9

Research and Development Needs for the Electric Power Delivery System

As discussed in earlier chapters, one of the most important steps in ensuring the electric power delivery system’s resilience to terrorism is to ensure that it is as resilient as possible against more routine disturbances, that it can be rapidly restored if and when a disruption occurs, and that while the disruption is in progress, the impact on critical services is as modest as possible. The committee has concluded that, with a few notable exceptions, there is relatively little R&D that can be targeted just at terrorism, but that much that is intended to improve operations also will help against terrorism. Many of the most promising technologies under development for improving the power system may not harden it against terrorist attack, but they often will improve grid resilience and response and recovery. This chapter assesses research needs for reducing the risk from terrorist attacks in the context of overall power delivery system needs. It also notes alternative strategies by which the electric power system could be guided to greater robustness.

As discussed in Chapter 2, recent decades have witnessed chronic underinvestment in sustaining and upgrading the U.S. transmission and distribution system. The same has been true for research investments. Funding for R&D is also addressed in this chapter.

R&D FOR MEETING THREE BROAD GOALS

This chapter addresses R&D needs to meet the three goals discussed in previous chapters:

 

•   Thwarting terrorist attacks (Chapters 3, 4, and 5);

•   Reducing vulnerability to terrorist attacks (Chapter 6); and

•   Reducing the impact of a terrorist attack and its consequences (Chapters 7 and 8).

Because the electric power system is one of the most complex systems every built, R&D programs to improve it are understandably complex as well. No one or two items will solve the problem of protecting against terrorism, mitigating impacts, and supporting recovery, although certain priorities can be identified.

Thwarting Attacks

Physical attacks on the bulk power system1 and on critical components of the distribution system can cause widespread, potentially long-term outages. Thwarting such attacks involves developing physical security and sensing technology that enhances the robustness of the system to physical attacks on various components of the power system and provides adequate early warning.

Improved means for countering cyber attacks also are needed and can be furthered by research to ensure secure communications, protect the energy management systems (EMSs) that control the bulk power network, and enhance the development of distribution management systems (DMSs) for controlling the distribution system. A wide range of intelligent electronic devices, relays, and controls at substations (primarily at the distribution system levels) are potentially vulnerable because they can be accessed remotely via several different types of communication networks.

Reducing Vulnerability to Attacks

Reducing vulnerability and enhancing resilience involve modifying the electric power system to better manage the loss of key components. R&D can provide a variety of options for enhanced monitoring, reduced system stress, improved reliability, incorporation of advanced technology, specific components, efficient demand-side management, and the use of distributed energy resources.

_____________________

1It is again noted that the term “bulk power system” generally applies to large central generation stations and those portions of the transmission system operated at voltages of 100 kV or higher.



The National Academies | 500 Fifth St. N.W. | Washington, D.C. 20001
Copyright © National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
Terms of Use and Privacy Statement



Below are the first 10 and last 10 pages of uncorrected machine-read text (when available) of this chapter, followed by the top 30 algorithmically extracted key phrases from the chapter as a whole.
Intended to provide our own search engines and external engines with highly rich, chapter-representative searchable text on the opening pages of each chapter. Because it is UNCORRECTED material, please consider the following text as a useful but insufficient proxy for the authoritative book pages.

Do not use for reproduction, copying, pasting, or reading; exclusively for search engines.

OCR for page 91
9 Research and Development Needs for the Electric Power Delivery System As discussed in earlier chapters, one of the most important solve the problem of protecting against terrorism, mitigating steps in ensuring the electric power delivery system's resil- impacts, and supporting recovery, although certain priorities ience to terrorism is to ensure that it is as resilient as pos- can be identified. sible against more routine disturbances, that it can be rapidly restored if and when a disruption occurs, and that while the Thwarting Attacks disruption is in progress, the impact on critical services is as modest as possible. The committee has concluded that, with a Physical attacks on the bulk power system1 and on few notable exceptions, there is relatively little R&D that can critical components of the distribution system can cause be targeted just at terrorism, but that much that is intended widespread, potentially long-term outages. Thwarting such to improve operations also will help against terrorism. Many attacks involves developing physical security and sensing of the most promising technologies under development for technology that enhances the robustness of the system to improving the power system may not harden it against ter- physical attacks on various components of the power system rorist attack, but they often will improve grid resilience and and provides adequate early warning. response and recovery. This chapter assesses research needs Improved means for countering cyber attacks also are for reducing the risk from terrorist attacks in the context of needed and can be furthered by research to ensure secure overall power delivery system needs. It also notes alterna- communications, protect the energy management systems tive strategies by which the electric power system could be (EMSs) that control the bulk power network, and enhance the guided to greater robustness. development of distribution management systems (DMSs) As discussed in Chapter 2, recent decades have witnessed for controlling the distribution system. A wide range of intel- chronic underinvestment in sustaining and upgrading the ligent electronic devices, relays, and controls at substations U.S. transmission and distribution system. The same has (primarily at the distribution system levels) are potentially been true for research investments. Funding for R&D is also vulnerable because they can be accessed remotely via several addressed in this chapter. different types of communication networks. R&D FOR MEETING THREE BROAD GOALS Reducing Vulnerability to Attacks This chapter addresses R&D needs to meet the three goals Reducing vulnerability and enhancing resilience involve discussed in previous chapters: modifying the electric power system to better manage the loss of key components. R&D can provide a variety of Thwarting terrorist attacks (Chapters 3, 4, and 5); options for enhanced monitoring, reduced system stress, Reducing vulnerability to terrorist attacks (Chapter improved reliability, incorporation of advanced technology, 6); and specific components, efficient demand-side management, Reducing the impact of a terrorist attack and its con- and the use of distributed energy resources. sequences (Chapters 7 and 8). Because the electric power system is one of the most com- 1It is again noted that the term "bulk power system" generally applies plex systems every built, R&D programs to improve it are to large central generation stations and those portions of the transmission understandably complex as well. No one or two items will system operated at voltages of 100 kV or higher. 91

