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Biographical Memoirs: Volume 89
Photograph by J. D. Sloan.
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Biographical Memoirs: Volume 89
KENNETH LOCKE HALE
August 15, 1934-October 8, 2001
BY MORRIS HALLE AND NORVIN RICHARDS
KEN HALE WAS A DESCENDANT of Roger Williams, the founder of Rhode Island, whose political and religious views led to his banishment from Massachusetts by order of the General Court of the Colony. Williams made special efforts to be on good terms with the indigenous Indians, and his 1643 book Key into the language of America is one of the earliest studies in English of a Native American language. Hale felt great affinity for his seventeenth-century ancestor, not only for the latter’s interests in the language and culture of the indigenous population among whom he had come to live, but also for his radical political views.
Hale was six years old when his father, who had been a banker in Chicago, changed careers and became a rancher in Arizona. Growing up on the family ranch, Hale came in contact with speakers of Native American languages and discovered that he had an extraordinary talent for acquiring languages quickly and thoroughly, a talent that he was fortunate to retain throughout his life.
Hale did his undergraduate work in anthropology at the University of Arizona in Tucson. For graduate study he transferred to Indiana, where he worked with C. F. Voegelin, who had been an associate of Edward Sapir (NAS 1934).
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Hale obtained his PhD in 1959 at Indiana University with a thesis A Papago Grammar. He then spent two years doing fieldwork in Australia, during which time he collected the basic linguistic data (morphology and core vocabulary) of around 70 languages and made a more intensive study of many of these. Hale’s field notes and records of those years have served as the raw material for linguistic research at all levels, from numerous Master’s and PhD theses written by students at universities in Australia and the US to the most advanced research currently underway.
Upon his return from Australia Hale taught at the University of Illinois at Urbana and at his alma mater, the University of Arizona. It was at this time (in the 1960s) that Hale became an active contributor to the work in transformational and generative linguistics that had been initiated by Noam Chomsky (NAS 1972) at MIT. This, in turn, led to his appointment in 1966 to the linguistics faculty at MIT, where he remained to the end of his life.
Hale was sensitive to the unequal relationship that often obtains between researchers, who usually have enormous material resources at their command, and the individuals whose languages are being studied, who often are barely surviving on the margins of our modern world. He was deeply concerned about “the sheer lethal incompatibility between the dominant Anglo-Saxon people’s empire and an Aboriginal society of almost inconceivable antiquity,”1 and he made major efforts to provide tangible benefits to the groups whose languages he was studying. In Australia, in Nicaragua, and particularly in the American Southwest, he was instrumental in starting programs in elementary education in several local languages. He tried in a great many instances to provide training to individuals from the groups whose languages he was studying, including admission to graduate programs in linguistics with financial support.
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These efforts, alas, were less successful than Hale had hoped. Mainly as a result of political changes over the last quarter century, many of the educational programs Hale established lost financial support and had to be abandoned after a few short years, well before they could have worked their planned effects. These setbacks did not discourage Hale. They only clarified for him the great difficulty of the task, which he hoped would never be abandoned but would be continued by subsequent generations of linguists.
An essential part of the research in linguistics consists of the collection of appropriate data. In many cases this involves extensive one-to-one contact with a speaker of a particular language. This is especially true of languages without copius written records, where fieldwork with native speakers is the only means of gathering necessary data. Hale was justly famous among linguists as a superb collector of linguistic data.
However, data collection was never the primary goal of his work. For Hale, as for many modern linguists, the central aim of linguistics was the elucidation of the mental capacities of humans by virtue of which they are able to learn to produce and understand utterances in one (or more) languages. Like any other science, linguistics aims to go beyond the recording of facts to the discovery of the principles that govern these facts. One important result of the work of the last half century is the conclusion that the grammars of languages do not vary virtually without limit, as had been widely assumed; rather, the cross-linguistic differences that we find are all variations on a theme, with a common core of linguistic properties that appear to be universal in human language. On one widely held view (subscribed to by Hale and the authors), this linguistic uniformity is due to the fact that the computations involved in putting words together into sentences employ neurophysi-
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ological machinery that is uniform in the human species. It is this machinery, sometimes called Universal Grammar,2 that allows humans, but not chimpanzees, to learn English, or Warlpiri, or any other language, and it is due to the nature of this machinery in homo sapiens that human languages have certain properties and lack others. On this view, the subject matter of linguistics is the nature of the human mind, of this neurophysiological machinery which is part of what makes us human, as revealed in the patterns of the languages of the world. This approach to human language began with Noam Chomsky’s pioneering work in the 50’s, and has driven several decades of fruitful work in linguistics—work to which Ken Hale made profound and varied contributions.
