Terrorism and the
Electric Power Delivery System

Committee on Enhancing the Robustness and Resilience of Future Electrical Transmission and Distribution in the United States to Terrorist Attack

Board on Energy and Environmental Systems

Division on Engineering and Physical Sciences

NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL
               OF THE NATIONAL ACADEMIES

THE NATIONAL ACADEMIES PRESS
Washington, D.C.
www.nap.edu



The National Academies | 500 Fifth St. N.W. | Washington, D.C. 20001
Copyright © National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
Terms of Use and Privacy Statement



Below are the first 10 and last 10 pages of uncorrected machine-read text (when available) of this chapter, followed by the top 30 algorithmically extracted key phrases from the chapter as a whole.
Intended to provide our own search engines and external engines with highly rich, chapter-representative searchable text on the opening pages of each chapter. Because it is UNCORRECTED material, please consider the following text as a useful but insufficient proxy for the authoritative book pages.

Do not use for reproduction, copying, pasting, or reading; exclusively for search engines.

OCR for page R1
Committee on Enhancing the Robustness and Resilience of Future Electrical Transmission and Distribution in the United States to Terrorist Attack Board on Energy and Environmental Systems Division on Engineering and Physical Sciences

OCR for page R1
THE NATIONAL ACADEMIES PRESS 500 Fifth Street, NW Washington, DC 20001 NOTICE: The project that is the subject of this report was approved by the Governing Board of the National Research Council, whose members are drawn from the councils of the National Academy of Sciences, the National Academy of Engineering, and the Institute of Medicine. The members of the committee responsible for the report were chosen for their special competences and with regard for appropriate balance. This study was supported by Contract HSHQPA-05-C-00016 between the National Academy of Sciences and the U.S. Department of Homeland Security. Any opinions, findings, conclusions, or recommendations expressed in this publication are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the organizations or agencies that provided support for the project. International Standard Book Number 13: 978-0-309-11404-2 International Standard Book Number 10: 0-309-11404-7 Available in limited supply from Board on Energy and Environmental Systems, National Research Council, 500 Fifth Street, NW, Keck W934, Washington, DC 20011, 202/334-3344. Additional copies available for sale from the National Academies Press, 500 Fifth Street, NW, Keck 360, Washington, DC 20011, 800/624-6242 or 202/334-3313, Internet, http://www.nap.edu. Copyright 2012 by the National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved. Printed in the United States of America

OCR for page R1
The National Academy of Sciences is a private, nonprofit, self-perpetuating society of distinguished scholars engaged in scientific and engineering research, dedicated to the furtherance of science and technology and to their use for the general welfare. Upon the authority of the charter granted to it by the Congress in 1863, the Academy has a mandate that requires it to advise the federal government on scientific and technical matters. Dr. Ralph J. Cicerone is president of the National Academy of Sciences. The National Academy of Engineering was established in 1964, under the charter of the National Academy of Sciences, as a parallel organization of outstanding engineers. It is autonomous in its administration and in the selection of its members, sharing with the National Academy of Sciences the responsibility for advising the federal government. The National Academy of Engineering also sponsors engineering programs aimed at meeting national needs, encourages education and research, and recognizes the superior achievements of engineers. Dr. Charles M. Vest is president of the National Academy of Engineering. The Institute of Medicine was established in 1970 by the National Academy of Sciences to secure the services of eminent members of appropriate professions in the examination of policy matters pertaining to the health of the public. The Institute acts under the responsibility given to the National Academy of Sciences by its congressional charter to be an adviser to the federal government and, upon its own initiative, to identify issues of medical care, research, and education. Dr. Harvey V. Fineberg is president of the Institute of Medicine. The National Research Council was organized by the National Academy of Sciences in 1916 to associate the broad community of science and technology with the Academy's purposes of furthering knowledge and advising the federal government. Functioning in accordance with general policies determined by the Academy, the Council has become the principal operating agency of both the National Academy of Sciences and the National Academy of Engineering in providing services to the government, the public, and the scientific and engineering communities. The Council is administered jointly by both Academies and the Institute of Medicine. Dr. Ralph J. Cicerone and Dr. Charles M. Vest are chair and vice chair, respectively, of the National Research Council. www.national-academies.org

