after a terrorist attack might be different, and what preparations need to be taken to deal with such events.

Because the nation’s electric power transmission and distribution systems cannot be made completely impervious to harm from natural or terrorist causes, Chapter 8 explores a different part of the problem—how to ensure that critical services can be maintained if and when the power system is disrupted, especially for a lengthy period.

New technology can do much to reduce the vulnerability of the nation’s electric power system to the risks posed by accidental and natural disruption and terrorist attack and reduce the costs of countering those risks. Chapter 9 explores research needs for reducing vulnerability and puts those in the context of overall electric power system R&D needs.

Chapters 2 through 5, which lay out the problems, end with a set of conclusions but no recommendations. Chapters 6 through 9 consider possible solutions to these problems. They end with both findings and recommendations. Chapter 10 draws these recommendations together and highlights those that the committee views as most important.

I greatly appreciate the efforts made by the many highly qualified experts on the committee. The committee operated under the auspices of the NRC Board on Energy and Environmental Systems and is grateful for the able assistance of James Zucchetto, Alan Crane, Panola Golson, and Duncan Brown of the NRC staff, and of Penelope Gibbs of the NAE Program Office staff.

M. Granger Morgan, Chair

Committee on Enhancing the Robustness and Resilience of Future Electrical Transmission and Distribution in the United States to Terrorist Attack

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