OCR for page 91
92 TERRORISM AND THE ELECTRIC POWER DELIVERY SYSTEM Any physical or electrical disturbance affects the perfor- MAJOR TECHNOLOGY AREAS FOR REDUCING mance of the electric power system. Therefore, advanced VULNERABILITY TO NATURAL DISASTERS AND emergency control techniques that would adjust disrupted TERRORIST ATTACKS power flow to an acceptable operating state would make This section discusses a wide range of specific technolo- the system more resilient to malicious attacks. Particularly gies for which R&D is promising. They are grouped into important is the development of improved tools and strate- eight technology areas according to how they will benefit gies that allow a more nuanced real-time treatment of which the power system. loads are and are not served during restoration. Technologies That Allow Significant Increases in Power Reducing the Impact of an Attack Flow Reducing the impact of an attack (and its consequences) Increasing the power flow capacity of transmission lines involves developing and using advanced network tech- can increase security because it provides greater ability to nologies and control features at both the bulk power system bypass a damaged line in delivering power from generating level and the distribution system level. Distributed energy stations to load centers. resources could also play a significant role in minimizing power disruptions to customers, powering critical services and facilities, and facilitating restoration. Several concepts Reconfiguring Conductors in this area involve the expanded use of combined heat and The transfer capability of some transmission circuits can power technology, distributed generation, and micro-grids. be increased by raising the operating voltage and reconfigur- Such technologies already are in use but not fully deployed. ing conductors into a more compact arrangement on existing However, considerable research focused on hardware, con- rights-of-way. trol systems, control policy, and the impacts of alternative regulatory arrangements is needed to enable resolution of technical and regulatory impediments to integrate such High-amperage Conductors resources into the overall system. New, recently developed conductors having composite The extended loss of electric supply due to a malicious cores or using aluminum alloys have higher current-carrying attack could have a significant impact on several interde- capability than conductors in general use. Under high rates pendent civilian infrastructure systems,2 including water of power flow, they have less mechanical sag at high tem- treatment and pumping facilities, sewage treatment plants, peratures because of lower thermal expansion as compared transportation, communication systems, gas pipelines, and to typical conductors with steel cores. Reducing the sag traffic control systems. Although studies have qualitatively of a loaded line allows greater loading of lines, although evaluated the impact of the loss of power supply on specific increased thermal capacity, if not used properly, can place systems, they have not, for the most part, considered all inter- more stress on the power system. dependent systems collectively. Moreover, in most regions, efforts have not been made to investigate and model the impacts of a long-term curtailment of the electricity supply. High-temperature Superconducting Cables A critical aspect of system interdependencies is that official High-temperature superconducting cables can potentially policies will be needed to coordinate these systems, establish carry three to five times as much current as conventional hierarchies in terms of responsibilities and control following cables of the same size, but considerably more research an attack, enunciate a clear public message, and continuously is required before these cables can be made technically update information in a coordinated fashion. successful and ready for widespread use. Although initial The need for a well-coordinated, automatic or semi- assessments indicate that such cables are very complex and automatic plan for restoring the electric system after a expensive special-purpose devices with limited applications, coordinated malicious attack has been a topic of intense they nonetheless deserve consideration. discussion in the electric power industry. North American Electric Reliability Council (NERC) guidelines require every region to have such a plan. Automating recovery to reduce Composite Structures the possibility of human error, however, is an enormous task New composite materials that are inherently insulating requiring significant investment in research toward develop- and corrosion-resistant could potentially replace metals in ing techniques to coordinate various options and develop the support structures for substations and transmission lines decision-making tools. and could also allow for reconfiguring existing rights-of-way to increase power flow. Many complex issues still have to 2See Chapter 8 for more details.

OCR for page 91
RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT NEEDS FOR THE ELECTRIC POWER DELIVERY SYSTEM 93 be addressed regarding their selection and application and Voltage-sourced Converters to reduce costs. Voltage-sourced converters can be used to connect independent asynchronous AC transmission systems. Other Equipment That Allows Greater Control of Energy Flows thyristor-based controllers can supply reactive power (i.e., volt-ampere-reactives) for voltage support and reactive Greater control of energy flows reduces the risk of cas- power management in transmission systems. Connection cading failures and may speed restoration of power after a of systems that now cannot be connected might lead to major outage. Medium-voltage (4-13 kV) and high-voltage increased power flow. (>69 kV) high-power electronic-based controllers can pro- vide flexibility and speed in controlling the flow of power over transmission and distribution lines. New energy stor- Intelligent Universal Transformers age units can help level loads and improve system stability. The intelligent universal transformer concept involves a Some specific examples of these equipment technologies state-of-the-art power electronic system and is not a trans- are given below. former device in the traditional sense. It would be designed to replace conventional transformers with a power electronic Flexible AC Transmission System (FACTS) Devices system that steps voltage as traditional transformers do, but can also manage and control consumer demand and power High-voltage power electronic-based controllers are cur- flows, and compensate for reactive power. rently being demonstrated. FACTS controllers can increase the power transfer capability of transmission and distribu- tion lines and improve overall system reliability by reacting Advanced Monitoring and Communications Equipment almost instantaneously to disturbances. The unified power Substantial improvements in the cost and performance of flow controller and the convertible static compensator are sensors and communications media and equipment offer the key examples of FACTS technology. They control both real prospect of increasing the capacity of existing power system and reactive power flows among transmission corridors and facilities by monitoring and compensating for the operating maintain the stability of transmission voltage. More research, conditions of numerous devices simultaneously. Examples design, and development is needed to reduce the cost and include the following. enhance the performance of FACTS technologies. The next steps should include the development of the fourth genera- tion of FACTS controllers using advanced power electronics Integrated Communication Architecture devices. Overlaying a communication architecture on the existing power delivery system could be a foundation for enhancing Advanced Power Electronic Devices the functionality of the power system and, therefore, its resilience. This requires an open standards-based systems The next major step in the development of power elec- architecture for an infrastructure for data communications tronic devices would be to replace the silicon-based thyris- and distributed computing. Several technical elements of this tors used in current devices with thyristors based on wide- infrastructure include, but are not limited to, data network- band-gap semiconductor materials, such as silicon carbide, ing, communications over a wide variety of physical media, gallium nitride, or very-thin-film diamond materials. These and embedded computing technologies. Challenges remain materials have the potential to reduce the cost of power in fully deploying such an architecture while meeting cyber electronic controls. security challenges. FACTS Integrated with Storage Wide Area Measurement System Fast-response devices for energy storage could be used The Wide Area Measurement System (WAMS), based on with FACTS controllers to provide ride-through capability a combination of satellite communications employing time- for transient and brief outages. One promising technology, stamping with fiber or wireless, will provide the real-time superconducting magnetic energy storage (SMES), responds information needed for integrated control of large, highly to disturbances in less than one AC cycle and provides interconnected transmission systems. By constantly monitor- ride-through capability for multi-second outages. Research ing the health of a network across a wide geographical area, is needed to adapt the high-temperature superconducting WAMS can detect abnormal system conditions as they arise. materials described above for cables for use in the high- field SMES environment, potentially lowering the cost so that these units can be used to support the electric power transmission system.

OCR for page 91
94 TERRORISM AND THE ELECTRIC POWER DELIVERY SYSTEM Dynamic Thermal Circuit Rating Technology outages on which a probabilistic reliability index could be based. Dynamic thermal circuit rating (DTCR) technology can be used to increase the thermal loading on individual transmission lines. Present limits are both static and often Database Protocols Development conservative, based on assumed weather conditions. DTCR A common information model is needed for transmission uses real-time information about weather, load, temperature, and distribution operations and maintenance databases. It line tension, and/or line sag to estimate actual thermal limits, would support interoperability by greatly reducing the num- allowing higher thermal capacity of lines. Certain DTCR ber of needed software translators in situations involving a devices are commercially available, and others are currently range of applications. being demonstrated on a few transmission systems. Technologies That Enable Increased Asset Utilization Video Sag Monitoring Growth in the demand for electric power in dense urban Direct monitoring of line sag can be used to extend the areas will continue to challenge the capacity of the traditional effectiveness of DTCR even further. A video "sag" meter medium-voltage underground network grids installed in most has been prototyped that uses a digital camera mounted large cities to provide reliable power. To meet projected on a transmission tower to monitor the vertical position of increases in demand while still providing safe, reliable, and the line. Sag monitoring is listed separately here and not affordable power, utilities will have to reconfigure networks included under the broader title of remote video monitor- and minimize secondary (low-voltage) cable. Technology ing of critical components because it enables dynamic options include the following: operation. Submersible (Underwater) Fast Switches Topology Estimators Fast switches enable connection of customers to alternate Topology estimators can be used to accurately deter- power sources during system reconfiguration, and a capabil- mine the real-time transmission grid configuration status ity for reconfiguration at medium voltage minimizes the of an interconnection. Accurate information on topology is impact of a catastrophic event at a single power station or necessary for accurate state estimation and the subsequent circuit. In underground networks where flooding is possible, security-constrained dispatch that is the key computation for there is a need for switches that can operate underwater while solving congestion problems. still energized so as to mitigate outages. Improved Simulation and Modeling Low-voltage Switches and Smart Fuses for Isolation Faster-than-real-time simulation and improved modeling Low-voltage devices such as automated breakers would enable very rapid computation of the power condi- (switches) and smart fuses that respond to appropriate rise tion's status, and in turn: times allow for reconfiguration and isolation of faulty sec- tions of the low-voltage grid network. Faster-than-real-time, look-ahead simulations of operating conditions; What-if analyses from both the operations and the Technologies That Are Particularly Intended to Enhance planning points of view; Security Integration of risk analysis into system models and The technologies discussed in this chapter will contrib- quantification of effects on system security; and ute to enhanced security of the electric power system even Through the use of advanced simulation, pattern though that is often not their primary goal. Technologies recognition, and diagnostic models, determination specifically intended to improve security will, in most cases, of the location and nature of suspicious events. provide significant benefits in the face of major equipment failures resulting from natural disasters as well as terrorist Monitoring of Constraints attacks. Sensor output, communication, and computation can be used in combination to monitor the effect of transmission Probabilistic Vulnerability Assessment constraints on wholesale power market activities. Operat- A key priority among efforts to improve overall system ing in a limited fashion for the Eastern Interconnection, this security is to assess power system vulnerabilities to terrorism capability could be enhanced to include probabilities of line and identify the most effective countermeasures. Probabilis-

