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2 Maritime Security: Cooperation Modes and Models The maritime security partnerships (MSP) initiative seeks to develop coop- erative arrangements between countries that allow them to share data among themselves to improve the situational awareness of activities off the shores or borders of those nations. States can then decide to act independently or coopera- tively if they choose to address what they perceive as a threat to their security or the security of one or more of the other parties. The premise of the MSP initiative is that by improving its awareness of what is happening in maritime areas that could be of interest to it, a state directly improves its security and would therefore be willing to share similar data with those countries it perceives to have congruent interests. Relationship building and information sharing during normal times may also mean that in time of crisis, the state will be able to call upon individuals or information to address an emerg- ing problem. The ease and trust with which information or individuals can be accessed will be directly related to the success of their past relationship. NEED FOR INTERNATIONAL LEgAL FRAMEWORk The key to effective MSP is improved maritime domain awareness (MDA)1 among participating states, which—along with agreements to take coordinated, mutually supportive tactical actions—will enable them to address, individually or 1The Department of Homeland Security’s 2005 National Plan to achiee Maritime Domain aware- ness (Washington, D.C., October, p. 1) defines MDA as “the effective understanding of anything associated with the maritime domain that could impact the security, safety, economy, or environment of the United States.” 30

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31 MaRITIMe SeCURITY: COOPeRaTION MODeS aND MODeLS collectively, what might be called “existing gaps in global maritime governance.”2 The existence of such maritime governance gaps has been made painfully evident by patterns of activities or events at sea that raise serious and legitimate concerns on the part of directly affected states and the international community at large: armed attacks on shipping; acts of piracy and terrorism; maritime trafficking of weapons, people, and drugs; marine environmental pollution; and illegal, unre- ported fishing. These phenomena are readily attributable to the sheer vastness of ocean spaces, the huge number of vessels involved, the lack of transparency that characterizes the maritime industry as a whole, and the comparatively limited resources that individual states can bring to bear on these problems. In the final analysis, they all point to inadequate information and inadequate resources, with the former pointing to MDA as an indispensable enabler of maritime security. Efforts to bolster the acquisition, processing (analysis and fusion), and sharing/distribution of maritime information—in short MDA-related core activi- ties—have significant implications for the international legal system. Given the broad range of conceivably relevant MDA-supportive measures, from off-shor- ing of security measures at one end to the nonconsensual boarding of a foreign flag vessel at the other, the drive to improve MDA is likely to affect the existing balance of power between flag states on the one hand and coastal and port states on the other. This balance has found expression in an elaborate set of rules that today are reflected principally in the United Nations Convention on Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and customary international law and in some other maritime treaties. Success in garnering wide international support for the idea of MSP—a critical precondition if it is to be effective—will depend on the proponents’ abil- ity to demonstrate convincingly that the common interest of all states is being served by MSP. Success will similarly require an approach for lobbying other states, international organizations, and civil society in general—in short, a judi- cious choice of implementation strategies and tools. What is less appreciated, however, is that the willingness of states and other actors to endorse and actively participate in MSP will also depend on whether they perceive the arrangement to be internationally legitimate. Indeed, concerns about legitimacy may turn out to be the stumbling block to the realization of the global maritime security network. For MSP to succeed, states must either come to see the project as compatible with existing international legal frameworks and rules or, conversely, understand that MSP proponents are willing to seek the adjustment of applicable legal rules, if necessary, to accommodate MSP within the international legal structure. The cautious attitude of several key states to signing up for the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI)3 and similar attitudes expressed by representatives of the Indian 2 See Chapter 1. 3Thus far, several states whose support of MSP would be extremely important—for example, Chi- na, India, Indonesia, and Malaysia—have not joined PSI, and Russia’s participation is conditional.

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32 MaRITIMe SeCURITY PaRTNeRSHIPS and Chilean navies as well as the Royal Navy in briefings to the committee on the topic of MSP, show that without a solid international legal grounding MSP is unlikely to reach its full potential. More details of the international legal frame- work for MSP can be found in Appendix C. MODELS FOR MARITIME SECuRITy PARTNERSHIPS The United States and most other countries participate in numerous informa- tion-sharing arrangements with varying degrees of trust and kinds of information. Traditional military missions, particularly during the Cold War, relied heavily on institutionalized modes of cooperation under formal treaties against a back- ground of extensive operational activities and persistent arrangements. For the United States, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) is still the most successful model for cooperation among states. The reach of NATO in terms of cooperation, information sharing, and equipment standardization goes far beyond the formalities of the fairly standard NATO treaty. It has been enriched by more than 50 years of experience, negotiation, and trust building. Even in times of discord and disagreement, NATO maritime forces train and exercise together and, especially in the last decade, have engaged in the full range of joint operations, with assignments in the Persian Gulf, Bosnia, the Arabian Sea, along the East African coast, and now in support of Afghanistan, although not always as formal NATO missions. The regular sharing of intelligence and data from surveillance and reconnaissance surveys is the stuff of daily life for most navies, even those of the new members in central and eastern Europe. A less familiar model is the innovative but limited partnership developed by the United States and the Soviet Union/Russia in the heyday of strategic arms control. In narrow areas, information of strategic significance was defined, exchanged, and even jointly developed. An elaborate vocabulary of signals, for- mal and informal, emerged, along with specialized protocols and mechanisms (such as the Washington-Moscow hotline) for risk avoidance or crisis dampen- ing. Regular meetings and continuing negotiations raised the level of information exchange and even led to a sharing of terms of the trade in negotiation and recon- naissance. “Trust but verify” became not only a watchword but also a standard for the type of information sharing that took place between partner states that were never quite friends but not strictly adversaries. The Cold War models with traditional partners do not adapt easily to the requirements of cooperation with nontraditional partner states to address non- traditional maritime security threats such as terrorism, economic crimes, piracy, civil turbulence, or failing state governance. But the United States and a number of other countries have had a wealth of experience over the last two decades that suggests forms and procedures to be followed in developing and securing MSP.