Partly because of his talent as a polyglot, Hale was able to shed light on these profound questions of human nature by drawing on data from a phenomenal number of languages from all over the world. In addition to studies of the native languages of Australia and the American Southwest (especially Navajo, Hopi, and Tohono O’odham [formerly called Papago]), Hale’s bibliography includes papers on two native languages of Nicaragua (Ulwa and Miskitu), on Irish, on Igbo, on Dagur (a language of Mongolia), on Hocąk (Winnebago), on K’ichee’ Mayan, and on numerous others. In what follows we have tried to present one of Hale’s many contributions to linguistic theory in a manner accessible to readers without extensive familiarity with the technical literature. We must emphasize that Hale’s contributions were so profound and far-reaching that we can discuss only a small fraction of them. We have picked a particular area in which he was active, and will go into this area in some detail, merely as an illustration of the impact of his work. It is our hope that the following pages provide those who have never been exposed to modern linguistics with
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some insight into the problems and a few of the results of this area of scientific inquiry.
ONE OF HALE’S QUESTIONS: ARGUMENT STRUCTURE
A recurring theme in Hale’s long and fruitful research career had to do with the nature of what linguists refer to as argument structure. This is the power of certain kinds of words (for example, verbs) to determine certain other aspects of the structure of the clause. Traditional grammar recognizes, for instance, that verbs may be transitive or intransitive, requiring or forbidding the presence of a direct object (here and below, examples marked with an asterisk, like (1b) and (2b), represent inadmissible sequences of words):
(1)
a.
The dragon devoured the villagers.
b.*
The dragon devoured.
(2)
a.
The knight fainted.
b.*
The knight fainted the danger.
Transitive verbs like devour require a direct object, while intransitive verbs like faint cannot occur with an object. In some cases, the demands imposed on the structure by the verb may be more elaborate than this; verbs like put, for example, require the presence not only of a direct object but of a locative prepositional phrase as well, as (3) shows:
(3)
a.
The dragon put the villager upon the plate.
b.*
The dragon put the villager.
c.*
The dragon put upon the plate.
In all of these examples, the argument structure is determined by the verb. Once the role of verbs in determining argument structure is recognized, a host of questions arises. What kinds of verbs can there be? We have seen
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above that verbs like devour require direct objects, and verbs like put require locative prepositional phrases as well as direct objects. Are there any limits on the kinds or numbers of things that verbs can require? Must the properties of argument structure be restated for each language, or are there principles that hold universally?
One of the important results of the work of the last half century is that the properties of argument structure across languages do not simply vary without limit, but are narrowly constrained by general principles of Universal Grammar. This is particularly interesting, since argument structure interacts with an aspect of linguistic knowledge that is plainly not universal, namely the properties of the individual words of the language. Part of the task of a child learning her first language is to learn the vocabulary. But, what does “learning the vocabulary” entail? At a minimum, a child learning English must learn, for example, that the word pronounced faint can be a verb with a particular meaning (something like “lose consciousness”). Here Universal Grammar is clearly of no help, as the pairing of sound and meaning is arbitrary; no universal principles predict that the word with this pronunciation ought to have this meaning rather than a different one. As (2) shows, any English speaker also knows at least one other fact about faint, namely that it is intransitive (that is, that it cannot have a direct object). Is this an independent fact that must be separately learned? Or does it follow from other properties of the verb’s meaning? This puzzle is one of many to which Hale contributed answers.
Let us consider the nature of transitivity somewhat more closely. There are verbs in English that differ from the ones considered above in that they can appear either with or without an object (that is, they may be either transitive or intransitive):
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(4)
a.
The ice melted.
[intransitive]
b.
I melted the ice.
[transitive]
(5)
a.
The pot broke.
[intransitive]
b.
I broke the pot.
