Below is the uncorrected machine-read text of this chapter, intended to provide our own search engines and external engines with highly rich, chapter-representative searchable text of each book. Because it is UNCORRECTED material, please consider the following text as a useful but insufficient proxy for the authoritative book pages.
1 absorbed dose å¸æ¶åéãxÄ«shÅu jìlià ngã absorption å¸æ¶ãxÄ«shÅuã Accelerated Strategic å éæç¥è®¡ç®å¡è®® Computing Initiative (ASCI) ãjiÄsù zhà nlüè jìsuà n chà ngyìã Note: The program has been changed 注ï¼ç°å·²æ¹ä¸ºâå è¿æ¨¡æä¸è®¡ç®è®¡ to Advanced Simulation and Computing åâã(æºèªï¼åèæç®[37]) Program (ASC). (From: Reference [37]) E account balance è´¦é¢å¹³è¡¡ãzhà ngmià n pÃnghéngã C accounting records è¡¡ç®è®°å½ãhéngsuà n jìlùã acquisition strategy/acquisition éåçç¥/éåéå¾ path ãcÇibà n cèlüè cÇibà n tújìngã A (hypothetical) scheme which a State æå½è°åç¨äºå¶é æ ¸çç¸è£ ç½®çæ ¸ could consider to acquire nuclear mate- ææçä¸ç§(设æ³)çç¥ã(æºèªï¼åè rial usable for manufacturing a nuclear æç®[4]ï¼3.8) explosive device. (From: Reference [4], 3.8) active defense 积æé²å¾¡ãjÄ«jà fángyùã Note 1: A term used to describe Chinaâs 注 1ï¼ç¨ä»¥æè¿°ä¸å½åäºæç¥çæ¯ military strategy. It includes the follow- ing main elements: firstly, taking a firm è¯ãå®ä¸»è¦å æ¬ä»¥ä¸ä¸æ¹é¢çå å®¹ï¼ stand of self-defense and gaining ä¸æ¯åæèªå«ç«åºåå®è¡ååå¶ mastery by striking only after the enemy 人ï¼äºæ¯ä»¥ç§¯æ主å¨çåäºåå¤å has struck; secondly, using active æ¿æ²»æäºé²æ¢æäºï¼ä¸æ¯ä¸æ¦æäº military preparations and political struggle to prevent war; thirdly, should çåï¼ä»¥ç§¯æçåå»åè¿æ»ä½æè¾¾ war break out, using active counter- ææç¥é²å¾¡ç®çã (æ¹èªï¼åèæç® attack and offensive operations to [31]ï¼p124-125) achieve strategic defensive objectives. (Modified from: Reference [31], p124-125) Note 2: In the U.S., âactive defenseâ is 注 2ï¼å¨ç¾å½ï¼â积æé²å¾¡âæé the employment of limited offensive åæéçæ»å»ååå»ä»¥é²æ¢ææ¹å action and counterattacks to deny a é¢ç«äºä¸çåºåæå°ç¹ã(æºèªï¼å contested area or position to the enemy. èæç®[9]ï¼p4) (From: Reference [9], p4) Note 3: In the context of missile 注 3ï¼å¨å¯¼å¼¹é²å¾¡é¢åï¼â积æé² defense, âactive defenseâ means the 御âææ¦æªå¹¶æ§æ¯å¯¼å¼¹æå ¶å¼¹å¤´ï¼
2 interception and destruction of missiles âæ¶æé²å¾¡âæ主è¦éè¿ä½¿ç¨çç¸ or their warheads; âpassive defenseâ is æ©ä½åé£ç©åå¨çæ¥æµå¾¡å¼¹å¤´çæ protection against the effects of the ç¨ã(æ¹èªï¼åèæç®[62]) warheads primarily by the use of blast shelters, stockpiling of food, etc. (Modified from: Reference [62]) active neutron detection ææºä¸åæ¢æµ E A method of determining the existence ãyÇuyuán zhÅngzÇ tà ncèã C of fissionable material through detecting å©ç¨å¤æºè¯±åè£åææè£åï¼éè¿ the neutrons emitted from the fission æ¢æµè£åååºçä¸åèè¯å®è£åæ that is induced by an external source. æåå¨çæ¹æ³ã(æºèªï¼åèæç®[1]ï¼ (From: Reference [1], p495) p495) active nuclear stockpile ç°å½¹æ ¸æ¦åºãxià nyì héwÇkùã active seal ææºå°è®°ãyÇuyuán fÄngjìã Refer to âsealâ åè§âå°è®°â active tag ææºæ ç¾ãyÇuyuán biÄoqiÄnã Refer to âtagâ åè§âæ ç¾â active warhead ç°å½¹å¼¹å¤´ãxià nyì dà ntóuã Ad Hoc Committee of è£åè°å¤ä¼è®®ç¹è®¾å§åä¼ãcáijÅ«n Conference on Disarmament tánpà n huìyì tèshè wÄiyuánhuìã ad hoc inspection ç¹å«è§å¯ãtèbié shìcháã Additional Protocol éå è®®å®ä¹¦ãfùjiÄ yìdìngshÅ«ã aftershock detection ä½éçæµãyúzhèn jiÄncèã Agreed Framework Between ç¾ææ¡æ¶åè®® the United States of American ãmÄi cháo kuà ngjià xiéyìã and the Democratic Peopleâs Republic of Korea agreement åå®/åè®®ãxiédìng xiéyìã Agreement Between the United ç¾èå ³äºå»ºç«åå°æ ¸å±é©ä¸å¿ States of America and the çåå® Union of Soviet Socialist ãmÄi sÅ« guÄnyú jià nlì jiÇnshÇo Republics on the Establishment héwÄixiÇn zhÅngxÄ«n de xiédìngã of Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers
3 Agreement Between the United ç¾èå ³äºé²æ¢æ ¸æäºåå® States of America and the ãmÄi sÅ« guÄnyú fángzhÇ hézhà nzhÄng Union of Soviet Socialist xiédìngã Republics on the Prevention of Nuclear War Agreement on Measures to ç¾èå ³äºåå°çåæ ¸æäºå±é©çæª Reduce the Risk of Outbreak of æ½çåå® Nuclear War Between the ãmÄi sÅ« guÄnyú jiÇnshÇo bà ofÄ E United States of America and hézhà nzhÄng wÄixiÇn de cuòshÄ« de the Union of Soviet Socialist xiédìngã C Republics Agreement on the Privileges å½é ååè½æºæç¹æåè±å åå® and Immunities of the IAEA ãguójì yuánzÇnéng jÄ«gòu tèquán hé huòmiÇn xiédìngã alarm system for physical å®ä½(å®ç©)ä¿æ¤æ¥è¦ç³»ç» protection ãshÃtÇ shÃwù bÇohù bà ojÇng xìtÇngã alert rate of nuclear missiles æ ¸å¯¼å¼¹çæå¤ç The percentage of those missiles that ãhédÇodà n de jièbèilÇã are on various stages of alert and can å¤äºåç§æå¤ç¶æ并è½å¨è§å®åå° launch in stipulated preparatory times in åå¤æ¶é´å å®æ½ä½æåå°çå¯¼å¼¹æ° relation to the entire arsenal of deploy- å é¨ç½²å¯¼å¼¹æ»æ°çç¾åæ¯ã(æ¹èªï¼ ed missiles. (Modified from: Reference [2], p49) åèæç®[2]ï¼p49) ammonium diuranate ééé ¸éµãzhòngyóusuÄnâÄnã announcement å ¬åãgÅnggà oã annual dose å¹´(è¾ç §)åéãnián fúzhà o jìlià ngã annual throughput å¹´éè¿éãnián tÅngguòlià ngã anti-ballistic-missile missile åå¼¹é导弹ç导弹 ãfÇndà ndà odÇodà n de dÇodà nã anti-coercion alarm åèè¿«æ¥è¦ãfÇnxiépò bà ojÇngã Also called anti-hijack alarm. The con- å称åå«ææ¥è¦ãç»å¼çãå·¡é»äºº cealed warning device provided for åé å¤çéè½æ¥è¦è£ ç½®ã(æ¹èªï¼å guards on duty or on patrol. (Modified from: Reference [2], p91) èæç®[2]ï¼p91) aquafluor process æ°´æ°åæµç¨ãshuÇfúhuà liúchéngã
4 aqueous reprocessing æ°´æ³åå¤çãshuÇfÇ hòuchÇlÇã area target é¢ç®æ ãmià n mùbiÄoã arming nuclear weapon æ ¸æ¦å¨è§£ä¿ãhéwÇqì jiÄbÇoã arms control åå¤æ§å¶ãjÅ«nbèi kòngzhìã arms race stability åå¤ç«èµç¨³å®æ§ E ãjÅ«nbèi jìngsà i wÄndìngxìngã C artificial radionuclide 人工æ¾å°æ§æ ¸ç´ ãréngÅng fà ngshèxìng hésùã ASEAN (Association of ä¸çå°åºè®ºå Southeast Asian Nations) ãdÅngméng dìqÅ« lùntánã Regional Forum assassin's mace ææéãshÄshÇujiÇnã A type of metal weapon. Chinese éæ¯ä¸ç§ç±éå±å¶æçå·å µå¨ãå¨ classical novels describe the means of ä¸å½å¤å ¸å°è¯´ä¸æä¸æå®ææ¶åºå ¶ throwing the mace at the adversary ä¸æå°ç¨éææ·ææã以æ±åèç unexpectedly in order to win during ææ°ãå»æå¨å ³é®æ¶å»ä½¿åºçææ¿ fighting. It is a metaphor for an adept æçæ¬é¢æ称ç»æã(æ¹èªï¼åèæç® ability or unique skill used at a critical moment. (Modified from: Reference [36]) [36]) asymmetric warfare é对称æäºãfÄiduìchèn zhà nzhÄngã A war in which either side employs a ä»»ä½ä¸æ¹ä½¿ç¨äºä¸åçæ¦å¨ãææ¯ different weapon, tactic or strategy. âAll ææç¥çæäºãâæææç¥é½åºäº strategy works on asymmetries, so é对称æ§ååè¿è¡è°ååå®æ½ï¼å asymmetric warfare is representative of æ¤çæ§è¿ç¹çæäºé½å ·æéå¯¹ç§°æ§ all rationally executed warfare.â (From: Reference [55], p102-108) ç¹å¾ã (æºèªï¼ â åèæç®[55]ï¼p102-108) atmospheric nuclear test 大æ°å±æ ¸è¯éªãdà qìcéng héshìyà nã atmospheric-pressure fuze of æ ¸æ¦å¨æ°åå¼ä¿¡ãhéwÇqì qìyÄ yÇnxìnã nuclear weapon atomic bomb ååå¼¹ãyuánzÇdà nã Atomic Energy Commission ååè½å§åä¼ ãyuánzÇnéng wÄiyuánhuìã
5 atomic mass ååéãyuánzÇlià ngã atomic nucleus ååæ ¸ãyuánzÇhéã atomic number åååºæ°ãyuánzÇ xùshùã atomic-vapor laser isotope ååè¸æ°æ¿å åä½ç´ åç¦»æ³ separation ãyuánzÇ zhÄngqì jÄ«guÄng tóngwèisù fÄnlÃfÇã E attribute approach å±æ§æ³ãshÇxìngfÇã Identifies treaty-limited objects by C éè¿æµéç©é¡¹çæäºç¹å¾æ¥è¯å«æ¡ measuring certain characteristics of an 约éå®ç©é¡¹çæ¹æ³ãè¿äºç¹å¾ä¸ºæ object that should be displayed by all items of a given general type. (Modified ç¹å®ç±»åçææç©é¡¹æå ·å¤ã(æ¹èªï¼ from: Reference [11], p104) åèæç®[11]ï¼p104) attributes test å±æ§æ£éªãshÇxìng jiÇnyà nã A statistical test of a characteristic (or å¤æä¸ä¸ªç©é¡¹çæ项ç¹å¾(æå±æ§) attribute) of an item to which the 为âæ¯âæâå¦âçç»è®¡è¯éªã(æº response is either âyesâ or ânoâ. (From: èªï¼åèæç®[4]ï¼10.30) Reference [4], 10.30) authentication çå®æ§éªè¯ ãzhÄnshÃxìng yà nzhèngã ballistic-missile early warning å¼¹é导弹é¢è¦ç³»ç» system ãdà ndà odÇodà n yùjÇng xìtÇngã ballistic-missile submarine å¼¹é导弹æ½è ãdà ndà odÇodà n qiántÇngã ban ç¦æ¢ãjìnzhÇã baseline data inspection åºåæ°æ®è§å¯ãjÄ«zhÇn shùjù shìcháã baseline exhibition for éæ ¸éåè½°ç¸æºåºçº¿å±ç¤º non-nuclear heavy bombers ãfÄihé zhòngxÃng hÅngzhà jÄ« jÄ«xià n zhÇnshìã batch data æ¹æ°æ®ãpÄ«shùjùã beginning inventory of nuclear æ ¸ææåæåé material ãhécáilià o chÅ«qÄ« cúnlià ngã The amount of nuclear material at the æä¸è¡¡ç®å¨æå¼å§æ¶ææ¥æçææ beginning of a balancing period. It éãåå§å®ç©åéåºçäºå次ææ should be equal to the inventory at the è¡¡ç®å¨æä¸æ ¸ææçæ«æåéã(æº
6 end of the last material balancing èªï¼åèæç®[2]ï¼p186) period. (From: Reference [2], p186) bilateral cooperation agreement åè¾¹åä½åå® ãshuÄngbiÄn hézuò xiédìngã binding energy ç»åè½ãjiéhéânéngã boiling water reactor (BWR) 沸水å ãfèishuÇduÄ«ã E book inventory of a material ææ平衡åºçè´¦é¢åé C balance area ãcáilià o pÃnghéngqÅ« de zhà ngmià n cúnlià ngã boosted atomic bomb å©çåååå¼¹ ãzhùbà oxÃng yuánzÇdà nã burnup çèãránhà oã calibration æ ¡åãjià ozhÇnã canned subassembly (CSA) ç½è£ ç»ä»¶ãguà nzhuÄng zÇjià nã The secondary assembly in a nuclear æ ¸æ¦å¨çæ¬¡çº§è£ ç½®ï¼å ¶å å å«èå weapon containing both fusion fuel and çæå(大å¤æ°æ åµä¸)éè£ æ(å¯è½ in most cases uranium (some or all of which may be HEU). (From: Reference [11], é¨åæå ¨é¨æ¯é«æµé)ã(æºèªï¼åè p90) æç®[11]ï¼p90) Note: In America, the subassembly that 注ï¼å¨ç¾å½ï¼è¦è£ å ¥æç»æ¦å¨çé¨ is to be incorporated into the final weapon is called a âcanned subassem- 件被称为âç½è£ ç»ä»¶âã blyâ capability of destroying æ¯ä¼¤ç¡¬ç®æ è½å hardened target ãhuÇshÄng yìngmùbiÄo nénglìã capability of destroying soft æ¯ä¼¤è½¯ç®æ è½å target ãhuÇshÄng ruÇnmùbiÄo nénglìã cascade 级èãjÃliánã centrifuge damping device 离å¿æºé»å°¼è£ ç½® ãlÃxÄ«njÄ« zÇnà zhuÄngzhìã centrifuge failure rate 离å¿æºå¤±æçãlÃxÄ«njÄ« shÄ«xià olÇã centrifuge rotor dynamics 离å¿æºè½¬åå¨åå¦ ãlÃxÄ«njÄ« zhuà nzÇ dònglìxuéã
7 centrifuge rotor material 离å¿æºè½¬åææ ãlÃxÄ«njÄ« zhuà nzÇ cáilià oã centrifuge separation plant 离å¿å离工åãlÃxÄ«n fÄnlà gÅngchÇngã chain reaction é¾å¼ååºãlià nshì fÇnyìngã charter å®ªç« ãxià nzhÄngã Chinaâs nonproliferation export ä¸å½é²æ©æ£åºå£ç®¡å¶ä½ç³» E control system ãzhÅngguó fángkuòsà n chÅ«kÇu Chinaâs comprehensive export control guÇnzhì tÇxìã C system regarding various nuclear, bio- ä¸å½å ³äºæ ¸ãçç©ãåå¦å导弹ç logical, chemical and missile-related åç±»ææç©é¡¹åææ¯åææååç sensitive items, technology and all å ¨é¢çåºå£æ§å¶ä½å¶ã(æºèªï¼åèæ military goods.(From: Reference [38]) ç®[38]) circular error probable (CEP) åæ¦çåå·®ãyuán gà ilÇ piÄnchÄã For repeated trials, the radius of a circle 对äºå°å¼¹ã导弹æç¸å¼¹èè¨ï¼å ¶å enclosing half of the impacts of a pro- æ¦çåå·®æ¯æï¼å¨åå¤è¯éªä¸ï¼å jectile, missile, or bomb. (Modified from: å«å ¶åæ°å¼¹çç¹çåå½¢åºåçå Reference [9]) å¾ã(æ¹èªï¼åèæç®[9]) classical super design ç»å ¸è¶ 级模å ãjÄ«ngdiÇn chÄojà móxÃngã classification of reactor ååºå åç±»ãfÇnyìngduÄ« fÄnlèiã clean hydrogen bomb å¹²å氢弹ãgÄnjìng qÄ«ngdà nã close-out inspection 设æ½å ³éè§å¯ ãshèshÄ« guÄnbì shìcháã closed-down facility/closed- å·²å ³é设æ½/å·²å ³éç设æ½å¤åºæ down location outside facilities ãyÇguÄnbì shèshÄ« yÇguÄnbì de shèshÄ«wà i chÇngsuÇã closed nuclear fuel cycle éå¼æ ¸çæå¾ªç¯ There are two common types of nuclear ãbìshì héránlià o xúnhuánã fuel cycle. One is the âopenâ fuel cycle, æ ¸çæ循ç¯é常æ两ç§ç±»åãä¸ç§ in which the spent fuel is not reprocess- æ¯âå¼å¼âçæ循ç¯ï¼å³ä¹çæä¸ ed but kept in storage pending eventual ç»è¿åå¤çï¼å¨æç»å¤ç½®å以åºæ disposal as waste. The other is the âclosedâ fuel cycle, where the spent fuel å½¢å¼å¨åãå¦ä¸ç§æ¯âéå¼âçæ is reprocessed and the uranium and 循ç¯ï¼å³ä¹çæç»è¿åå¤çä»è£å plutonium separated from the fission 产ç©ä¸å离åºéåéãéåéé½å¯
8 products. Both the uranium and the ä½ä¸ºæ°ççæå 件循ç¯ä½¿ç¨ã(æºèªï¼ plutonium can be recycled into new fuel åèæç®[14]ï¼p1-2) elements. (From: Reference [14], p1-2) cobalt bomb é´å¼¹ãgÇdà nã Refer to âinduced-radioactivity bomb â åè§âæçæ¾å°æ§å¼¹â cold war å·æãlÄngzhà nã E collective radiation dose éä½è¾ç §åéãjÃtÇ fúzhà o jìlià ngã C collective security éä½å®å ¨ãjÃtÇ Änquánã An approach to prevent and curb aggre- å¤å½éè¿æç»ç»çéä½è¡å¨æ¥é¢é² ssion and maintain security for countri- es through the organized collective åå¶æ¢ä¾µç¥ï¼ä¿æ¤åå½å®å ¨çä¸ç§ action of multiple countries. (From: æ¹å¼ã(æºèªï¼åèæç®[1]ï¼p23) Reference [1], p23) command, control,communi- ææ¥ãæ§å¶ãéä¿¡åæ æ¥ cation and intelligence system ç³»ç»(C3I ç³»ç») (C3I) ãzhÇhuÄ« kòngzhì tÅngxìn hé qÃngbà o xìtÇng C3I xìtÇngã command, control,communi- ææ¥ãæ§å¶ãéä¿¡ã计ç®å cations, computing and æ æ¥ç³»ç»(C4I ç³»ç») intelligence (C4I) ãzhÇhuÄ« kòngzhì tÅngxìn jìsuà n hé qÃngbà o xìtÇng C4I xìtÇngã Committee on Disarmament è£åè°å¤å§åä¼ ãcáijÅ«n tánpà n wÄiyuánhuìã common security å ±åå®å ¨ãgòngtóng Änquánã A security concept that originated in å·ææ¶æ欧洲形æçä¸ç§å®å ¨æ¦ Europe during the Cold War era. In 1982, the Independent Commission on 念ã1982 å¹´ï¼çå ¸é¦ç¸å¸å°æ¢ 主æ Disarmament and Security Issues çâè£ååå®å ¨é®é¢ç¬ç«å§åä¼â chaired by Swedish prime minister Olof Palme published a report entitled çæ¥åãå ±åå®å ¨ï¼çåèå¾ãä¸ âCommon Security: A Blueprint for é¦æ¬¡æåºã该æ¥å认为ï¼å ±åå®å ¨ Existenceâ, which for the first time put æ¯åºäºè¿æ ·ä¸ç§è®¤è¯ï¼å³å®å ¨çæ forward this concept. The report pointed out that common security is based on ä½³ä¿è¯æ¯éè¿åè¾¹æå¤è¾¹çå¢å¼ºå® the following concept: the best å ¨åä½èééè¿ç¸äºç«äºç强ææ¿ guarantee for security is obtained through cooperation in improving æ²»æ¥è·å¾ã(æºèªï¼åèæç®[1]ï¼p23)
