Gulf of Guinea (GoG) Initiative currently falls within the bilateral cooperation quadrant of the model (see Figure 2.1); however, the increased U.S. presence is leading to more cooperation and information sharing among 13 regional states and their European and U.S. partners. The GoG Initiative grew out of increased concern on the part of Africa, but also of the United States, NATO, and the European Union, about the violence and political, economic, and military instability resulting from the area’s emerging status as a major oil exporter. Based largely on an intersecting set of military-to-military relationships and the proactive programs of EUCOM, the initiative includes various strategies to improve information and situational awareness but is principally aimed at developing national military and nonmilitary capacities to ensure maritime safety and security. This geographical area features nations with immature governments, large ungoverned spaces, tremendous natural resources, militant violence and piracy, and limited ability to deal with the issues of maritime security. The legal frame- work for maritime law enforcement is inadequate or nonexistent in many of the countries, and pervasive corruption and weak governance detract from efforts to build and sustain security. The underlying assumptions are that the countries in the region will com- mit to reducing corruption and graft, embrace a regional approach to maritime security, work on a legal framework for maritime law enforcement, and commit 

196 MARITIME SECURITY PARTNERSHIPS to improved maritime security. For the U.S. side of the GoG partnership, the assumptions are that U.S. agencies and departments (DoS, DOJ, DOC, USAID, FBI, and CDC) will engage in support of U.S. policy for Africa and this initiative. In addition, it is assumed that NGOs and industry (especially the oil producers) will eventually participate and partner in this effort. Conferences, coordination sessions, and high-level visits to the countries have been part of the effort to bring various parties together. A GoG workshop on maritime safety and security was held in Ghana (March 2006) to address threats and vulnerabilities in the maritime domain. Conferences later in 2006 were attended by the ministers of 11 GoG nations as well as representatives from 5 EU members, government and military representatives from the United States, and members of regional and international organizations. The 11 GoG nations committed themselves to improving maritime awareness and enhancing regional cooperation through national, subregional, and international legal and regulatory frameworks. An action plan was developed with objectives to be met in the near term (12 months), the medium term (2 to 3 years), and the long term (more than 3 years) for improving MDA, regulatory frameworks, regional cooperation, and public awareness. In addition a commitment was made to strengthen regional and political will by establishing strategies for maritime safety and security (e.g., for individual and collective state access to AIS data) as well as linked national-level commissions for coordinating activities at sea and in ports. These initiatives were linked to the current EUCOM strategy for mitigating the conditions that foster extremism, increasing partnerships for regional stability, and creating an environment favorable to the expansion of free market economies. The emphasis is on capacity building, with provisions for training, exercises, and the provision of needed equipment, infrastructure, and software support. On-site activities in the region are being carried out by EUCOM’s proactive Naval Com- ponent Commander (C6F/CNE) and supported by Navy and USCG elements and other coalition naval units. The GoG Initiative is a reminder of the difficulty of achieving objectives over time and reinforces the point that DoS and interagencies should lead the effort through EUCOM in accordance with the Theater Engagement Plan for the near term, transitioning to the new AFRICOM when the time is right. The Navy or the USCG may be tasked to execute elements of the plan through the naval compo- nent commander. This model might well be followed in varying degrees with the other COCOMs based on their own theater engagement plans and bilateral and multinational relationships with coalition partners. Malacca Strait Security Initiative A growing number of Southeast Asian nations have formed a multilateral organization to develop and maintain a “comprehensive real-time regional sea situation picture” focused mainly on the Strait of Malacca and the Strait of Sin- 

APPENDIX D 197 gapore. Headquartered in Singapore, they have dealt with information gathering (and sharing) and the technologies required, the issues of interdiction, and the national laws needed to support the effort. Like JIATF-S, the Malacca Strait Security Initiative (MSSI) stands as a model for what can and should be done worldwide. The MSSI started with coordinated patrols by Singapore and Malaysia in 1992. It expanded to Indonesia (July 2004) and then Thailand (September 2005). As of September 2006, it had been expanded to eight countries (Cambodia, Japan, Laos, Singapore, Thailand, Philippines, Myanmar, and South Korea). Out of these efforts, a supporting information infrastructure has emerged. There is the Vessel Traffic Information System, which receives inputs from the closed circuit television surveillance system, AIS transponders, and the Singapore Port Traffic Management System. Since January 1, 2007, all licensed powered harbor and pleasure craft are required to have the Harbour Craft Transponder Sys- tem (HARTS), which feeds into the Port Operations Control Center. The Regional Maritime Information Exchange (ReMIX) is targeted at the WPNS Ops commu- nity. Information is exchanged on sea robberies and piracy incidents, missing or hijacked ships, vessels in distress, and other maritime incidents. It is an Internet, Web-browser-based platform. Access is via user ID and password. Once logged in, navies are free to upload or download any information they need. Information is shared with the Combined Enterprise Regional Information Exchange System (CENTRIXS), which operates in nearly 30 other countries throughout the world, including in the United States. Tsunami relief An example of a multilateral emergency response is the ad hoc organization that grew out of the end-of-2006 tsunami in the Indian Ocean. Because the Navy had assets in the general area it was able to move quickly into the affected area (including areas of Thailand and Indonesia). Initially, transportation into the area was by U.S. Navy helicopters, which delivered medical supplies, water, food, personnel, and so on. Quickly Australia, India, and a number of other countries responded and an ad hoc organization developed. In the organization that developed, Australia apparently volunteered to act as traffic cop to ensure the most effective allocation of available assets. One of the most important side benefits of the tsunami relief effort for the United States has been the increasingly favorable way that the United States is viewed by the citizens of the countries that were helped. That success resulted in the recent deployment of the USNS Comfort to the area. Participants include five countries and nongovernmental organizations. 