[transitive]
By contrast, the intransitive verbs in (6-7) lack transitive counterparts:
(6)
a.
The baby laughed.
[intransitive]
b.
*I laughed the baby.
[transitive]
(7)
a.
The engine coughed.
[intransitive]
b.
*I coughed the engine.
[transitive]
With respect to their argument structure, verbs fall into at least three classes: transitive (1), intransitive (6-7), and alternating (4-5). Argument structure is one of many complex aspects of language that we use instinctively. English speakers do not make mistakes about the facts in (1-7); English classes in high school do not dwell on them, and they are not discussed in popular newspaper columns about language. Because our mastery of these facts is so effortless, it is easy to assume that the explanation for these facts must be straightforward. We might think, for instance, that (6b) and (7b) are impossible because the sentences in question are meaningless.
But the problem with (6b) and (7b) is not a straightforward semantic one. It is easy to imagine what a sentence like (6b) could mean if it were grammatical (something like “I caused the baby to laugh,” just as (4a) roughly means “I caused the ice to melt”). (6b) cannot mean this, however; such meanings must be expressed via more complex
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syntactic structures involving multiple verbs, like the ones in (8):
(8)
a.
I made the baby laugh.
b.
I made the engine cough.
Moreover, as Hale never failed to note, these are not parochial facts about English. Navajo, for instance, has a class of intransitive verbs that add a prefix ł to form their transitive versions:
(9)
a.
Tin
ice 3 melt.PERF
‘The ice melted’
b.
Yas
snow 3.1s ł melt.PERF
‘I melted the snow’
(10)
a.
Tóshjeeh si-ts’il
barrel 3 shatter.PERF
‘The barrel shattered’
b.
Łeets’aa’ sé-ł -ts’il
dish 3.1s ł shatter.PERF
‘I shattered the dish’
With another class of verbs, the transitive cannot be formed so simply; this latter class includes Navajo verbs like the ones meaning laugh and cough. With these verbs, more complex structures, roughly analogous to the English ones in (8), must be used to express causation of the event.
We find a very similar situation in Miskitu, a Misumalpan language of eastern Nicaragua and Honduras on which Hale did extensive work. In this language, there is a class of verbs that may appear in either transitive or intransitive forms (with the difference indicated by a suffix); these include the verbs for melt (transitive slil-k, intransitive slil-w)
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and break (transitive kri-k, intransitive kri-w). And, again, just as in English and Navajo, there are verbs that may only be intransitive, including the verbs for laugh (kik) and cough (kuhb).
In all three of these unrelated languages, then, some intransitive verbs may be made transitive, while others may not. Moreover, the particular verbs that fall into these classes are startlingly similar across languages, as we see in the charts below:
(11) VERBS THAT CAN BE TRANSITIVIZED
English
Miskitu
Navajo
intransitive
transitive
intransitive
transitive
boil
pya-w-
pya-k-
-béézh
-ł-béézh
break
kri-w-
kri-k-
-ii-dłaad
-ii-ł-dlaad
crack
bai-w-
bai-k-
-ii-ts’il
-ii-ł-ts’ił
dry (up)
lâ-w-
lâ-k-
-gan
-ł-gan
fill
bangh-w-
bangh-k-
ha-di-bin
float
â-w-
â-k-
di-’eeł
di-ł-’eel
melt
slil-w-
slil-k-
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(12) VERBS THAT CANNOT BE TRANSITIVIZED
English
Miskitu
Navajo
cry
in-
-cha
cough
kuhb-
di-l-kos
laugh
kik-
ghi-dloh
play
pul-
na-né
shout
win-
di-l-ghosh
sing
aiwan-
ho-taał
sleep
yap-
i-ł-ghosh
snore
krat-w-
As the charts show, all three of these unrelated languages have transitivity alternations in their words for boil, break, crack, dry up, fill, float, and melt, while all of them lack transitivity alternations of the same type in their words for cry, cough, laugh, play, shout, sing, sleep, and snore. As we saw in (8) above, the problem is not a straightforward semantic one, since it is clear what the transitive versions of these latter verbs would mean—yet the fact is that they cannot be made to mean this.