9 security for both or all parties rather than through competitive power politics.(From: Reference [1], p23) communication system for å®ä½ä¿æ¤éä¿¡ç³»ç» physical protection ãshÃtÇ bÇohù tÅngxìn xìtÇngã communique å ¬æ¥ãgÅngbà oã compellence å¨é¼ãwÄibÄ«ã E The use of the threat of force to compel å¨è使ç¨æ¦å以迫使ææéåå·±æ¹ C a desired action by oneâs adversary. ææçè¡å¨ã(æºèªï¼åèæç®[23]) (From: Reference [23]) Note: compellence refers to efforts to 注ï¼å¨é¼è´åäºç»æ¢å·²åççè¡ä¸º stop an action already underway èå¨æ è´åäºé²æ¢æªåççè¡å¨ã whereas deterrence refers to efforts to (æºèªï¼åèæç®[39]) prevent future action. (From: Reference [39]) Derived from: âCompellence⦠usually è¡çï¼å¨é¼ï¼é常å æ¬åèµ·(å¨èæ§) involves initiating an action (or an çè¡å¨(æè¯è¯¸è¡å¨çä¸å¯æ´æ¹ç irrevocable commitment to action) that å³å¿)ï¼åªæå¨å¯¹æä½åº(妥åæ§ç) can cease, or become harmless, only if ååºåæè½ç»æ¢æåå¾æ 害ã(æºèªï¼ the opponent responds.â (From: Reference [23]) åèæç®[23]) complex (diffusion) barrier å¤å±å离è/å¤åå离è A kind of (isotope) separation barrier ãduÅcéng fÄnlÃmó fùhé fÄnlÃmóã composed of multiple layers of ç±å¤å±ä¸åç»æçå¤åèç´§å¯å å compactly overlapped porous barriers ç»æçå离èã(æºèªï¼åèæç®[2]ï¼ with different structure. (From: Reference [2], p81) p81) composite sample æ··åæ ·åãhùnhé yà ngpÇnã comprehensive (full scope) å ¨é¢ä¿éçç£åå® safeguards agreement (CSA) ãquánmià n bÇozhà ng jiÄndÅ« xiédìngã comprehensive national power 综åå½åãzÅnghé guólìã Comprehensive Test Ban å ¨é¢ç¦æ¢æ ¸è¯éªæ¡çº¦ Treaty (CTBT) ãquánmià n jìnzhÇ héshìyà n tiáoyuÄã compressor for gaseous æ°ä½æ©æ£å离åç¼©æº diffusion separation ãqìtÇ kuòsà n fÄnlà yÄsuÅjÄ«ã
10 computer simulation of a æ ¸çç¸ç计ç®æºæ¨¡æ nuclear explosion ãhébà ozhà de jìsuà njÄ« mónÇã concert of powers 大å½åè°ãdà guó xiétiáoã Conference of the Committee è£åå§åä¼ä¼è®® on Disarmament (CCD) ãcáijÅ«n wÄiyuánhuì huìyìã Conference on Disarmament è£åè°å¤ä¼è®® E (CD) ãcáijÅ«n tánpà n huìyìã C Confidence and Security 建ç«ä¿¡ä»»ä¸å®å ¨æªæ½ Building Measures (CSBMs) ãjià nlì xìnrèn yÇ Änquán cuòshÄ«ã configuration of hydrogen 氢弹æå½¢ãqÄ«ngdà n gòuxÃngã bomb contact fuze of nuclear weapon æ ¸æ¦å¨è§¦åå¼ä¿¡ ãhéwÇqì chùfÄ yÇnxìnã containment of nuclear material æ ¸ææå°éãhécáilià o fÄnggéã containment strategy éå¶æç¥ãèzhì zhà nlüèã Refers to the foreign policy strategy of ç¾å½å¨å·æåæè¯å¾é»æ¢èèçæ© the United States during the Cold War å¼ åé²æ¢ä¸äºå½å®¶å¨æ¿æ²»ä¸èµ°åè in which it attempted to stop the expan- sion of the Soviet Union and to prevent èé¢å¯¼çå ±äº§ä¸»ä¹çå¤äº¤æ¿çæ nations moving politically towards com- ç¥ã(æ¹èªï¼åèæç®[40]) munism led by the Soviet Union. (Modified from: Reference [40]) continental shelf 大éæ¶ãdà lùjià ã continuous inspection è¿ç»è§å¯ãliánxù shìcháã An inspection regime intended to 为达å°ä¿éçç£ç®çï¼éè¿å¯çå ³ maintain continuity of knowledge con- é®æä½ãè®°å½æµéåè¿è¡çæ°æ®å¹¶ cerning inventory and flow of nuclear material by witnessing key operations, æ ¸å®è¿äºä¿¡æ¯ï¼å以æç»å°ææ¡æ recording measurement and operating æçåºåæ¸ ååæµåæ åµçè§å¯æº data, and verifying the information in å¶ã(æºèªï¼åèæç®[4]ï¼11.12) order to meet the safeguards objec- tives. (From: Reference [4], 11.12) control center for physical å®ä½ä¿æ¤æ§å¶ä¸å¿ protection ãshÃtÇ bÇohù kòngzhì zhÅngxÄ«nã
11 control sample å¯¹ç §æ ·åãdùizhà o yà ngpÇnã convention å ¬çº¦ãgÅngyuÄã Convention on Physical æ ¸ææå®ä½(ç©)ä¿æ¤å ¬çº¦ Protection for Nuclear Material ãhécáilià o shÃtÇwù bÇohù gÅngyuÄã The convention signed to promote the è¯¥å ¬çº¦ä»¥ä¿è¿ãä¸æ©æ£æ ¸æ¦å¨æ¡çº¦ã peaceful purpose of developing and using nuclear energy among every çåç¼çº¦å½åå¹³åå±åå©ç¨æ ¸è½ä¸º E Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty State ç®çï¼å¹¶å 强åå½å¯¹æ ¸ææ使ç¨ã C Party, to strengthen the protection of å¨ååè¿è¾çä¿æ¤ï¼é²æ¢æ ¸ææç nuclear material usage, storage and transportation, and to prevent the éæ³è·åå使ç¨èå¯è½é æçå± possible dangers caused by illegally é©ãå ¬çº¦äº 1980 å¹´ 3 æç¾ç½²ã2005 obtaining and using nuclear material. It was signed on 3 March, 1980. In July å¹´ 7 æéè¿äºæ¨å¨è¿ä¸æ¥å å¼ºæ ¸è®¾ 2005, the amended version of the æ½ä¸æ ¸ææä¿æ¤çå ¬çº¦ä¿®è®¢æ¡å¹¶ç¾ convention that aims to further ç½²äºæ°å ¬çº¦ãæ°å ¬çº¦é纳äºä¸å½æ strengthen the protection of nuclear material and facilities was adopted and 交çæ¯æå½é 社ä¼å å¼ºå¯¹æ ¸è®¾æ½ä¿ the new convention was signed. The æ¤çåªåãå对以任ä½å½¢å¼å¯¹å ¶ä» new convention accepted the å½å®¶åå¹³æ ¸è®¾æ½å¨ç¨æ¦åæè¿è¡æ¦ amendment submitted by China which declared its support for the effort of the åå¨èç修订æ¡ãæ°å ¬çº¦è¿é¦æ¬¡æ international community to strengthen ç¡®è§å®ï¼ç¼çº¦å½è¦å¨ä¿æ¤æ ¸ææå® the protection of nuclear facilities, and opposed any form of force or threat of å ¨ãé²èæ ¸ææ主ä¹æ¹é¢è¿ä¸æ¥å force to any Statesâ peaceful nuclear 强å½é åä½ã(æºèªï¼åèæç®[52]) facility. It also prescribes for the first time that any State Party should further strengthen international cooperation on protecting the safety of nuclear material and preventing nuclear terrorism. (From: Reference[52]) conversion inspection 转åè§å¯ãzhuÇnhuà shìcháã conversion of uranium å æ°åé转å hexafluoride ãliùfúhuà yóu zhuÇnhuà ã conversion of uranium product é产åç转å ãyóuchÇnpÇn de zhuÇnhuà ã
12 conversion plant 转ååãzhuÇnhuà chÇngã conversion time 转åæ¶é´ãzhuÇnhuà shÃjiÄnã The time required to convert different å°ä¸åå½¢å¼çæ ¸ææ转åææ ¸çç¸ forms of nuclear material to the metallic è£ ç½®éå±é¨ä»¶æéè¦çæ¶é´ã(æºèªï¼ components of a nuclear explosive device. (From: Reference [4], 3.13) åèæç®[4]ï¼3.13) E conversion time of nuclear æ ¸ææ转åæ¶é´ C material ãhécáilià o zhuÇnhuà shÃjiÄnã cooling of spent fuel ä¹çæçå·å´ ãfáránlià o de lÄngquèã cooperation protocol åä½è®®å®ä¹¦ãhézuò yìdìngshÅ«ã cooperative security åä½å®å ¨ãhézuò Änquánã A new security approach that evolved å·æåå½¢æçä¸ç§æ°çå®å ¨éå¾ï¼ after the end of the Cold War, âwhich âå®å¼ºè°å®å ¨ä¿è¯ï¼èä¸æ¯å¨æ ï¼ emphasizes reassurance rather than deterrence; it is inclusive rather than å®æ¯å 容æ§çï¼èä¸æ¯ææ¥æ§çï¼ exclusive; favours multilateralism over å®æ³¨éå¤è¾¹ä¸»ä¹èä¸æ¯åè¾¹æåè¾¹ unilateralism or bilateralism; does not 主ä¹ï¼å®ä¸è®¤ä¸ºåäºæ段é«äºéå rank military solutions over non-military äºæ段ï¼å®è®¤ä¸ºå½å®¶æ¯å®å ¨ä½ç³»é ones; assumes that states are the ç主è¦è¡ä¸ºä½ï¼ä½ä¹æ¥åéå½å®¶è¡ principal actors in the security system 为ä½è½åæ¥éè¦ä½ç¨ï¼å®ä¸ç¹å«å¼º but accepts that non-state actors have an important role to play; does not è°ï¼ä½ä¹ä¸æç»å»ºç«æ£å¼çå®å ¨æº particularly emphasize the creation of æï¼æéè¦çæ¯ï¼å®å¼ºè°å»ºç«å¯¹è¯ formal security institutions, but does not ä¹ æ¯çéè¦æ§ã (æºèªï¼ â åèæç®[65]) reject them either; and which, above all, stresses the value of creating habits of dialogue.â (From: Reference [65]) Cooperative Threat Reduction åä½åå°å¨è计å/纳æ©-å¢æ ¼è®¡å Program/Nunn-Lugar Program ãhézuò jiÇnshÇo wÄixié jìhuà nà âÄn The November 1991 legislation that lúgé jìhuà ã provides the Department of Defense ç±ç¾å½å½ä¼äº 1991 å¹´ 11 æéè¿ã (DOD) with the authority to fund 该ç«æ³ææå½é²é¨ä¸ºç¬¦åæ¡ä»¶çå assistance to the eligible states of the former Soviet Union to dismantle and èèå½å®¶æé¤åéæ¯å¤§è§æ¨¡æ伤æ§
13 destroy weapons of mass destruction; æ¦å¨æä¾èµéæ´å©ï¼å 强æå¸è¿ç¨ to strengthen the security of nuclear weapons and fissile materials in ä¸æ ¸æ¦å¨åè£åææçå®å ¨ï¼é²æ¢ connection with dismantlement; to æ©æ£ï¼å¸®å©ç¬èä½å½å®¶(NIS)æå¤§è§ prevent proliferation; and to help 模æ伤æ§æ¦å¨çå·¥ä¸åç§æåºç¡è®¾ demilitarize the industrial and scientific infrastructure in the Newly Independent æ½è½¬å为éåäºç®çãä» 1996 å¹´ States (NIS) which has supported èµ·ï¼ç¾å½å½å¡é¢è´è´£æ¦å¨ä¸å®¶ç转 E weapons of mass destruction. Since C è¡ååºå£æ§å¶ï¼è½æºé¨è´è´£æ ¸ææ 1996, the Department of State and Department of Energy have assumed çæ§å¶åè¡¡ç®ã(æ¹èªï¼åèæç®[50]) responsibility respectively for redirection of weapons expertise and export controls (State) and nuclear material control and accountability (DOE) prog- ram activities. (Modified from: Reference [50]) core of atomic bomb åå弹弹è¯ãyuánzÇdà n dà nxÄ«nã Refer to âpitâ åè§âå¼¹è¯â CORRTEX (continuous ç§å°å¤ªå æ¯æ³ãkÄâÄrtà ikèsÄ« fÇã reflectometry for radius vs time ( è¿ç»åå°æ³æµéåå¾éæ¶é´åå experiment) çå®éª) countercurrent gas centrifuge éæµç¦»å¿æºãnìliú lÃxÄ«njÄ«ã counterforce strike æå»åäºåéãdÇjÄ« jÅ«nshì lìlià ngã The employment of strategic air and å¨ä»»ä½å¯å¼åå²çªçæ åµä¸ï¼ä½¿ç¨ missile forces in an effort to destroy, or æç¥ç©ºåå导弹åéæ§æ¯æ使éå® render impotent, selected military capa- bilities of an enemy force under any of çææ¹åäºåé失æã(æºèªï¼åèæ the circumstances by which hostilities ç®[9]ï¼p128) may be initiated. (From: Reference [9], p128) countervalue strike æå»ç¤¾ä¼è´¢å¯ãdÇjÄ« shèhuì cáifùã Striking non-military assets of value to æå»ææ¹æä»·å¼çéåäºç®æ ï¼å¦ the enemy, such as population and 人å£åå·¥ä¸è®¾æ½ã(æ¹èªï¼åèæç®[27]) industry centers. (Modified from: Reference [27])
14 covenant ç约ãméngyuÄã coverage of IAEA safeguards å½é ååè½æºæä¿éçç£çèå´ ãguójì yuánzÇnéng jÄ«gòu bÇozhà ng jiÄndÅ« de fà nwéiã cratering of nuclear explosion æ ¸çç¸æåæåº ãhébà ozhà chéngkÄng xià oyìngã E crisis control å±æºæ§å¶ãwÄijÄ« kòngzhìã A series of interactive processes carried C æ³æéµå¾ªç»´æ¤å½å®¶å©çåé¿å æ¦å out following the principle of safeguard- ing national interests and avoiding arm- å²çªçååèæå¶å±æºæ©å±çä¸ç³» ed conflicts, to eliminate the factors that åäºå¨è¿ç¨ï¼å¨å±æºå°å¤æ½å¨é¶æ®µ may impel the eruption of latent crisis; æ¶åªåæ¶é¤å¯è½ä¿å ¶çåçå ç´ ï¼ to lessen the seriousness of the crisis å¨å±æºçåæ¶ä¿å ¶å°½å¿«åç¼è§£æ¹å as soon as possible, and to reduce the 转åï¼å å¿å©å¯¼ï¼å°½å¯è½éä½å¯¹æ degree of rivalry and contain the expan- sion of the crisis. (Modified from: Reference ç¨åº¦ã(æ¹èªï¼åèæç®[1]ï¼p42) [1], p42) crisis management å±æºç®¡çãwÄijÄ« guÇnlÇã Procedures for controlling and manag- æ§å¶å管çå±æºï¼ä½¿å ¶ä¸è³äºå¤±æ§ ing a crisis so that it does not get out of è导è´æäºçè¿ç¨ãå±æºç®¡çåºç¡® hand and lead to war. Crisis manage- ment also ensures that the crisis is ä¿è§£å³å±æºä»¥ä¿éå½å®¶æ¸å ³å©çã resolved so that the vital interests of the (æ¹èªï¼åèæç®[28]ï¼p240) states involved are secured and protect- ed. (Modified from: Reference [28], p240) crisis stability å±æºç¨³å®æ§ãwÄijÄ« wÄndìngxìngã critical assembly 临çè£ ç½®ãlÃnjiè zhuÄngzhìã criticality safety assessment 临çå®å ¨è¯ä¼°ãlÃnjiè Änquán pÃnggÅ«ã Analyses and experiments made to 为确ä¿æ ¸æ¦å¨ç¨çå¯è£åææå¨ç ensure fissionable materials used for nuclear weapons remains in a 产ãå å·¥ãè¿è¾åè£ é è¿ç¨ä¸åå¤ subcritical and safe state during the äºæ¬¡ä¸´çå®å ¨ç¶ææè¿è¡çå®éªå whole process of production, process- åæã(æ¹èªï¼åèæç®[2]ï¼p40) ing, transportation and assembly. (Modified from: Reference [2], p40)
15 cruise missile å·¡èªå¯¼å¼¹ãxúnháng dÇodà nã cumulative radiation dose 累积è¾ç §åéãlÄijÄ« fúzhà o jìlià ngã damaging and injuring effects æ°´é¢åæ°´ä¸æ ¸çç¸æ¯ä¼¤æåº of shallow or underwater nu- ãshuÇmià n jà shuÇxià hébà ozhà clear explosion huÇshÄng xià oyìngã damaging and injuring effects å²å»æ³¢æ¯ä¼¤æåº of shock wave ãchÅngjÄ«bÅ huÇshÄng xià oyìngã E damaging and injuring effects å°é¢æå°ä¸æ ¸çç¸æ¯ä¼¤æåº C of surface or underground ãdìmià n huò dìxià hébà ozhà huÇshÄng nuclear explosion xià oyìngã damaging and injuring effects æ ¸çç¸å è¾å°æ¯ä¼¤æåº of thermal radiation of nuclear ãhébà ozhà guÄngfúshè huÇshÄng explosion xià oyìngã data update inspection æ°æ®æ´æ°è§å¯ãshùjù gÄngxÄ«n shìcháã decay è¡°åãshuÄibià nã decay energy è¡°åè½ãshuÄibià nnéngã declaration 宣è¨ãxuÄnyánã decommissioned facility/de- é役设æ½/éå½¹ç设æ½å¤åºæ commissioned location outside ãtuìyì shèshÄ« tuìyì de shèshÄ«wà i facilities chÇngsuÇã decoupled underground 解è¦çå°ä¸æ ¸çç¸ nuclear explosion ãjiÄâÇu de dìxià hébà ozhà ã de-exemption 解é¤è±å ãjiÄchú huòmiÇn ã defect äºéãkuÄ«lià ngã defense white paper å½é²ç½ç®ä¹¦ãguófáng báipÃshÅ«ã defensive strategy é²å¾¡æ§æç¥ãfángyùxìng zhà nlüèã To guard against and resist the enemyâs å¨å ¨å±ä¸éåæ¿åãéæ¥åå¼±åé» attack by means of a strategy based on operations that absorb, progressively æ¢çæå¿ï¼é²å¤åæå»æ人çè¿æ»ã weaken and block such an attack. (æ¹èªï¼åèæç®[18]ï¼p36-37) (Modified from: Reference [18], p36-37) depleted uranium è´«åéãpÃnhuà yóuã depletion è´«åãpÃnhuà ã
16 design information verification 设计èµææ ¸æ¥ãshèjì zÄ«lià o hécháã (DIV) destruction éæ¯ãxiÄohuÇã destructive analysis (DA) ç ´åæ§åæãpòhuà ixìng fÄnxÄ«ã detection of nuclear explosion æ ¸çç¸æ¢æµãhébà ozhà tà ncèã detection probability æ¢ç¥æ¦çãtà nzhÄ« gà ilÇã E C detection system for physical å®ä½ä¿æ¤æ¢æµç³»ç» protection ãshÃtÇ bÇohù tà ncè xìtÇngã detection system of nuclear æ ¸çç¸æ¢æµç³»ç» explosion ãhébà ozhà tà ncè xìtÇngã detection technology of nuclear æ ¸çç¸æ¢æµææ¯ explosion ãhébà ozhà tà ncè jìshùã detection time æ¢ç¥æ¶é´ãtà nzhÄ« shÃjiÄnã detente ç¼åãhuÇnhéã deterrence å¨æ ãwÄishèã The prevention from action by fear of éè¿ä½¿å¯¹æ害æåææ¥é²æ¢å ¶éå the consequences. Deterrence is a è¡å¨ãå¨æ æ¯ä¸ç§ç±é¾ä»¥æ¿åçå state of mind brought about by the å»è¡å¨æè´çå¯ä¿¡å¨èçåå¨æå¼ existence of a credible threat of unacceptable counteraction. (From: åçå¿çç¶æã(æºèªï¼åèæç®[9]ï¼ Reference [9], p160) p160) Refer to âcompellenceâ åè§âå¨é¼â deterrence of diversion éå¶è½¬ç¨ãèzhì zhuÇnyòngã deuterium æ°ãdÄoã diagnostic and measurement of æ ¸è¯éªçè¯æåæµé nuclear test ãhéshìyà n de zhÄnduà n hé cèliángã diffuser æ©æ£å离å¨ãkuòsà n fÄnlÃqìã diffusion barrier å离èãfÄnlÃmóã diffusion separation unit æ©æ£å离æºç»ãkuòsà n fÄnlà jÄ«zÇã directed-energy weapon driven æ ¸çæ¿å±å®åè½æ¦å¨ by a nuclear explosion ãhébà o jÄ«lì dìngxià ngnéng wÇqìã
17 direct-use material ç´æ¥ä½¿ç¨ææãzhÃjiÄ shÇyòng cáilià oã Nuclear material that can be used for æªç»å¬åæè¿ä¸æ¥æµç¼©å°±å¯ç¨äºå¶ the manufacture of nuclear explosive é æ ¸çç¸è£ ç½®çæ ¸ææã(æºèªï¼å devices without transmutation or further èæç®[4]ï¼4.25) enrichment. (From: Reference [4], 4.25) dirty bomb èå¼¹ãzÄngdà nã Refer to âradiological dispersal åè§âæ¾å°æ§ç©è´¨æ£å¸è£ ç½®â E device (RDD)â C disarmament è£åãcáijÅ«nã dissuasion åé»ãquà nzÇã In current U.S. thinking, âto persuade å¨å½åç¾å½æç»´ä¸ï¼æåè¯´å ¶ä»å¤§ other powers to refrain from initiating a competition in military capabilities.â å½æ¾å¼ä¸ç¾å½å¨åäºè½åæ¹é¢çç« (From: Reference [41]) äºã(æºèªï¼åèæç®[41]) Note: In the context of nuclear doctrine, 注ï¼å¨æ ¸å¦è¯´èç´ï¼æ³è¯åè¯âla the French word, âla dissuasionâ means dissuasionâå®è´¨ä¸ææå¨æ ã(æºèªï¼ essentially âdeterrenceâ. (From: Reference [69], pII-41) åèæç®[69]ï¼pII-41) distinguishability exhibition å¯åºåæ§å±ç¤º ãkÄqÅ«fÄnxìng zhÇnshìã diversion of nuclear material æ ¸ææè½¬ç¨ ãhécáilià o zhuÇnyòngã diversion strategy/diversion 转ç¨çç¥/转ç¨éå¾ path ãzhuÇnyòng cèlüè zhuÇnyòng tújìngã A (hypothetical) scheme which a State ä¸ç§(åå®ç)çç¥ï¼å³æå½å¯è½è could consider to divert nuclear material è转ç¨å½é ååè½æºæä¿éçç£ç or to misuse items subject to IAEA æ ¸æææä¸æ£å½ä½¿ç¨å½é ååè½æº safeguards. Diversion strategies would include: the undeclared removal of æä¿éçç£çç©é¡¹ã转ç¨çç¥å¯è½ nuclear material from a safeguarded å æ¬ï¼ä»ä¸ä¸ªåä¿éçç£ç设æ½å facility or the use of a safeguarded æ èªè½¬ç§»æ ¸æææå©ç¨ä¸ä¸ªåä¿é facility for the introduction, production or çç£çæ ¸è®¾æ½å¼è¿ãç产æå¤çæª processing of undeclared nuclear ç³æ¥çæ ¸ææã(æºèªï¼åèæç®[4]ï¼ material. (From: Reference [4], 3.7) 3.7)