OCR for page 91
RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT NEEDS FOR THE ELECTRIC POWER DELIVERY SYSTEM 95 tic vulnerability assessment is a framework for objectively Integrated Asset Management identifying the most significant threats to the electricity More sophisticated maintenance procedures will be vital supply chain and assessing the relative cost-effectiveness of to hardening the power system and ensuring the reliability various potential solutions. The probabilistic methods devel- of increasingly complex transmission networks. Software oped in this effort will also provide the basis for improved is needed that would interpret the raw data coming from assessment of risks encountered during normal power system real-time monitors into the critical information needed by operations. system operators. Emergency Control and Restoration Integration of Distributed Energy Resources Following a major terrorist attack or natural calamity, a There is a need to develop interconnection standards system is needed to focus the initial response on prevention and requirements related to integrating distributed energy of cascading. Wide-area control and the use of fast-acting resources with power delivery systems. The effect of dis- autonomous agents may create self-sufficient "islands" that tributed resources on system performance, especially at high can maintain power within a large blacked-out area. penetration rates, also needs to be determined. Complex Interactive Networks Real-time Analysis Continuation of R&D on complex interactive networks Real-time analysis of system stability and security will be would enable analysis of information about the status of needed to properly detect a multi-pronged terrorist attack or the power delivery system and the secure communications a sequence of other natural or man-made disasters. Online system after an attack, as well as coordination of their use analytical tools are needed that will take this information, for adaptive islanding. Once a stable configuration of power such as the data available from WAMS, and determine auto- delivery system islands is established, algorithms for self- matically what actions should be taken to prevent incipient healing would gradually return the power delivery system to disturbances from spreading. Meeting real-time system its normal state as more resources became available. control requirements will require completing such analysis Most sensing and control agents in a power system today in a fraction of a second. Power system visualization would simply respond to changing local conditions according to improve operator situational awareness, allowing a faster preprogrammed instructions. Enhanced intelligent network response to rapidly deteriorating situations. agents (INAs) would have decision-making capability, based on internal analysis of network-wide conditions. Once imple- mented, INA technology would facilitate adaptive islanding Solid-state and Superconducting Fault Current Limiters and the smart power delivery system, which is among the Unless carefully planned, the location of generation on a technologies described below. given power system can pose a risk of short-circuit currents that are dangerous to utility field personnel and may cause Smart Power Delivery System considerable damage to the power system. Fault current lim- iters would use either power electronics or superconductivity The smart power delivery system would contain to limit short-circuit currents. These solid-state devices not transmission-class fault anticipators tied to a network of only would act as a circuit breaker, but also would act in distributed data processors communicating with regional milliseconds to limit fault current levels. operations centers, allowing simulations to be run to deter- mine optimal corrective responses to any disruption. When attacks occur, a network of sensors would instantly detect Solid-state Power Electronic Circuit Breakers a voltage fluctuation and communicate this information to Solid-state breakers will allow the system of the future intelligent relays and other equipment located at substa- to respond more quickly to disruptions and terrorist attacks. tions. These relays would automatically execute corrective actions, isolating the failed lines and re-routing power via power electronic-based controllers to other parts of the power Recovery Transformers delivery system. Many consumers would be unaware that As noted in Chapters 3 and 8, the large power transform- a disruption had occurred. Additionally, advanced system ers in generating station switchyards and major substations analysis will allow utilities to determine reliability metrics are vulnerable to terrorist attack and could take months or based on probabilistic techniques, which would lead to years to replace. Options for bypassing damaged substa- improved asset utilization. tions to bring power from remote generating stations to load centers are very limited because the grid is already stressed

OCR for page 91
96 TERRORISM AND THE ELECTRIC POWER DELIVERY SYSTEM during peak demand. The result of a coordinated attack on nologies will be needed to enable load control to complement key substations could be rolling blackouts over a wide area the options available for response to security concerns. until the substations are repaired. Under such conditions, the availability of compact, eas- Advanced Distribution Automation ily transported recovery transformers would be invaluable. Recovery transformers would be usable for a variety of Advanced distribution automation (ADA) is defined as applications to replace the large power transformers opti- distribution monitoring and control, distribution system man- mized for a particular substation. They would be smaller for agement, and consumer interaction (e.g., load management, easier transport and relatively inexpensive. They would also "smart" metering, and real-time pricing). ADA will enable be less efficient and therefore more costly to operate, and so real-time optimization, such as operating distributed energy would be used only until a regular replacement is available. resources when other facilities have been compromised. Two Recovery transformers need further development and developments are needed to make ADA a reality: (1) an open testing. Then a reasonable supply of them would have to communication architecture and (2) a redeveloped power be manufactured and stored in strategic U.S. locations for system from an electrical architecture standpoint. ADA will use to recover as quickly as possible from any widespread use various advanced technologies, including communica- disaster affecting a large part of the electric transmission tions systems, distributed computing, embedded system infrastructure (see Chapter 8). The increased standardization computing, sensor and monitoring technologies, and power- of substation transformers being embraced by utilities will electronics-based components. facilitate use of these recovery transformers. Self-healing Control Methodology for Distribution Systems Physical Security For the distribution system to be secure, it is essential Chapter 3 detailed a set of very-near-term developments to enable distribution system monitoring through a web that relate to physical security, including advanced design of sensors integrated with an overall control methodology and engineering steps to harden substation sites and to make to respond to terrorist attacks and reduce the duration and key components less vulnerable, improved sophisticated impact of failures through a self-healing methodology. electronic surveillance technology that integrates sensor and monitoring, and security systems for high-voltage submarine Low-cost Sensors cables. A series of web-enabled, inexpensive sensors that can be linked to global positioning satellites would allow higher Consumer Products levels of control of control. An array of R&D opportunities exist related to consumer products for enhancing the public's resilience to terrorism, Pre-failure Indicators particularly in residential and urban settings, but these are not considered within the scope of this report and so are not High-speed, online sensors are needed for detecting dis- addressed here. tortions in the 60-cycle power line carrier. Waveform distor- tions need to be correlated with early indicators of system component failure. Pattern recognition software is needed Technologies That Enable Greater Connectivity and that will analyze the power line waveform and detect pre- Control failure indicators in real time. Making the nation's power system truly secure from disasters will require true consumer connectivity that Technologies to Reduce Demand on the Power System includes the optimization of end-use devices. Means for achieving this include those outlined below. Although the technologies described below are not directly related to addressing threats from terrorism, they would collectively reduce the stress on the electric system Demand-side Management infrastructure and thereby contribute to its resilience in the Demand-side management (DSM), which is defined as the face of attack. further deployment and utilization of energy-efficient elec- tric end-use devices and greater use of consumer load con- Efficient Lighting trol, will also be critical to complement the supply options inherent in a secure power system. DSM includes the ability Much of the artificial illumination in place today is con- to dispatch both loads and distributed energy resources. A siderably less efficient than theoretically, or even practically, variety of new communications and customer-interface tech- possible. Increased use of high-efficiency lighting systems