We are confronted, then, with a question: what constrains the ability of verbs to alternate between transitive and intransitive versions? We have seen that the answer to this question cannot be based on facts that are peculiar to English; what is needed is a theory that predicts that a verb that means cough, whatever language it finds itself in, will be unable to take a direct object, while a verb that means float will be able to do so.
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offer windows onto different parts of a single puzzle, namely the nature of the human language faculty.
We must be careful not to overlook differences among languages when they do arise, and the reader may be concerned that we have been too quick to conclude that English and Basque have deep syntactic properties in common. In fact, the behavior of resultatives offers a new kind of argument for the conclusion that in English, as in Basque, some apparently intransitive verbs are underlyingly transitive. If we consider the behavior of resultatives in intransitive sentences, we find two major types. For one type, resultatives cannot appear at all:
(36)
a.*
I laughed hoarse.
b.*
She coughed dizzy.
These sentences do not have resultative readings; for instance, (36a) cannot mean that I laughed until I became hoarse. For a second class of intransitive verbs, the resultative denotes the end state of the subject:
(37)
a.
The vase broke into smithereens.
b.
The butter melted into a puddle.
These are the two classes of intransitive verbs that Hale and Keyser are concerned with; verbs like laugh and spit underlyingly have direct objects that ultimately become part of the verb, while verbs like break and melt have direct objects which change into subjects. The facts in (36-37) follow, and are instances of the condition in (35). In (36), the resultative attempts to modify the subject, in violation of (35). In (37), by contrast, (35) is satisfied because the subjects to which the resultatives apply are underlying objects. We may state (35) more precisely as (38):
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(38)
A resultative denotes the end state of the underlying object.
To summarize, then, Hale and Keyser posit three major types of verbs. Ordinary transitive verbs have both a subject and an object:
(39)
In addition, we find two categories of verbs that appear to be intransitive in English. Hale and Keyser posit one set of verbs (including laugh and spit) that are underlyingly transitive with a ‘light’ verb that contributes little to the meaning of the clause. For these verbs, the underlying object of the verb becomes part of the verb, yielding a surface intransitive verb:
(40)
Finally, there are verbs that underlyingly have no subject at all (melt and break.) The underlying object of such verbs must become the surface subject, satisfying the requirement in English that all clauses have a surface subject:
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(41)
Transitivization, then, involves adding an agent responsible for causing an event to take place, which becomes the surface subject of the clause:
(42)
A subject can be added to verbs like the one in (41), but not to verbs like the ones in (39-40), which already have underlying subjects. The account therefore correctly divides surface intransitive verbs into two types; verbs like break, which can be transitivized by adding a subject, and verbs like laugh, which are in fact already transitive and therefore cannot be transitivized.
Hale’s typology of verbs involves two main principles (43), and at least three processes (44) that sometimes make discovering these principles difficult:
(43)
a.
All verbs must have underlying objects.
b.
All clauses must have surface subjects.
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(44)
a.
In English, light verbs sometimes ‘absorb’ their underlying objects: laugh, for example, in (40).
b.
‘Transitivization’ adds an underlying subject to a verb that lacks one: The knight broke the sword in (42).
c.
If a verb has no underlying subject, the underlying objectmay become the surface subject, as in The sword broke in (41).
We can return now to the question with which we began this section. We have seen that break, in a sentence like (41), combines with a single noun phrase that starts out as its underlying object, before later becoming its surface subject. With verbs like laugh, on the other hand, the surface subject—the knight, in (40)—is also the underlying subject (that is, these verbs are stored in the speaker’s memory as requiring subjects). Why do these verbs differ in this way? What is it about break and laugh that causes them to behave syntactically as they do? We have seen that the behavior of these verbs is remarkably consistent across languages, so our answer should not simply be that the verbs are arbitrarily classified, as exhibiting this particular behavior.
A better answer to this question may be inferred from the nature of transitivization. We have seen that this operation adds an underlying subject, which is the agent responsible for causing an event to take place. A crucial difference between laugh and intransitive melt is that laughing is something an individual can do on purpose, while melting is not—that is, the subject of laugh is an agent, unlike the subject of melt. Hale claimed that this fact about the meanings of laugh and melt has repercussions for the way these verbs are associated with syntactic structure. Only agents, in his view, may be underlying subjects; non-agents may become surface subjects, but must be underlying non-subjects.