OCR for page R1

OCR for page R1
COMMITTEE ON ENHANCING THE ROBUSTNESS AND RESILIENCE OF FUTURE ELECTRICAL TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION IN THE UNITED STATES TO TERRORIST ATTACK M. GRANGER MORGAN, NAS,1 Carnegie Mellon University, Chair MASSOUD AMIN, University of Minnesota EDWARD V. BADOLATO,2 Integrated Infrastructure Analytics Inc. WILLIAM O. BALL, Southern Company Services ANJAN BOSE, NAE,3 Washington State University CLARK W. GELLINGS, Electric Power Research Institute MICHEHL R. GENT, North American Electric Reliability Corporation (retired) DIANE MUNNS, Edison Electric Institute SHARON L. NELSON, State of Washington Attorney General's Office (retired) DAVID K. OWENS, Edison Electric Institute LOUIS L. RANA, Consolidated Edison Company of New York B. DON RUSSELL JR., NAE,Texas A&M University RICHARD E. SCHULER, Cornell University PHILIP R. SHARP, Resources for the Future CARSON W. TAYLOR, NAE, Bonneville Power Administration (retired) SUSAN F. TIERNEY, Analysis Group VIJAY VITTAL, NAE, Arizona State University PAUL C. WHITSTOCK, Marsh USA Inc. Project Staff Board on Energy and Environmental Systems ALAN CRANE, Study Director DUNCAN BROWN, Senior Program Officer (part time) HARRISON T. PANNELLA, Senior Program Officer (until July 2007) JAMES J. ZUCCHETTO, Director, BEES National Academy of Engineering Program Office PENELOPE GIBBS, Senior Program Associate 1NAS, National Academy of Sciences. 2The committee notes with regret Edward Badolato's death in November 2008. It greatly appreciates his contributions to this report. 3NAE, National Academy of Engineering v

OCR for page R1
BOARD ON ENERGY AND ENVIRONMENTAL SYSTEMS DOUGLAS M. CHAPIN, NAE, MPR Associates Inc., Chair ROBERT FRI, Resources for the Future, Vice Chair RAKESH AGRAWAL, NAE, Purdue University ALLEN J. BARD, NAS, University of Texas, Austin MARILYN BROWN, Georgia Institute of Technology PHILIP R. CLARK, NAE, GPU Nuclear Corporation (retired) MICHAEL CORRADINI, NAE, University of Wisconsin, Madison E. LINN DRAPER JR., NAE, American Electric Power Inc. (retired) CHARLES H. GOODMAN, Southern Company DAVID G. HAWKINS, Natural Resources Defense Council DAVID K. OWENS, Edison Electric Institute WILLIAM F. POWERS, NAE, Ford Motor Company (retired) TONY PROPHET, HP Personal Systems Group MICHAEL P. RAMAGE, NAE, ExxonMobil Research and Engineering Company MAXINE L. SAVITZ, NAE, Honeywell Inc. (retired) PHILIP R. SHARP, Resources for the Future SCOTT W. TINKER, University of Texas, Austin Staff JAMES ZUCCHETTO, Director DUNCAN BROWN, Senior Program Officer (part-time) ALAN CRANE, Senior Program Officer JOHN HOLMES, Senior Program Officer MARTIN OFFUTT, Senior Program Officer (until April 2007) MATT BOWEN, Senior Program Associate (until November 2007) JENNIFER BUTLER, Financial Assistant DANA CAINES, Financial Associate PANOLA GOLSON, Program Associate (until May 2007) LANITA JONES, Program Associate KATHERINE BITTNER, Senior Project Assistant NOTE: Board and staff membership as of the date of initial approval of this report in 2007. vi