OCR for page 91
RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT NEEDS FOR THE ELECTRIC POWER DELIVERY SYSTEM 97 that combine efficacious light sources with luminaries that sible. Key energy storage technologies requiring R&D are effectively direct light where it is desired, coupled with lead acid batteries, nickel-cadmium batteries, nickel-metal controls to adjust light levels as needed, will collectively hydride batteries, lithium-ion batteries, vanadium redox flow improve overall lighting efficiency. batteries, sodium-sulfur batteries, flywheel energy storage, ultracapacitors, miniature compressed air energy storage, and superconducting magnetic energy storage. Efficient Space Conditioning (Building Heating and Cooling) Considerable progress has been made in the last few R&D Priorities decades toward improving the efficiency of space condition- ing equipment. Much of the progress is due to state building The technologies discussed above are correlated in Table codes and federal standards that dictate the minimum effi- 9.1, with the goals to which they may contribute: thwarting ciency of new air conditioning systems. More opportunities attacks, reducing vulnerability, and reducing the impact of exist to further enhance the efficiency of heating and cooling prolonged outages. Although relatively few technologies are systems and thus reduce demand for electric power. listed directly for thwarting attacks, reducing vulnerability to and the impacts of attacks also reduces terrorists' incentives for attacking the power system. Therefore to some extent, Efficient Domestic Water Heating all the technologies listed in Table 9.1 will contribute to Electric water heaters lose heat through tank walls and thwarting attacks. piping. Research is needed on newer systems that produce The committee was assisted in the selection of these hot water on demand, thereby eliminating the storage tank technologies by the advice of many experts in industry, aca- and its associated losses of heat. In addition, R&D is needed demia, and research institutions whose views were solicited on (1) heat pump water heaters that can utilize heat from the in a widely circulated questionnaire. This exercise and the surrounding air to heat water while providing cooling and results are described in Box 9.1. The full list of promising dehumidification of the surrounding room air space, and R&D projects considered in the questionnaire is shown in (2) systems that recover waste heat from air conditioning Appendix H. systems. The committee believes that the following should have the highest priority in the mid- to long-term time frame: Distributed Energy Resource Technologies 1. Development, demonstration, and deployment of high-voltage recovery transformers; Distributed Generation 2. Development and demonstration of the advanced Distributed generation (DG), micro-grids, and other dis- computational system intended to support more tributed energy resources technologies can augment the large rapid estimation of system state and broader system central power generators of the present-day electric power analysis; delivery system. Energy conversion efficiencies for DG tech- 3. Development of a visualization system for transmis- nologies are still substantially below those for conventional sion control centers to support informed operator generation technologies. However, it is often possible to use decision making and reduce vulnerability to human the waste heat in industrial processes, an approach known as errors; combined heat and power (CHP), boosting overall efficiency 4. Development of dynamic systems technology and to high levels (e.g., 75 percent). Key DG technologies requir- demand response demonstrations to allow interactive ing R&D are intelligent control systems, high-efficiency control of consumers and consumer loads; internal combustion engines, microturbines, fuel cells, and 5. Development of multilayer control strategies that Stirling engines. Also needed is R&D on CHP for residential include capabilities to island and self-heal the power applications, photovoltaic devices and low-cost "balance of system; and system" electronics, solar-thermal systems, and building- 6. Development of improved energy storage that can be integrated and concentration solar systems. deployed as dispersed systems. Electric Energy Storage HOW MUCH RESEARCH? Electric energy storage refers specifically to a capability The market is very good at commercializing well-devel- for storing already-generated electrical energy and con- oped basic technology ideas. However, many of the ideas trolling its release for use at another time. Most electrical discussed in this chapter are not yet at the stage that they can energy storage systems have demonstrated efficiencies of be readily turned into operating hardware or systems. The between 60 and 70 percent, a level that must be improved earlier the stage of development, and the longer the interval significantly to make applications such as load leveling fea- from idea to commercial application, the lower the prob-

OCR for page 91
98 TERRORISM AND THE ELECTRIC POWER DELIVERY SYSTEM TABLE 9.1 Promising Research Technologies for Reducing Vulnerability Objectives Thwart Reduce Reduce Research Areas Technologies Attack Vulnerability Impact Technologies that allow Reconfiguring conductors X X significant increases in power High-amperage conductors X X flow High-temperature superconducting cables X Composite structures X Equipment that allows greater Flexible AC transmission system (FACTS) devices X control of energy flows Advanced power electronic devices X FACTS integrated with storage X Voltage-sourced converters X X Intelligent universal transformers X X Advanced monitoring and Integrated communication architecture X X communications equipment Wide-area measurement system X Dynamic thermal circuit rating technology X Video sag monitoring X X X Topology estimators X Improved simulation and modeling X Monitoring of constraints Database protocols development Technologies that enable Submersible (underwater) fast switches X X increased asset utilization Low-voltage switches and smart fuses for isolation X Technologies that are particularly Probabilistic vulnerability assessment X X X intended to enhance security Emergency control and restoration X X Complex interactive network X X Smart power delivery system X X X Integrated asset management X X Integration of distributed energy resources X X Real-time analysis X X Solid-state and superconducting fault current limiters X Solid-state power electronic circuit breakers X Recovery transformers X Physical security technologies X Technologies that enable greater Demand-side management X connectivity and control Advanced distribution automation X X Self-healing control methodology for distribution X X systems Low-cost sensors X Pre-failure indicators X X Technologies to reduce demand Efficient lighting X X on the power system Efficient space conditioning (building heating/ X X cooling Efficient domestic water heating X X Distributed energy technologies Distributed generation X X Electric energy storage X X

