sions should consider the potential emergency restoration benefits of distribution automation when they review utility applications involving such investments. Time Scale for Action: 2 Years.
Recommendation 8.4 Congress, DHS, and the states should provide resources and incentives to cover incremental costs associated with private and public sector risk prevention and mitigation efforts to reduce the societal impact of an extended grid outage. Such incentives could include incremental funding for those aspects of systems that provide a public good but little private benefit, R&D support for new and emerging technology that will enhance the resiliency and restoration of the grid, and the development and implementation of building codes or ordinances that require alternate or backup sources of electric power for key facilities. Time Scale for Action: 2-5 Years.
Recommendation 6.1 The ERO should require power companies to reexamine their critical substations to identify serious vulnerabilities to terrorist attack. Where such vulnerabilities are discovered, physical and cyber protection should be applied. In addition, the design of these substations should be modified with the goal of making them more flexible to allow for efficient reconfiguration in the event of a malicious attack on the power system. The bus configurations in these substations could have a significant impact on the capacity for maintaining reliability in the event of a malicious attack on the power system. Bus layout or configuration could be a significant factor if a transformer, circuit breaker, instrument transformer, or bus work is blown up, possibly damaging nearby equipment. Time Scale for Action: 1 Year (Assessment), 3-10 Years (Upgrades).
Recommendation 6.2 The ERO and FERC should direct greater attention to vulnerability to multiple outages (e.g., N-2) planned by an intelligent adversary. In cases where major, long-term outages are possible, reinforcements should be considered as long as costs are commensurate with the reduction of vulnerability and other possible benefits. The ERO and FERC should direct greater attention at vulnerability due to multiple outages (e.g., N-2) planned by an intelligent adversary. Since necessary reinforcements will entail significant costs, just how far systems should move in this direction will depend on a careful quantitative probabilistic assessment of costs and benefits. Time Scale for Action: 1–3 Years.
Recommendation 6.3 The ERO and FERC should develop best practices and standards for improving system-wide instrumentation and the ability of near-real-time state estimation and security assessments, since otherwise operators are at a disadvantage in trying to understand and manage system disruptions as they unfold. Time Scale for Action: 1-3 Years.
Recommendation 8.3 State and local regions should undertake regional and local vulnerability assessments, building on the models provided by DHS, develop plans to collaboratively implement key strategies to reduce vulnerability, and assist private sector parties and individuals to identify steps they can take to reduce their vulnerabilities. Time Scale for Action: 1-3 Years.
Recommendation 8.5 Federal and state agencies should identify legal barriers to data access, communications, and collaborative planning that could impede appropriate regional and local assessment and contingency planning for handling long-term outages. Political leaders of the jurisdictions involved should analyze the data security and privacy protection laws of their agencies with an eye to easing obstacles to collective planning and to facilitating smooth communication in a national or more localized emergency. Time Scale for Action: 1–3 Years.
Recommendation 9.1 Complete the development and demonstration of high-voltage recovery transformers, and develop plans for the manufacture, storage, and installation of these recovery transformers (also see Recommendation 1 above).
Recommendation 9.2 Continue the development and demonstration of the advanced computational system currently funded by the Department of Homeland Security and underway at the Electric Power Research Institute. This system is intended to assist in supporting more rapid estimation of the state of the system and broader system analysis.
Recommendation 9.3 Develop for transmission control centers a visualization system that will support informed operator decision making and reduce vulnerability to human errors. R&D to this end is underway at the Electric Power Research Institute, Department of Energy, Consortium for Electric Reliability Technology Solutions, and Power System Engineering Research Center, but improved integration of these efforts is required.
Recommendation 9.4 Develop dynamic systems technology in conjunction with response demonstrations now being outlined as part of an energy efficiency initiative being developed by EPRI, the Edison Electric Institute, and DOE.