Hale’s proposals about argument structure are proposals about the nature of Universal Grammar. To Hale, all of us are born knowing general principles like (43a) and the
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requirement that underlying subjects be agents. No matter what language a young child is acquiring, she is able to correctly deduce that the single argument of a verb with the meaning of intransitive break must be an underlying object. Since it is not an agent, it cannot be an underlying subject, and it becomes a surface subject only because of a requirement that the clause have a surface subject.
This approach succeeds in reducing to a minimum the task faced by children learning the vocabulary of their native languages. As we mentioned above, the mapping between sound and meaning varies arbitrarily across languages; there are no principles of Universal Grammar that guarantee that a verb pronounced break must mean what break means in English. Clearly, learning a word must involve learning its pronounciation and its meaning; Universal Grammar is of no help in these tasks. What Hale established is that once the child has learned what a verb means, she has also learned its argument structure. Having learned what laugh means, for instance, she is in a position to conclude, on the basis of conditions like those in (43-44), that it is underlyingly transitive, and cannot be straightforwardly transitivized. The argument structure of words need not be learned independently, but follows from the general principles that map meaning onto structure. If Hale is correct, then a number of questions arise. Why must clauses have surface subjects? Why must verbs have underlying objects? What properties of agents constrain their syntactic behavior? It is perhaps one of Ken Hale’s greatest legacies that he left us with questions like these to answer.
Hale’s proposals about these general principles are proposals about the nature of the human mind. Part of what it is to be a human being is to have a mind that constructs grammars incorporating the requirements in (43), and every normal human being is born with such a mind. Ulti-
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mately, of course, we would like to have a theory that explains how principles like the ones in (43) are implemented in the neurophysiology of the brain, and work intended to develop such explanations is under way. Hale’s career is a testament to the fact that one can make progress on questions about the properties of the mind without directly investigating the implementation of those properties in the brain. In fact, it would be impossible to develop such theories of neurological implementation without a clear understanding of what is to be implemented, and as we have tried to show, the properties of human grammar are more complex than they might appear at first sight. Our understanding of these complex properties owes an enormous debt to Hale’s work.
Limitations of space and time make it impossible for us to fully describe the extent of Hale’s many other contributions to linguistic theory. Hale worked on historical reconstruction of the Australian language families, on intonation in Tohono O’odham, on stress in Hocąk, on agreement in Irish and K’ichee,’ on the phonology and semantics of a sacred initiation language of the Lardil called Damin, and on countless syntactic issues in languages from Warlpiri to Dagur to Navajo. He produced dictionaries of Lardil and of Ulwa, and contributed extensively to a dictionary of Warlpiri, and to educational materials in countless other endangered languages. He was the first, and in many cases, the only researcher to document the vocabulary and structure of dozens of aboriginal languages of Australia. He lived the kind of life that no set of writings can do full justice to. He was a great man, and we count ourselves fortunate to have known him and worked with him.
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In writing this piece we benefited greatly from comments by Noam Chomsky, Heidi Harley, Jay Keyser, Mary Laughren, David Nash, David Pesetsky, Norvin Richards, and Jane Simpson, and we are very grateful for their help. Responsibility for any remaining errors is entirely ours.
NOTES
1.J. Simpson, D. Nash, M. Laughren, P. Austin, and B. Alpher. Forty years on: Ken Hale and Australian Languages. Ogmios 2.5, no 17, summer 2001, p.3
2.The name is perhaps an unfortunate one, since it is not intended to refer to the grammar of any particular language, but rather to properties which universally hold of human languages.
3.(34a) may have another, irrelevant reading, in which they pounded the metal while they were sweaty, with no change of state implied. This reading treats sweaty not as a resultative but as a depictive, which is subject to different conditions.
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1976 The adjoined relative clause in Australia. In Grammatical Categories in Australian Languages, ed. R. M. W. Dixon, pp. 78-105. Canberra: Australian Institute of Aboriginal Studies.
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1989 With L. M. Jeanne. Argument obviation and switch-reference in Hopi. In General and Amerindian Ethnolinguistics: In Remembrance of Stanley Newman, eds. M. R. Key and H. M. Hoenigswald, pp. 201-211. Contributions to the Sociology of Language 55. Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter.
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