OCR for page 91
RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT NEEDS FOR THE ELECTRIC POWER DELIVERY SYSTEM 99 ability that conventional market forces will result in research 1000 and development being done. Society funds longer-term $ fundamental research as a way to provide options for the n llio $ future. However, the question of how much society should 100 tri n llio 1 bi invest in research to develop basic ideas to protect the electric = $ 0 e n 10 ag llio power system from terrorist threats is difficult to answer for am = bi ld e 10 10 ag three reasons: ta am To = e ld ag ta am To 1. Because the probability of terrorist attacks on the ld 1 ta To power system, the magnitude of such attacks, and the likelihood of success are all unknowable, it is impossible to calculate accurately what the benefits 0.1 of R&D might be. 2. It cannot be known beforehand what new technolo- gies and options research will make available. 0.01 1 in 10 6 1 in 10 5 1 in 10 4 1 in 1000 1 in 100 1 in 10 1.0 3. As indicated above in this chapter, most investments in power delivery system research would serve broad Probability of major attack in the coming decade needs, not just the need to protect the system from terrorist attacks. Even those investments that are FIGURE 9.1 Diagrammatic means for estimating potential terrorist most antiterrorism-specific have other beneficial attack cost mitigation resulting from investment in R&D. aspects (e.g., recovery transformers could be moved quickly to a stricken area after a large earthquake or hurricane). ing the conventional needs of the FIGURE system, then the value of 9.1 the research in this case could be roughly $100 million (see In view of these considerations, the best that can be done gray curved line at vertical axis). is to develop some order-of-magnitude arguments concern- Of course, new technical knowledge alone is not suf- ing research investments. The committee was unable to find ficient. Knowledge must also be put to work in the form of any rigorous estimates of the national impact of prolonged deployed systems. Those investments are typically much blackouts resulting from terrorist attacks. In Chapter 1, the larger than the investments required to do the research. How- committee concluded that a sophisticated terrorist attack ever, given the conclusion reached above in this chapter-- could cost hundreds of billions of dollars, mostly from the that to a first order, much of the research needed to better loss of economic activity while power is unavailable. prepare to deal with terrorism is very similar to the research Over the next decade, a well-designed research program needed to make general improvements and upgrades to the could result in knowledge and technology that could signifi- power delivery system--much of the cost of implementation cantly reduce the cost of a large, long-term blackout caused might well be justified by other societal needs. by terrorist attack. This is particularly true if that research In 2004, the Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) also included some of the strategies discussed in Chapter did an extensive analysis of the costs of making all of the 8 that would make critical social services less vulnerable improvements needed to deploy the advanced technologies in the face of disruption of electrical supply. The commit- detailed in this chapter. (EPRI, 2004). EPRI estimated that tee has not been able to develop meaningful quantitative the power sector was spending about $18 billion per year estimates of the probability of attack. However, a simple (in 2004 $) on capital investments in the transmission and parametric assessment can help to bound the potential value distribution system and that an additional expenditure of of R&D undertaken to reduce the power delivery system's $165 billion over 20 years, or $ 8.3 billion per year, would be vulnerability to terrorist acts, as shown in Figure 9.1. For needed to fully deploy the technologies relevant to enhancing example, suppose that over the coming decade, there is a 1 the resilience and functionality of the power delivery system. in 100 chance that a large coordinated terrorist attack on the To develop these technologies so that they are available for electric power delivery system could impose societal costs deployment, the committee believes that an additional R&D of the order of $100 billion. A 1 in 100 chance of a loss of investment of approximately 10 percent of those additional $100 billion can then be represented as an expected loss of expenditures, or $800 million per year, over current funding $1 billion (gray horizontal line) in Figure 9.1. If a research levels would be needed. This amount is in addition to invest- investment over that same decade could reduce losses from ments in R&D targeted at power generation or environmental such an attack to $10-billion and the cost of deployment of sciences. the new technology and systems could be supported as meet-

OCR for page 91
100 TERRORISM AND THE ELECTRIC POWER DELIVERY SYSTEM BOX 9.1 Questionnaire Respondents' Views on General R&D Needs for the Power Delivery System Needed Specifically to Address Terrorism In gathering input for Chapter 9, the Committee on Enhancing the Robustness and Resilience of Electrical Transmission and Distribution in the United States to Terrorist Attack prepared and circulated a questionnaire to industry and academic experts in transmission and distribution R&D needs, including several members of the committee. The questionnaire first asked respondents to allocate a research budget1 across the research areas shown in Table 9.1 and then across the technologies listed for each area, "considering all the needs and objectives of the U.S. electric power transmission and distribution system." Respondents were asked to think about "(1) the importance of the area to the future operation of the U.S. electric power system, and (2) how easy it would be to make progress in each area (i.e., the marginal returns per R&D dollar invested)." After completing the first part of the questionnaire, respondents were asked to go through the same tasks again, this time considering "only the need to improve the security and reliability of the U.S. electric power transmission and distribution system." Respondents were asked to rate the technologies listed in Table 9.1 as to their potential importance in enhancing the resilience of the nation's power delivery infrastructure. Based on responses to the questionnaire, the following technologies were viewed as high-priority R&D goals by most experts: High-voltage recovery transformers; Systems to improve operator awareness and system visualization; Advanced demand response based on dynamic systems; Multi-layer control strategies; Distributed control and recovery; Distributed generation and micro-grids; Low-cost undergrounding techniques; Physically robust/resilient poles, conductors, etc.; Solid-state transformers; Smart meters; Distribution power electronic devices; Advanced relaying and protection; Advanced failure detection and location; and Improved distributed storage. Most of the R&D priorities identified by questionnaire respondents showed little differentiation between those needed for improving today's system without a specific focus on the risk of terrorism and those identified with such a focus. However, when the focus was countermeasures to the risk of terrorism, the following emerged as clearly more important: High-voltage recovery transformers, Systems to improve operator awareness and system visualization, Advanced demand response based on dynamic systems, FUNDING RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT R&D on electricity transmission and distribution in the United States is conducted by a variety of organizations. Current Situation and Challenges The U.S. DOE has a significant effort aimed at a select group of technologies, primarily concerning electric power Judicious investments in research and development of per- transmission technologies, and especially focusing on super- tinent technologies can help to enhance the quality of human conductivity for cables and short-circuit current limiters. life and better serve society's needs, as well as reducing EPRI has a substantial effort, funded both by U.S. utilities the costs of increasing the capacity of the transmission and and by institutions from as many as 30 other countries. distribution systems to handle increasing loads. A balanced, Other national efforts, supported by DOE, EPRI, utilities, cost-effective approach to investment in R&D and to the and several equipment suppliers, are carried out through subsequent use of technology can make a sizable difference organizations like the Power System Engineering Research in mitigating risks. Center (PSERC) and the Consortium for Electric Reliability

OCR for page 91
RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT NEEDS FOR THE ELECTRIC POWER DELIVERY SYSTEM 101 Multilayer control strategies (including capabilities to island and to self-heal), and Improved distributed storage. In general, while respondents acknowledged that improving end-use energy efficiency would reduce stress on the electric power infrastructure, they nearly uniformly felt that R&D related to reliability, demand response, control, hardening the system, and recovery had priority over reducing the stress on the system by decreasing demand through enhancing efficiency. In addition to the needs described above for development of technologies, systems, and software, respondents identified several other "nonhardware" research topics. Public Perception of Risk Although there is considerable literature about the general public's perception of risk, very little research has been done on reactions to blackouts, whether caused by natural disasters, equipment failure, or terrorism. A team of researchers could be prepared to be deployed within hours following such an event. One goal of the work would be to develop protocols for responding effectively to major disruptions of the power supply, so that the public would be kept informed and made aware of constructive steps to take. Lessons Learned from Blackouts A research team organized by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and deployed following blackouts could learn about efforts made by utilities, government officials, business leaders, and others to respond in resilient ways. Public Response The organizational structure employed and the effort made to communicate with the public following a significant terrorist attack on the power system need to be addressed. In particular, managing the public response to distress could contribute substantially to mitigating the loss of life and the discomfort experienced by the public following a terrorist attack on the power system. DHS could develop guidelines for communications under these conditions. Market Disruptions DHS could consider research into the unique problems that could result from terrorist attacks on the power system in areas where centralized markets exists. Disruption of markets can be as difficult to deal with as problems with the physical electric system and could lead to chaos if the potential consequences and countermeasures are not thought out in advance. Such work should develop guidelines for market operators to use in the event of market disruption. As the respondents reallocated priorities for R&D related to security, they tended to decrease funding for all other items. 1No precise budget was specified, but respondents were told "if your allocation would depend on how much money you have available and for how long, assume you have $400 million per year for at least the next decade." Technology Solutions (CERTS). The manufacturers of the underway. The New York State Energy Research and Devel- electrical apparatus and equipment used in power systems opment Authority (NYSERDA) has complementary work also conduct research related to development of new equip- underway as well. ment. Most of these efforts are modest and are conducted Nationally, a temporary R&D tax credit enacted as part of outside the United States. Smaller firms increasingly are the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981 has been extended developing technologies that are digitally based and intended several times, although the R&D tax credit that expired on for potential deployment on power systems. December 31, 2005, was not renewed until December 2006, In addition, individual utilities sponsor some R&D proj- resulting in a 1year gap. In recent years, support for R&D ects, but these internal R&D budgets and R&D staffs are only investment has been constricted by a number of factors, a fraction of what they were in the mid-1990s. Two states including reduced federal funding and the cost pressures have substantial R&D programs. The California Energy on private industry. As a result, it has become increasingly Commission (CEC) has a major transmission research effort important that there be renewed support for research funding.