18 diversity of technical protection ææ¯é²æ¤ç³»ç»çå¤æ ·æ§ systems ãjìshù fánghù xìtÇng de duÅyà ngxìngã doctrine of "reasonable âåç足å¤âåå sufficiency" ãhélÇ zúgòu yuánzéã downstream facility ä¸æ¸¸è®¾æ½ãxià yóu shèshÄ«ã drilling to obtain radioactive é»æ¢åæ ·ãzuÄntà n qÇyà ngã E samples C dry reprocessing å¹²æ³åå¤çãgÄnfÇ hòuchÇlÇã dry storage å¹²æ³è´®åãgÄnfÇ zhùcúnã DUPIC (Direct Use of Spent æç®å å·¥èºãdùpÃkè gÅngyìã PWR fuel in CANDU reactors) (åæ°´å ä¹çæç´æ¥ç¨äºåæååº process å çå·¥èº) early-warning satellite é¢è¦å«æãyùjÇng wèixÄ«ngã effects of nuclear explosion on æ ¸çç¸éä¿¡æåº communication ãhébà ozhà tÅngxìn xià oyìngã effects of radioactive æ¾å°æ§æ²¾ææåº contamination ãfà ngshèxìng zhÄnrÇn xià oyìngã efficiency of barrier å离èæçãfÄnlÃmó xià olÇã The ratio of a porous barrierâs real å离èçå®é æµç¼©å åä¸çæ³æµç¼© enrichment factor to its theoretical maximum enrichment factor. Because å åçæ¯å¼ãç±äºé纯ååæµåè of non-ideal molecular flow and back ååæ©æ£çå½±åï¼å离èçå®é æµ diffusion, the real enrichment factor is 缩å åé常å°äºçæ³æµç¼©å åã(æ¹ less than the theoretical maximum enrichment factor. (Modified from: Reference èªï¼åèæç®[2]ï¼p126) [2], p126) efficiency of cascade 级èæçãjÃlián xià olÇã Eighteen-Nation Committee on åå «å½è£åå§åä¼ Disarmament (ENCD) ãshÃbÄguó cáijÅ«n wÄiyuánhuìã electromagnetic-pulse æçæ³¢åçµç£èå²æ¨¡æå¨ boundary-wave type simulator ãyÇujiè bÅxÃng dià ncà mà ichÅng mónÇqìã electromagnetic pulse of é«ç©ºæ ¸çç¸çµç£èå² high-altitude nuclear explosion ãgÄokÅng hébà ozhà dià ncà mà ichÅngã
19 electromagnetic-pulse è¾å°æ³¢åçµç£èå²æ¨¡æå¨ radiation-wave type simulator ãfúshèbÅxÃng dià ncà mà ichÅng mónÇqìã electromagnetic pulse weapon çµç£èå²å¼¹ãdià ncà mà ichÅng dà nã A nuclear explosive designed to ä¸ç§è®¾è®¡æè½å å¼ºæ ¸æ¦å¨çµç£èå² enhance the electromagnetic pulse æåºçæ ¸çç¸è£ ç½®ã(æºèªï¼åèæç® radiated by a nuclear weapon. (From: [20]) E Reference [20]) C electromagnetic pulse weapon æ ¸ç驱å¨çµç£èå²å¼¹ driven by nuclear explosion ãhébà o qÅ«dòng dià ncà mà ichÅngdà nã electron çµåãdià nzÇã electron gun çµåæªãdià nzÇqiÄngã electronic reconnaissance çµå侦å¯å«æ satellite/electronic intelligence ãdià nzÇ zhÄnchá wèixÄ«ngã (ELINT) satellite elimination inspection éæ¯è§å¯ãxiÄohuÇ shìcháã ending inventory of nuclear æ ¸æææ«æåé material ãhécáilià o mòqÄ« cúnlià ngã energy consumption of unit åä½å离åè½è separative work ãdÄnwèi fÄnlÃgÅng nénghà oã engineering design of nuclear æ ¸æ¦å¨å·¥ç¨è®¾è®¡ weapon ãhéwÇqì gÅngchéng shèjìã enhanced X-ray weapon å¢å¼º X å°çº¿å¼¹ ãzÄngqiáng X shèxià ndà nã enriched uranium æµç¼©(å¯é)éãnóngsuÅ fùjà yóuã enrichment æµç¼©(å¯é)度ãnóngsuÅ fùjà dùã enrichment factor æµç¼©(å¯é)å å ãnóngsuÅ fùjà yÄ«nzÇã enrichment plant/isotope æµç¼©(å¯é)å/åä½ç´ å离å separation plant ãnóngsuÅ fùjà chÇng tóngwèisù fÄnlÃchÇngã entrance and exit control åºå ¥å£æ§å¶ ãchÅ«rùkÇu kòngzhìã
20 environmental sampling ç¯å¢åæ ·ãhuánjìng qÇyà ngã In the context of IAEA safeguards, the å¨ IAEA ä¿éçç£æ¡æ¶å ï¼ä»ç¯å¢ collection of samples from the environ- ä¸åæ ·ï¼å¹¶éè¿å¯¹æ ·åçåæè·å ment with a view to analyzing them for traces of materials that can reveal ç¸å ³ç迹以æ示æå¤ççæ ¸æææ information about nuclear material è¿è¡çæ´»å¨çä¿¡æ¯ã(æºèªï¼åèæç® handled or activities conducted. (From: [4]ï¼9.1) E Reference [4], 9.1) C environmental sampling of æ ¸çç¸ç¯å¢åæ · nuclear explosion ãhébà ozhà huánjìng qÇyà ngã environmental simulation test æ ¸æ¦å¨ç¯å¢æ¨¡æè¯éª of nuclear weapon ãhéwÇqì huánjìng mónÇ shìyà nã equipment for ground test and æ ¸æ¦å¨å°é¢æµæ§è®¾å¤ monitoring of nuclear weapon ãhéwÇqì dìmià n cèkòng shèbèiã equivalent dose å½éåéãdÄnglià ng jìlià ngã equivalent megatonnage çæç¾ä¸å¨æ° The 2/3 power of the yield of a nuclear ãdÄngxià o báiwà ndÅ«nshùã warhead measured by megaton TNT 以ç¾ä¸å¨ TNT å½é为åä½è®¡éæ ¸ equivalent. The formula is å¼¹å¨åçæ°å¼çä¸åä¹äºæ¬¡æ¹ãç¨ EMT=(Y/Y0)2/3, where Y is the yield of a å ¬å¼å¯è¡¨ç¤ºä¸º EMT=(Y/Y0)2/3ãå¼ä¸ nuclear warhead and Y0 is one megaton Y ä¸ºæ ¸å¼¹å¨åï¼Y0 为ä¸ç¾ä¸å¨ TNT TNT equivalent. (Modified from: Reference å½éã(æ¹èªï¼åèæç®[3]ï¼p115-116) [3], p115-116) equivalent megatonnage-to- æ¯çæç¾ä¸å¨æ° weight ratio ãbÇdÄngxià o bÇiwà ndÅ«nshùã error 误差ãwùchÄã essential equipment list (EEL) éè¦è®¾å¤æ¸ å ãzhòngyà o shèbèi qÄ«ngdÄnã examine and repair deployed é¨ç½²å¼¹å¤´çæ£ä¿® warhead ãbùshÇ dà ntóu de jiÇnxiÅ«ã exchange of notes æ¢æãhuà nwénã exemption from IAEA å½é ååè½æºæä¿éçç£çè±å safeguards ãguójì yuánzÇnéng jÄ«gòu bÇozhà ng jiÄndÅ« de huòmiÇnã
21 existing stock of nuclear æ ¸ææç°æåºå material ãhécáilià o xià nyÇu kùcúnã exposure ç §å°ãzhà oshèã extended nuclear deterrence 延伸(æ©å±)æ ¸å¨æ 1 Strategy of preventing nuclear attack ãyánshÄn kuòzhÇn héwÄishèã on oneâs allies by threatening the 1 éè¿ç¨æ ¸æ¥å¤å¯¼è´æ æ³æ¿åçæ¯ perceived or potential enemy with E unacceptable damage by nuclear 伤以å¨èè§å¯å°çææ½å¨çææï¼ C retaliation. é²æ¢å ¶å¯¹çå½è¿è¡æ ¸æå»çæç¥ã 2 Strategy of preventing conventional 2 以å¨èæ ¸æ¥å¤æ¥é²æ¢å¯¹å ¶æå ¶ç attack on oneself or oneâs allies by åè¿è¡å¸¸è§æå»çæç¥ã(æ¹èªï¼å threat of nuclear retaliation. (Modified from: Reference [7], p14-15) èæç®[7]ï¼p14-15) false-alarm rate èè¦çãxÅ«jÇnglÇã The ratio of alarms triggered by real 被éçå®äºä»¶é©±å¨çæ¥è¦æ¬¡æ°ä¸ç events to the total number of alarms the monitoring system detects. The false æµç³»ç»è®¾è®¡ä¸æè½ä¾¦æµå°çæ»æ¥è¦ alarms are generated because the 次æ°çæ¯ä¾ãèè¦ç产çæ¯ç±äºç monitoring system could not distinguish æµç³»ç»æ æ³åºåçå®çæèåçè¦ real from false alarms. (Modified from: Reference [1], p489) æ¥ã(æ¹èªï¼åèæç®[1]ï¼p489) fast-neutron criticality facility å¿«ä¸å临çè£ ç½® ãkuà izhÅngzÇ lÃnjiè zhuÄngzhìã fast-neutron pulse reactor å¿«ä¸åèå²å ãkuà izhÅngzÇ mà ichÅng duÄ«ã fast neutrons å¿«ä¸åãkuà izhÅngzÇã fast reactor å¿«å ãkuà iduÄ«ã feed and withdrawals of a gas æ°ä½ç¦»å¿æºçä¾åæ centrifuge ãqìtÇ lÃxÄ«njÄ« de gÅngqÇlià oã feed material ä¾æãgÅnglià oã fertile material å¯è½¬æ¢ææãkÄzhuÇnhuà n cáilià oã Nuclear material that can be converted éè¿å¨ä¸ä¸ªååæ ¸ä¸ä¿è·ä¸ä¸ªä¸å into a special fissionable material through capture of one neutron per èè½è¢«è½¬å为ç¹ç§å¯è£åææçä¸ nucleus. (From: Reference [4], 4.7) ç§æ ¸ææã(æºèªï¼åèæç®[4]ï¼4.7)
22 Final Document of the Special è大è£åç¹å«ä¼è®®æåæ件 Session of the General ãliándà cáijÅ«n tèbié huìyì Assembly Devoted to zuìhòu wénjià nã Disarmament firing range å°ç¨ãshèchéngã firing the nuclear weapon æ ¸æ¦å¨å¼çãhéwÇqì yÇnbà oã E First Committee of the UN èåå½å¤§ä¼ç¬¬ä¸å§åä¼ General Assembly ãliánhéguó dà huì dìyÄ« wÄiyuánhuìã C first-generation nuclear weapon 第ä¸ä»£æ ¸æ¦å¨ãdìyÄ«dà i héwÇqìã fissile material æè£åææ ãyìlièbià n cáilià oã fission neutrons è£åä¸åãlièbià n zhÅngzÇã fission weapon è£åæ¦å¨ãlièbià n wÇqìã fission yield è£å产é¢/è£åå¨å ãlièbià n chÇnâé lièbià n wÄilìã fissionable material å¯è£åææãkÄlièbià n cáilià oã In general, an isotope or a mixture of ä¸è¬èè¨ï¼æè½äº§çæ ¸è£åçä¸ç§ isotopes capable of nuclear fission. åä½ç´ æåä½ç´ æ··åç©ãæäºå¯è£ Some fissionable materials are capable of fission only by sufficiently fast åææåªæå¨è¶³å¤å¿«çä¸å(å¦å¨ neutrons (e.g. neutrons of a kinetic è½è¶ è¿ 1 MeV çä¸å)ä½ç¨ä¸æè½ energy above 1 MeV). Isotopes that åçè£åãå¨ææè½éçä¸åå æ¬ undergo fission by neutrons of all æ ¢(ç)ä¸åä½ç¨ä¸é½å¯ä»¥åçè£å energies, including slow (thermal) neutrons, are usually referred to as çåä½ç´ é常称ä¹ä¸ºæè£åæææ fissile materials or fissile isotopes. For æè£ååä½ç´ ãä¾å¦ï¼åä½ç´ é example, isotopes U-233, U-235, -233ï¼é-235ï¼é-239ï¼é-241 æ¢è¢« Pu-239 and Pu-241 are referred to as 称为å¯è£åææå被称为æè£åæ both fissionable and fissile, while U-236 æï¼èé-238 åé-240 ä» è¢«ç§°ä¸ºå¯ and Pu-240 are fissionable but not fissile. (From: Reference[4], 4.6) è£åææèä¸æ¯æè£åææã(æºèªï¼ åèæç®[4]ï¼4.6) Five Principles of Peaceful åå¹³å ±å¤äºé¡¹åå Coexistence ãhépÃng gòngchÇ wÇxià ng yuánzéã The Five Principles are: mutual respect åå¹³å ±å¤äºé¡¹ååï¼å³ç¸äºå°é主
23 for sovereignty and territorial integrity, æåé¢åå®æ´ãäºä¸ä¾µç¯ãäºä¸å¹² mutual non-aggression, non- æ¶å æ¿ãå¹³çäºå©ãåå¹³å ±å¤ãè¿ interference in each other's internal äºé¡¹ååç±å¨æ©æ¥æ»çå¨ä¸å°åº¦ä»£ affairs, equality and mutual benefit, and 表å¢è°å¤æ¶æåºï¼å¹¶äº 1954 å¹´ 6 æ peaceful coexistence. In negotiation é¦æ¬¡è¢«åå ¥å¨æ©æ¥æ»çä¸è´¾ç¦ with an Indian delegation the Five Principles were set forth by Premier å·尼赫é²æ»çç¾ç½²çèåå ¬æ¥ä¸ï¼ E Zhou Enlai, and subsequently included æ¤å被ä¼å¤å½é æ§æ件æéç¨å¹¶æ C in the joint communique issued by ä¸ºå ¬è®¤çæ导å½é å ³ç³»çååã(æº Premier Zhou Enlai and Prime Minister èªï¼åèæç®[53]) Jawaharlal Nehru, in June 1954. Since that time the principles have been adopted in many other international documents. (Modified from: Reference[53]) flash radiography by éªå X å°çº¿ç §ç¸ pulsed X-ray system ãshÇnguÄng X shèxià n zhà oxià ngã flow field in gas centrifuge æ°ä½ç¦»å¿æºæµåºãqìtÇ lÃxÄ«njÄ« liúchÇngã fluoride volatility process æ°åæ¥åæ³ãfúhuà huÄ«fÄfÇã fluorides of uranium éçæ°åç©ãyóu de fúhuà wùã fluorination of uranium oxide éæ°§åç©çæ°å ãyóuyÇnghuà wù de fúhuà ã focusing of weak shock wave å¼±å²å»æ³¢èç¦ãruò chÅngjÄ«bÅ jùjiÄoã formerly declared facility å åç³æ¥è®¾æ½è§å¯ inspection ãxiÄnqián shÄnbà o shèshÄ« shìcháã forward defense strategy å沿é²å¾¡æç¥ ãqiányán fángyù zhà nlüèã fratricidal effect of nuclear æ ¸æ¦å¨èªç¸æ§æ¯æåº weapon ãhéwÇqì zìxiÄng cuÄ«huÇ xià oyìngã freeze å»ç»ãdòngjiéã fuel assembly çæç»ä»¶ãránlià o zÇjià nã fuel bundle çææ£æãránlià obà ngshùã fuel component çæé¨ä»¶ãránlià o bùjià nã
24 fuel element çæå 件ãránlià o yuánjià nã fuel fabrication plant çæå¶é åãránlià o zhìzà ochÇngã fuel of fusion èåçæãjùbià n ránlià oã fusion reaction èåååºãjùbià n fÇnyìngã fusion yield èåå¨åãjùbià n wÄilìã E fuze of nuclear weapon æ ¸æ¦å¨å¼ä¿¡ãhéwÇqì yÇnxìnã C G-8 Global Partnership Against å «å½éå¢âé²æ¢å¤§è§æ¨¡æ伤æ§æ¦å¨ the Spread of Weapons and åæææ©æ£çå ¨çä¼ä¼´è®¡åâ Materials of Mass Destruction ãbÄguó jÃtuán fángzhÇ dà guÄ«mó Launched in 2002 by the G-8 (Russian, shÄshÄngxìng wÇqì hé cáilià o kuòsà n de quánqiú huÇbà n jìhuà ã the U.S., Britian, France, Japan, Germany, Canada and Italy), this effort 该计åæ¯å «å½éå¢(ä¿ç½æ¯ãç¾å½ã aims to prevent the proliferation of è±å½ãæ³å½ãæ¥æ¬ãå¾·å½ãå æ¿å¤§ weapons of mass destruction to terror- åæ大å©)äº 2002 å¹´æåºçï¼æ¨å¨ ists or those who support them through éè¿ä¸è£åãä¸æ©æ£ãåæåæ ¸å® projects pertaining to disarmament, å ¨æå ³ç项ç®ï¼é²æ¢å¤§è§æ¨¡æä¼¤æ§ nonproliferation, counterterrorism and æ¦å¨æ©æ£å°ææ主ä¹è æå ¶æ¯æè nuclear safety. Originally targeted at æä¸ãæåç®æ æ¯å¨ä¿ç½æ¯å¼å±ä¸º carrying out $20 billion of projects in æ 10 å¹´èèµ 200 亿ç¾å ç项ç®ï¼ç° Russia over 10 years, the G-8 Global å «å½éå¢å ¨çä¼ä¼´å ³ç³»å·²ç»æ©å±å° Partnership has expanded to include å «å½ä»¥å¤çå½å®¶ã (æ¹èªï¼åèæç® additional countries. (Modified from: References [42-43]) [42-43]) gamma radiation monitoring γè¾å°çæµåè½è°±åæ and energy spectrum analysis ãγ fúshè jiÄncè hé néngpÇ fÄnxÄ«ã gas centrifuge æ°ä½ç¦»å¿æºãqìtÇ lÃxÄ«njÄ«ã gaseous diffusion method æ°ä½æ©æ£æ³ãqìtÇ kuòsà nfÇã gaseous diffusion plant æ°ä½æ©æ£å·¥å ãqìtÇ kuòsà n gÅngchÇngã geological repository å°è´¨å¤ç½®åºãdìzhì chÇzhìkùã geophysical effects of nuclear æ ¸çç¸å°çç©çæåº explosion ãhébà ozhà dìqiúwùlÇ xià oyìngã
25 geophysical survey in on-site ç°åºè§å¯ä¸çå°çç©çåæµ inspections ãxià nchÇng shìchá zhÅng de dìqiú wùlÇ kÄncèã glass solidification ç»çåºåãbÅli gùhuà ã Global Initiative to Combat æå»æ ¸ææ主ä¹å ¨çè¡å¨å¡è®® Nuclear Terrorism ãdÇjÄ« hékÇngbùzhÇyì quánqiú Launched in 2006 by the United States xÃngdòng chà ngyìã E and Russia, the initiative aims to 2006 å¹´ç±ç¾å½åä¿å½åèµ·ï¼æ¨å¨é² prevent terrorist access to nuclear C æ¢ææ主ä¹ååè·åæ ¸ææçå¡ materials by improving accounting and è®®ï¼å ·ä½æªæ½å æ¬ï¼æ¹åæ ¸åæ¾å° security of radioactive and nuclear materials, enhancing security at civilian æ§ææçè¡¡ç®ä¸å®å ¨ï¼å 强对æ°ç¨ nuclear facilities, and improving æ ¸è®¾æ½çä¿æ¤ï¼æé«å¯¹æ ¸åæ¾å°æ§ detection of nuclear and radioactive ç©è´¨æ¢æµè½å以é²æ¢éæ³èµ°ç§ã(æº materials to prevent illicit trafficking. èªï¼åèæç®[44]) (From: Reference [44]) global strategy å ¨çæç¥ãquánqiú zhà nlüèã Strategy that aims at achieving and æ³æè¿ç¨åäºãç»æµãæ¿æ²»ãå¤äº¤ maintaining global interests for a nation or a group of nations through military, çæ段以å®ç°åä¿æ¤å½å®¶æå½å®¶é economic, political, diplomatic and other å¢å¨å ¨ççå©ççæ¹ç¥ã(æºèªï¼å means. (From: Reference [1], p25) èæç®[1]ï¼p25) glove box æå¥ç®±ãshÇutà oxiÄngã graphite moderated reactor ç³å¢¨æ ¢åå ãshÃmò mà nhuà duÄ«ã gravimetric analysis ééåæãzhònglià ng fÄnxÄ«ã green salt 绿çãlÇyánã The popular name of green uranium 绿è²ç UF4 æ¶ä½ï¼æ¯éå·¥èºä¸ UF4 tetrafluoride (UF4) crystal. It is an important mid-point production in the çä¿ç§°ãUF4 æ¯çäº§æ ¸çæçéè¦ process of producing uranium fuel. It ä¸é´äº§åï¼ç¨äºå¶å¤å æ°åé(UF6) can be used to produce uranium åéå±éã(æºèªï¼åèæç®[2]ï¼p304) hexafluoride (UF6) and uranium metal. (From: Reference [2], p304) ground resolution/spatial å°é¢å辨ç/空é´å辨ç resolution ãdìmià n fÄnbià nlÇ kÅngjiÄn fÄnbià nlÇã
26 ground zero çå¿æå½±ç¹ãbà oxÄ«n tóuyÇngdiÇnã Group of 21 21 å½éå¢ãèrshÃyÄ«guó jÃtuánã Guidelines for the Management é管çæ导åå of Plutonium ãbù guÇnlÇ zhÇdÇo yuánzéã The Guidelines adopted by nine states 该æ导ååç±äºä¸ªæ ¸æ¦å¨å½å®¶åå¾· (the five nuclear weapon states and å½ãæ¥æ¬ãæ¯å©æ¶ãç士çä¹å½äº E Germany, Japan, Belgium and Switzer- 1997 å¹´éè¿ï¼å®çç¼äºæç §å½é 约 C land) in 1997, with a view to ensuring that holdings of plutonium are managed å®(å æ¬å®ä»¬å¨ NPT ä¸çä¹å¡ï¼æ¬§ safely and effectively in accordance å ±ä½æåå½è¿æ欧洲ååè½èè¥æ¡ with international commitments, includ- 约ä¸çä¹å¡)å IAEA çä¿éçç£å ing their obligations under the NPT å®ç¡®ä¿å¯¹ææçéè¿è¡å®å ¨ææç (and, for states that are members of the European Community, also under the 管çã该æ导ååæè¿°äºå¨æ¥å该 Euratom Treaty), and with their safe- æ导ååä¸éç¨äºéçæ ¸ææè¡¡ç® guards agreements with the IAEA. The ä½å¶ãå®ä½ä¿æ¤æªæ½åå½é è¿è¾æ Guidelines describe, inter alia, the ç»ãå®è¿è¿ä¸æ¥æå®äºåä¸å½è¦å nuclear material accountancy system, å¸çæå ³é管ççä¿¡æ¯ï¼å æ¬ä»ä»¬ physical protection measures and æææçæ°ç¨æªè¾ç §éåæ°ç¨ååº international transfer procedures applic- able to the plutonium subject to the å ä¹çæä¸å«æçéä¼°éçå¹´åº¦ç³ Guidelines. They further specify the æ¥ã(æºèªï¼åèæç®[1]ï¼p409ï¼[4]ï¼1.30) information to be published by the participating States in respect of plutonium management, including annual statements of their holdings of civil unirradiated plutonium and of their estimates of plutonium contained in spent civil reactor fuel. (From: Reference [1], p409ï¼[4], 1.30) gun-type atomic bomb æªæ³ååå¼¹ãqiÄngfÇ yuánzÇdà nã half-life åè¡°æãbà nshuÄiqÄ«ã hardened target å åºç®æ ãjiÄgù mùbiÄoã heavy water éæ°´ãzhòngshuÇã