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33 MaRITIMe SeCURITY: COOPeRaTION MODeS aND MODeLS PREREquISITES FOR MARITIME SECuRITy PARTNERSHIPS It is this committee’s observation that there is no one single model that must or should be used in forming MSP. Many potential nontraditional partners for maritime security facing new challenges do not need, nor could they operate, elaborate programs or mechanisms that conform to present NATO standards, for example. Rather, they need purpose-driven programs that help with maritime situational awareness and capacity building. The models that now exist in the maritime and other domains, such as the programs developed from 1994 to the present under NATO’s Partnership for Peace (PFP), provide a rich source of expe- rience and information. Fundamentally new models are emerging as well, such as the robust new Gulf of Guinea Initiative under Naval Forces-Europe and the multinational work in Joint Task Force-150 operating in the Arabian Sea. The technology needed to establish networks for information exchange with nontraditional partners is already widely available or relatively easily adaptable to existing equipment; no elaborate new system development seems required. The main constraints are (1) rather outdated domestic legislation on foreign informa- tion sharing and export control procedures in the United States; (2) inadequate domestic information sharing and program planning; and (3) the low priority accorded to the primarily nontraditional challenges of this century. The sum of these experiences persuaded the committee that three critical elements are needed to achieve local, regional, and global success in establishing new MSP or improving existing ones: 1. A cadre of trained, proactive specialists, military and civilian, who are able to operate linguistically and culturally in the region or in the U.S.-based planning and coordinating functions—as, for example, in the reestablished Navy foreign area officer (FAO) program or the FAO programs that already exist in the Army, the Air Force, and the Marine Corps (see below). 2. Secure, persistent funding that is adequate in the immediate future to support particular opportunities. For example, to secure the transition away from Soviet-era military training and equipping models in central and eastern Europe in the early 1990s, the United States increased funds under the PFP process and labeled its action the “Warsaw Initiative,” which then for more than a decade and a half supported expanded military-to-military exchanges and exercises among new NATO members and PFP candidates. 3. A robust coordinating authority, particularly at the highest levels of the U.S. government, that can arrange appropriate governance at all levels (see Chapter 4). It could bring disparate program elements in from across the different agencies and ensure a proactive, coordinated effort to overcome local challenges while also expanding planning and integrating domestic and international priori- ties (as, for example, the Container Security Initiative).

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34 MaRITIMe SeCURITY PaRTNeRSHIPS Several elements influence the form of prospective MSP agreements and the most appropriate time to get such cooperation agreements in place, including the following: • Leel of organizational coordination/contact. Is it high, medium, or low in the country’s hierarchy of information organizations? • Commitment to consult. Will the partners exchange information only in a defined situation? Will they do it sometimes or always? • Length of agreement or cooperation. Is it a one-time arrangement for a specified time or a permanent arrangement that needs to be formally canceled? • Scope. Are the partnerships local, regional, or global? • Military status. Are the participants military or nonmilitary or both? • Primary area of actiity. Is the purpose mainly traditional defense, law enforcement, humanitarian, or commercial? All these factors will impact the prospective scope and level of agreement. THE RANgE OF PRESENT MSP RELATIONSHIPS Figure 2.1 shows the range of agreements in which the United States and key maritime states currently participate. Most maritime partnerships are, as in the past, bilateral agreements, although many are nested within multilateral treaty frameworks to which the states already subscribe (see Appendix C). They are arrangements between two states that agree to provide each other informa- tion (a two-way exchange of information) for a specified purpose dictated in the agreement or treaty. The purpose can involve many different kinds of interaction, from a simple exchange of information or data to the other extreme, whereby one country would allow another country and its assets (say, vessels with embarked personnel) to enforce laws within its coastal waters. bilateral Relationships Table 2.1 lists what the committee considers some of the more interesting contemporary examples of bilateral relationships relevant to maritime security and characterizes them according to the factors just mentioned. These range from those that are at a fairly basic level of information sharing and interaction to those that involve a wide range of tactical operations and cooperation—as enhanced cooperation and intensive efforts to develop common or converging bases for joint action, perhaps encompassing intelligence, surveillance, or reconnaissance at the very highest ends. The process of developing relationships often starts with military-to-military contacts, which then lead to personal exchanges and contacts or a dialogue on a specific area of interest. In the Navy, it ranges from contacts between the Chief of