OCR for page 91
102 TERRORISM AND THE ELECTRIC POWER DELIVERY SYSTEM It is also essential that support for necessary improvements to Yet another difficulty in encouraging R&D concerns the phe- the U.S. electric power delivery system be continuous in this nomenon of "free-rider" utilities, so-called because they take critical time. The tax credit provision strengthens the innova- advantage of R&D done by others--often while participating tion, productivity, and competitiveness of the U.S. economy in collaborative arrangements. Such free-riders inhibit some and is vital to U.S. leadership in technological innovation entities from joining collaborative efforts. and global competitiveness in the 21st century. In addition to problems with state mandates and under- Many of the technologies described above are not yet investment in the industry, research priorities differ by util- sufficiently developed to be attractive private sector research ity and by region. The extent to which utilities have staff investments toward deployable products and systems, even capable of managing research activities also varies, as does with tax credits. Others are still too expensive or do not have the strength of their connections with local universities, the level of functionality required for wide adoption, even national and commercial laboratories, and national research though they may provide substantial benefits to society as organizations. a whole. Low levels of support for R&D have led to dramatic The current level of R&D funding in both the public and shrinkage in university programs in power systems. For private sectors of the electric industry is at an all-time low. a while the field was seen by many electrical engineering Neither the utility industry nor the electrical apparatus indus- (EE) departments as uninteresting. Today, with all the new try is spending as much as could be justified by the expected developments underway, that is no longer true. However, benefits of improved technology, particularly for longer-term when having to choose between hiring an assistant professor research. The committee believes that a much larger annual in power engineering who might manage to secure research R&D investment is required in order for today's transmission support of a few hundred thousand dollars per year, and an and distribution technologies to evolve and for the necessary assistant professor in a field such as micro-electronics who new technologies to become realities. might succeed in securing research support in excess of a In trying to be responsive to their stakeholders, utilities million dollars per year, EE department heads have been typically tend to limit R&D to areas of immediate applica- understandably reluctant to replace retiring power engineers tion and payback. Aside from these short-term develop- or add new junior faculty in this area. The result has been a ments, utilities have little incentive to invest in R&D for growing shortage of people with strong technical capabili- the longer term. Furthermore, for regulated investor-owned ties in this field. utilities, there is the additional pressure caused by Wall Societal benefits from adequate R&D investment in the Street to sustain and increase dividends. In addition, during electric power delivery system could extend far beyond the restructuring of the last decade a substantial number of the benefits from enhancing the resilience of the power utilities agreed to rate caps, which, in the face of ongoing cost system. These include the economic benefits from enhanc- increases, put pressure on what were perceived as discretion- ing the depth of research in the United States overall and ary budget items such as R&D. Government is likely to be the enhancements in overall productivity. A modern power the only source of funding for basic and long-term R&D. delivery system is critical to supporting the nation's future Therefore, this research is unlikely to be undertaken unless and will not evolve without increased R&D. the government significantly increases funding for electric transmission and distribution R&D. A Possible Path Forward There have been various attempts in regulatory proceed- ings to encourage or establish increased levels of R&D To achieve the level of R&D expenditure discussed above, investments. The results from such efforts have been mixed. R&D budgets would have to be increased substantially both In some cases, funds have been used for economic develop- in industry and by the federal government. To date, no agree- ment activities or local demonstrations of already commer- ment has been reached by the diverse players in the power cially available technology, activities that contribute little to industry, political decision makers, or society as a whole on stimulating the innovations in science and technology that a strategy to secure funding at a level to adequately address are needed. Usually, developments by any one state are not research needs in the electricity industry. This committee sufficient to influence the market for technology. Collabora- likewise found total agreement hard to attain, with all but a tive programs have had more success in this regard; however, few members of the committee agreeing that federal legisla- states have difficulty in funding any research outside their tion and regulations should be pursued that can achieve the state. following goals for the electric power sector:3 In addition, the enthusiasm among state regulators to encourage higher levels of R&D for the utilities they 3The committee did not achieve consensus on the need for substantial regulate is tempered by the difficulty of providing strong additional federal funding because of the following issues: a) as a mature business cases for R&D--the results of which are inher- industry, electric power companies and suppliers should be able to fund their ently unpredictable. Moreover, investments in R&D often own research; b) rapidly expanding grids in other countries should provide ample incentives for new developments; and (c) much of the underlying require patience before longer-term paybacks are realized. R&D is done by other industries (e.g,, communications and information