27 heavy water production plant éæ°´ç产å ãzhòngshuÇ shÄngchÇnchÇngã heavy water reactor (HWR) éæ°´å ãzhòngshuÇduÄ«ã hedge warheads stockpile å¤ç¨æ§æ ¸æ¦åºãbèiyòngxìng héwÇkùã One part of the U.S. active stockpile of ç¾å½ç°å½¹æ ¸æ¦åºçä¸é¨åï¼ä½ä¸ºå warheads, retained as part of the responsive force, to be used to aug- åºåéçä¸é¨åäºä»¥ä¿çï¼ç¨æ¥å E ment the operationally deployed force in 强ä½æé¨ç½²çåé以åºå¯¹æ½å¨çæ C order to meet potential contingencies, å¤äºæ ãçªåçäºä»¶ææ¾ç°çå¨èã unanticipated events or emerging thre- (æ¹èªï¼åèæç®[66] p4ï¼[67-68]) ats. (Modified from: Reference [66], p4; [67-68]) hedging strategy 两é¢ä¸æ³¨æç¥ A balanced approach to foster ãliÇngmià n xià zhù zhà nlüèã cooperation with a nation where possi- å°½å¯è½ä¿è¿åä»å½åä½ä½ä¹ä¸ºæ对 ble while also preparing for hostile æ´»å¨ååå¤çä¸ç§åè¡¡åæ³ãæ¹èªï¼ ( activity. (Modified from: Reference [45]) åèæç®[45]) hegemonism é¸æ主ä¹ãbà quánzhÇyìã helium-3 æ°¦-3ãhà i sÄnã high-enriched uranium (HEU) é«æµéãgÄonóngyóuã high level radioactive waste é«æ¾åºç©ãgÄofà ngfèiwùã high resolution sensing camera é«å辨ççµæç §ç¸æº ãgÄofÄnbià nlÇ lÃngmÇn zhà oxià ngjÄ«ã high-technology warfare é«ææ¯æäºãgÄojìshù zhà nzhÄngã high temperature gas-cooled é«æ¸©æ°å·å ãgÄowÄn qìlÄngduÄ«ã reactor (HTGR) hold-up æ»çéãzhìliúlià ngã hot cell ç室ãrèshìã hydroacoustic monitoring 水声çæµãshuÇshÄng jiÄncèã hydrodynamic experiment æµä½å¨åå¦å®éª An experiment used to simulate the ãliútÇ dònglìxué shÃyà nã implosion process of a nuclear 为模ææ ¸çç¸å çè¿ç¨æè¿è¡çå® explosive. It uses other materials such éªãå®æ¯ç¨ä»£ç¨ææ(å¦é-238ãé¨ã
28 as U-238, tungsten and steel as é¢ç)æ¿ä»£æ ¸è£ ç½®ä¸çè£åææé« substitute for fissile materials such as æµéæé-239ãç¨é«è½ç¸è¯çç¸å HEU or Pu-239 in a nuclear device, and uses the high explosive to compress the ç¼©è¯¥è£ ç½®çæ´ä½æé¨åç»æèè¿è¡ whole or partial structure of the device. çä¸ç§å®éªãç±äºè£ ç½®ä¸çææå¨ As the materials are in the liquid state é«è½ç¸è¯çç¸å缩ä¸å¤äºæµä½ç¶ under the compression of explosion of E high explosive, such experiments are æï¼å æ¤ç§°æ¤ç±»å®éªä¸ºæµä½å¨åå¦ C called hydrodynamic experiments. The å®éªãè¿ç§å®éªæ²¡ææ ¸è½éæ¾ï¼å® experiment releases no nuclear energy éªä¸ä¸å®è¦å¨æ ¸è¯éªåºå°è¿è¡ã(æº and is not required to be conducted at a èªï¼åèæç®[1]ï¼p212-213) nuclear test site. (From: Reference [1], p212-213) hydrogen bomb 氢弹ãqÄ«ngdà nã hydronuclear experiment æµä½æ ¸å®éªãliútÇ héshÃyà nã A method for assessing some aspects ä¸ç§è¯ä¼°æ ¸æ¦å¨æäºå®å ¨é®é¢çæ¹ of nuclear weapon safety, first conducted at Los Alamos during the æ³ï¼ç±æ´æ¯Â·é¿æè«æ¯å½å®¶å®éªå®¤ 1958-61 moratorium on nuclear testing (LANL)å¨ 1958 å¹´è³ 1961 å¹´çæå to investigate the âone-pointâ safety of a æ ¸è¯éªæé´ç ç©¶æ ¸çç¸âä¸ç¹å® nuclear explosive. The experiments å ¨âæ¶é¦å 使ç¨ã该å®éªå¨æ¬¡ä¸´ç resulted in subcritical multiplying assemblies or a very slight degree of å¢æ®è£ ç½®ä¸ææ轻微çè¶ ä¸´çç¶æ supercriticality and, in some cases, ä¸è¿è¡ï¼å¨æäºæ åµä¸ä¼éæ¾å°äº involved a fission energy release less 7 å ç¦è®¾è®¡éé¢çè£åè½ã(æ¹èªï¼å than the design limit of 7 megajoules. èæç®[30]ï¼p1) (Modified from: Reference [30], p1) IAEA inspection goal å½é ååè½æºæè§å¯ææ ãguójì yuánzÇnéng jÄ«gòu shìchá zhÇbiÄoã IAEA Safeguards System å½é ååè½æºæçä¿éçç£ä½ç³» ãguójì yuánzÇnéng jÄ«gòu de bÇozhà ng jiÄndÅ« tÇxìã IAEA timeliness detection goal å½é ååè½æºæåæ¶æ§æ¢ç¥ææ ãguójì yuánzÇnéng jÄ«gòu jÃshÃxìng tà nzhÄ« zhÇbiÄoã IAEAâs 93+2 program å½é ååè½æºæâ93+2â计å ãguójì yuánzÇnéng jÄ«gòu â93+2â jìhuà ã
29 ideal separation factor of æ°ä½æ©æ£ççæ³å离å å gaseous diffusion process ãqìtÇ kuòsà n de lÇxiÇng fÄnlà yÄ«nzÇã identity (identification) data æ è¯æ°æ®ãbiÄoshà shùjùã imaging reconnaissance æå侦å¯å«æ satellite ãchéngxià ng zhÄnchá wèixÄ«ngã implosion-type atomic bomb å çæ³ååå¼¹ ãnèibà ofÇ yuánzÇdà nã E inactive nuclear stockpile éç°å½¹æ ¸æ¦åºãfÄi xià nyì héwÇkùã C inactive warhead éç°å½¹å¼¹å¤´ãfÄi xià nyì dà ntóuã indirect use material éç´æ¥ä½¿ç¨ææ All nuclear material except direct use ãfÄi zhÃjiÄ shÇyòng cáilià oã material. It includes: depleted, natural é¤ç´æ¥ä½¿ç¨ææ以å¤çæææ ¸æ and low enriched uranium, and thorium, æãå®å æ¬ï¼è´«åéã天ç¶éåä½ all of which must be further processed æµç¼©é以åéï¼ææè¿äºææé½å¿ in order to produce direct use material. é¡»ç»è¿è¿ä¸æ¥å 工以ç产ç´æ¥ä½¿ç¨ (From: Reference [4], 4.26) ææã(æºèªï¼åèæç®[4]ï¼4.26) induced-radioactivity bomb æçæ¾å°æ§å¼¹ A type of hydrogen bomb that utilizes ãgÇnshÄng fà ngshèxìngdà nã radioisotopes induced by neutrons å©ç¨æ ¸çä¸åæççæ¾å°æ§åä½ç´ during a nuclear explosion to increase å¢å¤§æ¾å°æ§æ²¾æçä¸ç§æ°¢å¼¹ã1950 radioactive contamination. In February 1950 Hungarian physicist Leo Szilard å¹´ 2 æåçå©ç©çå¦å®¶ L ⢠西æå¾· published the concept of this bomb â æ æ© æ åº è¿ ç§ å¼¹ ç 设 æ³ â¯â¯â é´ the âcobalt bombâ. However no state å¼¹âãä½å¹¶æ²¡æ人å¶é åè¯éªã(æº manufactures and tests this kind of èªï¼åèæç®[2]ï¼p63) bomb. (From: Reference [2], p63) inertia fuze of nuclear weapon æ ¸æ¦å¨æ¯æ§å¼ä¿¡ ãhéwÇqì guà nxìng yÇnxìnã inertial confinement fusion æ¯æ§çº¦æèå (ICF) ãguà nxìng yuÄshù jùbià nã INFCIRC/153 safeguards INFCIRC/153 å ä¿ é ç ç£ å å® agreement (IAEA) (IAEA) ãINFCIRC 153 xÃng bÇozhà ng jiÄndÅ« xiédìngã
30 INFCIRC/66 safeguards INFCIRC/66 å ä¿ é ç ç£ å å® agreement (IAEA) (IAEA) ãINFCIRC 66 xÃng bÇozhà ng jiÄndÅ« xiédìngã information barrier ä¿¡æ¯å±éãxìnxÄ« pÃngzhà ngã Used to protect any sensitive weapon ç¨æ¥ä¿æ¤é´å«è¿ç¨ä¸å¯è½æéå°ç design information that may be E æææ¦å¨è®¾è®¡ä¿¡æ¯ãè¿å¯ä»¥éè¿èª gathered during the identification C process, for example, by automating the å¨è¿è¡ééãå¨åååææ°æ®ï¼å¹¶ collection, storage, and analysis of data, åªåè§å¯åæä¾åæçç»ææ¥å® and by making only the conclusions of ç°ã(æ¹èªï¼åèæç®[11]ï¼p107-108) the analysis available to the inspector. (Modified from: Reference [11], p107-108) information warfare (IW) ä¿¡æ¯æãxìnxÄ«zhà nã infrared remote sensor 红å¤é¥æå¨ãhóngwà i yáogÇnqìã infrasound monitoring 次声çæµãcìshÄng jiÄncèã initial inspection åå§è§å¯ãchÅ«shÇ shìcháã initial nuclear radiation of æ ¸çç¸æ©ææ ¸è¾å° nuclear explosion ãhébà ozhà zÇoqÄ« héfúshèã initial physical inventory of æ ¸ææåå§åé nuclear material ãhécáilià o chÅ«shÇ cúnlià ngã initiating component èµ·çå 件ãqÇbà o yuánjià nã initiating sequence èµ·çåºåãqÇbà o xùlièã injuring and damaging effects æ ¸çç¸æ©ææ ¸è¾å°æ¯ä¼¤æåº of initial nuclear radiation of ã hébà ozhà zÇoqÄ« héfúshè huÇshÄng nuclear explosion xià oyìngã insensitive high explosive éæé«è½ç¸è¯ ãdùngÇn gÄonéng zhà yà oã integral process ä¸ä½åæµç¨ãyÄ«tÇhuà liúchéngã integrated numerical simulation æ ¸(çç¸)è£ ç½®å ¨è¿ç¨æ°å¼æ¨¡æå®éª experiment of explosion device ãhé bà ozhà zhuÄngzhì quánguòchéng shùzhà mónÇ shÃyà nã integrated safeguards ä¸ä½åä¿éçç£ The optimum combination of all ãyÄ«tÇhuà bÇozhà ng jiÄndÅ«ã
31 safeguards measures available to the å¨å ¨é¢ä¿éçç£åè®®åéå è®®å®ä¹¦ IAEA under comprehensive safeguards ä¸ï¼å½é ååè½æºææè½è·å¾çæ agreements and additional protocols to æä¿éçç£æ段çæä½³ç»åï¼å ¶ç® achieve maximum effectiveness and çæ¯å©ç¨å¯æ¥æçèµæºï¼æææã efficiency in meeting the IAEAâs æé«æå°æ»¡è¶³å½é ååè½æºæè§å® safeguards obligations within available çä¿éçç£ä¹å¡ã(æºèªï¼åèæç®[4]ï¼ resources. (From: Reference [4], 3.5) E 3.5) integrated test of Arming, C å¼æ§ç³»ç»èè¯ Fuzing & Firing (AF&F) system ãyÇnkòng xìtÇng liánshìã integrity of protection system ä¿æ¤ç³»ç»å®æ´æ§ ãbÇohù xìtÇng wánzhÄngxìngã Interim Agreement Between the ç¾èéå¶è¿æ»æ§æç¥æ¦å¨ United States of America and çæäºæªæ½ç临æ¶åå® the Union of Soviet Socialist ã mÄi sÅ« xià nzhì jìngÅngxìng zhà nlüè Republics on Certain Measures wÇqì de mÇuxiÄ cuòshÄ« de lÃnshà with Respect to the Limitation xiédìngã of Strategic Offensive Arms (SALT I) intermediate fluorides of éçä¸é´æ°åç© uranium ãyóu de zhÅngjiÄn fúhuà wùã intermediate-level radioactive ä¸æ¾åºç©ãzhÅngfà ng fèiwùã waste intermediate product ä¸é´äº§åãzhÅngjiÄn chÇnpÇnã International Atomic Energy å½é ååè½æºæ Agency (IAEA) ãguójì yuánzÇnéng jÄ«gòuã international conflict å½é å²çªãguójì chÅngtÅ«ã international custom å½é æ¯ä¾ãguójì guà nlìã International Data Center (IDC) å½é æ°æ®ä¸å¿ãguójì shùjù zhÅngxÄ«nã international dispute å½é äºç«¯ãguójì zhÄngduÄnã international law å½é æ³ãguójìfÇã International Maritime å½é æµ·äºç»ç»ãguójì hÇishì zÇzhÄ«ã Organization (IMO) International Monitoring å½é çæµç³»ç»ãguójì jiÄncè xìtÇngã System (IMS)
32 Part of the verification system that was ä¸ºæ ¸æ¥ãå ¨é¢ç¦æ¢æ ¸è¯éªæ¡çº¦ã established to verify the implementation (CTBT)æ§è¡æ åµè建ç«çæ ¸æ¥æº of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). It mainly consists of a å¶çä¸ä¸ªç»æé¨åãå®ä¸»è¦ç±å°é seismic monitoring network, an çæµç½ã大æ°æ¾å°æ§æ ¸ç´ çæµç½ã atmospheric radionuclide monitoring 次声çæµç½å水声çæµç½ç»æã(æº network, an infrasound monitoring E èªï¼åèæç®[1]ï¼p478) network and a hydroacoustic monitoring C network. (From: Reference [1], p478) international sanction å½é å¶è£ãguójì zhìcáiã international standards of å½é è¡¡ç®æ å accountancy ãguójì héngsuà n biÄozhÇnã international strategic pattern å½é æç¥æ ¼å±ãguójì zhà nlüè géjúã international technical means å½é ææ¯æ段(æ ¸æ¥ç¨) (for verification) ãguójì jìshù shÇuduà n hécháyòngã international treaty å½é æ¡çº¦ãguójì tiáoyuÄã inventory åéãcúnlià ngã inventory change åéååãcúnlià ng bià nhuà ã ion 离åãlÃzÇã isotope åä½ç´ ãtóngwèisùã isotope separation åä½ç´ å离ãtóngwèisù fÄnlÃã isotope separation factor åä½ç´ å离å å A characteristic value for measuring ãtóngwèisù fÄnlà yÄ«nzÇã separative efficiency of a separative 表å¾å离åå å离ææçç¹å¾éï¼ unit. It is the ratio of the relative 表示æä¸å离æåºæ产çåä½ç´ ç¸ concentration after and before process- 对丰度çååæ åµã(æºèªï¼åèæç® ing. (From: Reference [2], p404) [2]ï¼p404) isotope shift åä½ç´ ä½ç§»ãtóngwèisù wèiyÃã item counting ç©ä»¶è®¡æ°ãwùjià n jìshùã Joint Statement by the ä¸å人æ°å ±åå½ä¸»å¸åä¿ç½æ¯èé¦ President of the People's æ»ç»å ³äºäºä¸é¦å 使ç¨æ ¸æ¦å¨åäº
33 Republic of China and the ä¸å°æç¥æ ¸æ¦å¨çå对æ¹çèå President of the Russian 声æ Federation on No-First-Use of ãzhÅnghuá rénmÃn gònghéguó zhÇxà Nuclear Weapons and hé éluósÄ« liánbÄng zÇngtÇng guÄnyú Detargeting of Strategic hùbù shÇuxiÄn shÇyòng héwÇqì hé Nuclear Weapons Against Each hùbù jiÄng zhà nlüèhéwÇqì miáozhÇn Other duìfÄng de liánhé shÄngmÃngã key measurement point (KMP) å ³é®æµéç¹ãguÄnjià n cèliángdiÇnã E kill probability æ¯ä¼¤æ¦çãhuÇshÄng gà ilÇã C laser chemical isotope æ¿å åå¦æ³å离åä½ç´ separation ãjÄ«guÄng huà xuéfÇ fÄnlà tóngwèisùã laser isotope separation æ¿å å离åä½ç´ ãjÄ«guÄng fÄnlà tóngwèisùã laser plasma ion extraction æ¿å ç离åä½ç¦»åèå ãjÄ«guÄng dÄnglÃzÇtÇlÃzÇ cuìqÇã launch-on-warning (LOW) é¢è¦å³åå°ãyùjÇng jì fÄshèã launch-under-attack (LUA) éè¢å³åå°ãyùxà jì fÄshèã lifespan of nuclear weapon æ ¸æ¦å¨å¯¿å½ãhéwÇqì shòumìngã The whole period of a nuclear weaponâs æ ¸æ¦å¨ä»åºåå°æ æ³æ»¡è¶³ææ¯æ§è½ life, beginning from when it was ææ åä½æ使ç¨è¦æ±çæ´ä¸ªè¿ç¨ç produced until when it could no longer fulfill technical performance criteria or æéã(æ¹èªï¼åèæç®[2]ï¼p222) meet operational requirements. (Modified from: Reference [2], p222) lifetime extension and æ ¸æ¦å¨ç延寿ä¸éå½¹ decommissioning of nuclear ãhéwÇqì de yánshòu yÇ tuìyìã weapon light water reactor (LWR) 轻水å ãqÄ«ngshuÇduÄ«ã limited deterrence æéå¨æ ãyÇuxià n wÄishèã A term used by some scholars to æäºå¦è ç¨äºæè¿°æç§å¨æ å½¢å¼æ describe a form of deterrence. However, there is no consensus on the ç¨çæ¯è¯ï¼ä½ç®åå°æ å®è®ºã definition. Note 1: In some descriptions limited 注 1ï¼å¨æäºæè¿°ä¸ï¼æéå¨æ è¦ deterrence requires a limited warfight- æ±æä¸å®çæ ¸æè½åï¼è½å¤å¨æ ¸æ
34 ing capability to inflict costly damage on äºä¸çåå级é¶æ¢¯ä¸ç»å¯¹æé ææ the adversary at every rung on the 失ï¼ä»èæ«è´¥å¯¹æ使ä¹ä¸è½åèã escalation ladder, thus denying the adversary victory in a nuclear war. (æ¹èªï¼åèæç®[46]) (Modified from: Reference [46]) Note 2: In some descriptions it refers to 注 2ï¼å¨æäºæè¿°ä¸æ¯ææ³å½çæ ¸ Franceâs nuclear deterrent. (Modified from: å¨æ ã(æ¹èªï¼åèæç®[18]ï¼p360ï¼[70]ï¼ E Reference [18], p360; [70], p195-196) p195-196) C Note 3: âdeterrenceâ can also apply in 注 3ï¼âå¨æ â亦éåºäºéæ ¸æ åµã non-nuclear circumstances. limited war æéæäºãyÇuxià n zhà nzhÄngã limit éå¶ãxià nzhìã lithium éãlÇã lithium deuteride æ°åéãdÄohuà lÇã lithium deutero-tritide æ°æ°åéãdÄochuÄnhuà lÇã lithium hydride æ°¢åéãqÄ«nghuà lÇã lithium isotopes separation éåä½ç´ å离ãlÇ tóngwèisù fÄnlÃã local war å±é¨æäºãjúbù zhà nzhÄngã location outside facilities (LOF) 设æ½å¤åºæãshèshÄ«wà i chÇngsuÇã long-term biological effects of æ ¸çç¸çé¿æçç©æåº nuclear explosion ãhébà ozhà de chángqÄ« shÄngwù xià oyìngã low-enriched uranium (LEU) ä½æµéãdÄ«'nóngyóuã low level radioactive waste ä½æ¾åºç©ãdÄ«fà ng fèiwùã maintainability of nuclear æ ¸æ¦å¨å¯ç»´ä¿®æ§ weapon ãhéwÇqì kÄwéixiÅ«xìngã managed access éå¶åå ¥ãxià nzhì zhÇnrùã Upon the request of a State, the IAEA æå¨è¢«è§å¯å½çè¦æ±ä¸ï¼IAEA å and the State shall make arrangements 该å½è¾¾æçéå¶è¿å ¥æéçå®æã for managed access, arranged in such a way as âto prevent the dissemination è¿ç§å®æåºæç §âé²æ¢ä¸æ©æ£ç¸å ³ of proliferation sensitive information, to çææä¿¡æ¯çæ£å¸ã满足å®å ¨æå® meet safety or physical protection ä½ä¿æ¤è¦æ±æè ä¿æ¤ææææåä¸