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35 MaRITIMe SeCURITY: COOPeRaTION MODeS aND MODeLS Basic Cooperative Relationship Relationship/Info Sharing Quadrant II Quadrant IV PSI Multilateral RIMPAC/UNITAS Interpol JTF-150 Tsunami relief Drift net fisheries Gulf Cooperation Council IMO-AIS/LRIT RFMOs Heads of Pacific Coast Guards Italy (NATO) Gulf of Guinea English Channel Singapore/Malaysia/Indonesia ASEAN Quadrant I Quadrant III Lloyd’s Bilateral USNS JIATF Comfort Container Security Selected shippers Maersk Pakistan earthquake Greek shipping companies Caribbean support tender FIGURE 2.1 Types of agreement. NOTE: Interpol, International Criminal Police Organiza- tion; RIMPAC/UNITAS, Rim of the Pacific/Annual U.S.–South American Allied Exercise; ASEAN, Association of Southeast Asian Nations; JTF, Joint Task Force; PSI, Prolifera- tion Security Initiative; IMO-AIS/LRIT, International Maritime Organization–Automatic Figure 2-1, editable, b&w Identification System/Long-Range Identification and Tracking; RFMO, Regional Fisheries Management Organization; USNS, U.S. naval ship; JIATF, Joint Interagency Task Force. R01141 Naval Operations (CNO) or the fleet commander and the foreign Navy or Marine Corps counterparts; other relationships develop through the networks established during joint exercises, training, and port visits. For the USCG, it might be the Pacific Area Commander reaching out to his international Coast Guard counter- parts on how to secure international trade lanes or it could begin like the work of the USCG with its Chinese counterparts in search and rescue exercises, securing trade lanes, and cooperating on maritime security and safety. Such contacts can result in the signing of bilateral or even multilateral agree- ments. The United States for most of its history but particularly of late prefers to enter into bilateral rather than multilateral agreements. The basic reason for this approach is that an arrangement reached by multilateral consensus often ends up too watered down to mean much. On the other hand, multiple country-to-country (bilateral) agreements may end up raising everyone’s boat in terms of the actions desired by an even larger group of potential partners. It would be useful here to review the many bilateral counterdrug agreements the United States has concluded with countries of the Caribbean basin under the Joint Interagency Task Force-South (JIATF-S) (see Appendix D for further details of this and other programs). The discussions, initiated by the U.S. State Depart- ment at the request of the USCG, all begin with the United States presenting a

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36 TABLE 2.1 Bilateral Relationships Law Enforcement, Commitment Defense, Level of to Length of Military or Humanitarian, Organization Consultation Cooperation Scope Nonmilitary Commercial USNS Comfort L S O G M H Container Security Initiative M A P G NM LE Pakistan earthquake relief L S O L M H Caribbean support tender L S S R M LE Lloyd’s of London H A P G NM C Joint Interagency Task Force-South H A P R NM LE Maersk M S S G NM C Greek shipping lines H A P G NM C NOTE: H/M/L, high, medium, low; O/S/A, onetime, sometimes, always; O/S/P, onetime, specific, permanent; L/R/G, local, regional, global; M/NM, military, nonmilitary; LE/DEF/H/C, law enforcement, defense, humanitarian, commercial; USNS, U.S. Naval Ship (civilian manned).

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37 MaRITIMe SeCURITY: COOPeRaTION MODeS aND MODeLS model eight-part bilateral agreement that lists the full suite of joint purposes for which information may be shared. Washington’s intention is for all agreements to look the same. In reality, very few are the same, because each country has differ- ent motivations and sovereignty concerns, at least in the initial phases. At some point, if bilateral accords are signed, as they were for the counterdrug efforts in the Caribbean, the desired end result is more nearly achieved with a multilateral agreement, which tries to accommodate all the divergent views. The Caribbean counterdrug efforts that are directed by JIATF-S in Key West, Florida, operate multilaterally yet take into account all the separate bilateral agreements. This approach engenders trust and cooperation while showing an appreciation for the uniqueness and domestic politics of each country. There is now a wealth of examples in which implementation was specifically assigned to the state that had not only the capabilities for action but also the right rules of engagement as set by its national authorities. Such activities, observed and acted on over a significant period of time, have increased cooperation, trust building, and information-sharing activities. Multilateral Relationships The second form of agreement is a multilateral one, which is a single agree- ment signed by multiple nations and involving mutual commitments among all the participants (see Table 2.2). Like bilateral agreements, multilateral agreements can entail a simple exchange of information or the use of force in a third nation’s territorial waters in defined situations. They may also be more intense, more specific forms of earlier, broader multilateral agreements that set looser standards for action and cooperation. International or global organizations that operate by treaty or convention represent a special, formal variant of multilateral agreements and most often impose not only a formal, global level of organization but also obligations, and they may convey rights under international law to all states and nongovernmental entities that participate. Examples of a range in duration and in formality of an organization are the multilateral agreements that set up Interpol, PSI, Joint Task Force (JTF)-150, and the International Maritime Organization (IMO), particu- larly its Automatic Identification System (AIS) and Long-Range Identification and Tracking (LRIT) system (see Figure 2.1). The last two agreements illustrate another critical function of international and multilateral organizations, the cre- ation of universal standards that all signatories are pledged to meet. In this case, to ensure maritime safety and security throughout the maritime commons, IMO signatories have agreed to accept the relevant International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS) amendments establishing standards for the collec- tion of identification data for large ships (300 GT and larger) wherever they are, accessible through an agreed mechanism and in standard format. The IMO is also

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3 TABLE 2.2 Multilateral Relationships Law Enforcement, Commitment Defense, Level of to Length of Military or Humanitarian, Organization Consultation Cooperation Scope Nonmilitary Commercial Interpol H A P G NM LE RIMPAC/UNITAS H S S R M DEF Tsunami relief L O O R NM H Gulf Cooperation Council M S P R M DEF Gulf of Guinea Initiative M/H S S R M LE Heads of Pacific Coast Guards M S S R NM LE Proliferation Security Initiative M S P G NM LE ASEAN M S P R NM LE Joint Task Force-150 H A S R M DEF Drift net fisheries M S P R NM LE IMO-AIS/LRIT H A P G NM LE RFMO L S S R NM LE Italy (NATO) M A S R M LE English Channel H A P R NM LE Singapore/Malaysia/Indonesia H A P R M LE NOTE: H/M/L, high, medium, low; O/S/A, onetime, sometimes, always; O/S/P, onetime, specific, permanent; L/R/G, local, regional, global; M/NM, military, nonmilitary; LE/DEF/H/C, law enforcement/defense/humanitarian/commercial; RIMPAC/UNITAS, Rim of the Pacific/Annual U.S.-South American Allied Exercise; ASEAN, Association of Southeast Asian Nations; IMO, International Maritime Organization; AIS/LRIT, Automatic Identification System/Long-Range Identification and Tracking; RFMO, Regional Fisheries Management Organization; NATO, North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