OCR for page 91
RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT NEEDS FOR THE ELECTRIC POWER DELIVERY SYSTEM 103 A coherent national plan for increasing both public rations, or state and federal government entities, such and private sector R&D funding to address electricity as national laboratories; needs; Regular open review of each individual industry An increase in the current level of U.S. R&D (public participant's R&D portfolio by a consortium of its and private) to $10 billion per year. While somewhat stakeholders to obtain input on research direction and speculative, this amount is approximately three times priorities; the current level of R&D, but only about 3 percent Exclusion of activities from the proposed R&D of total U.S. R&D, only about 0.1 percent of U.S. program according to the definition by the Internal annual GDP, and less than 5 percent of annual utility Revenue Service, which is as follows: "Scientific revenue; research does not include activities of a type ordi- An approximate doubling of federal electricity R&D narily carried on as an incident to commercial or budgets, increases that should not be burdened with industrial operations, as, for example, the ordinary further earmarks; testing or inspection of materials or products or the A federally legislated requirement that the electric- designing or construction of equipment, buildings, ity industry's share of this increase for R&D should etc." (Treasury, 1986); come from consumers; Oversight of the program by an appropriate combi- Specification by such a mandate that 3 percent of nation of accountability authorities--such as state the amount charged on a consumer's electricity bill energy regulatory commissions, the Federal Energy be directed to R&D. Existing programs and R&D Regulatory Commission, or the Internal Revenue budgets that meet the criteria outlined below should Service--charged with ensuring that research dol- be awarded the funds raised by the 3 percent levy. The lars are being applied to their intended targets. To program should be designed to require each and every facilitate tracking, appropriate accounting systems industry or market participant4 to invest 3 percent of will have to be implemented; the value-added portion of their revenues annually A 10-year sunset and review embedded into the pro- in R&D as defined below. Value-added should be gram design. defined as follows: -- For the generation portion, it should be the total The committee recognizes the potential for a variety of cost of generation. pitfalls in a program with the general objectives outlined -- For the transmission ownership portion, it should above. If they are not carefully crafted, such programs also be the transmission wires charge. can be subject to abuse. Accordingly, the committee recom- -- For the transmission operations portion, it should mends that an executive branch agency be charged with be the cost of operations. developing a proposal that addresses the issues in implement- -- For the distribution portion, it should be the distri- ing such a program. bution wires charge. --For the retail service provider, it should be the mar- ALTERNATIVE VIEWS OF HOW POWER SYSTEMS ginal cost of services provided to the consumer. COULD EVOLVE Structuring of the program to ensure that the amount invested in R&D is fully recoverable from consumers In large measure, today's electric power system can be according to a method that involves every U.S. pro- viewed as comprising more than 130 cohesive electrical vider and consumer in as fair and equitable a manner zones. These zones have evolved based on utilities' efforts as possible. Consumers generally are the intended to meet the growth in electrical load by locating generat- beneficiaries of the outcomes of the needed R&D and ing facilities reasonably close to customer load centers and ultimately must pay the bill; arranging a network of electric transmission and distribution Management of the investments in R&D by the systems (wires, breakers, transformers, and so on) to meet industry participant (1) to conduct R&D directly customer needs. These zones were tied together over time itself or to contract such work to a for-profit research (interconnected) to enhance reliability and to enable the most provider or (2) to fund R&D performed by nonprofit cost-effective and efficient use of generation. Many zones research institutions, national public-private collabo- are considered "control areas" and are controlled in an inde- pendent way that includes coordination with other control technology) which the electric industry should be able to adapt and apply areas in a region. Today's control areas could be described without more federal spending. Most committee members conclude that as being partially independent while being integrated with the needed R&D will not take place on a useful schedule without more neighboring control areas. federal involvement. The configuration of today's power system is based 4This includes vertically integrated utilities, power generators, transmis- largely on central station power plants located in control sion owners, transmission operators, distribution utilities, and retail provid- ers (where they are active). areas. The power delivery system that integrates these power

OCR for page 91
104 TERRORISM AND THE ELECTRIC POWER DELIVERY SYSTEM Centralized Independent Fully Functional Control Areas with Bulk Power Limited Integration Deli very System Delivery (Today) Fully Integrated Autonomous Communications, Automation Sensors & Computational Ability Ab Independent Building Integrated Interconnected Systems & Microgrids & Microgrids Distribution Systems FIGURE 9.2Alternative ways in which power systems could Decentralized evolve. production facilities with consumers is constrained, as evi- The decentralized approach starts with the notion that denced by the growing number of failed wholesale transac- consumers increasingly expect energy-consuming devices tions. In addition, the power delivery system is mechanically and appliances to operate optimally. Optimal operation not controlled with only limited integration of communications, only potentially enables a highly mobile digital society, but automation, or computational ability. Figure 9.2 depicts also, once the optimal performance of devices is defined, the potential evolution of today's power system along two provides elements of performance which enable, in turn, dominant dimensions--one the degree of centralization, the FIGURE 9.2 a building-integrated system. Building-integrated systems other the degree of system integration--fully integrated com- can also accommodate increasing consumer demands for munications, sensors, and computational ability vs. greater independence, convenience, appearance, environmentally autonomy depending on how automation occurs. friendly service, and cost control. In this paradigm, the issue of whether tomorrow's power Building-integrated systems can, in turn, be integrated system will become more decentralized or more centralized into distributed systems, which can then be interconnected is the greatest driver. The path taken will affect decisions and integrated with technologies that ultimately enable about which technologies to pursue most vigorously, but the a fully integrated national-scale "perfect" power system committee does not recommend one approach over the other. (Figure 9.3). Note that such systems could be restricted in terms of their rating size and might not have the advantage of economies of scale that current interconnected centralized The Decentralized Approach systems have. Each configuration in this approach reflects The basic philosophy in the decentralized approach is to a distributed level of both instrumentation and control and first increase the independence, flexibility, and intelligence would require a complementary set of milestones on the path of local systems for optimization of energy use and energy to comprehensive national power system perfection. management at the local level, and then to integrate local The four different configurations reflect development of systems as necessary or justified for delivering power supply the system in two important dimensions: and services that consumers desire. Four configurations are associated with a decentralized approach: Level of intelligence and energy capacity in distrib- uted devices and systems. Increased investment in Device-level power systems local intelligence and infrastructure also accelerates Building-integrated power systems progress through entrepreneurial leadership opportu- Distributed power systems nities not initially available at higher levels of system Fully integrated power systems integration.

OCR for page 91
RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT NEEDS FOR THE ELECTRIC POWER DELIVERY SYSTEM 105 Technology of Today's Power Systems FIGURE 9.3 Development path for the perfect power system. SOURCE: Galvin Electricity Initiative (2006). Level of integration of the entire power delivery infra- FIGURE 9.4 Evolution of possible configurations (from center structure. Higher levels of integration require ever outward) and relevant nodes of innovation (in outer ring) enabling more significant transformation of the infrastructure the power system. SOURCE: Galvin Electricity Initiative (2006). for communications and control, as well as of the overall power delivery infrastructure. sions, because it is typically possible to operate them as New type in gray box Each of these configurations can essentially be considered high-efficiency combined heat and power systems. The net and new arrows FIGURE 9.4 can be twice that of a possible structure for a future power system in its own right, energy use efficiency of such systems but each stage logically evolves to the next stage based on the central stations in which "waste" heat must be disposed of via efficiencies, and the quality or service value improvements, cooling towers. Recent analysis by King (2006) suggests that to be attained. In effect, these potential system configuration even with current technology and rate structures, micro-grids stages build on each other starting from a device-level power could be cost attractive in some applications. However, there system connected to other device-level power systems that are significant regulatory barriers that must be addressed then can evolve into a building-integrated power system, a if such systems are to become widespread (King, 2006; distributed power system, and eventually a fully integrated Morgan and Zerriffi, 2002). power system as diagrammed in Figure 9.4. Figure 9.4 also highlights technologies that would have to be further devel- The Centralized Approach oped for this concept to evolve. The optimum configuration may vary for different envi- The centralized approach assumes that the creation of ronments. For instance, the availability of inexpensive and an intelligent electricity power delivery infrastructure will clean central generation (e.g., advanced coal, advanced evolve from the existing power system through bottom-up nuclear, advanced hydro, and large wind systems) may transformation created by individual companies adding accelerate the migration to the fully integrated stage, whereas advanced capabilities piece by piece onto the existing grid. other service systems developing from new portable, local- The basis of this transformation is that over the last few ized, or distributed infrastructures may achieve their final decades, advances in diverse technologies--solid-state optimum in the distributed structure. electronics, microprocessors, sensors, communications, and In a stochastic simulation of a completely decentralized information technology (IT)--have transformed society and system, Zerriffi (2004) showed that such systems could commerce, permanently increasing society's capabilities achieve dramatic improvements in power delivery reli- and expectations. These advances also present new oppor- ability in the face of system disruptions (see also Farrell et tunities for operating and using the electric power network, al., 2004). Although no civilian system has approached this opportunities not envisioned when the power delivery system level of decentralization, some military systems have begun was first formed. For the power system itself, there is the to evolve toward it. possibility of creating a nimbler, more flexible network that Distributed systems have also become attractive to those marries electric power with cutting-edge communication concerned with energy efficiency and reducing CO2 emis- and computing capabilities--an intelligent system that can