35 requirements, or to protect proprietary ææä¿¡æ¯âçååå¶å®ã(æºèªï¼å or commercially sensitive information.â èæç®[4]ï¼11.26) (From: Reference [4], 11.26) maneuverable reentry vehicle æºå¨åå ¥å¼¹å¤´ãjÄ«dòng zà irù dà ntóuã (MaRV) marine propulsion reactor è°è¹ç¨å¨åååºå ãjià nchuányòng dònglì fÇnyìngduÄ«ã E material balance area (MBA) æ ¸ææ平衡åºãhécáilià o pÃnghéngqÅ«ã C material balance period (MBP) ææ平衡å¨æ ãcáilià o pÃnghéng zhÅuqÄ«ã material category ææç±»å«ãcáilià o lèibiéã material description ææ说æãcáilià o shuÅmÃngã material form ææå½¢æãcáilià o xÃngtà iã material type ææç±»åãcáilià o lèixÃngã material unaccounted for (MUF) ä¸æææéãbùmÃng cáilià olià ngã maximum deterrence æå¤§æ ¸å¨æ ãzuìdà héwÄishèã A term used in the past by some é¨åä¸å½åäºå¦è 以åæè¿°ä¸ç§æ ¸ Chinese military scholars to describe a form of deterrence whereby with strong å¨æ å½¢å¼æ使ç¨çæ¯è¯ï¼å³ç¨å¼ºå¤§ nuclear superiority as support, the çæ ¸ä¼å¿ä¸ºåç¾ï¼ä»¥å¤§è§æ¨¡ä½¿ç¨æ ¸ threat of a massive nuclear strike is æ¦å¨ä½å¨èæ¥å¨æ 对æã(æ¹èªï¼å used to deter the adversary. (Modified èæç®[18]ï¼p359) from: Reference [18], p359) Refer to âdeterrenceâ åè§âå¨æ â means to drive circulation in a æ°ä½ç¦»å¿æºç¯æµé©±å¨æ³ gas centrifuge ãqìtÇ lÃxÄ«njÄ« huánliú qÅ«dòngfÇã measurement of nuclear æ ¸çç¸æåºåæ°æµé explosion effect parameters ãhébà ozhà xià oyìng cÄnshù cèliángã measurement of nuclear fireball æ ¸çç¸ç«çåæ°æµé parameters ãhébà ozhà huÇqiú cÄnshù cèliángã measurement technology of æ ¸è¯éªæµè¯ææ¯ nuclear test ãhéshìyà n cèshì jìshùã mechanical damage induced by X å°çº¿è¾ç §å¼èµ·çåå¦æ伤 X-ray irradiation ãX shèxià n fúzhà o yÇnqÇ de lìxué sÇnshÄngã
36 memorandum å¤å¿å½ãbèiwà nglùã metallic fuel éå±çæãjÄ«nshÇ ránlià oã metallic plutonium éå±éãjÄ«nshÇbùã metallic uranium éå±éãjÄ«nshÇyóuã methods of tritium production 产æ°æ¹æ³ãchÇnchuÄn fÄngfÇã E militarization of space å¤ç©ºåäºåãwà ikÅng jÅ«nshìhuà ã The deployment of assets (typically C å¨å¤ç©ºé¨ç½²è®¾æ½(é常æ¯å«æ)为å satellites) in space for providing infor- mation support to military activities. äºæ´»å¨æä¾ä¿¡æ¯æ¯æã(æ¹èªï¼åèæ (Modified from: Reference [56], p30) ç®[56]ï¼p30) Refer to âweaponization of spaceâ åè§âå¤ç©ºæ¦å¨åâ military stability åäºç¨³å®æ§ãjÅ«nshì wÄndìngxìngã miniature neutron source å¾®åä¸åæºååºå reactor (MNSR) ãwÄixÃng zhÅngzÇyuán fÇnyìngduÄ«ã minimum deterrence æä½æ ¸å¨æ ãzuìdÄ« héwÄishèã Threatening the lowest level of damage éè¿å¨è使ç¨æå°æ°éçæ ¸æ¦å¨ï¼ necessary to prevent attack, with the 产çè½å¤æ æ¢å¯¹æ¹æ»å»æéçæä½ fewest number of nuclear weapons é度çç ´åã(æºèªï¼åèæç®[24]ï¼p2) possible. (From: Reference [24], p2) missile accuracy 导弹精度ãdÇodà n jÄ«ngdùã Missile Technology Control 导弹ææ¯æ§å¶å¶åº¦ Regime (MTCR) ãdÇodà n jìshù kòngzhì zhìdùã The MTCR was originally established in ç¾å½ç西æ¹å½å®¶ 1987 å¹´å¶å®çï¼æ¨ 1987 by western countries. It is a regime that aims to restrict the å¨é²æ¢ç¨äºè¿è½½å¤§è§æ¨¡æ伤æ§æ¦å¨ proliferation of systems (except manned çææ·ç³»ç»(æ人驾驶é£æºé¤å¤)å air vehicles), equipments and æå ³è®¾å¤åææ¯æ©æ£çæ§å¶å¶åº¦ã technologies intended for the delivery of 该å¶åº¦ç±âååâåâ设å¤ä¸ææ¯ weapons of mass destruction (WMD). The MTCR includes the Guidelines and é件â两个æ件ç»æï¼æéå¶é¡¹ç® the Equipment and Technology Annex, (导弹ãåç³»ç»ãé¨ä»¶ï¼ç产设æ½å and it divides controlled items (missiles æå ³ææ¯)åæ两大类ã第ä¸ç±»é¡¹ç® along with their subsystems and components, production equipments 为âæææ项ç®âï¼ä¸è¬ä¸å¾è½¬è®©ã and related technologies) into two 第äºç±»é¡¹ç®ä¸ºåæ°ä¸¤ç¨é¡¹ç®ï¼åºå£
37 category. Category I items are the most æ¶è¦ä»¥è®¸å¯è¯æ¹å¼é件审æ¹ï¼ä¿è¯ sensitive items, commonly the transfer ä¸ç¨äºå å«ç¬¬ä¸ç±»é¡¹ç®çç³»ç»ã of them will not be authorized. Category II items are dual-use items, which 1993 å¹´æåå½å¯¹âååâè¿è¡äºä¿® should be examined and approved æ¹ï¼æåçä¸æ§å¶âæ ¸æ¦å¨è¿è½½ç³» case-by-case subject to export license, ç»âç转让æ¹ææ§å¶â大è§æ¨¡æ伤 and be guaranteed not to be used in projects including Category I items. In æ§æ¦å¨(å³æ ¸ãçãåæ¦å¨)è¿è½½ç³» E 1993, member states modified the ç»âç转让ãæªè³ 2007 å¹´åºï¼è¯¥å¶ C Guidelines. âControl the transfer of 度æ 34 个æåå½ã(æ¹èªï¼åèæç®[1]ï¼ nuclear weapons delivery systemsâ, in p410) the original version was modified to âcontrol the transfer of weapons of mass destruction (nuclear, biological, chemical weapon) delivery systemsâ. Up to the end of 2007, the Regime has 34 member states. (Modified from: Reference [1], p410) misuse 滥ç¨ãlà nyòngã mixed oxide (MOX) æ··åæ°§åç©ãhùnhé yÇnghuà wùã mobile missile æºå¨å¯¼å¼¹ãjÄ«dòng dÇodà nã molecular flow ååæµãfÄnzÇliúã molten salt electrorefining çççµè§£ç²¾ç¼æµç¨ process ãróngyán dià njiÄ jÄ«nglià n liúchéngã monitoring çæµãjiÄncèã The means by which information is ä¸ºæ ¸æ¥è·åä¿¡æ¯çéå¾ã(æºèªï¼å obtained for verification purposes. èæç®[16]) (From: Reference [16]) moratorium on nuclear testing æåæ ¸è¯éªãzà ntÃng héshìyà nã multi-fissile body subcritical å¤è£åä½æ¬¡ä¸´çå®å ¨å®éª safety experiment ãduÅlièbià ntÇ cìlÃnjiè Änquán shÃyà nã multiple independently å导å¼å¤å¼¹å¤´ãfÄndÇoshì duÅdà ntóuã targetable reentry vehicle (MIRV)
38 multiplicity of technical ææ¯é²æ¤ç³»ç»çå¤éæ§ protection system ãjìshù fánghù xìtÇng de duÅchóngxìngã National Ignition Facility (NIF) å½å®¶ç¹ç«è£ ç½® ãguójiÄ diÇnhuÇ zhuÄngzhìã national interest å½å®¶å©çãguójiÄ lìyìã E national military strategy å½å®¶åäºæç¥ãguójiÄ jÅ«nshì zhà nlüèã C The deployment and application of åé åè¿ç¨åäºåé以å®ç°å½å®¶å® military power to attain national security å ¨æç¥åå½é²æç¥ç®æ ã(æ¹èªï¼å strategy and national defense strategy objectives. (Modified fromï¼Reference [9], p365) èæç®[9]ï¼p365) national security strategy å½å®¶å®å ¨æç¥ Development, application, and coordi- ãguójiÄ Änquán zhà nlüèã nation of the instruments of national åå±ãè¿ç¨ååè°åç§å½å®¶åéæ power to achieve objectives that contri- 段以å®ç°æå©äºç»´æ¤å½å®¶å®å ¨çç® bute to national security. In the U.S., it is a formal U.S. government docu- æ ãå¨ç¾å½ï¼è¿æ¯ä¸ä¸ªæ£å¼çå®æ¹ ment. (Modified from: Reference [9], p 367) æ件ã(æ¹èªï¼åèæç®[9]ï¼p367) national strategy å½å®¶æç¥ãguójiÄ zhà nlüèã national technical means å½å®¶ææ¯æ段 (NTMs) ãguójiÄ jìshù shÇuduà nã 1 Verification and monitoring techno- 1 ä¸ä¸ªå½å®¶åæ¹é¢æ¥æçæ ¸æ¥åç logies or measures owned by a country alone, and information thus collected æµææ¯ææªæ½ï¼æè·ä¿¡æ¯ç¬å®¶äº«ç¨ï¼ will be used by itself. NTM is usually 常ç¨äºè·åå ¶ä»å½å®¶çç¸å ³æ´»å¨ç used to obtain information or intelli- ä¿¡æ¯ææ æ¥ãææ¶ï¼ä¹å¯ç¨äºåå¤ gence on relevant activities conducted by other countries. It may also be used æ§å¶æ¡çº¦æåè®®ï¼ä»¥äºè§£åæ ¸æ¥å ¶ for understanding and verifying comp- ä»å约æ¹çéµçº¦æ åµã(æ¹èªï¼åèæ liance with treaties or agreements ç®[1]ï¼p472) related to arms control by other treaty signatories. (Modified from: Reference [1], p472) 2 NTM refers to nationally owned 2 å¨æªä¾µå ¥åè®®æ¹é¢åãé¢ç©ºãé¢ instruments for surveying a party's æµ·çåæä¸ï¼å½å®¶æ¥æçç¨äºæ ¸æ¥ compliance with agreement obligations, without intruding onto its territory, å ¶ä»åè®®æ¹æ¯å¦éµçº¦çæ段ãæ¥èª
39 airspace or national waters. Informa- NTM çä¿¡æ¯å¯ç¨äºå½é æ ¸æ¥å¶åº¦ï¼ tion derived from NTM may be used in international verification regimes by a ç±æ¡çº¦ç¼çº¦å½åå¦ä¸æ¹è´¨çæ¯å¦éµ treaty party to question another partyâs 约ã(æºèªï¼åèæç®[19]ï¼p198) compliance. (From: Reference [19], p198) natural radionuclides 天ç¶æ¾å°æ§æ ¸ç´ ãtiÄnrán fà ngshèxìng hésùã E natural uranium 天ç¶éãtiÄnrányóuã C naval reactor æµ·åç¨ååºå ãhÇijÅ«nyòng fÇnyìngduÄ«ã near-field physical diagnostic è¿åºç©çè¯æãjìnqÅ« wùlÇ zhÄnduà nã To judge nuclear weaponsâ perform- ç´æ¥æµéæ ¸çç¸è¿ç¨ä¸ä¼´éçæ ¸å ance parameters by directly measuring åºæ¾åºçä¸åãγå°çº¿ãX å°çº¿ï¼ä»¥ neutrons, γ-rays, and X-rays released from the nuclear reactions. (Modified from: å¤ææ ¸æ¦å¨æ§è½åæ°ã(æ¹èªï¼åèæ Reference [3], p391) ç®[3]ï¼p391) neutron bomb/enhanced ä¸åå¼¹/å¢å¼ºè¾å°æ¦å¨ radiation weapon ãzhÅngzÇdà n zÄngqiáng fúshèwÇqìã A low-yield hydrogen bomb with a 以é«è½ä¸å为主è¦æ¯ä¼¤å ç´ ï¼ç¸å¯¹ special design utilizing high-energy neutrons as its main destructive åå¼±å²å»æ³¢åå è¾å°æåºçä¸ç§ç¹ element and relatively reducing its æ®è®¾è®¡çä½å¨å氢弹ãå ¶è¾ç¡®åç shock wave and thermal radiation effects. In a more accurate sense, it is å称æ¯å¢å¼ºè¾å°æ¦å¨ã(æ¹èªï¼åèæ called an âenhanced radiation weaponâ. ç®[1]ï¼p152) (Modified from: Reference [1], p152) neutron generator used in æ ¸æ¦å¨ç¨ä¸ååçå¨ nuclear weapon ãhéwÇqìyòng zhÅngzÇ fÄshÄngqìã neutrons ä¸åãzhÅngzÇã new facility inspection æ°è®¾æ½è§å¯ãxÄ«n shèshÄ« shìcháã new international economic å½é ç»æµæ°ç§©åº order ãguójì jÄ«ngjì xÄ«nzhìxùã new international political order å½é æ¿æ²»æ°ç§©åº ãguójì zhèngzhì xÄ«nzhìxùã new strategic triad æ°æç¥ä¸ä½ä¸ä½ ãxÄ«n zhà nlüè sÄnwèiyÄ«tÇã
40 A new U.S. military strategy revealed in ç¾å½2002å¹´ãæ ¸æå¿è¯ä¼°ãæ¥åä¸ the 2002 Nuclear Posture Review, æåºçä¸ç§æ°çåäºæç¥ï¼ç±ä¸é¨ consisting of nuclear and non-nuclear åç»æï¼æ ¸ä¸éæ ¸æå»åéï¼ä¸»å¨ strike forces; passive and active çå被å¨çé²å¾¡ï¼å ¨æ°çé²å¾¡åºç¡ defenses; and a revitalized defense infrastructure. (From: Reference [67]) 设æ½ã(æºèªï¼åèæç®[67]) Refer to âold nuclear triadâ. åè§âæ§æ ¸ä¸ä½ä¸ä½â E new thinking æ°æç»´ãxÄ«nsÄ«wéiã C 1 The former Soviet Union President 1 20 ä¸çºª 80 年代ä¸æèèé¢å¯¼äºº Mikhail Gorbachevâs enunciated opinion æå°å·´ä¹å¤«å¯¹å½æ¶ä¸çççæ³ä»¥å on the world situation and Soviet Union foreign policy in the 1980s. The main å ³äºèèå¤äº¤æ¿ççè§ç¹ï¼ä¸»è¦å points are: (1) The world is a unity of 容为ï¼(1)ä¸çæ¯ä¸ä¸ªå¤æ ·æ§çç»ä¸ diversity. (2) Respect the choices of ä½ï¼(2)å åå°éåå½äººæ°æç §èªå·± style of life according to people in each çéæ©èç活并ç¬ç«èªä¸»å°è§£å³èª country and of the ways of solving their 身çé®é¢ï¼(3)å ¨äººç±»çå©çé«äºé¶ own problems independently. (3) The interest of humanity has priority over 级å©çï¼(4)æäºå¨èç人类ççå that of a class. (4) Nuclear war is a ä¸åå±ï¼(5)å ¨äººç±»æ®éå®å ¨çå¯ä¸ threat to human life and development. åååºç¡æ¯å°é主æã(æ¹èª:åèæ And (5) The basis of human common ç®[1]ï¼p34ï¼[64]) security is respect for independence and sovereignty of other members of the world community. (Modified From: Reference [1], p34; [64]) 2 The term used to characterize 2 该æ¯è¯ç¨ä»¥æè¿° 20 ä¸çºª 80 年代 distinctive elements in Soviet foreign ä¸åæå¨æå°å·´ä¹å¤«æ»ç»é¢å¯¼ä¸è policy thinking developed under the leadership of President Mikhail åå±çèèå¤äº¤æ¿çæç»´çç¹æ§ã Gorbachev in the latter half of the æ°æç»´ç主è¦è§ç¹å æ¬ï¼(1)èµæ¬ä¸» 1980s. The main propositions in new ä¹å社ä¼ä¸»ä¹ä¹é´ä¸æ¯âé¶åâå ³ thinking included: (1) the relationship between capitalist and socialist states ç³»ï¼(2)å ±åç人类å©çé«äºé¶çº§å© was not zero-sum; (2) common human çï¼(3)ä¸ç¾å½çåäºå衡对èèç interests should take priority over å®å ¨ä¸æ¯å¿ éçï¼éæ»å»æ§çé²å¾¡ class-based interests; (3) military parity with the U.S. was not necessary for æç¥åºä¼äºè¿æ»æç¥ï¼(4)åäºåé Soviet security, and non-offensive 主è¦ç¨äºé²æ¢å²çªï¼èä¸æ¯å¨æäº
41 defensive strategies were preferable to ä¸æ败对æãæ°æç»´çæäºè¡¨ç°å½¢ offensive strategies; (4) the main å¼å æ¬åè¾¹è£åæªæ½ãåååäºå purpose of military power was to prevent conflict, rather than to defeat an éãæ¿è¯ºåè¾¹åå¤è¾¹ç信任建ç«å adversary in a war. Some of the è£ å æª æ½ ã ( æº èª ï¼ å è æ ç® [57] ï¼ manifestations of new thinking included p117-129ï¼[58]) certain unilateral disarmament measures, reductions in the size of E certain military forces, and a strong C commitment to bilateral and multilateral confidence building and arms control measures. (From: Reference [57], p117-129; [58]) new triad æ°ä¸ä½ä¸ä½ãxÄ«n sÄnwèiyÄ«tÇã Refer to ânew strategic triadâ. åè§âæ°æç¥ä¸ä½ä¸ä½â no-first-use of nuclear weapons ä¸é¦å 使ç¨æ ¸æ¦å¨ ãbù shÇuxiÄn shÇyòng héwÇqìã nonaligned movement ä¸ç»çè¿å¨ãbùjiéméng yùndòngã non-application of IAEA ä¸å®æ½å½é ååè½æºæçä¿éçç£ safeguards ãbùshÃshÄ« guójì yuánzÇnéng jÄ«gòu de bÇozhà ng jiÄndÅ«ã non-compliance ä¸éµçº¦ãbùzÅ«nyuÄã non-nuclear weapon state æ æ ¸æ¦å¨å½å®¶ãwú héwÇqì guójiÄã (NNWS) non-proliferation ä¸æ©æ£ãbùkuòsà nã (North South) Joint Declaration å ³äºæé²åå²æ æ ¸åå ±åå®£è¨ on the Denuclearization of the ã guÄnyú cháoxiÇn bà ndÇo wúhéhuà Korean Peninsula gòngtóng xuÄnyánã NPT Review Conferences ãä¸æ©æ£æ ¸æ¦å¨æ¡çº¦ãå®¡è®®ä¼ ãbùkuòsà n héwÇqì tiáoyuÄ shÄnyìhuìã nuclear airburst 空ä¸æ ¸çç¸ãkÅngzhÅng hébà ozhà ã nuclear artillery projectile æ ¸ç®å¼¹ãhépà odà nã nuclear blackmail æ ¸è®¹è¯ãhéâézhà ã nuclear bomb æ ¸ç¸å¼¹ãhézhà dà nã
42 nuclear campaign æ ¸æå½¹ãhézhà nyìã A series of related military operations å¨ä¸å®æ¶é´ååºåå 为å®ç°æå½¹æ using nuclear weapons aimed at æç¥ç®æ æéåçä¸ç³»å使ç¨æ ¸æ¦ accomplishing a strategic or operational objective within a given time and space. å¨çç¸å ³åäºè¡å¨ã(æ¹èªï¼åèæç® (Modified from: Reference [9], p76) [9]ï¼p76) nuclear counterattack æ ¸åå»ãhéfÇnjÄ«ã E nuclear decay æ ¸è¡°åãhéshuÄibià nã C nuclear depth bomb æ ¸æ·±æ°´ç¸å¼¹ãhé shÄnshuÇ zhà dà nã nuclear deterrence æ ¸å¨æ ãhéwÄishèã A strategy of preventing a nuclear 以ç»è§å¯å°çææ½å¨çæ人é ææ attack by threatening the perceived or æ³æ¿åçæ¯ä¼¤çæ ¸æ¥å¤ç¸å¨èï¼ä» potential enemy with unacceptable èé²æ¢æ人å®æ½æ ¸æå»çæç¥ã(æº damage by nuclear retaliation. (From: Reference [6], p177) èªï¼åèæç®[6]ï¼p177) Note: In principle, nuclear deterrence 注ï¼ååä¸ï¼æ ¸å¨æ ä¸ä» ä» å¯ä»¥ç¨ could be used to deter not only nuclear æ¥é»æ¢æ ¸æ»å»ï¼èä¸ä¹å¯ä»¥ç¨æ¥é» attacks but also attacks with conventional forces, attacks with æ¢å¸¸è§åéãåå¦æçç©æ¦å¨çæ» chemical or biological weapons, or even å»ï¼çè³ç¨æ¥é»æ¢ç±éåäºæ段使 assaults on vital national interests by è³å ³éè¦çå½å®¶å©çéåæ害çæ» nonmilitary means. (From: Reference [7], å»ã(æºèªï¼åèæç®[7]ï¼p14-15) p14-15) nuclear doctrine æ ¸å¦è¯´ãhéxuéshuÅã The fundamental principles governing 为æ¯æå½å®¶æç¥ç®æ èè§å®å¨ä½ç§ the conditions under which and the modalities of how nuclear weapons are æ å½¢ä¸ä»¥ä½ç§æ¹å¼ä½¿ç¨æ ¸æ¦å¨çåº to be used in support of national object- æ¬ååã(æ¹èªï¼åèæç®[9]) tives. (Modified from: Reference [9]) nuclear earth penetrator æ ¸é»å°å¼¹ãhézuÄndìdà nã nuclear electromagnetic pulse æ ¸çµç£èå²ãhédià ncà mà ichÅngã (NEMP) nuclear energy level æ ¸è½çº§ãhénéngjÃã nuclear explosion æ ¸çç¸ãhébà ozhà ã The process of producing explosive å©ç¨è½èªæè¿è¡çååæ ¸è£åæ/