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39 MaRITIMe SeCURITY: COOPeRaTION MODeS aND MODeLS Bilateral Multilateral Bilateral Agreement Agreement Agreement Country Operating K Country Country Multilaterally F E Country J Country Country G Country N D Country Country A L Country Country H Country C M Country Country I B Multilateral Country O Agreement Country R Country Country P Q FIGURE 2.2 Agreement types. in the process of specifying a global system for the storage of the data collected Figure 2-2. editable, broadside, b&w and disseminated to states and interested parties according to specific rules and R01141 protocols under international law. Multilateral organizations might also spark the establishment of informal but widely accepted norms for behavior or standards for action. While such norms may not be accepted by all states and hardly can be said to have been established by formal agreement, bilaterally or multilaterally, they raise expectations about what should be done, expectations on the part of ordinary people or the media, and critical public and private actors if not always governments.4 Figure 2.2 shows that it is possible for bilateral and multilateral agreements to be in place with various countries at a given time. The relationships shown in color represent multilateral agreements, while bilateral agreements are shown by the solid black lines between the countries. Country N is depicted with a single multilateral agreement, and Country O is shown with multiple bilat- 4This accretion of legitimacy is thought by some to be the first step in the creation of what in- ternational relations specialists consider an informal regime, still not lawlike rules but a cluster of ideals and behavioral metrics. It parallels the way in which international prohibitions on the slave trade began or the growing expectation throughout much of Europe that individuals taken into police custody should be read their Miranda rights even though these rights formally apply only to U.S. citi- zens in U.S. jurisdictions. Analysts speculate that this reflects the constant invocation of this process in television programs and movies screened abroad.

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40 MaRITIMe SeCURITY PaRTNeRSHIPS eral agreements. Country A and Country L have both bilateral and multilateral agreements. The challenge of the multilateral agreement is getting all parties to agree on the similar terms and conditions—often an arduous process. The bilateral agree- ment is preferred because it expedites the approval process between the parties and puts in place a mechanism for beginning to cooperate. Indeed, for some pur- poses, throughout its history and certainly in the last 8 years, the United States has preferred the use of informal agreements. The important thing is to address the challenge and not get bogged down in a prolonged bureaucratic negotiation. The MSP initiative is as much about the network and services that maritime security agreements provide as it is about the trust and cooperation that are built through the networks. The network permits sharing of information under rules agreed to by the signatories. In the service-oriented architecture model, the parties agree to post MDA information based on their observations. Other countries can be authorized to receive this information and post their own data. As in NATO, these access rules need not be symmetrical or identical at the outset, although over time the arrangements tend to converge (as they did in the JIATF-S). As this process evolves and countries become comfortable with the interactions and data sharing, they begin to build trust and broaden or deepen cooperation and start to benefit from the mutual activities. The geographic Reach of MSP Many, including some recent participants, argue that the difficulty and delays in getting these agreements approved grows directly with the number of nations involved. Agreements and functional cooperation can be local, regional, or global, depending on the scale of the challenge and complexity of the approval process for the agreement. Local agreements in a small geographical area—say, agree- ments about illegal fishing or piracy or the mutual right to arrest citizens of either country who break safety or environmental laws in the territorial waters of either state—typically involve a law enforcement arrangement, usually within the maritime environments of two or three nation-states. Regional agreements involve neighboring states that come together to address a common problem. The Asso- ciation of Southeast Asian Nations, a relatively informal regional state-to-state network with growing cooperation on security, is a good example of this type of agreement. Finally, global agreements can involve nation partners, nongovern- mental associations (e.g., shippers’ associations), or commercial entities (e.g., Lloyd’s) in addressing global issues. All these types of partners participated, for example, in persuading the IMO to accept the AIS standards for tracking ships larger than 300 GT. Regional approaches seem to work best when interests are congruent and the stakes are clear or when legacy practices or habits of cooperation can be extended to support present agreements. Global effects are often desired and can