OCR for page 91
106 TERRORISM AND THE ELECTRIC POWER DELIVERY SYSTEM predict power problems before they get out of hand and heal against terrorists, disgruntled employees, or severe natural itself when damage is unavoidable. disasters. There are, however, serious limits (both economic Another aspect of an intelligent system is the ability to and technical) to how much protection current technology fully utilize existing assets through greater system control can provide. Advanced technology can raise these limits and flexibility, along with new concepts of designing for high significantly. The committee's assessment of the status of reliability. Opportunities for improving the overall efficiency research and development for the electric power delivery of the power system equipment use and operation, while still system led it to draw the following general findings. maintaining reliability, are possible in areas such as a dense urban environment, where existing assets are located in close Finding 9.1 Even in the absence of terrorist attacks, cur- proximity but are often not fully employed. rent and projected future inadequacies in the electric power For electricity customers, a smart power system means delivery system are likely to result in deteriorating reliability, not only enhanced power reliability and security but also excessive instances of degraded power quality, and the inabil- new services that can add value by giving customers options ity to provide enhanced services to consumers.5 Inadequate for control of use, and thus the cost of electricity. For investments in this infrastructure and growing demand for example, customers may be able to monitor their building electric power have led to an increasingly stressed system. or industrial-process energy use in real time, choose from a menu of service packages to best fit their energy needs and Finding 9.2 Underinvestment in R&D for the electric power use patterns, and even sell excess electricity from distributed delivery system has been even more pronounced than under- generation back to their power provider. The promise of a investment in the infrastructure. New technologies and tech- smart power delivery system clearly carries advantages for niques are not being developed that could overcome stresses utilities and consumers. and reduce the cost of delivering electric power to meet the The change to an intelligent digital system will come new and growing needs to which the system must respond. from the gradual confluence of innovative projects under- taken by individual companies, rather than through a sud- Finding 9.3 There is considerable overlap between the den transformation. Although the new smart devices and R&D needed to reduce vulnerability to terrorist attack and technologies developed for these projects will be of value the R&D that can address the challenges already faced by individually, the greater benefit to the power network will be the power delivery system. An R&D strategy for the power realized only when they all work together. Ensuring that the delivery system focused exclusively on terrorism is likely to individual sensing, communications, and computing equip- be less cost-effective and less successful than an integrated ment installed over the coming years can be integrated with strategy to address all the needs and challenges confronting other systems and, eventually, come together to form a single the system, including those posed by terrorism. system requires an overall power network architecture--that is, common methods and tools for planning and designing Finding 9.4 EPRI, DOE, and a number of utilities and cor- the smart systems, and a complete suite of standards. For this porations have all engaged in R&D road mapping exercises purpose, current information technology has some shortcom- for the electric power delivery system. The most critical ings. Architecture and standards for power systems have needs are already well identified, and a much larger and to include consideration of how the legacy systems can be more comprehensive R&D program could be created rapidly. preserved and integrated. The elements of this program are listed in Table 9.1. A more At present, more than 150 different communications pro- extensive list is shown in Appendix H. DOE would have tocols are used in the U.S. electric utility industry. Interop- primary responsibility for most of this program. erability in today's environment is thus impossible. The industry and the federal government have begun to recognize Recommendations for R&D to Reduce Vulnerability to this deficiency and have initiated several efforts to formulate Terrorism an architecture that could underpin a smart power system. These various approaches all rely, in one way or another, DHS should cooperate with DOE to support the follow- on one or more innovative technologies. Many of these ing parts of an enhanced R&D program for electric power technologies have not been fully researched, developed, or transmission and distribution to harden the system against demonstrated. terrorism, mitigate the impacts of terrorist acts, and enhance recovery. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS Recommendation 9.1 Complete the development and demonstration of high-voltage recovery transformers, and Findings Currently available technology can and should be used more extensively to protect the power delivery system 5See also Chapters 2, 6, and 7.

OCR for page 91
RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT NEEDS FOR THE ELECTRIC POWER DELIVERY SYSTEM 107 develop plans for the manufacture, storage, and installation The committee believes that electric power R&D bud- of these recovery transformers. gets should be increased substantially, although there was no consensus as to the appropriate source of the funding. Recommendation 9.2 Continue the development and dem- Resolution might come as a result of considering research onstration of the advanced computational system currently policy options: What are the impacts if the funding comes funded by the Department of Homeland Security and under- from the government, or from private industry, or from some way at the Electric Power Research Institute. This system is combination thereof? One possibility is a federally mandated intended to assist in supporting more rapid estimation of the program constructed such that each industry participant state of the system and broader system analysis. invests some fraction (say 3 percent) of the value-added portion of its revenues annually in R&D, that the expense is Recommendation 9.3 Develop a visualization system for fully recoverable, and that the cost is allocated to every U.S. transmission control centers which will support informed provider and consumer as fairly and equitably as possible. operator decision making and reduce vulnerability to human DHS should work with DOE and the Office of Management errors. R&D to this end is underway at the Electric Power and Budget to substantially increase the level of federal basic Research Institute, Department of Energy, Consortium for technology research investment in power delivery. Electric Reliability Technology Solutions, and Power System Engineering Research Center, but improved integration of REFERENCES these efforts is required. EPRI (Electric Power Research Institute). 2004. "Power Delivery System of the Future: A Preliminary Study of Costs and Benefits." Palo Alto, Recommendation 9.4 Develop dynamic systems technol- Calif.: EPRI. ogy in conjunction with response demonstrations now being Farrell, A.E., H. Zerriffi, and H. Dowlatabad. 2004. "Energy Infrastruc- outlined as part of an energy efficiency initiative being ture and Security." Annual Review of Environment and Resources 29: formed by EPRI, the Edison Electric Institute, and DOE. 421469. These systems would allow interactive control of consumer Galvin Electricity. 2006. Phase 1 Summary, The Galvin Electricity Initiative. Available at www.galvinelectricity.org. loads. King, D.E. 2006. "Electric Power Micro-grids: Opportunities and Chal- lenges for an Emerging Distributed Energy Architecture." Ph.D. Thesis, Recommendation 9.5 Develop multilayer control strategies Department of Engineering and Public Policy, Carnegie Mellon Univer- that include capabilities to island and self-heal the power sity, Pittsburgh, Pa. delivery system. This program should involve close coop- Morgan, M.G., and H. Zerriffi. 2002. "The Regulatory Environment for Small Independent Micro-Grid Companies." Electricity Journal 15(9): eration with the electric power industry, building on work in 5257. the Wide Area Management System, the Wide Area Control Treasury (U.S. Department of the Treasury). 1986. Scientific Research System, and the Eastern Interconnection Phasor Project. Under IRC 501(c)(3). Treasury Regulation 1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(5)(ii). Available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-tege/eotopico86.pdf. Accessed Recommendation 9.6 Develop improved energy storage November 2007. Zerriffi, H. 2004. "Electric Power Systems Under Stress: An Evaluation of that can be deployed as dispersed systems. The committee Centralized Versus Distributed System Architectures." Ph.D. Thesis, thinks that improved lithium-ion batteries have the greatest Department of Engineering and Public Policy, Carnegie Mellon Uni- potential. The development of such batteries, which might versity, Pittsburgh, Pa. become commercially viable through use in plug-in hybrid electric vehicles, should be accelerated.