43 effects and potentially huge casualties åèåååºç¬æ¶éæ¾ç巨大è½éï¼ and damage by huge energy instan- 产ççç¸ä½ç¨åå¯è½é æ巨大æ伤 taneously released from selfsustaining ç ´åæåºçè¿ç¨ã(æ¹èªï¼åèæç®[3]ï¼ nuclear fission or/and fusion. (Modified p394) from: Reference [3], p394) Note: A nuclear explosion is a 注ï¼æ ¸çç¸æç±äºå¨ææä¸åçèª self-sustaining fission chain reaction (or æè£åé¾å¼ååºæè£åï¼èåååº E fission-fusion reaction) in a material that is disrupted in the process, with the è导è´ææ解ä½(ä»çº¯ç²¹çæ ¸èå C exception of inertial-confinement fusion ä¸è·å¾è½éçæ¯æ§çº¦æèåç³»ç»é¤ systems for obtaining energy from pure å¤)ãæ ¸ååºå ï¼å³ä½¿æ¯è£åè¿ç¨ç± nuclear fusion. A nuclear reactor, even äºåºä½ææçè¨èèç»æ¢çèå²æ ¸ a pulsed nuclear reactor in which the fission process is terminated by thermal ååºå ï¼ä¹ä¸å±äºæ ¸çç¸ã(æ¹èªï¼ expansion of solid material, is not a åèæç®[59]ï¼p14-15) nuclear explosion. (Modified from: Reference [59], p14-15) nuclear explosion debris æ ¸çç¸ç¢ççåå fractionation ãhébà ozhà suìpià n de fÄnnÃngã nuclear-explosion-driven æ ¸çæ¿å±é«åç微波æ¦å¨ microwave weapon ãhébà o jÄ«lì gÄogÅnglÇ wÄibÅ wÇqìã A nuclear explosive with special ä¸ç§å ·æç¹æ®æ§è½çæ ¸çç¸è£ ç½®ï¼ characteristics coupled with a special å®éè¿ä¸å¾®æ³¢åçå¨è¦åçæ¹å¼ï¼ microwave generator that can disturb or destroy enemiesâ communication 产ç以é«åç微波干æ°ææ¯åææ¹ system or electronic components of éä¿¡ç³»ç»ææ¦å¨ççµåé¨ä»¶ãå称 weapons by high-power microwaves. It æ ¸ç驱å¨çµç£èå²å¼¹ãå®æ¯æè®®ä¸ is one of the proposed third generation 第ä¸ä»£æ ¸æ¦å¨çä¸ç§ã(æ¹èªï¼åèæ nuclear weapons. (Modified from: Reference ç®[2]ï¼p176) [2], p176) nuclear explosion effects æ ¸çç¸æåºãhébà ozhà xià oyìngã nuclear explosion fireball æ ¸çç¸ç«çãhébà ozhà huÇqiúã nuclear-explosion-level prompt æ ¸çç¸çº§ç¬æ¶è¾å°æ¨¡ææº radiation simulation source ãhébà ozhà jà shùnshà fúshè mónÇ yuánã nuclear explosion shock wave æ ¸çç¸å²å»æ³¢ãhébà ozhà chÅngjÄ«bÅã
44 nuclear explosive device æ ¸çç¸è£ ç½®ãhébà ozhà zhuÄngzhìã A fission or thermonuclear device å ·ææ ¸çç¸åè½çè£åè£ ç½®æçæ ¸ capable of producing a nuclear explo- è£ ç½®ã(æ¹èªï¼åèæç®[3]ï¼p379) sion. (Modified from: Reference [3], p379) nuclear-explosive material æ ¸çææãhébà o cáilià oã (NEM) Any mixture of nuclear-explosive and 以éå½çæ°éã纯度åæååå¨æ¶ï¼ E other nuclides that can be made to è½ç¨ä»¥æ¯æé¾å¼ååºçæ ¸ç¸è¯åå ¶ C support a chain reaction when present ä»æ ¸ç´ çæ··åç©ã (æºèªï¼åèæç® in suitable quantity, purity, and [11]ï¼p221) geometry is called ânuclear-explosive materialâ (NEM). (From: Reference [11], p221) nuclear export control æ ¸åºå£æ§å¶ãhéchÅ«kÇu kòngzhìã Control of commercial export, gifts to å¯¹æ ¸ææãæ ¸è®¾å¤åååºå ç¨éæ ¸ and exhibitions in foreign countries or regions, as well as scientific and ææçç©é¡¹åå ¶ç¸å ³ææ¯çè´¸ææ§ technological cooperation with and åºå£å对å¤èµ éãå±è§ãç§æåä½ assistance to foreign countries or regions that involve nuclear materials, åæ´å©è¿è¡æ§å¶ã(æ¹èªï¼åèæç®[25]) nuclear equipment, non-nuclear mater- ials used for reactors and other items as well as their related technologies. (Modified from: Reference [25]) nuclear first strike 第ä¸æ¬¡æ ¸æå»ãdìyÄ«cì hédÇjÄ«ã 1 The launching of an initial nuclear 1 å¨å¯¹æè½å¤ä½¿ç¨ä»»ä½æç¥æ¦å¨ä¹ attack before oneâs opponent is able to use any strategic weapon. First strike is åçå åå¨æ ¸æ»å»ãé¦æ¬¡æå»æ¯ç» a nuclear attack carried out at such a 对æé ææ大çç ´åè´ä½¿å ¶å¤±å»å devastatingly high level of destruction as to nullify an enemyâs capability to èµ·ææåå»è½åçæ ¸è¿æ»ã(æºèªï¼ launch a major counterstrike. (From: åèæç®[6]ï¼p72) Reference [6], p72) 2 An initial attack on an opponent's 2 对ææ¹æç¥æ ¸åéçé¦æ¬¡æå»ã strategic nuclear forces. Such an attack è¿ç§æå»å¯ç¨äºè¯å¾æ§æ¯ææ¹çæ¥ may be undertaken in an attempt to destroy an enemy's retaliatory å¤(第äºæ¬¡æå»)è½åã(æºèªï¼åèæ (second-strike) capability. (From: Reference ç®[8]) [8])
45 nuclear fission æ ¸è£åãhélièbià nã nuclear football æ ¸é»å£åãhé hÄixiáziã A popular name of a portable briefcase è£ ææ»ç»ç¨æ¥ææ使ç¨æç¥æ ¸æ¦å¨ or package that contains instructions and codes for the president to çæ令åå¯ç ç便æºææç®±æææ authorize the use of strategic nuclear å çä¿ç§°ã(æ¹èªï¼åèæç®[2]ï¼p203) weapons. (Modified from: Reference[2], p203) E nuclear forces æ ¸æ¦è£ åéãhéwÇzhuÄng lìlià ngã C nuclear fuel æ ¸çæãhéránlià oã nuclear fuel cycle æ ¸çæ循ç¯ãhéránlià o xúnhuánã A system of nuclear installations and ç±ä¸æ ¸ææç©æµç¸å ³çæ ¸è®¾æ½åæ ¸ activities interconnected by streams of æ´»å¨ç»æçç³»ç»ãä»ç±å½å¤æä¾å¸¦ nuclear material. The characteristics of the fuel cycle may vary widely from çæçå个ååºå ï¼å°ä¸æ´å¥å®å State to State, from a single reactor ç³»ç»ï¼ä¸åå½å®¶ä¹é´çæ循ç¯çç¹ supplied from abroad with fuel, to a fully ç¹å¯è½åå¨å¾å¤§å·®å¼ã(æºèªï¼åèæ developed system. (From: Reference [4], ç®[4]ï¼4.30) 4.30) nuclear fuel reprocessing æ ¸çæåå¤çãhéránlià o hòuchÇlÇã nuclear hardening ææ ¸å åºãkà nghé jiÄgùã nuclear heating reactor ä¾çååºå ãgÅngrè fÇnyìngduÄ«ã nuclear high altitude burst é«ç©ºæ ¸çç¸ãgÄokÅng hébà ozhà ã nuclear land (water) surface å°(æ°´)é¢æ ¸çç¸ burst ãdìshuÇmià n hébà ozhà ã nuclear loss æ ¸æèãhésÇnhà oã Loss of nuclear material due to its æç±äºæ ¸ååºä½¿æ ¸ææ转åæå ¶ä» transformation into other element(s) or å ç´ æåä½ç´ èé æçæ ¸æææ isotope(s) as a result of nuclear reactions. Nuclear loss also includes èãæ ¸æèè¿å æ¬æ ¸ææå¨ååºå burn up of nuclear material in a reactor ä¸çç§æé æçæè以ååå¨æé´ and decay (e.g. of Pu-241) during è¡°åæé æçæè(ä¾å¦é-241 ç storage. (From: Reference [4], 6.22) è¡°å)ã(æºèªï¼åèæç®[4]ï¼6.22) nuclear material æ ¸ææãhécáilià oã
46 nuclear material accountancy æ ¸ææè¡¡ç®æ´»å¨ The practice of nuclear material ãhécáilià o héngsuà n huódòngã accounting as implemented by the 设æ½è¿è¡è åå½å®¶æ ¸ææè¡¡ç®åæ§ facility operator and the State system of å¶ç³»ç»æéåçè¡¡ç®æ ¸ææçè¡ accounting for and control of nuclear material (SSAC), inter alia, to satisfy the å¨ï¼å°¤å ¶æ¯ä¸ºæ»¡è¶³ IAEA å该å½(æ requirements in the safeguards agree- å½å®¶éå¢)ä¹é´çä¿éçç£åè®®ç E ment between the IAEA and the State è¦æ±ï¼ä¹å æ¬ IAEA æéåç类似 (or group of States); and as implement- C è¡å¨ï¼å°¤å ¶æ¯ä¸ºç¬ç«æ ¸æ¥å½å®¶æ ¸æ ed by the IAEA, inter alia, to indepen- dently verify the correctness of the æè¡¡ç®åæ§å¶ç³»ç»(SSAC)å IAEA nuclear material accounting information ææä¾ç设æ½çºªå½åæ¥åä¸æ ¸ææ in the facility records and the reports è¡¡ç®ä¿¡æ¯çæ£ç¡®æ§ã(æºèªï¼åèæç® provided by the SSAC to the IAEA. [4]ï¼6.2) (From: Reference [4], 6.2) nuclear material incident æ ¸æææå¤äºä»¶ ãhécáilià o yìwà i shìjià nã nuclear matter æ ¸ç©è´¨ãhéwùzhìã nuclear missile reentry vehicle æ ¸å¯¼å¼¹å¼¹å¤´ãhédÇodà n dà ntóuã 1 A missile reentry vehicle equipped 1 è£ ææ ¸ææé¨ç导弹åå ¥é£è¡å¨ã with a nuclear warhead. (From: Reference [3], p96) (æºèªï¼åèæç®[3]ï¼p96) 2 reentry vehicle (RV) â The part of a 2 åå ¥é£è¡å¨â¯â¯è®¾è®¡ä¸ºåå ¥å°ç space vehicle designed to re-enter the 大æ°å±ç空é´é£è¡å¨é¨ä»¶ã(æºèªï¼ earthâs atmosphere. (From: Reference [9], p456) åèæç®[9]ï¼p456) 3 reentry vehicle (RV) â A nuclear 3 åå ¥é£è¡å¨(æ(åå ¥)弹头)ââå¨ warhead on a ballistic missile specially 导弹çå¼¹éç»ç«¯è½åå ¥å°ç大æ°å± designed to reenter the earth's atmos- phere in the terminal portion of the çå¼¹é导弹ä¸çæ ¸ææé¨ã(æºèªï¼ missile's trajectory. (From: Reference [8]) åèæç®[8]) Note: The term âreentry bodyâ is the 注ï¼âåå ¥é£è¡å¨âçä¸ç§éå¸¸ç¨ less-common equivalent of âreentry vehicleâ. å称æ¯âåå ¥ä½âã nuclear operation plan æ ¸ä½æ计åãhézuòzhà n jìhuà ã nuclear primacy æ ¸ä¼å¿ãhéyÅushìã The condition whereby one state holds ä¸ä¸ªæ ¸å½å®¶çæ ¸æ¦å¨æ¥æææ¾çè´¨
47 a clear qualitative and quantitative éåæ°éä¸çä¼å¿è¶³ä»¥é»æ¢ææ§æ¯ ability to prevent or render ineffective a 对æçæ¥å¤æ§(第äºæ¬¡)æå»è½åç rival's retaliatory (second) strike ç¶æã(æ¹èªï¼åèæç®[22]) capability. (Modified from: Reference [22]) Note: In another view, âThe ability to 注ï¼å¦ä¸ç§è§ç¹æ¯ï¼âæ§æ¯å¯¹ææ destroy all of an adversary's nuclear ææ ¸åéãæ¶é¤æ¥å¤æ§æå»å¯è½æ§ forces, eliminating the possibility of a çè½åï¼è¢«è®¤ä¸ºæ¯ä¸ç§ç¬¬ä¸æ¬¡æå» E retaliatory strike, is known as a first- strike capability, or nuclear primacy.â è½åææ ¸ä¼å¿â (æºèªï¼ ã åèæç®[22]) C (From: Reference [22]) nuclear reaction æ ¸ååºãhéfÇnyìngã nuclear-related dual-use item æ ¸ç¸å ³ä¸¤ç¨ç©é¡¹ An item which has a technical use in ãhé xiÄngguÄn liÇngyòng wùxià ngã both nuclear and non-nuclear applica- æä¸ç§å¨æ ¸åéæ ¸é¢åé½æææ¯ç¨ tions, and may be subject to certain éçç©é¡¹ï¼æä¾è¿ç§ç©é¡¹æ¶è¦éµå® conditions of supply because such ä¸å®æ¡ä»¶ï¼å 为è¿ç§ç©é¡¹å¯è½ä¸ºæ ¸ items could make a major contribution çç¸æ´»å¨æä¾å¾å¤§ç帮å©ã(æ¹èªï¼ to a nuclear explosive activity. (Modified from: Reference [4], 5.34) åèæç®[4]ï¼5.34) Nuclear Safety Convention æ ¸å®å ¨å ¬çº¦ãhéâÄnquán gÅngyuÄã nuclear second strike 第äºæ¬¡æ ¸æå»ãdìâèrcì hédÇjÄ«ã Retaliatory nuclear attack following an 对ææ¹ç¬¬ä¸æ¬¡æ ¸è¢å»çæ¥å¤æ§æ ¸æ enemyâs first nuclear attack. (Modified å»ã(æ¹èªï¼åèæç®[2]ï¼p62) from: Reference [2], p62) nuclear strategy æ ¸æç¥ãhézhà nlüèã Strategy of planning and guiding the ç¹ååæå¯¼æ ¸åéåå±ä¸è¿ç¨çæ¹ development and employment of ç¥ã(æºèªï¼åèæç®[1]ï¼p112) nuclear force. (From: Reference [1], p112) nuclear strike æ ¸æå»ãhédÇjÄ«ã Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) æ ¸ä¾åºå½éå¢ãhégÅngyìngguó jÃtuánã A group of nuclear supplier countries éè¿æ§è¡æ ¸(åæ¶åæ ¸)åºå£ååè which seeks to contribute to the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons é²æ¢æ ¸æ¦å¨æ©æ£çæ ¸ä¾åºå½å®¶ãå through the implementation of Guide- åä¸å½éè¿å ¶å½å®¶æ³å¾åæ¯ä¾æ¥æ§
48 lines for nuclear exports and nuclear è¡æ ¸ä¾åºå½éå¢çååãåºå£ç³è¯· related exports. The NSG Guidelines are implemented by each Participating ç±å½å®¶å±é¢å³å®ï¼å¹¶ç¬¦åå½å®¶åºå£ Government in accordance with its 许å¯è§å®ã(æºèªï¼åèæç®[47]) national laws and practices. Decisions on export applications are taken at the national level in accordance with E national export licensing requirements. C (From: Reference [47]) Nuclear Suppliers Group æ ¸ä¾åºå½éå¢åå Guidelines ãhégÅngyìngguó jÃtuán zhÇnzéã nuclear test æ ¸è¯éªãhéshìyà nã nuclear test site æ ¸è¯éªåºãhéshìyà nchÇngã nuclear threat æ ¸å¨èãhéwÄixiéã nuclear threshold state (NTS) æ ¸é¨æ§å½å®¶ãhéménkÇn guójiÄã nuclear underground (or å°(æ°´)ä¸æ ¸çç¸ underwater) burst ãdìshuÇxià hébà ozhà ã nuclear war æ ¸æäºãhézhà nzhÄngã nuclear warfighting capability æ ¸æè½åãhézhà n nénglìã In nuclear strategy, having the capability å¨æ ¸æç¥ä¸ï¼å ·æ使ç¨æ ¸æ¦å¨è¿è¡ to use nuclear weapons to fight a war, æäºçè½åï¼èä¸ä» éäºæ æ¢æ ¸æ and not just to deter the outbreak of nuclear war. (Modified from: Reference [48]) äºçåçè½åã(æ¹èªï¼åèæç®[48]) nuclear warhead æ ¸ææé¨ãhézhà ndòubùã The part of a nuclear weapon whose æ ¸æ¦å¨ä¸ç¨æ¥æ¯ä¼¤ç®æ çé¨åã主 function is to destroy or damage targets. It mainly consists of a nuclear è¦ç±æ ¸çç¸è£ ç½®ãå¼çæ§å¶ç³»ç»ã explosive device, arming, fuzing and å ¶ä»åè½é¨ä»¶åç¸åºçç»æé¨ä»¶ç firing systemï¼and other functional parts ç»æãå¨ä¸å½åå¤æ§å¶é¢å常ææ ¸ or relevant structures. In Chinese writings in the arms control field, the ææé¨ç§°ä¸ºæ ¸å¼¹å¤´ã(æ¹èªï¼åèæç® nuclear warhead is often called [3]ï¼p404) ãhédà ntóuã(æ ¸å¼¹ 头). (Modified from: Reference [3], p404) Note: The warhead is that part of a 注ï¼ææé¨ââ导弹ãç®å¼¹ãé±¼é·ã
49 missile, projectile, torpedo, rocket, or ç«ç®æå ¶ä»æ¦å¨çæ¯ä¼¤ç®æ çé¨ other munition which contains either the åï¼å®å«ææ ¸æçæ ¸ç³»ç»ãé«è½ç¸ nuclear or thermonuclear system, high è¯ç³»ç»ãçç©æåå¦å¶åãææ°æ§ explosive system, chemical or biological agents or inert materials intended to ææã(æºèªï¼åèæç®[5]ï¼p15) inflict damage. (From: Reference [5], p15) nuclear weapon æ ¸æ¦å¨ãhéwÇqìã E 1 Weapon assembly that is capable of 1 å©ç¨è½èªæè¿è¡çååæ ¸è£åå C producing an explosion and massive injury and destruction by the sudden (æ)èåååºç¬æ¶éæ¾çå·¨å¤§è½ release of energy instantaneously éï¼äº§ççç¸ä½ç¨ï¼å¹¶å ·æ大è§æ¨¡ released from self-sustaining nuclear æ¯ä¼¤ç ´åæåºçæ¦å¨ãä»å¹¿ä¹ä¸è¯´ fission and/or fusion. From the generalized point of view, it refers to a å®æ¯æå æ¬ææ·æåå°ç³»ç»å¨å ç nuclear weapon system with a å ·æä½æè½åçæ ¸æ¦å¨ç³»ç»ã(æ¹èªï¼ warfighting capability including the åèæç®[3]ï¼p394) delivery or launch system. (Modified from: Reference [3], p394) 2 NATO definition â¯â¯ A complete 2 å约 å®ä¹â¯â¯ æ ¹ æ®é¢æ 设 计 æ assembly (i.e. implosion type, gun type é ï¼å¨å®ææå®çå¼çæ§å¶åºååï¼ or thermonuclear type) in its intended ultimate configuration which, upon è½å¤äº§çé¢æçæ ¸ååºå¹¶éæ¾åºæ ¸ completion of the prescribed arming, è½çå®æ´è£ ç½®(å¦å çåãæªåæç fusing and firing sequence, is capable of producing the intended nuclear æ ¸å)ãä¹è¢«ç§°ä¸ºâååæ¦å¨âã(æº reaction and release of energy. Also èªï¼åèæç®[49]ï¼p11) called âatomic weaponâ. (From: Reference [49], p11) 3 Russian definition â¯â¯ Nuclear 3 ä¿ç½æ¯å®ä¹ââä¿ç½æ¯èé¦åé Weapons in the Armed Forces of the çæ ¸æ¦å¨æ¯æå æ¬æ ¸è£ æãæ ¸ææ Russian Federation include an aggregate of armaments including é¨ãè¿è½½å·¥å ·åæ§å¶ç³»ç»å¨å çæ¦ nuclear charges, nuclear ammunition, å¨ç³»ç»ã(æºèªï¼åèæç®[29]ï¼p21) means of their delivery to the target and control means. (From: Reference [29], p21) 4 A device that releases nuclear energy 4 使ååæ ¸äº§çè£åæèåé¾å¼å in an explosive manner as the result of åº(æå ¼èæä¹)ï¼ä»¥çç¸æ¹å¼éæ¾ nuclear chain reactions involving the
50 fission or fusion, or both, of atomic æ ¸è½çè£ ç½®ã(æºèªï¼åèæç®[8]) nuclei. (From: Reference [8]) nuclear weapon accidents æ ¸æ¦å¨äºæ ãhéwÇqì shìgùã nuclear weapon miniaturization æ ¸æ¦å¨å°ååãhéwÇqì xiÇoxÃnghuà ã nuclear weapon physics æ ¸æ¦å¨ç©çãhéwÇqì wùlÇã E nuclear weapon safety æ ¸æ¦å¨å®å ¨æ§ãhéwÇqì Änquánxìngã C In maintenance and use of nuclear å¨æ£å¸¸çç»´æ¤æ使ç¨æ ¸æ¦å¨ä¸ï¼é² weapons, the capability to avoid an æ¢å 设å¤ææ¦å¨ç误æä½ãéæ¥é accident involving personnel, facilities and installations due to misuse or from åææå¤æ éçåå åç人åã设 gradual deterioration or a sudden fault å¤å设æ½çäºæ çè½åã(æ¹èªï¼å in equipment or weapons. (Modified from: èæç®[2]ï¼p217) Reference [2], p217) nuclear weapon security æ ¸æ¦å¨ä¿å®æ§ãhéwÇqì bÇoâÄnxìngã The capability of a nuclear weapon and æ ¸æ¦å¨åå ¶ç¸å ³ç设å¤å人åè½æµ its surrounding equipment and å¶ä»»ä½éææç使ç¨çè½åã(æ¹èªï¼ personnel to prevent any unauthorized use. (Modified from: Reference [2], p217) åèæç®[2]ï¼p217) nuclear weapon state (NWS) æ ¸æ¦å¨å½å®¶ãhéwÇqì guójiÄã nuclear weapons stockpile æ ¸æ¦å¨åºåãhéwÇqì kùcúnã nuclear weapons surety æ ¸æ¦å¨ç¡®ä¿¡æ§ The materiel, personnel, and ãhéwÇqì quèxìnxìngã procedures that contribute to the safety, 使ç¨è½æé«æ ¸æ¦å¨å®å ¨æ§ãä¿å®æ§ã security, reliability, and control of å¯é æ§åå¯æ§æ§çææã人ååç¨ nuclear weapons, thus assuring no åºï¼ä»¥ç¡®ä¿æ ¸æ¦å¨å¨ä½¿ç¨è¿ç¨ä¸ä¸ nuclear accidents, incidents, unau- åçæ ¸äºæ ãæ éãéææ使ç¨æ thorized use, or degradation in åè½éåã (æºèªï¼åèæç®[60]) performance. (From: Reference [60]) nuclear winter æ ¸å¬å¤©ãhédÅngtiÄnã nucleon æ ¸åãhézÇã nuclide æ ¸ç´ ãhésùã ocean surveillance satellite æµ·æ´çè§å«æ ãhÇiyáng jiÄnshì wèixÄ«ngã