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41 MaRITIMe SeCURITY: COOPeRaTION MODeS aND MODeLS be articulated when one of the affected states is much stronger than the others. But for most maritime security purposes, the committee believes that all issues are local. In some cases, a relationship that is formed to address a specific immedi- ate issue starts out as an ad hoc relationship, but if it succeeds it may become a formal program. The U.S. government’s response to the tsunami in the Indian Ocean is an example of an urgent, ad hoc relationship formed to respond to the devastation. A task force was organized and moved to the area, where it engaged the affected governments—India, Indonesia, and Thailand—and provided what- ever relief it could. The end result was very positive, and the view of the United States was enhanced by the manner in which aid was provided. In Indonesia, for instance, only 30 percent of the population viewed the U.S. government favorably before the assistance was rendered. Afterward, a favorable impression was shared by 70 percent. Also, as a direct consequence, military-to-military contacts, which had been suspended, were resurrected and still continue. The United States had a similar experience when it assisted Pakistan after the earthquake in 2005. To sustain the favorable opinion, the U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM) has worked aggressively to further these nontraditional contacts involving maritime personnel. A 2007 event was the deployment under specific bilateral agreements of the USNS Comfort hospital ship to the region to provide humanitarian assis- tance. As a result, the U.S. Navy and DOD are poised to respond to international natural disasters around the world as a means to change impressions and develop enduring positive relationships. Special Cases Sometimes offers of cooperation have unintended consequences. The increased incidence of piracy in the Malacca Strait and its impact on interna- tional shipping flows and insurance led ADM Fargo, USN, PACOM commander, to propose that the U.S. Navy might help to patrol in the area. The governments of Singapore, Indonesia, and Malaysia agreed to undertake patrols and share information in order to secure the area and said that U.S. Navy patrols would not be needed or welcome. The trilateral Malaysia, Singapore, and Indonesia (MALSINDO) scheme has been successful and has added a fourth partner, Thai- land. It now shares information with PACOM and has multilateral ties with eight other partner states under the Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia (ReCAAP, signed in 2006). Some programs of cooperation do not succeed directly but set the stage for other programs later on, when political conditions have become more auspicious. The Navy’s Fleet Station concept, now being planned for the Gulf of Guinea, is rooted in an earlier cooperative approach in the Caribbean, the Caribbean support tender (CST). Under bilateral agreements and through the State Department, the USCG provided regional states with decommissioned vessels—specifically, 82-ft

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42 MaRITIMe SeCURITY PaRTNeRSHIPS patrol boats and buoy tenders. It soon became apparent that without assistance, these vessels would not be maintained and would not have the desired force multiplier effect. The USCG’s CST then became a circuit rider throughout the region, providing training and maintenance. A unique aspect of this program was the personal relationships that devel- oped among the international crew of approximately 50. The captain and a small cadre of officers and enlisted men were from the USCG, and the remaining crew comprised member country officers and enlisted men who sailed on the vessel for a year, returned to their own countries, and assumed positions of leadership. There was much competition to become assigned to this vessel. Cooperative relationships build on the power of examples and available mod- els. In the buildup to and during the initial phases of Operation Iraqi Freedom in 2002, the coalition partners saw the need to protect U.S. and coalition assets transiting the Strait of Gibraltar and set up a task force to do this. It patrolled under Operation Active Endeavor and is still functioning today. In operations, it is essentially the old STANAVFORMED (Standing Naval Force Mediterranean) and STANAVFORLANT (Standing Naval Force Atlantic) combined, taking on a specific mission rather than just a training exercise. Other countries have joined its patrols, including Russia. It has essentially operated in the western Mediter- ranean and was designed to intercept ships carrying materials for weapons of mass destruction and has queried thousands of ships for this purpose. However, the actual boardings have been to disrupt the north-south flow of illicit goods and people into southern Europe. FINDINgS AND RECOMMENDATIONS The Gulf of Guinea Initiative is probably the most interesting example of a combatant commander (COCOM)-driven program to broaden and thicken maritime security partnerships in the face of turbulent regional challenges (see Appendix D for specific details). One example (without U.S. participation) of making a relationship more effective is the multilateral organization that has developed in the Strait of Malacca and the Strait of Singapore. Maritime security for Singapore is all about national survival. As a consequence, Singapore has become proactive in policing the straits and other local waterways. Patrols with Indonesia were first initiated in 1992. In July 2004, the trilateral organization MALSINDO started the Malacca Strait Security Initiative (MSSI) patrols in the Strait of Malacca. In September 2005, the MSSI organization became quadrilateral when Thailand joined and the “Eyes in the Sky” program was begun with sensor-laden aircraft overflying the Strait of Malacca. Piracy has been significantly reduced. ReCAAP, an agreement that includes Cambodia, Japan, Laos, Singapore, Thailand, Philippines, Myan- mar, and South Korea, has been in force since September 2006.

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43 MaRITIMe SeCURITY: COOPeRaTION MODeS aND MODeLS Out of these efforts, a supporting information infrastructure has emerged: the Vessel Traffic Information System, which receives inputs from the closed- circuit television surveillance system; AIS transponders; and the Singapore Port Traffic Management System. Since January 1, 2007, all licensed powered harbor and pleasure craft are required to have the Harbour Craft Transponder System (HARTS), which feeds into the Port Operations Control Center. The Regional Maritime Information Exchange (ReMIX) is targeted at the Western Pacific Naval Symposium (WPNS) operations community. Information is exchanged on rob- beries at sea, piracy incidents, missing or hijacked ships, vessels in distress, and other maritime events. ReMIX is a Web-based platform, accessible by password. Once logged in, navies are free to upload and download information as they need. Information is shared with the Combined Enterprise Regional Information Exchange System (CENTRIXS), made up of nearly 30 countries throughout the world, including the United States. The Singapore Navy’s Access System is a portable command and control (C2) system that allows sharing a sea situation picture among the various nations. It uses the commercial-satellite-based Global Positioning System and proprietary C2 software for the automatic tracking of targets. It has a chat-and-file transfer facility for target management. The Singapore data-sharing structure, in partner- ship with PACOM, is shown in Figure 2.3. Data from U.S. PACOM other sources Comprehensive real -time regional sea situation picture Data from civilian C2 Centre sources (Singapore) Military data Information sharing Transponder with data (ASCS) regional nations FIGURE 2.3 Singapore’s organization for information sharing. SOURCE: COL James Soon, Republic of Singapore Navy,editable,Defence Technology Office, Embassy of Sin- Figure 2-3, Head, b&w, broadside R01141 gapore, “The 1,000-Ship Navy: A Perspective from Singapore,” presentation to the com- mittee, Washington, D.C., March 14, 2007. NOTE: U.S. PACOM, U.S. Pacific Command; C2, command and control; ASCS, Acoustic Sediment Classification System.