OCR for page R1
Foreword The electric power transmission and distribution system (the grid) is a critical and extraordinarily complex part of the nation's infrastructure. The National Academy of Engineering called the grid the world's largest integrated machine and a central part of the greatest engineering achievement of the 20th century--electrification of modern society. Reliable electricity service is essential to health, welfare, national security, communica- tion, and commerce. Because of its scale, geographic reach, and complexity, however, the grid also poses many security challenges in maintaining reliable operation. Furthermore, more than 90 percent of the U.S. power grid is privately owned and regulated by the states, making it challenging for the federal government to address potential vulnerabilities to its operation, and perhaps especially its vulnerability to terrorist attack. This report, prepared by a committee of dedicated experts assembled by the National Research Council (NRC), addresses those vulnerabilities and how they can be reduced. The committee began work in the fall of 2004 and completed it in the fall of 2007 with the intention of releasing the report by the end of that year. As required under the contract, the report was submitted to the sponsor, the Science and Technology Directorate of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), for security classification review. In August 2008, following protracted discussions regarding the information that would be suitable for public dissemination, DHS concluded that the report would be classified in its entirety under the original classification authority vested in the DHS undersecretary for science and technology. Because the committee believed that the report as submitted contained no restricted information, the NRC requested the formal classification guidance constituting the basis for the classification decision. That guidance was not provided, and so in August 2010, the NRC submitted a formal request for an updated security classification review. Finally, in August 2012, the current full report was approved for public release, reversing the original classification decision, except that several pages of information deemed classified are available to readers who have the necessary security clearance. We regret the long delay in approving this report for public release. We understand the need to safeguard security information that may need to remain classified. But openness is also required to accelerate the progress with current technology and implementation of research and development of new technology to better protect the nation from terrorism and other threats. Even though the committee's work was completed in 2007, the report's key findings remain highly relevant. We believe that we have a responsibility to make this report avail- able to the public. Major cascading blackouts in the U.S. Southwest in 2011, and in India in 2012, underscore the need for the measures discussed in this report. The nation's power grid is in urgent need of expansion and upgrading. Incorporating the technologies discussed in the report can greatly reduce the grid's vulnerability to cascading failures, whether initi- vii

OCR for page R1
viii FOREWORD initiated by terrorists, nature, or malfunctions. In fact the report already has helped DHS focus on research aimed at developing a recovery transformer that could be deployed rap- idly if many large power transformers were destroyed. Electric utilities and other private sector entities, state and local governments, and others involved with electric power are also likely to find the information in this report very useful. Concurrent with the report's release to the public, a workshop is being planned to address changes that have occurred since the report's completion in 2007. It is of vital interest to us all to ensure that the risk of a widespread, long-term blackout is minimized. We hope that the effort reflected in this report will contribute to achieving that goal. Ralph J. Cicerone Charles M. Vest President, National Academy of Sciences President, National Academy of Engineering Chair, National Research Council Vice-Chair, National Research Council

OCR for page R1
Preface The electric power transmission and distribution systems are the wires and associated equipment that carry power from central generators to end users. Such systems provide almost all of the electricity that is essential for the operation of the economy and for human well-being. They also are difficult to protect and have been attacked by terrorists elsewhere in the world. Therefore, it is important to think about what can be done to make them less vulnerable to attack, how power can be rapidly restored if an attack occurs, and how important services can be sustained while the power is out. This report explores all of these issues, describes the current situation, and makes recommendations for improvements. This report was requested by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security as part of its efforts to protect the nation's critical infrastructure. The National Research Council (NRC) established the Committee on Enhancing the Robustness and Resilience of Future Electri- cal Transmission and Distribution in the United States to Terrorist Attack to conduct the study. The committee's statement of task is given in Appendix A. Committee members were selected from academia, industry, state government agencies, and other organizations. They brought considerable expertise on electric power networks, their operation and regulation, security, and other issues. Biographical sketches of the committee members are presented in Appendix B. The committee met six times in 2005 and 2006 to gather information from public sources (listed in Appendix C) and to discuss the key issues. It also held several conference calls. Throughout the study the committee worked carefully to balance the need to explore issues with sufficient depth to ensure that key decision makers and other readers can under- stand the problem well enough to take informed action, while at the same time not laying out a "cookbook" that tells terrorists how to plan an attack that would do maximum dam- age. Thus, for example, the committee has been intentionally vague about some specific vulnerabilities or some modes of attack. Chapter 1 frames the problem. It briefly describes the transmission and distribution systems; notes the differences between common disruptions and intentional attacks on the system; asks who might want to attack the system; and explores what the impact of such attacks might be. Chapter 2 analyzes the structure and operation of the transmission and distribution sys- tem affecting the vulnerabilities that it faces. In the three chapters that follow the committee discusses the vulnerabilities of the system in terms of physical attack (Chapter 3); cyber security for guarding against/thwarting attacks on communications, sensors, and controls (Chapter 4); and the people who run, or have access to, the system (Chapter 5). Chapter 6 focuses on how the system can be protected and how it can be modified to minimize the damage if it is attacked. Once portions of the transmission and distribution system have been disrupted, restoring service becomes important. Chapter 7 discusses how this is currently done, how restoration ix