51 offensive strategy è¿æ»æ§æç¥ãjìngÅngxìng zhà nlüèã A strategy that aims to carry military 为æ¥è¿å¹¶æ§æ¯ææ¹åäºåé以å夺 operations to the enemy by closing with åçååéè¦èµæºè对ææ¹éåç and destroying enemy forces, seizing åäºè¡å¨ãå®è´åäºæ¢å ãä¿æå territory and vital resources. Its focus is on seizing, retaining, and exploiting the åæ¥ä¸»å¨æã (æºèªï¼åèæç®[61]ï¼ initiative. (From: Reference [61], p3-27) p3-27) off-load refuelled power reactor åå æ¢æå¨åå E ãtÃngduÄ« huà nlià o dònglìduÄ«ã C old nuclear triad æ§æ ¸ä¸ä½ä¸ä½ãjiù hé sÄnweìyÄ«tÇã The three legs of the U.S. strategic ç¾å½æç¥æ ¸åéçä¸ä¸ªæ¯æ±ï¼æ½å° nuclear force: submarine-launched å¼¹é导弹(SLBMs)ï¼éåºæ´²é å¼¹é ballistic missiles (SLBMs), land based intercontinental ballistic missiles 导弹(ICBMs)ï¼è¿ç¨è½°ç¸æºã(æºèªï¼ (ICBMs) and long-range bombers. (From: åèæç®[72]) Reference [72]) åè§âæ°æç¥ä¸ä½ä¸ä½â Refer to ânew strategic triadâ once-through nuclear fuel cycle ä¸æ¬¡éè¿å¼æ ¸çæå¾ªç¯ ãyÄ«cì tÅngguòshì héránlià o xúnhuánã one-point safety of a nuclear æ ¸æ¦å¨ä¸ç¹å®å ¨ weapon ãhéwÇqì yÄ«diÇn Änquánã Safety performance of a nuclear æ ¸æ¦å¨å¨å¼å¸¸ç¯å¢(æå»ææªå»)ä¸ weapon when any one point of the æ¦å¨ä¸ç¸è¯ä»»ä½ä¸ç¹èµ·çæ¶æå ·æ high explosive is detonated in abnormal situations (by impact, projectile, etc). çå®å ¨æ§è½ãç¾å½åç¨æ å为ï¼å¨ The U.S. military standard is that the ä»»ä½äºæ ä¸ï¼ç¸è¯ä»»ä½ä¸ç¹èµ·çæ¶ probability of releasing more than 1.8 kg æ产ççè£åè½å¨ 1.8 åå 梯æ©æ¢¯ TNT equivalent fission energy when any å½é以ä¸çæ¦çå°äºç¾ä¸åä¹ä¸ã point of the explosive is ignited is less (æ¹èªï¼åèæç®[2]ï¼p223) than one per million in any accident. (Modified from: Reference [2], p223) on-load refuelled power reactor ä¸åå æ¢æå¨åå ãbùtÃngduÄ« huà nlià o dònglìduÄ«ã on-site inspection (OSI) ç°åºè§å¯ãxià nchÇng shìcháã The verification method carried out by å¨è¢«æ¢æµç°åºå©ç¨äººåæ仪å¨æ¶é personnel or apparatus on the selected site. The 13 types of inspection are ä¿¡æ¯çè§å¯æ¹å¼ããç¾èå ³äºåå
52 defined in the START I treaty. åéå¶è¿æ»æ§æç¥æ¦å¨æ¡çº¦ãè§å® Inspections are carried out by äº 13 ç§ç°åºè§å¯æ¹å¼ãè§å¯ç±ææ´¾ designated inspectors to verify that particular activities prohibited by an çè§å¯åæ§è¡ï¼æ¨å¨æ ¸å®æ²¡æè¿è¡ arms limitation agreement are not åå¤éå¶åè®®æç¦æ¢çæ´»å¨ï¼ç¡®è®¤ performed, to check that particular æ§è¡äºåå¤éå¶åè®®æè§å®çæ´» activities prescribed by an arms E limitation agreement are implemented, å¨ï¼æè°æ¥å¯çäºä»¶ççç¸ã(æ¹èªï¼ C or to examine the nature of a suspicious åèæç®[16]ï¼p231) event. (Modified from:Reference [16], p231) Open Skies Treaty å¼æ¾å¤©ç©ºæ¡çº¦ ãkÄifà ng tiÄnkÅng tiáoyuÄã operating records è¿è¡è®°å½ãyùnxÃng jìlùã operational capability å®æè½åãshÃzhà n nénglìã operational characteristics of æ ¸æ¦å¨ææ¯ææ¯æ§è½ nuclear weapon ãhéwÇqì zhà nshù jìshù xìngnéngã operationally deployed å®æé¨ç½²ç弹头 warhead ãshÃzhà n bùshÇ de dà ntóuã operations research and æ ¸æ¦å¨è¿ç¨çè¿ç¹åæ analysis of nuclear weapon ãhéwÇqì yùnyòng de yùnchóu fÄnxÄ«ã employment Organization for Security and 欧洲å®å ¨ä¸åä½ç»ç» Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) ãÅuzhÅu Änquán yÇ hézuò zÇzhÄ«ã overall design of nuclear æ ¸æ¦å¨æ»ä½è®¾è®¡ weapon ãhéwÇqì zÇngtÇ shèjìã passive gamma-ray detection æ æºÎ³å°çº¿æ¢æµ A rapid and non-destructive detection of ãwúyuán γ shèxià n tà ncèã fissionable materials and equipments éè¿æµéè£åææè¡°åæ¶äº§ççç¹ containing fissionable material through å¾Î³å°çº¿ï¼å¯¹è£åææåå«è£åææ detecting characteristic gamma-rays emitted from decay of such fissionable çè£ ç½®è¿è¡å¿«éãæ ææ¢æµçæ¹æ³ã material. (From: Reference [1], p495) (æºèªï¼åèæç®[1]ï¼p495) passive neutron detection æ æºä¸åæ¢æµ A method of rapid non-destructive ãwúyuán zhÅngzÇ tà ncèã detection of fissionable material or éè¿æ¢æµè£åææçèªåä¸åè对 devices containing fissionable materials è£åæææå«è£åææçè£ ç½®è¿è¡
53 by detecting neutrons spontaneously å¿«éæ ææ¢æµçæ¹æ³ã(æºèªï¼åèæ emitted from such fissionable material. ç®[1]ï¼p495) (From: Reference [1], p496) passive seal æ æºå°è®°ãwúyuán fÄngjìã Refer to âsealâ åè§âå°è®°â passive tag æ æºæ ç¾ãwúyuán biÄoqiÄnã E Refer to âtagâ åè§âæ ç¾â C path-length fuze of nuclear æ ¸æ¦å¨è·¯ç¨é¿åº¦å¼ä¿¡ weapon ãhéwÇqì lùchéng chángdù yÇnxìnã payload ææè½½è·ãyÇuxià o zà ihèã peaceful nuclear explosions åå¹³æ ¸çç¸ãhépÃng hébà ozhà ã peaceful use of nuclear åå¹³å©ç¨æ ¸çç¸ explosion ãhépÃng lìyòng hébà ozhà ã pellet è¯åãxÄ«nkuà iã penetration ability of nuclear æ ¸æ¦å¨çªé²è½å weapon ãhéwÇqì tÅ«fáng nénglìã penetration aids of nuclear æ ¸å¯¼å¼¹ççªé²è£ ç½® missiles ãhédÇodà n de tÅ«fáng zhuÄngzhìã perimeter portal continuous 设æ½å¨è¾¹ä¸è¿åºå£è¿ç»çæµ monitoring ãshèshÄ« zhÅubiÄn yÇ jìnchÅ«kÇu liánxù jiÄncèã permanent radiation damage in çµåç³»ç»çæ°¸ä¹ æ§è¾å°æ伤 electronics ãdià nzÇ xìtÇng de yÇngjiÇxìng fúshè sÇnshÄngã permeability of barrier å离èçæ¸éæ§ ãfÄnlÃmó de shèntòuxìngã permissive action link (PAL) å¯ç é(亦称å¯å¨è¿æ¥è£ ç½®) A device included in or attached to a ãmìmÇsuÇ yìchÄng qÇdòng nuclear weapon system to preclude liánjiÄ zhuÄngzhìã arming and/or launching until the ä¸ç§å®è£ æéå å¨æ ¸æ¦å¨ç³»ç»ä¸ç insertion of a prescribed discrete code. è£ ç½®ï¼ç¨äºå¨è¾å ¥é¢å®ç离æ£å¯ç (From: Reference[9], p412) åï¼é²æ¢è§£é¤ä¿é©å(æ)åå°ã(æº Refer to âsafing device of nuclear èªï¼åèæç®[9]ï¼p412) weaponâ åè§âæ ¸æ¦å¨ä¿é©è£ ç½®â
54 physical barrier for protected ä¿æ¤åºå®ä½å±é sections ãbÇohùqÅ« shÃtÇ pÃngzhà ngã physical diagnostic æ ¸è¯éªçç©çè¯ææµé measurement in nuclear test ãhéshìyà n de wùlÇzhÄnduà n cèliángã physical inventory å®ç©åéãshÃwù cúnlià ngã The sum of all the measured or derived æä¸ç»å®æ¶å»ï¼å¨ç¹å®æ ¸ææ平衡 estimates of batch quantities of nuclear E åºå ï¼æç §è§å®ç¨åºæµéæä¼°ç®æ material on hand at a given time within C a material balance area, obtained in å¾å°çæææ¹éçæ ¸æææ»åã(æ¹ accordance with specified procedures. èªï¼åèæç®[15]ï¼para113ï¼[4]ï¼6.41) (Modified from: Reference [15], para113; [4], 6.41) physical inventory-taking of æ ¸ææå®ç©çå nuclear material ãhécáilià o shÃwù páncúnã The activities carried out to determine 为确å®æ ¸ææå®ç©åéèéåçè¡ physical inventory. (Modified from: Reference å¨ã(æ¹èªï¼åèæç®[15]ï¼para113ï¼[4]ï¼ [15], para113; [4], 6.41) 6.41) physical-protection authoriza- æ ¸ææå®ä½ä¿æ¤ææ tion of nuclear material ãhécáilià o shÃtÇ bÇohù shòuquánã physical-protection design å®ä½ä¿æ¤è®¾è®¡åºåå¨è basis threats ãshÃtÇ bÇohù shèjì jÄ«zhÇn wÄixiéã physical-protection emergency å®ä½ä¿æ¤åºæ¥ååº response ãshÃtÇ bÇohù yìngjà xiÇngyìngã physical-protection for nuclear æ ¸ææå®ä½ä¿æ¤ material ãhécáilià o shÃtÇ bÇohùã Establishing a security protection 对åææ ¸ææç建çç©å车è¾(æ¶ system for extant buildings and vehicles åå¨ååè¿è¾è¿ç¨)ç建ç«å®å ¨é² (relating to storage or transportation èç³»ç»,以å®æ½å¯¹æ ¸ææçä¿éç processes) with nuclear material, so as to safeguard nuclear material. (From: ç£ã(æºèªï¼åèæç®[2]ï¼p186) Reference [2], p186) physical-protection levels of æ ¸ææå®ä½ä¿æ¤ç级 nuclear material ãhécáilià o shÃtÇ bÇohù dÄngjÃã physical-protection å®ä½ä¿æ¤ç»ç»æºæ organization ãshÃtÇ bÇohù zÇzhÄ« jÄ«gòuã physical-protection å®ä½ä¿æ¤å»ºè®®ãshÃtÇ bÇohù jià nyìã recommendations
55 physical-protection å®ä½ä¿æ¤ç³»ç»å¤±æå¤æåå system-failure criterion ãshÃtÇ bÇohù xìtÇng shÄ«xià o pà nduà n zhÇnzéã physical-simulation of nuclear æ ¸çç¸ç©ç模æ explosion ãhébà ozhà wùlÇ mónÇã physics package ç©çå ãwùlÇbÄoã The primary and secondary of a nuclear æ ¸æ¦å¨ä¸å°è£ å¨è¾å°å£³å çå级å E weapon are housed inside a radiation case; the completed assembly is called 次级é¨ä»¶çå®æ´çç»è£ 件ã(æºèªï¼ C the âphysics package.â (From: Reference åèæç®[11]ï¼p91) [11], p91) pit å¼¹è¯ãdà nxÄ«nã The sphere or shell of nuclear explosive å®ç½®å¨å çè£ ç½®ä¸å¿ãé常æéæ material at the center of an implosion å ¶ä»éå±å å±çæ ¸ç¸è¯ææçä½æ device, usually clad with beryllium or another metal. (Modified from: Reference [11], 壳ä½ã(æ¹èªï¼åèæç®[11]ï¼p90) p90) plutonium éãbùã plutonium alloy éåéãbùhéjÄ«nã plutonium decontamination éåå循ç¯ãbù jìnghuà xúnhuánã cycle plutonium dioxide äºæ°§åéãèryÇnghuà bùã plutonium recycling éå循ç¯ãbù zà ixúnhuánã A process of reusing in nuclear reactors å°ä»ä¹çæä¸åæ¶å¾å°çéå¨ååº the plutonium extracted from spent fuel. å å å使ç¨çè¿ç¨ã(æºèªï¼åèæç® (From: Reference [2], p22) [2]ï¼p22) Note: In the DUPIC process, spent 注ï¼å¨ DUPIC è¿ç¨ä¸ï¼è½»æ°´å çä¹ LWR fuel rods are directly used as fuel çææ£åªéæºæ¢°å¤çèä¸éåå¦å for CANDU-type heavy-water power å¤çå³å¯ç´æ¥ä½ä¸º CANDU åéæ°´ reactors, with only mechanical modifi- å¨åå ççæã(æºèªï¼åèæç®[32]ï¼ cations and not chemical reprocessing. p25-40) (From: Reference [32], p25-40) point sample ç¹æ ·åãdiÇn yà ngpÇnã An environmental sample taken in one å¨ä¸ä¸ªç¹å®å°åºç¯å¢ä¸ºç¡®å®è½å¤å¨ particular area to characterize one source of released material which can æ¥è¿æ³æ¼ç¹ä¸´è¿å°åºåç°æ³æ¼ç©è´¨
56 be found in a contiguous area adjacent çæºçç¹å¾èééçæ ·åã(æºèªï¼ to a release point. (From: Reference [4], 9.5) åèæç®[4]ï¼9.5) point target ç¹ç®æ ãdiÇn mùbiÄoã post-exercise dispersal æ¼ä¹ åçæ£è§å¯ inspection ãyÇnxÃhòu shÅ«sà n shìcháã E power reactor å¨åå ãdònglìduÄ«ã C powered phase 主å¨æ®µãzhÇdòngduà nã predetonation in fission è£åçç¸è¿æ©ç¹ç« explosion ãlièbià n bà ozhà guòzÇo diÇnhuÇã preemptive strike å åå¶äººæå»ãxiÄnfÄzhìrén dÇjÄ«ã preset burst depth of nuclear æ ¸æ¦å¨è£ 订çæ·± weapon ãhéwÇqì zhuÄngdìng bà oshÄnã preset burst height of nuclear æ ¸æ¦å¨è£ 订çé« weapon ãhéwÇqì zhuÄngdìng bà ogÄoã pressurized water reactor åæ°´å ãyÄshuÇduÄ«ã (PWR) principal nuclear facility éè¦æ ¸è®¾æ½ãzhòngyà o héshèshÄ«ã Principled Declaration on å ³äºå½é å ³ç³»ä¸ä¸å¾è¿è¡æ¦åå¨è Refraining from the Threat or æ使ç¨æ¦åçååå®£è¨ Use of Force in Their ãguÄnyú guójìguÄnxì zhÅng bùdé International Relations jìnxÃng wÇlì wÄixié huò shÇyòng wÇlì de yuánzé xuÄnyánã processing of radioactive liquid æ¾å°æ§åºæ¶²å¤ç waste ãfà ngshèxìng fèiyè chÇlÇã production of uranium åæ°åéæ°åç产å æ°åé hexafluoride by fluorination of ãsìfúhuà yóu fúhuà uranium tetrafluoride shÄngchÇn liùfúhuà yóuã production reactor ç产å ãshÄngchÇnduÄ«ã prohibition of the production of ç¦æ¢ä¸ºæ ¸æ¦å¨ç产æè£åææ fissile material for nuclear ãjìnzhÇ wèi héwÇqì shÄngchÇn weapon yìlièbià n cáilià oã project and supply agreement 项ç®åä¾åºåå® ãxià ngmù hé gÅngyìng xiédìngã
57 projection of nuclear weapon æ ¸æ¦å¨æå°ãhéwÇqì tóushèã propagation of nuclear æ ¸çµç£èå²çä¼ æ electromagnetic pulse ãhédià ncÃmà ichÅng de chuánbÅã protection from nuclear æ ¸çµç£èå²çé²æ¤ electromagnetic pulse ãhédià ncà mà ichÅng de fánghùã protection of nuclear weapon æ ¸æ¦å¨çé²æ¤ ãhéwÇqì de fánghùã E protocol è®®å®ä¹¦ãyìdìngshÅ«ã C Protocol to the Treaty Between ç¾èå ³äºåååéå¶è¿æ»æ§æç¥æ¦ the United States of America å¨æ¡çº¦è®®å®ä¹¦ and the Union of Soviet ãmÄi sÅ« guÄnyú xuÄjiÇn hé xià nzhì Socialist Republics on the jìngÅngxìng zhà nlüèwÇqì tiáoyuÄ Reduction and Limitation of yìdìngshÅ«ã Strategic Offensive Arms proton è´¨åãzhìzÇã PUREX (Plutonium Uranium æ®é·å æ¯æµç¨ãpÇléikèsÄ« liúchéngã Recovery by Extraction) (ééçèååæ¶æµç¨) process pyrochemical processing é«æ¸©åå¦å¤çãgÄowÄn huà xué chÇlÇã pyrometallurgical processing é«æ¸©å¶éå¤çãgÄowÄn yÄjÄ«n chÇlÇã radar fuze of nuclear weapon æ ¸æ¦å¨é·è¾¾å¼ä¿¡ãhéwÇqì léidá yÇnxìnã radiation è¾å°ãfúshèã radiation-hardened electronic è¾å°å åºççµåå¨ä»¶ components ãfúshè jiÄgù de dià nzÇ qìjià nã radioactive aerosol of nuclear æ ¸çç¸äº§ççæ¾å°æ§æ°æº¶è¶ explosion ãhébà ozhà chÇnshÄng de fà ngshèxìng qìróngjiÄoã radioactive cloud æ¾å°æ§çäºãfà ngshèxìng yÄnyúnã radioactive contamination æ¾å°æ§æ²¾æãfà ngshèxìng zhÄnrÇnã radioactive fallout æ¾å°æ§æ²éãfà ngshèxìng chénjià ngã radioactive gas sampling and æ¾å°æ§æ°ä½åæ ·ä¸æ¢æµ detecting ãfà ngshèxìng qìtÇ qÇyà ng yÇ tà ncèã
58 radioactive nuclide from æ ¸çç¸äº§ççæ¾å°æ§æ ¸ç´ nuclear explosion ãhébà ozhà chÇnshÄng de fà ngshèxìng hésùã radioactive waste æ¾å°æ§åºç©ãfà ngshèxìng fèiwùã radioactive waste disposal æ¾å°æ§åºç©å¤ç½® ãfà ngshèxìng fèiwù chÇzhìã E radioactivity æ¾å°æ§æ´»åº¦ãfà ngshèxìng huódùã C radiochemical diagnostic of æ ¸è¯éªæ¾å°åå¦è¯æ nuclear test ãhéshìyà n fà ngshèhuà xué zhÄnduà nã radioisotope æ¾å°æ§åä½ç´ ãfà ngshèxìng tóngwèisùã radiological dispersal device æ¾å°æ§ç©è´¨æ£å¸è£ ç½® ãfà ngshèxìng (RDD) wùzhì sà nbù zhuÄngzhìã Refer to âdirty bombâ åè§âèå¼¹â radionuclide monitoring æ¾å°æ§æ ¸ç´ çæµ A method for monitoring nuclear relat- ãfà ngshèxìng hésù jiÄncèã ed activity through collecting, analyzing, éè¿æ¶éãåæãæµéåç§æ¾å°æ§ and measuring different kinds of radio- æ ¸ç´ ï¼ä»¥è¾¾å°çæµç¸å ³æ ¸æ´»å¨ç®ç nuclides. (Modified from: Reference [1], p486) çæ¹æ³ã(æ¹èªï¼åèæç®[1]ï¼p486) random inspection éæºè§å¯ãsuÃjÄ« shìcháã An inspection performed at a facility or a å¨ä¸ä¸ªéæºéå®çæ¥æ对ä¸å¤è®¾æ½ location outside facilities on a date æ设æ½å¤çä¸å¤åºå°è¿è¡çè§å¯ã chosen randomly. (From: Reference [4], 11.8) (æºèªï¼åèæç®[4]ï¼11.8) random sampling éæºåæ ·ãsuÃjÄ« qÇyà ngã The process of selecting samples in ææ¶ç¾¤ä½å çææç©é¡¹æç¸å被é such a manner that all items in a population have the same probability of æ¦ççåæ ·æ¹å¼ã(æºèªï¼åèæç®[4]ï¼ being selected. (From: Reference [4], 7.8) 7.8) range of nuclear missiles æ ¸å¯¼å¼¹å°ç¨ãhédÇodà n shèchéngã reactor ååºå ãfÇnyìngduÄ«ã reactor-grade plutonium ååºå 级éãfÇnyìngduÄ«jà bùã Plutonium containing more than 18% é常æé-240 å«éå¤§äº 18%çéã Pu-240. (Modified from: Reference [2], p93) (æ¹èªï¼åèæç®[2]ï¼p93)