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44 MaRITIMe SeCURITY PaRTNeRSHIPS Finding: Most information-sharing relationships start out as an individual bilat- eral agreement between the United States and one other country. The greatest gains in the intermediate term come from expanding bilateral relationships and agreements. In many cases, the base on which to build will be military-to-mili- tary relationships that can be expanded to include other groups—military and civilian, government and nongovernment—that are important to the maritime security task. Recommendation 1: The Chief of Naval Operations, working with the combat- ant commanders, the Commandant of the Coast Guard, and the Commandant of the Marine Corps5 should commit to transforming bilateral relationships into broader, more substantiative and inclusive maritime security partnerships by some or all of the following means: • Forward presence; • Increased language and cultural awareness; • Expeditionary training teams; • Ongoing analysis of gaps in capacity with plans for follow-up capacity- building steps; • Tools and resources appropriate for the particular geography of an area— for example, shallow draft vessels such as the HSV-2 Swift rather than larger and deeper draft combat vessels; • Maritime domain awareness—information-sharing systems that will even- tually be expandable to include both unclassified and classified information; and • Funding for Phase Zero.6 Two quite different examples show the way in which national legislation can be put to use: • The Singapore example. In 2003, the Singapore parliament adopted leg- islation designed to keep out of terrorist hands materials that could be used for making WMD devices. The Strategic Goods (Control) Act gives the government more legal muscle to track strategic goods—about 600 controlled items, includ- ing munitions and materials with civilian and military uses. Singapore is the first 5The identification of specific officers and offices in the government with specific recommended actions is intended to reflect those most closely aligned in terms of the existing structures of organi- zational responsibilities. 6The traditional four phases of a military campaign identified in joint publications are deter/engage, seize initiative, decisive operations, and transition. Phase Zero encompasses all activities before the beginning of Phase I—that is, everything that can be done to prevent conflicts from developing in the first place.

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45 MaRITIMe SeCURITY: COOPeRaTION MODeS aND MODeLS Southeast Asian country to have laws aimed at controlling the movement of such goods. • The Proliferation Security Initiatie example. PSI, established in 2003 in response to fears about the spread of WMD, represents a mixed form of intensive multilateral and bilateral information sharing. According to the Bush administra- tion, it is not an organization or a treaty framework but an “activity.” PSI is a set of interlocking bilateral and multilateral agreements among a group of almost 20 core supporters, associated with a set of declarations of support, many done secretly, by a larger group of more than 80 states.7 The core supporters have subscribed to a Statement of PSI Principles, which includes a commitment to improve constraints at borders, ports, in the air, on land, and at sea by exploiting existing and new national legislation, as well as a commitment to consult and an implied willingness to take action if there is credible evidence of incidents in their sovereign territories. There have been a number of largely unpublicized actions under PSI, perhaps as many as 30 interdictions, including a few boardings at sea, in the past 4 years. A number of key countries (India, China, Indonesia, and South Korea) remain outside PSI, while Russia supports only the general concept of PSI activities. PSI has been reinforced by a number of bilateral arrangements on specific issues. The United States, for example, has concluded agreements with seven flag states supporting and specifying the conditions for a U.S. right to board after a formal request has been made to board ships on the high seas suspected of car- rying components for WMD. The ships of these seven states taken together with those of the PSI core states themselves account for more than 70 percent of the world’s commercial fleets. PSI is also in congruence with (although deliberately not referenced by) two broad United Nations Security Council resolutions, 1540 (against nuclear terrorism and proliferation) and 1718 (action against nuclear developments in North Korea). It also will gain status if support grows for rel- evant amendments to the IMO Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation. Finding: With each of the participants of the existing maritime security partner- ships, there appear to be sufficient national and international legal frameworks to support the maintenance and the extension of maritime security initiatives. Exercises and exchanges are fundamental vehicles of trust building that lead to nation-to-nation cooperation. Information sharing can be facilitated through combatant commander (COCOM) maritime operations centers or headquarters to develop awareness and to develop relationships with partner nations. Training for cooperation lends itself readily to gaming as an effective vehicle. Face-to-face 7 See the list of PSI participants at the Web site of the Bureau of International Security and Non-Pro- liferation, available at . Accessed on September 25, 2008.

