telecommunications and air traffc control in the face of extended and widespread loss of electric power, and then develop and implement strategies to reduce or eliminate vulnerabilities. Part of this work should include an assessment of the available surge capacity for large mobile generation sources. Such an assessment should include an examination of the feasibility of utilizing alternative sources of temporary power generation to meet emergency generation requirements (as identifed by state, territorial, and local governments, the private sector, and nongovernmental organizations) in the event of a large-scale power outage of long duration. Such assessment should also include an examination of equipment availability, sources of power generation (mobile truck-mounted generators, naval and commercial ships, power barges, locomotives, and so on), transportation logistics, and system interconnection. When areas of potential shortages have been identifed, plans should be developed and implemented to take corrective action and develop needed resource inventories, stockpiles, and mobilization plans. Time Scale for Action: 2 Years (Assessments), 2-5 Years (Response Plans).
Recommendation 7.2 Utilities, governments at the federal, state, and local level, and law enforcement agencies should develop official memoranda of understanding (MOUs) that spell out each party’s responsibilities before, during, and immediately following deliberate destruction of utility equipment that leads to a disruption of electric service. These MOUs should provide a clear understanding of who is in charge and explain how decisions will be reached in dealing with potential tensions between crime scene investigation and timely restoration of service, as well as with unanticipated contingencies. The MOUs should also help to ensure the appropriate allocation of resources and should address concerns about potential government seizure of utility supplies and equipment during catastrophic events, which can seriously hinder a utility’s prompt restoration of electric service. Time Scale for Action: 6 Months.
Recommendation 7.5 DHS with DOE and the Electric Reliability Organization should work with utilities that have not yet done so to:
• Establish a team reporting to top management that coordinates physical, cyber, and operations security through comprehensive plans that clearly defne what is expected of security personnel before, during, and after a deliberate destructive act; identifes the technologies and strategies to be used to continuously monitor critical company facilities; and establishes an Incident Command System and designates an incident commander to work with outside agencies. Time Scale for Action: 6 Months.
• Examine their internal radio communications systems to determine that battery backup systems and portable generators are in place to ensure that all communication devices will remain operational during a crisis. Because traditional communication systems may become unavailable during a destructive attack on the electric system, options such as satellite communications should be evaluated (and periodically tested) for potential use as backup communication. Time Scale for Action: 6 Months.
• Assess black-start capabilities in their systems under the assumption that major physical disruption of the transmission system can occur, develop appropriate contingency plans, and test both the plans and the equipment on a regular basis. Time Scale for Action: 6 Months.
• Assess the potential for the cascading collapse of long stretches of transmission line, and, where appropriate, include offsetting towers at various intervals, or reinforce or upgrade towers at more frequent intervals along the line. Time Scale for Action: 6 Months.
Recommendation 7.3 State and federal law or regulations should be modifed to:
• Recognize utilities as essential service providers so that relevant utility employees will be trained and legally designated as frst responders to deal with attacks on the power system. Time Scale for Action: 1 Year.
• Provide utilities, when needed, with temporary exemptions from laws that restrict their use of equipment and their access to roads, materials, supplies, and other critical elements for restoration of electric service to essential loads, including those that have an impact on public health and safety. Time Scale for Action: 1 Year.
• Ensure that state regulatory agencies support prudent efforts by utilities to commit and acquire the necessary resources for service restoration and that they provide reasonable assurance for recovery of these costs. Time Scale for Action: 1 Year.
Recommendation 7.6 State legislatures should change utility law to explicitly allow micro-grids with distributed generation. IEEE should revise its standards to include the appropriate use of islanded distributed generation and micro-grid resources for local islanding in emergency recovery operations. Utilities should reexamine and, if necessary, revise their distribution automation plans and capabilities in light of the possible need to selectively serve critical loads during extended restoration efforts. Public utility commis-