OCR for page R1
x PREFACE after a terrorist attack might be different, and what preparations need to be taken to deal with such events. Because the nation's electric power transmission and distribution systems cannot be made completely impervious to harm from natural or terrorist causes, Chapter 8 explores a different part of the problem--how to ensure that critical services can be maintained if and when the power system is disrupted, especially for a lengthy period. New technology can do much to reduce the vulnerability of the nation's electric power system to the risks posed by accidental and natural disruption and terrorist attack and reduce the costs of countering those risks. Chapter 9 explores research needs for reducing vulnerability and puts those in the context of overall electric power system R&D needs. Chapters 2 through 5, which lay out the problems, end with a set of conclusions but no recommendations. Chapters 6 through 9 consider possible solutions to these problems. They end with both findings and recommendations. Chapter 10 draws these recommendations together and highlights those that the committee views as most important. I greatly appreciate the efforts made by the many highly qualified experts on the com- mittee. The committee operated under the auspices of the NRC Board on Energy and Environmental Systems and is grateful for the able assistance of James Zucchetto, Alan Crane, Panola Golson, and Duncan Brown of the NRC staff, and of Penelope Gibbs of the NAE Program Office staff. M. Granger Morgan, Chair Committee on Enhancing the Robustness and Resilience of Future Electrical Transmission and Distribution in the United States to Terrorist Attack

OCR for page R1
Acknowledgments The Committee on Enhancing the Robustness and Resilience of Electrical Transmission and Distribution in the United States to Terrorist Attacks is grateful to the many individuals who contributed their time and effort to this National Research Council (NRC) study. The presentations at committee meetings provided valuable information and insight on electric- ity technologies and system operations. The committee thanks the following individuals who provided briefings: Edward V. Badolato, Integrated Infrastructure Analytics Inc., William Ball, Southern Company Services, Tom Bowe, PJM Interconnection, John Caskey, National Electrical Manufacturers Association, Christopher L. DeMarco, University of Wisconsin-Madison, James Fama, Edison Electric Institute, Joseph Fiorito, Caterpillar Inc., Clark Gellings, Electric Power Research Institute, Michehl R. Gent, North American Electric Reliability Council, David Hall, Tennessee Valley Authority, David Hawkins, California ISO, Bruce A. Hedman, Energy and Environmental Analysis Inc., David Meyer, U.S. Department of Energy, Scott Mix, KEMA Inc., Dave Nevius, North American Electric Reliability Council, David K. Owens, Edison Electric Institute, William Parks, U.S. Department of Energy, Lou Rana, Consolidated Edison Company of New York, William Rees Jr., U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Julio Rodriguez, Idaho National Laboratory, Robert Schainker, Electric Power Research Institute, Gene Tsudik, University of California, Irvine, and Joseph Weiss, KEMA Inc. (via telephone). This report has been reviewed in draft form by individuals chosen for their diverse per- spectives and technical expertise, in accordance with procedures approved by the NRC's Report Review Committee. The purpose of the independent review is to provide candid and critical comments that will assist the institution in making its published report as sound as possible and to ensure that the report meets institutional standards for objectivity, evidence, and responsiveness to the study charge. The review comments and draft manuscript remain xi