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46 MaRITIMe SeCURITY PaRTNeRSHIPS gaming with foreign partners will address the issues of cooperation before being forced to play in real time. The instruments of operational cooperation range from equipment and sys- tems to training of both U.S. and partner nation personnel in the COCOM’s area of responsibility. Clearly, having the equipment and software systems both to interface with an information-sharing database and/or to feed the database is critical for all partners. Integral to this (as noted above) is the development of data standards for sharing. Specific intensive course material and tactical gaming experience will have to become part of the curricula at all the Navy’s professional schools—the Naval Academy, the Naval Postgraduate School, and the Naval War College, paralleled by similar actions at the USCG and Marine Corps professional schools. Emphasis should be placed on the opportunities and instruments that exist to develop and implement these partnerships and on the interagency opportunities and compe- tencies. Consistent with the 2006 and 2007 decisions of the CNO on language and cultural enrichment education initiatives, these opportunities include those military officers now assigned to specialize in specific regions and languages. 8 The core curriculum will aim to build a network of experts across the fed- eral agencies and across the public-commercial divide who know and trust one another and who will have expectations about joint programs and cooperation. It will legitimize maritime security as a professional specialty, a military occupation specialty (MOS) that will give new prominence to the MSP concept. While the relevant agencies are present to some degree within the military educational system, they are not always present in large numbers. MSP training will have to draw not only on the talents that exist at the Department of State but also on those that exist at the Departments of Commerce, Justice (specifically the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA)), Transportation, Treasury, and Homeland Security. It will also need the strengths of the Navy’s newly reestablished for- eign area officer (FAO) program, parallel efforts within the Marine Corps, and a specialized program that the USCG should establish. An effort should be made to increase the number of those attending from each agency to between three and five per maritime professional school and to designate those with special skills as maritime security partnership scholars. Recognition for individuals who attend and go on to a successful career will be a sure indicator of the long-lasting relevance of this activity. A smaller number of emerging civilian and military leaders should be selected to take part in a shorter training course specifically designed to foster networks and develop capacity across the interagency core involved in MSP. Lasting 3 to 6 months, with downstream refresher courses available onsite or electronically, 8The National Research Council’s Naval Studies Board has just conducted a study of the manpower and personnel needs for a transformed naval force (see National Research Council, 2008, Manpower and Personnel Needs for a Transformed Naal force, The National Academies Press, Washington, D.C.).

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47 MaRITIMe SeCURITY: COOPeRaTION MODeS aND MODeLS the curriculum should be designed for managers and implementers of maritime security partnerships, coming primarily from within the government but also from shippers and other relevant commercial companies. Finding: The continued training of U.S. and partner nation personnel in a mari- time security partnership is critical to long-term success and to building the rela- tionships and trust that eventually result in the establishment of maritime security partnerships with as many countries as possible. MSP requires the ongoing development of a cadre of military and civilian personnel to widen the scope of cooperation both within and external to the military. This will require training in maritime cooperation and an appreciation for the relevant competencies across the broader government and private sectors. Such appreciation for the capabilities of other agencies needs to become a core leadership quality, creating a diversified atmosphere that results in a multiplier effect in these nontraditional areas of military concern. Recommendation 2: To educate and train U.S. and partner nation personnel so that they can support and extend maritime security partnerships, the Chief of Naval Operations should: • With the active support of the leaders of the Marine Corps and the Coast Guard, ask the combatant commanders to support and extend maritime security partnerships through continued and even expanded formal educational and bilat- eral/multilateral training exercises for these personnel; • Require that maritime security training become a significant part of the core curriculum at every level of professional education for maritime service; • Adopt as a critical long-term goal the broadening of participation in mari- time professional education to ensure representation from all of the relevant U.S. civilian and military agencies; • Cooperate with the Secretary of the Navy and join in the present Coast Guard plan under the Department of Homeland Security to design and fund an institute of maritime studies that would encompass specialized studies in mari- time security within the framework of an existing university program. Critical for the longer-term ability of the CNO to implement MSP will be the establishment within the maritime services of a clear professional career track for officers and civilian officials with wide-reaching international expertise and experience. Appropriate models are the FAO programs of the Army and, to a lesser extent, the Air Force and the Marine Corps. FAOs are individuals who select this as a military specialization early in their careers and train intensively in the cultural and linguistic skills needed for particular regions (e.g., East Asia) and/or functions (e.g., arms control monitor- ing and implementation). Later assignments, which may last longer (e.g., 4 to 6

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4 MaRITIMe SeCURITY PaRTNeRSHIPS years) than a normal tour of duty, may include assignment in an embassy, at a regional command, or as an in-country advisor to partner militaries. Most Army officers in these specialties accept as a consequence somewhat diminished career prospects (e.g., fewer opportunities for promotion to general officer), but a num- ber have indeed gone on to flag rank by combining their capabilities. Active CNO support for these programs will have a number of advantages, even though it may take 5 to 7 years to grow an initial group of Navy FAOs. These advantages would include not only career stability and enhancement and prospects of promotion but also official recognition of the value of their special- ization and their particular contribution to the long-term maritime security of the United States and its partners. This could be particularly true for the Navy FAO specialization, which was introduced twice but failed to find a niche in the Navy’s professional structure like that which it enjoys within the Army structure. Until a maritime FAO cadre can be trained (this committee estimates that it will take at least 5 years), the CNO’s mandate will have to rely on a “purple” or joint manpower approach (i.e., a resort to resources from the long-established Army FAO program). It might also draw on enlisted personnel with appropriate linguistic backgrounds, identified under the CNO’s 2006 and 2007 directives on the identification of all Navy personnel with special language abilities and cultural awareness. Gaps could also be filled by civilian employees or contract personnel, who could provide the needed services at regional commands as well as at home. Finding: There appears to be a shortage of qualified FAOs within the U.S. naval services. Such FAOs could provide invaluable aid in developing the capabilities of regional maritime security forces that would allow them to move their countries toward participation in regional and, later, global maritime information sharing. Recommendation 3: The Chief of Naval Operations should mandate the expan- sion of a robust foreign area officer (FAO) program within the Navy to meet the needs of staffing and expanding maritime security partnerships. In addition, the Commandant of the Coast Guard should establish an FAO program and the Com- mandant of the Marine Corps should expand its present limited FAO program for the development of bilateral and multilateral relationships. The law enforcement authority and legal skills that would be needed to carry out countersmuggling and counterterrorist activities in coastal waters do not usu- ally exist aboard naval vessels. Naval vessels engaged in counter-drug-smuggling missions carry USCG law enforcement detachments (LEDETs) that actually board intercepted vessels that are suspected of smuggling drugs and, if needed, arrest their crews. Using personnel from the Naval Criminal Investigative Service (NCIS) or other law enforcement personnel could be equally effective, but addi- tional training and equipment might be needed to gain ship boarding capabilities as well as to clarify the legal authorization.