198 MARITIME SECURITY PARTNERSHIPS UNITAS United States–South American Allied Exercise (UNITAS) is a navy-to-navy (military-to-military)-generated exercise and training maritime program. This program started over 45 years ago as a bilateral engagement around the Caribbean and Latin America. The planning and engagement was at the direction of the U.S. Navy. As time passed the Marines and the USCG became regular participants, making this a truly maritime-centered event. At first, engagement consisted of Navy vessels making port calls, conducting onshore and underway training, and progressing from country to participating country. In the early 1990s, the orga- nization became more multilateral. It is no longer expected or required that the United States lead or even plan all of the events. For instance, the Colombian Navy could lead a multination maritime event. In the late 1990s, SOUTHCOM moved from Panama to Miami, Florida. The move included the setting up of a naval component for SOUTHCOM, and more structured and dedicated UNITAS engagements ensued. Engagements are now conducted regionally and are not necessarily run by the U.S. Navy, although they are planned by the U.S. naval component of SOUTHCOM. The long-term commitment of U.S. maritime forces to the program has led to increased international cooperation and understanding. The U.S. Navy recognized that some USCG and Marine Corps competencies are critical for an integrated engagement program. UNITAS operations are now bilaterally initiated but act multilaterally in specific geographic areas. RimPac Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC) is a bilaterally initiated training and exercise program in the Pacific, planned and led by the Navy. Countries are invited to participate off Pearl Harbor in multicountry task forces and exercises. Participa- tion varies but has included Japan, Korea, Taiwan, Australia, New Zealand, the Philippines, and others. It remains U.S.-led and planned but fosters close working relationships and mutual understanding. Cooperation and Afloat Readiness and Training Pacific bilateral exercises outside Hawaii are conducted with the maritime forces of Pacific countries. The Cooperation and Afloat Readiness and Training (CARAT) exercise series believes that it is making the “1,000-ship Navy” vision a reality. CARAT is now in its 13th year and has had partners such as Brunei, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand. It is a military-to-military, navy-to-navy engagement process. The 2007 exercise began in the Philippines   LT Ed Early, USN. 2007. “CNO’s Vision of 1,000-ship Navy Tested by CARAT Exercise,” Navy Newsstand, June 26. 

APPENDIX D 199 and ended in Thailand. While cooperation between the U.S. and host-nation ship and aircraft crews is crucial for CARAT, the exercise also involves Marine Corps and USCG personnel. The exercises are free-form. If a country wants to focus on maritime security, then that is what is done. Information sharing is a central premise of the 1,000-ship Navy, and in this exercise (CENTRIX) it is used extensively to communicate quickly and effectively at sea and ashore. Vietnam was an observer during two phases of the exercise and is expected to become a full member in the years ahead. The goal is to see CARAT become more multinational because transnational problems are multinational in nature. Container Security Initiative The Container Security Initiative (CSI) is a post-9/11, bilateral cooperative initiative that began with Canada, Singapore, and the Netherlands. The initiative stations U.S. Customs personnel overseas to help ensure that containers loaded in overseas ports and destined for the United States are not tampered with. Load- ing can mean two things: cargo loaded into a container while in a port or, more often, containers sent to a port for further transfer. U.S. Customs inspectors carry out, in cooperation with their host country counterparts, preloading inspections in the foreign port. The desire is for worldwide participation, resulting in more secure cargo shipment, reduced losses in the port, and increased integrity of the global supply chain. To date, 49 agreements have been entered into, with more anticipated in the future. Although the agreements are bilateral, when 49 countries are signatories the effect is a multilateral system of cargo security. Joint Interagency task force-South JIATF-S is an interesting hybrid organization. From the U.S. perspective it is a military command and a joint interagency task force that reports to SOUTH- COM. It has both homeland security and homeland defense responsibilities. This DOD command is uniquely led by a USCG officer, underlining the law enforce- ment nature of the command. It is staffed by all of the U.S. military services and many U.S. federal law enforcement agencies. It is also supported by a number of U.S. intelligence agencies. The mission is to counter illicit trafficking, to promote cooperation on secu- rity, and to coordinate country team and partner nation initiatives. Since 9/11, the scope of the mission has been expanded to include other security concerns. Drug traffickers are now categorized as narcoterrorists. JIATF-S is in reality a joint international interagency task force. Twelve countries have posted liaison officers to JIATF-S. Specific rules for information sharing protect sensitive and classified information. 

200 MARITIME SECURITY PARTNERSHIPS Bilateral agreements, ratified by the nations involved, now exist between numerous countries. These bilateral agreements were negotiated by DoS. Nego- tiation begins with an eight-part model counterdrug bilateral agreement. Most agreements differ one from the other because of the different viewpoints of the countries involved. These differences, combined with the particular require- ments for information and intelligence sharing, create a complicated operational response structure that over time has become very successful. In the aggre- gate, JIATF-S operates multilaterally as it prosecutes counternarcotics cases and searches across the different national capacities for the right tools to deal with specific incidents. The success of JIATF-S has increased steadily over time by strengthening intelligence and information gathering. At the same time the assets dedicated to the mission have steadily decreased. The single law-enforcement-centric mission made it easy for many nations to participate. The recent expansion of the mission scope of JIATF-S has raised concerns on the part of some partner nations, but to date has caused no adverse reaction. The significant trust that exists between partner nations did not occur overnight. Attention to national concerns and infor- mation sharing opened the doors to increased cooperation. Every contributor is a valued partner in the process, and information sharing is the goal.