OCR for page R1
xii ACKNOWLEDGMENTS confidential to protect the integrity of the deliberative process. We wish to thank the fol- lowing individuals for their review of this report: Daniel Bienstock, Columbia University, Earl Boebert, Sandia National Laboratories (retired), Tom Bowe, PJM Interconnection, Doug Chapin (NAE), MPR Associates, Thomas Garrity, Siemens Power Transmission & Distribution, Michael Greenberg, Rutgers University, Thomas Overbye, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, Larry Papay (NAE), Science Applications International Corporation (retired), Walter Robb (NAE), Vantage Management, Hal Scherer (NAE), Commonwealth Electric Company (retired), Rick Sergel, North American Electric Reliability Corporation, and Irvin (Jack) White, New York State Energy Research and Development Authority (retired). Although the reviewers listed above have provided many constructive comments and suggestions, they were not asked to endorse the conclusions or recommendations, nor did they see the final draft of the report before its release. The review of this report was over- seen by Chris Whipple, Review Monitor, and Naraim G. Hingorani, Review Coordinator. Appointed by the National Research Council, they were responsible for making certain that an independent examination of this report was carried out in accordance with institutional procedures and that all review comments were carefully considered. Responsibility for the final content of this report rests entirely with the authoring committee and the institution. The individuals listed below responded to the committee's questionnaire on research and development needs for transmission and distribution systems, as discussed in Chap- ter 9. This exercise was important in helping the committee to prioritize R&D needs for countering terrorism. Michael F. Ahern, Northeast Utilities, Kenneth Anderson, Tri-State Generation & Transmission Association Inc., Navin B. Bhatt, American Electric Power Service Corp., Steve DeCarlo, New York Power Authority, John L. Del Monaco, Public Service Electric & Gas Co., Douglas R. Fitchett, American Electric Power Service Corp., Brice Freeman, Electric Power Research Institute, Paul Hines, Carnegie Mellon University, Jim Hunter, International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, Ed Jakubiak, Detroit Edison Co., Gregg Lawry, Alliant Energy Corporation, Glenn L. McCullough Jr., TVA (retired), William E. Muston, TXU Power, James T. Rhodes, Virginia Power (retired), David E. Schleicher, PPL Electric Utilities Corp., David G. Victor, Stanford University, and Thomas M. Wick, We Energies.

OCR for page R1
Contents SUMMARY1 The Nature of the Problem, 1 Physical Vulnerability, 2 Cyber Vulnerability, 2 Personnel Vulnerability, 2 Reducing Risks, 3 Reduce Vulnerability, 3 Expedite Restoration, 4 Reduce Vulnerability of Critical Services in the Event of Outages, 5 The Importance of Investment in Research, 5 What Should the Department of Homeland Security Do?, 6 1THE ELECTRIC TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM AS A TERRORIST TARGET 7 The Electric Power System and Its Vulnerability, 7 Non-malicious Threats to the Electricity Delivery System, 8 Potential Attacks on the Electric Power System, 9 Precedents for Attacks on Power Systems, 14 Impacts of Widespread, Long-Lasting Blackouts, 16 Actions Taken So Far to Reduce Vulnerability, 17 Actions by the Utility Industry, 17 Actions by Government, 17 Conclusions, 18 References, 18 2 THE ELECTRIC POWER SYSTEM TODAY 20 The Power Delivery System, 21 Overview Description, 21 Regional Differences Among Electric Power Systems in the United States, 23 Operations and Standards, 23 Electric Power Industry Institutions and Organizations, 23 Implications for System Reliability of an Industry in Transition, 25 Structural Changes in the Industry, 25 Industry Practice--Normal Planning and Operations, 26 Long-Range Planning, 28 Incentives for Transmission and Distribution Facility Investment, 30 Conclusions, 30 References, 31 xiii