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49 MaRITIMe SeCURITY: COOPeRaTION MODeS aND MODeLS If a LEDET is to be carried aboard a deployed naval vessel, that vessel in effect carries the full spectrum of U.S. maritime law enforcement and DOD authority. The present Maritime Operational Threat Response process can be used to determine under which authority an action is to take place. This addi- tional onboard capability would give the U.S. government and, by extension, the COCOMs full-spectrum response capability. The USCG would need additional personnel and resources to carry out this additional tasking (these numbers might be available). At a later stage, the goal is to expand the onboard representation in law enforcement detachments to include selected interagency personnel on an ad hoc basis. Finding: The inclusion of U.S. Coast Guard personnel, the Naval Criminal Inves- tigative Service, or other law enforcement detachments or personnel on selected U.S. Navy ships could extend U.S. capabilities to respond to suspected smuggling or terrorist activities. Recommendation 4: The Chief of Naval Operations should ask the Coast Guard, the Naval Criminal Investigative Service, or another law enforcement entity to provide legal personnel for selected U.S. Navy ships. In order to realize theater engagement or Navy MSP goals, the USCG could be asked to forward-deploy additional vessels to specific areas of the world. These vessels would work for the COCOMs on missions accepted by the USCG. For instance, low-end USCG vessels might be the appropriate maritime component command for a military operation. The USCG’s “sovereignty expertise” might be the right answer for the Navy/COCOM, allowing them to gain access that they could not otherwise obtain. Such actions could pave the way for greater trust and cooperation between countries, including between their military counterparts. This activity and the associated program would affirm the concept of the USCG/Navy National Fleet. The USCG would need to be funded and staffed appropriately to take on this additional mission responsibility. A recent example was the use of a USCG cutter in the Gulf of Guinea. Likewise, USCG ships par- ticipated in PACOM activities on the Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC) and deploy- ments to Joint Task Force-150. Each year, COCOM requests for USCG vessels and training teams far outstrip the capacity of the USCG. In the Gulf of Guinea deployment, for instance, using low-end USCG vessels and the mission control center for a military operation was appropriate for the situation. It is the USCG sovereignty expertise, mentioned above, that many countries seek and that in turn give the Navy/COCOM access that would not otherwise be possible. Such actions can pave the way for greater trust and cooperation between one country and another and between their military counterparts. This would be true for all other USCG training teams that might be funded and made available to carry out specific missions.

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50 MaRITIMe SeCURITY PaRTNeRSHIPS Finding: The forward deployment of U.S. Coast Guard vessels can enhance and strengthen the engagement activities and thus increase the number of partnerships. Recommendation 5: The Chief of Naval Operations should ask the Commandant of the Coast Guard to forward-deploy Coast Guard cutters to locations that offer opportunities for the joint enforcement of maritime security. These cutters would help to attain Navy and combatant commander engagement goals and would be the correct security assets to employ to meet theater cooperation goals. Relatively speaking, the total effort required to expand the scope and depth of MSP is not large. Indeed, some of the overall funding can come from direct or in-kind contributions of the strategic partners themselves. MSP are based on the win-win concept—that is, they are of benefit both to relationships and to the flows of activity and information that sustain them. But at least for the initial period, the 1,000-ship Navy concept requires the Office of Management and Budget to scrutinize Navy programs and budgets not only to identify programs but also to include the funding needed for implementation of the MSP. Finding: Secure, continuing funding is a key ingredient for sustaining and deep- ening maritime security partnerships. Recommendation 6: To sustain and deepen maritime security partnerships (MSP) and to make such programs robust and stable, the Chief of Naval Opera- tions should: • Establish and assign to a specific office the coordination authority for pro- grams and budgets for MSP in the Navy, throughout the Department of Defense (DOD), and across the federal agencies. This should include enhanced opportu- nities for professional education and for the necessary equipment and support services; • Request that the Defense Security Cooperation Agency work with the State Department to significantly enhance the portfolio of international military education and training funds (e.g., those under Sections 1206 and 1208 of the National Defense Authorization Act of 2006, and COCOM Initiative Funds) for countries deemed key for MSP development. This activity—the implementation of a network of MSP—should also set a high priority on the institutionalization of an international legal training program; • Task the Navy’s International Programs Office to place high priority on funding the transfer of equipment, software, and services to support and intensify existing MSP and to develop new bilateral and multilateral MSP; • Together with the appropriate officials at the State Department and other agency partners in MSP, request more funds for use by the maritime services, the State Department, and other relevant government agencies for training and

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51 MaRITIMe SeCURITY: COOPeRaTION MODeS aND MODeLS support of MSP initiatives or for activities at the International Maritime Organiza- tion and other relevant international organizations and multilateral frameworks to maintain and expand information-sharing programs and protocols; • Propose to the appropriate parts of DOD the setting aside of a portion of research, development, test, and evaluation funds over the next 5 years to be committed under the Office of Manpower and Personnel guidance to the specific goal of improving technologies and techniques for easy, reliable information sharing and the continuous availability of common maritime operational pictures on as broad a basis as possible. These would subsume but go beyond the already programmed funding for MDA only that is now appropriated to the Office of Naval Research (see Chapter 3).