OCR for page R1
xiv CONTENTS 3 PHYSICAL SECURITY CONSIDERATIONS FOR ELECTRIC POWER SYSTEMS 32 The Threat, 32 Power System Choke Points and Vulnerabilities, 32 Points of Vulnerability, 33 Countermeasures, 34 Repair and Restoration, 35 Consequence Management, 35 Post 9/11 Power Industry Physical Security Enhancements, 36 Conclusions, 37 References, 37 4 VULNERABILITIES OF SYSTEMS FOR SENSING, COMMUNICATION, AND CONTROL 38 Sensing, Communication, and Control Subsystems, 38 Functions of Sensing, Communication, and Control Elements of a Typical Power System, 38 Threats and Risk, 41 Toward Secure Systems for Sensing, Communication, and Control, 42 Conclusions, 44 Bibliography, 46 5 VULNERABILITIES RELATED TO THE PEOPLE WHO RUN THE ELECTRIC POWER SYSTEM 48 Security Threats from Insiders, 48 Planning, Training, and Rehearsal, 49 Preparatory Activities, 49 First Responders, 49 Errors and Automation, 49 Aging Workforce, Recruiting, and Training, 51 Workforce Vulnerability to Pandemics, 53 Conclusions, 53 References, 54 6 MITIGATING THE IMPACT OF ATTACKS ON THE POWER SYSTEM 55 Bulk Power System Engineering, 55 Substation Design and Modernization, 56 Power System Protective Relaying, 57 Sensors, 59 Automatic Controls for Power Systems, 59 Power System Operations and Energy Management Systems, 60 Distribution Engineering, 63 Distributed Generation/Energy Sources, 65 Findings and Recommendations, 66 Findings, 66 Recommendations, 67 Bibliography, 67 7 RESTORATION OF THE ELECTRIC POWER SYSTEM AFTER AN ATTACK 69 Planning for the Aftermath of a Terrorist Attack, 69 Ensuring Access to Physical Equipment for Restoration, 71 Organizing for Restoration, 73 Coordination of Essential Services, 73 Crisis Communication, 73 Partnering for Mutual Assistance, 74 Additional Special Considerations, 74 Testing for Restoration--Drills, 75 Restoration Considerations, 75

OCR for page R1
CONTENTS xv Service Restoration, 76 Black-Start Equipment, 77 Restoring Damaged Infrastructure, 77 Communications with the Public, 78 Findings and Recommendations, 79 Findings, 79 Recommendations, 80 References, 81 8STRATEGIES FOR SECURING CRUCIAL SERVICES AND CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE 82 IN THE EVENT OF AN EXTENDED POWER OUTAGE The Need for Planning for Outages, 82 Strategies for Securing Crucial Services, 83 Assessing and Mitigating Vulnerabilities, 83 Improving the Reliability of Services, 86 The Importance of Federal Leadership, 89 Findings and Recommendations, 89 Finding, 89 Recommendations, 90 References, 90 9 RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT NEEDS FOR THE ELECTRIC POWER DELIVERY SYSTEM 91 R&D for Meeting Three Broad Goals, 91 Thwarting Attacks, 91 Reducing Vulnerability to Attacks, 91 Reducing the Impact of an Attack, 92 Major Technology Areas for Reducing Vulnerability to Natural Disasters and Terrorist Attacks, 92 Technologies That Allow Significant Increases in Power Flow, 92 Equipment That Allows Greater Control of Energy Flows, 93 Advanced Monitoring and Communications Equipment, 93 Technologies That Enable Increased Asset Utilization, 94 Technologies That Are Particularly Intended to Enhance Security, 94 Technologies That Enable Greater Connectivity and Control, 96 Technologies to Reduce Demand on the Power System, 96 Distributed Energy Resources and Power Technologies, 97 R&D Priorities, 97 How Much Research?, 97 Funding Research and Development, 100 Current Situation and Challenges, 100 A Possible Path Forward, 102 Alternative Views of How Power Systems Could Evolve, 103 The Decentralized Approach, 104 The Centralized Approach, 105 Findings and Recommendations, 106 Findings, 106 Recommendations for R&D to Reduce Vulnerability to Terrorism, 106 References, 107 10RECOMMENDATIONS 108 Specific Recommendations for the Department of Homeland Security, 109 Additional Recommendations, 110 Additional Recommendations Primarily for Active Participation by DHS, 110 Recommendations Primarily for Utilities, System Operators, and Law Enforcement, 111 Recommendations Primarily for Congress and/or State Legislatures, 111 Recommendations Primarily for Standards-setting Groups, 112

OCR for page R1
xvi CONTENTS Recommendations Primarily for State Government, Regions, and Communities, 112 Recommendations Primarily for DOE, EPRI, and Other Research Organizations, 112 APPENDIXES A Statement of Task 117 B Committee Biographical Information 119 C List of Presentations and Committee Meetings 124 DAcronyms 126 E Summary of NERC Cyber Security Standards 128 F Substation Configurations 134 G Controlling Power Systems 137 H R&D Needs for the Power Delivery System 142

OCR for page R1
Tables, Figures, and Boxes TABLES S.1 Examples of Options for Minimizing Vulnerability, 3 1.1 Some Worldwide Examples of Cascading Power Failures with Potential or Actual Widespread Impact, 13 2.1 Major Industry Players in the U.S. Electric Industry, 24 8.1 Examples of Critical Social Services That Depend on the Availability of Electric Power, 84 9.1 Promising Research Technologies for Reducing Vulnerability, 98 H.1 Research Area Options Primarily for the Existing Bulk Power (Transmission) System Architecture, 142 H.2 Research Area Options for Enabling New Bulk Power (Transmission) System Architecture, 144 H.3 Research Area Options Primarily for Existing Distribution System Architecture, 144 H.4 Research Area Options for Enabling New Distribution System Architecture, 145 H.5 Research Area Options Primarily for Existing Device and Building Systems, 146 H.6 Research Area Options for Enabling New Device and Building Systems Architecture, 146 FIGURES 1.1aSystem Average Interruption Duration Index (SAIDI) indicators for U.S. utilities for the period 1992 to 2001 (excluding major events), 8 1.1bSystem Average Interruption Frequency Index (SAIFI) indicators for U.S. utilities for the period 1992 to 2001 (excluding major events), 9 1.2aSystem Average Interruption Duration Index (SAIDI) indicators internationally for the period 1992 to 2001 (excluding only interruptions caused by major storms and hurricanes), 10 1.2bSystem Average Interruption Frequency Index (SAIFI) indicators internationally for the period 1992 to 2001 (excluding only interruptions caused by major storms and hurricanes), 10 1.3 Relative frequency of electrical outages in the United States between 1984 and 2000, 11 1.4 Frequency of electrical outages in the United States over time, 11 1.5 Annual number of transmission loading relief events since 1997, 11 1.6 Illustrative analogy of electric transmission and distribution, 12 1.7 Simple classification of potential power system attackers, 15 2.1 The NERC regions, along with the interconnection areas, 22 xvii

OCR for page R1
xviii TABLES, FIGURES, AND BOXES 4.1 Perceived threats to power system control centers as reported in a survey of electric utilities conducted by EPRI in 2000, 39 4.2 Simplified diagram of the sensing, communication, and control systems associated with a typical power system, 40 4.3 Road map for achieving secure control systems in the energy sector, 43 5.1 Typical power industry employee age distribution, 52 6.1 Protection and control system characteristics, 58 6.2 Power system stability controls, 60 6.3 Modern emergency management system, 61 6.4 Balancing areas, 62 6.5 Reliability coordinators, 63 9.1 Diagrammatic means for estimating potential terrorist attack cost mitigation resulting from investment in R&D, 99 9.2 Alternative ways in which power systems could evolve, 104 9.3 Development path for the perfect power system, 105 9.4 Evolution of possible configurations and relevant nodes of innovation enabling the power system, 105 F.1 One-line diagram of main and transfer bus scheme, 134 F.2 One-line diagram of breaker-and-a-half bus configuration, 135 F.3 One-line diagram for ring bus configuration, 135 F.4 One-line diagram of double breakerdouble bus configuration, 136 G.1 Power system stability controls, 139 G.2 August 14, 2003, voltage profile from west to east across northern Ohio, 140 G.3 August 14, 2003, reactive power production and reserves, 140 BOXES 3.1 Security Criteria to Be Considered in Evaluating Substation Security, 33 3.2 Examples of Security Protocols and Mitigation Measures Intended to Provide Protection Against Current Terrorist Threats, 36 3.3 Steps Taken by Most U.S. Utilities to Limit Access to Facilities and Information, 36 3.4 Examples of Technical Physical Security Skills and Practices Being Developed and Implemented by Electric Power Industry Security Personnel, 37 4.1 Addressing Control System Vulnerabilities, 45 8.1 The Pittsburgh Study, 87 9.1Questionnaire Respondents' Views on General R&D Needs for the Power Delivery System Needed Specifically to Address Terrorism, 100