59 real cascade å®é 级èãshÃjì jÃliánã real-time monitoring å®æ¶çæµãshÃshà jiÄncèã Monitoring information which has been é¤äºçµåéä¿¡æå¿ éçæ¶é´å¤ï¼æ²¡ delayed only by the time required for electronic communication, implying that ææ¾è延è¿å°å¯¹æ°æ®æä¿¡æ¯è¿è¡ç there are no noticeable delays. (Modified åæ¶ççæµã(æ¹èªï¼åèæç®[9]ï¼p451) from: Reference [9], p451) E redox process é·éå æ¯æµç¨ãléidà okèsÄ« liúchéngã C reduced residual radioactivity å¼±å©ä½æ¾å°æ§æ¦å¨(3R å¼¹) weapon (RRRW) ãruò shèngyú fà ngshèxìng wÇqì 3Rdà nã reduced yield nuclear test åå¨åæ ¸è¯éªãjiÇnwÄilì héshìyà nã reduction ååãxuÄjiÇnã reentry phase åå ¥æ®µãzà irùduà nã reentry telemetry for nuclear æ ¸å¼¹å¤´åå ¥é¥æµ reentry vehicle ãhédà ntóu zà irù yáocèã reference material åèç©è´¨ãcÄnkÇo wùzhìã reflector (tamper) layer ååå¼¹åå°å±(æ°å±) in atomic bomb ãyuánzÇdà n fÇnshècéng duòcéngã regional system of accounting å°åºæ ¸ææè¡¡ç®åæ§å¶ç³»ç» for and control of nuclear ãdìqÅ« hécáilià o héngsuà n hé kòngzhì material (RSAC) xìtÇngã Regulations of the People's ä¸å人æ°å ±åå½æ ¸ä¸¤ç¨ååç¸å ³æ Republic of China on Export æ¯åºå£ç®¡å¶æ¡ä¾ Control of Dual-Use Nuclear ãzhÅnghuá rénmÃn gònghéguó hé Goods and the Related liÇngyòngpÇn jà xiÄngguÄn jìshù chÅ«kÇu Technologies guÇnzhì tiáolìã The chinese government promulgated ä¸å½æ¿åºäº 1998 å¹´ 6 æ 10 æ¥å ¬å¸ the Regulations of the People's Republic of China on Export Control of ãä¸å人æ°å ±åå½æ ¸ä¸¤ç¨ååç¸å ³ Dual-use Nuclear Goods and the ææ¯åºå£ç®¡å¶æ¡ä¾ãï¼æ¡ä¾ä»å ¬å¸ Related Technologies on June 10, ä¹æ¥èµ·çæãæ¡ä¾ç± 23 æ¡æ£æåé 1998. The Regulations took effect as of the date of promulgation. They consist 件ãæ ¸ä¸¤ç¨ååç¸å ³ææ¯ç®¡å¶æ¸ åã of 23 articles and the Annex named the ç»æã(æºèªï¼åèæç®[1]ï¼p415) Nuclear Dual-Use Items and Related
60 Technologies Export Control List. (From: Reference [1], p415) [73] Note: this set of regulations was revised 注ï¼è¯¥æ¡ä¾å¨ 2007 å¹´è¢«ä¿®è®¢äº ã [73] in 2007 . Regulations of the People's ä¸å人æ°å ±åå½æ ¸åºå£ç®¡å¶æ¡ä¾ Republic of China on Nuclear ãzhÅnghuá rénmÃn gònghéguó Export Control hé chÅ«kÇu guÇnzhì tiáolìã E The chinese government promulgated ä¸å½æ¿åºäº 1997 å¹´ 9 æ 10 æ¥å ¬å¸ C the Regulations of the People's Republic of China on Nuclear Export ãä¸å人æ°å ±åå½æ ¸åºå£ç®¡å¶æ¡ Control of on Sep.10, 1997, and ä¾ãï¼å¹¶å®£å¸ç«å³çæãæ¡ä¾å ± 22 declared that it took effect immediately. æ¡ã(æºèªï¼åèæç®[1]ï¼p414) It has 22 articles. (From: Reference [1], p414) [74] Note: this set of regulations was revised 注ï¼è¯¥æ¡ä¾å¨ 2006 å¹´è¢«ä¿®è®¢äº ã [74] in 2006 . reliability of nuclear missiles æ ¸å¯¼å¼¹å¯é æ§ãhédÇodà n kÄkà oxìngã reliability of nuclear weapon æ ¸æ¦å¨å¯é æ§ãhéwÇqì kÄkà oxìngã Throughout the nuclear weaponâs life- æ ¸æ¦å¨å¨ä½¿ç¨å¯¿å½æé´ï¼å¨è§å®ç time, the capability to the achieve nuclear explosion within the designed æ£å¸¸ç¯å¢æ¡ä»¶ä¸ï¼ä»¥è®¾è®¡æ§è½ææ performance under the defined normal å®ç°æ ¸çç¸çè½åã(æ¹èªï¼åèæç®ï¼ environment. (Modified from: Reference [2], [2] p221) p221) Note 1: The probability of achieving the 注 1ï¼å¨æ ¸æ¦å¨çæ´ä¸ªè®¾è®¡å¯¿å½æ specified yield, at the target, across the é´ï¼ç»åä»åºåè³æå»ç®æ çåç§ Stockpile-To-Target Sequence of environments, throughout the weaponâs å¤é¨ç¯å¢ï¼å¨æ£ç¡®è¾å ¥æ令åï¼è½ lifetime, assuming proper inputs. In this å¨æå»ç®æ ä¸å®ç°æå®å¨åçæ¦ definition, the specified yield is generally understood to mean within ten çãå¨æ¤å®ä¹ä¸ï¼âæå®å¨åâé常 percent; the Stockpile-To-Target 被ç解æä¸è®¾è®¡å¨åç¸å·® 10%以å Sequence of environments is the range çææï¼âä»åºåè³æå»ç®æ çç¯ of conditions the warhead is expected to experience in its service life in å¢âææ ¸å¼¹å¤´å¨å ¶æå½¹æå çå¨åã storage, transit, or use, such as 转è¿å使ç¨è¿ç¨ä¸ä¼ç»åçå¤é¨ç¯ temperature extremes, radiation from å¢ï¼å¦æ端温度ãæ ¸å¯¼å¼¹é²å¾¡æ¦æª any nuclear-armed missile defense interceptors, and acceleration; lifetime å¨çè¾å°ãè¿è½½ï¼â寿å½âæå¨è®¾ is the âoriginal lifetime objective as 计æ¶æå®çåå§å¯¿å½ç®æ ï¼âæ£ç¡®
61 specified at the time of designâ; and è¾å ¥âæå¼çæ§å¶ä¿¡å·ã(æºèªï¼å proper inputs are arming, fuzing, and firing signals. (From: Reference[10], p8.) èæç®[10]ï¼p8) Note 2: In this definition from Sandia 注 2ï¼å£å°äºå½å®¶å®éªå®¤çå®ä¹ä¸ï¼ National Laboratories, âweaponâ has âæ¦å¨âæâæ ¸å¼¹å¤´âçææï¼å¦ the meaning of âwarheadâ; if âweaponâ æâæ¦å¨âæå å«å¯¼å¼¹æé£è¡å¨ç had the meaning of âweapon systemâ including the missile or aircraft, the âæ¦å¨ç³»ç»âçææï¼é£ä¹å¯é æ§ E reliability would be much lower. å°æ´ä½ã C reliability of stockpile nuclear åºåæ ¸æ¦å¨å¯é æ§ weapon ãkùcún héwÇqì kÄkà oxìngã remote sensing technology é¥æææ¯ãyáogÇn jìshùã Technology for detecting objects and/or ç¨ä¼ æå¨è¿è·ç¦»æ¢æµä¸æ¡çº¦æå ³ç activities at a distance by means of ç©é¡¹å(æ)æ´»å¨çææ¯ã(æ¹èªï¼åè sensors. (Modified from: Reference [19], p235) æç®[19]ï¼p235) representative sample 代表æ§æ ·åãdà ibiÇoxìng yà ngpÇnã reprocessing åå¤çãhòuchÇlÇã reprocessing plant åå¤çåãhòuchÇlÇ chÇngã research reactor ç 究å ãyánjiÅ«duÄ«ã response time of nuclear æ ¸å¯¼å¼¹ååºæ¶é´ missiles ãhédÇodà n fÇnyìng shÃjiÄnã The time elapsed from receiving launch æ ¸å¯¼å¼¹ä»æ¥å°åå°å½ä»¤å°å¯¼å¼¹èµ·é£ orders to the launch of nuclear missiles. (From: Reference [2], p50) æéçæ¶é´ã(æºèªï¼åèæç®[2]ï¼p50) responsive force ååºåéãxiÇngyìng lìlià ngã The responsive force is intended to ææå¨ééæ½å¨çæå¤äºæ æ¶è½å¢ provide a capability to augment the operationally deployed force to meet å ä½æé¨ç½²åéçè½åãå®ä½¿é¢å¯¼ potential contingencies. It retains the å±è½æ¡ææ ¹æ®å±æºåå±çç¨åº¦èå¢ option for leadership to increase the å ä½æé¨ç½²åéæ°éçéæ©æã number of operationally deployed (æ¹èªï¼åèæç®[66]) forces in proportion to the severity of an evolving crisis. (Modified from: Reference [66]) retained waste åçåºç©ãcúnliú fèiwùã
62 retargeting capability éæ°çåè½å ãchóngxÄ«n miáozhÇn nénglìã revised supplementary agree- æå ³ä¿éçç£ç修订补å åå® ment relevant to safeguards ãyÇuguÄn bÇozhà ng jiÄndÅ« de xiÅ«dìng bÇchÅng xiédìngã revisit period é访å¨æ ãchóngfÇng zhÅuqÄ«ã E revolution in military affairs åäºåé©ãjÅ«nshì bià ngéã C (RMA) Fundamental reforms that thoroughly å°å è¿çææ¯åæ¦å¨ç³»ç»ï¼ä¸åæ° change the characteristics and patterns çåäºå¦è¯´åç»ç»ä½å¶ç»åå¨ä¸ of military operations so as to greatly èµ·ï¼ä½¿åäºä½æçç¹ç¹åæ¹å¼åç enhance operational effectiveness of the military through advanced æ ¹æ¬æ§çååï¼åéçä½ææè½è¾¾ technology and weapons systems å°æ大æé«çæ ¹æ¬æ§æ¹é©ã(æ¹èªï¼ combined with innovative military doctrines and organizational mechani- åèæç®[1]ï¼p47) sms. (Modified from: Reference [1], p47) rotor of a gas centrifuge æ°ä½ç¦»å¿æºè½¬ç ãqìtÇ lÃxÄ«njÄ« zhuà ntÇngã routine inspection ä¾è¡è§å¯ãlìxÃng shìcháã Safeguards Agreement ä¿éçç£åå® ãbÇozhà ng jiÄndÅ« xiédìngã safeguards conclusion ä¿éçç£ç»è®º ãbÇozhà ng jiÄndÅ« jiélùnã safeguards criteria ä¿éçç£æ å ãbÇozhà ng jiÄndÅ« biÄozhÇnã Safeguards of International å½é ååè½æºæä¿éçç£å¶åº¦ Atomic Energy Agency ãguójì yuánzÇnéng jÄ«gòu IAEA safeguards are a set of activities bÇozhà ng jiÄndÅ« zhìdùã by which the IAEA seeks to verify that a IAEA çä¿éçç£å¶åº¦æ¯ IAEA 为 State is living up to its international undertakings not to use peaceful æ ¸å®æå½å®¶å±¥è¡æªå°æ°ç¨æ ¸è®¡å转 nuclear programs for nuclear weapons ç¨äºæ ¸æ¦å¨ç®ççå½é æ¿è¯ºçä¸æ´ purposes. The safeguards system is å¥è¡å¨ãä¿éçç£ä½ç³»æ¯åºäºæå½ based on assessment of the correctness and completeness of the å°±å ¶æ ¸ææåç¸å ³æ ¸æ´»å¨å IAEA
63 Stateâs declarations to the IAEA ç³æ¥çåç¡®æ§åå®æ´æ§çè¯ä¼°ãè¿ concerning nuclear material and nuclear-related activities. To date, 145 ä»ä¸ºæ¢ï¼å·²æ 145 个å½å®¶å å ¥ IAEA States have entered into such çä¿éçç£åè®®ï¼å°æ ¸ææãæ ¸è®¾ agreements with the IAEA, submitting æ½åæ ¸æ´»å¨å交 IAEA ä¿éçç£è§ nuclear materials, facilities and activities to the scrutiny of IAEAâs æ¥åè¿è¡è¯¦ç»å®¡æ¥ãIAEA çæ ¸æ¥ safeguards inspectors. IAEA verification æå©äºç¡®è®¤ä¸è¿°é¡¹ç®æªè½¬ç¨ææ»¥ç¨ E helps to provide assurance that such C items are not diverted or misused in äºå¶é æ ¸æ¦å¨ï¼ä»¥åä¿éçç£æè¦ order to assemble nuclear weapons and æ±ç³æ¥ç项ç®å·²å ¨é¨ç³æ¥ã(æºèªï¼ that no items required to be declared under safeguards are undeclared. (From: åèæç®[51]) Reference[51]) safeguards quality assurance ä¿éçç£çè´¨éä¿è¯ In the context of IAEA safeguards, a ãbÇozhà ng jiÄndÅ« de zhìlià ng bÇozhèngã management tool for ensuring a systematic approach to all of the å¨å½é ååè½æºæä¿éçç£ä½ç³» activities affecting the quality of the ä¸ï¼ç¡®ä¿å¯¹ææä¼å½±åä¿éçç£å® safeguards implementation. (From: æ½è´¨éçæ´»å¨è¿è¡ç³»ç»åçæ§çä¸ Reference [4], 3.36) ç§ç®¡çæ段ã(æºèªï¼åèæç®[4]ï¼3.36) safety problems of atmospheric 大æ°å±æ ¸è¯éªçå®å ¨é®é¢ nuclear test ãdà qìcéng héshìyà n de Änquán wèntÃã safety problems of under- å°ä¸æ ¸è¯éªçå®å ¨é®é¢ ground nuclear test ãdìxià héshìyà n de Änquán wèntÃã safing device of nuclear æ ¸æ¦å¨ä¿é©è£ ç½® weapon ãhéwÇqì bÇoxiÇn zhuÄngzhìã Refer to âpermissive action link (PAL)â åè§âå¯ç é(亦称å¯å¨è¿æ¥è£ ç½®)â sample æ ·åãyà ngpÇnã sample size æ ·åéãyà ngpÇnlià ngã sampling technology of 大æ°å±æ ¸çç¸åæ ·ææ¯ atmospheric nuclear explosion ãdà qìcéng hébà ozhà qÇyà ng jìshùã sampling technology of å°ä¸æ ¸çç¸åæ ·ææ¯ underground nuclear explosion ãdìxià hébà ozhà qÇyà ng jìshùã scaled depth of burst æ¯ä¾çæ·±ãbÇlì bà oshÄnã
64 scaled height of burst æ¯ä¾çé«ãbÇlì bà ogÄoã scrap åå(ç¢)æãqiÄxuÄ suì lià oã scrap recovery plant åå(ç¢)æåæ¶å ãqiÄxuÄ suì lià o huÃshÅuchÇngã seal å°è®°ãfÄngjìã Anything that tightly or completely ç¨ä»¥ç´§ç´§å°æå®å ¨å°å°éæä¿æ¤æ E closes or secures a thing. A seal with ç©ï¼ä¿ç§°å°æ¡æå°ç¾ãå©ç¨åç¹æ® C special markers is usually applied to those inspected equipments or compo- æ è®°çæ¹æ³å¨è¢«æ ¸æ¥è®¾å¤æé¨ä»¶å nents in order to prevent weapons and å°æ¡ï¼ä»¥é²æ¢æ¦å¨åæ¦å¨é¨ä»¶è¢«è½¬ related components from being trans- 移åæ¹å¨çæªæ½ãå°è®°å¿ é¡»å ·æé² ferred and modified. A seal must be tamper-proof and counterfeit-proof and æ¢ç¯¡æ¹åé²ä¼ªé çç¹æ§ï¼å ·æå¯ä¸ it must be unique and hard to duplicate æ§ï¼ä¸è½å¤å¶ï¼æå¾å¼ºçç½®ä¿¡åº¦ï¼ with high confidence. It also should åæ¶åè¦ä¿è¯è¢«æ ¸æ¥è®¾å¤æé¨ä»¶ä¸ guarantee that inspected equipments or åå½±åæä¸è¢«æ¹åï¼ä¸æç¤ºè¢«æ ¸æ¥ components remain unaffected or un- changed and that sensitive information 设æ½çææä¿¡æ¯ãåºç¨ä¸çå°è®°æ related to the inspected facilities would å 纤å°è®°ãçç¼å°è®°ãçµåå°è®°å not be revealed. Seals currently in è¶ å£°å°è®°çã(æºèªï¼åèæç®[1]ï¼p496) application include fiber seal, welding seal, electric seal and ultrasonic seal etc. (From: Reference [1], p496) Note: An active seal requires electrical 注ï¼ææºå°è®°å·¥ä½æ¶éè¦çµæºï¼ä½ power, while a passive seal works æ æºå°è®°ä¸éè¦çµæºã without a power supply. second-generation nuclear 第äºä»£æ ¸æ¦å¨ãdìâèrdà i héwÇqìã weapon seismic monitoring å°éçæµãdìzhèn jiÄncèã seismic monitoring system å°éçæµç³»ç»ãdìzhèn jiÄncè xìtÇngã self-defensive nuclear èªå«æ ¸åå»ãzìwèi héfÇnjÄ«ã counterattack å¨éå第ä¸æ¬¡æ ¸æå»åè¿è¡æ ¸å A nuclear counterattack launched after absorbing an opponentâs first nuclear å»ã(æ¹èªï¼åèæç®[34]) attack. (Modified from: Reference [34]) self-defensive nuclear strategy èªå«é²å¾¡æ ¸æç¥ Term used officially by China to ãzìwèi fángyù hézhà nlüèã
65 describe its nuclear strategy. The ä¸å½å®æ¹æè¿°å ¶æ ¸æç¥æç¨çæ¯ strategy takes as its fundamental goal è¯ã该æç¥çæ ¹æ¬ç®æ æ¯éå¶ä»å½ deterring other countries from using or threatening to use nuclear weapons 对ä¸å½ä½¿ç¨æå¨è使ç¨æ ¸æ¦å¨ã该 against China. It includes an official æç¥æ£å¼æ¿è¯ºå¨ä»»ä½æ¶åãä»»ä½æ commitment to a policy of no first use of åµä¸é½ä¸é¦å 使ç¨æ ¸æ¦å¨çæ¿çï¼ nuclear weapons at any time and under any circumstances. It unconditionally æ æ¡ä»¶å°æ¿è¯ºä¸å¯¹æ æ ¸å½å®¶åæ æ ¸ E undertakes not to use or threaten to use å°åºä½¿ç¨æå¨è使ç¨æ ¸æ¦å¨ï¼ä¸»å¼ C nuclear weapons against non-nuclear- å ¨é¢ç¦æ¢åå½»åºéæ¯æ ¸æ¦å¨ã该æ weapon states or nuclear-weapon-free zones, and stands for the comprehen- ç¥åæèªå«åå»åæéåå±çå sive prohibition and complete elimina- åï¼çç¼äºå»ºè®¾ä¸æ¯æ»¡è¶³å½å®¶å®å ¨ tion of nuclear weapons. The strategy éè¦ç精干ææçæ ¸åéï¼ç¡®ä¿æ ¸ upholds the principles of counterattack in self-defense and limited development æ¦å¨çå®å ¨æ§ãå¯é æ§ï¼ä¿ææ ¸å of nuclear weapons, and aims at build- éçæç¥å¨æ ä½ç¨ã(æ¹èªï¼åèæç® ing a lean and effective nuclear force [34]) capable of meeting national security needs. It endeavors to ensure the security and reliability of its nuclear weapons and maintains a credible nuclear deterrent force. (Modified from: Reference [34]) self-destruct device of nuclear æ ¸æ¦å¨èªæ¯è£ ç½® weapon ãhéwÇqì zìhuÇ zhuÄngzhìã self-sustaining thermonuclear èªæçæ ¸çç§ãzìchà rèhé ránshÄoã burn separation efficiency of a éæµæ°ä½ç¦»å¿æºçå离æç countercurrent gas centrifuge ãnìliú qìtÇ lÃxÄ«njÄ« de fÄnlà xià olÇã separation stage å离级ãfÄnlÃjÃã separative element å离åå ãfÄnlà dÄnyuánã separative power å离åçãfÄnlà gÅnglÇã A unit for measuring separative work ä¸ä¸ªå离åå æä¸ä¸ªå离级èå¨å per unit time provided by a separating unit or a separating cascade. (Modified ä½æ¶é´æè½æä¾çå离åã(æ¹èªï¼ from: Reference [2], p125) åèæç®[2]ï¼p125)
66 separative work å离åãfÄnlÃgÅngã The required work to enrich uranium to æä¸å®éçéæµç¼©å°ä¸å®çé-235 a certain level of U-235 concentration. It 丰度æéè¦æå ¥çå·¥ä½éï¼è¡¨è¾¾ä¸º is described in terms of kg Separative åå å离ååä½(kgSWU)æå¨å离 Work Unit (kgSWU) or ton Separative Work Unit (tSWU). (Fromï¼Reference [26], ååä½(tSWU)ã p213) (æºèªï¼åèæç®[26]ï¼p213) E C separative work unit å离ååä½ãfÄnlÃgÅng dÄnwèiã service safety å¤å¡ä¿é©ãqÃnwù bÇoxiÇnã shaft nuclear test ç«äºå°ä¸æ ¸è¯éª ãshùjÇng dìxià héshìyà nã shipper/receiver difference åæ¹/æ¶æ¹å·®é¢ (SRD) ãfÄfÄng shÅufÄng chÄâéã shock wave load å²å»è½½è·ãchÅngjÄ« zà ihèã shock wave weapon å²å»æ³¢å¼¹ãchÅngjÄ«bÅ dà nã short-notice inspection 临æ¶éç¥è§å¯ãlÃnshà tÅngzhÄ« shìcháã An inspection performed at a facility or a IAEA 对ä¸ä¸ªå½å®¶çä¸å¤è®¾æ½æ设 location outside facilities for which less æ½å¤çä¸å¤åºå°è¿è¡è§å¯æ¶ï¼æå advance notice is provided by the IAEA éæ¥æ¶é´æ¯ INFIRCIR/153 åè®®ç to the State than that provided for under paragraph 83 of [IAEA INFIRCIR 153]. 第 83 段è§å®çéæ¥æ¶é´ççè§å¯ã (From: Reference [4], 11.7) (æºèªï¼åèæç®[4]ï¼11.7) significant quantity (SQ) éè¦éãzhòngyà olià ngã The approximate amount of nuclear ä¸è½æé¤å¶é ä¸ææ ¸çç¸è£ ç½®å¯è½ material for which the possibility of æ§çæ ¸ææç大è´æ°éã(æºèªï¼å manufacturing a nuclear explosive device cannot be excluded. (From: èæç®[4]ï¼3.14) Reference [4], 3.14) silo å°ä¸åå°äºãdìxià fÄshèjÇngã silo cold launch å°ä¸äºå·åå°ãdìxià jÇng lÄngfÄshèã silo hot launch å°ä¸äºçåå°ãdìxià jÇng rèfÄshèã simulation of nuclear explosion æ ¸çç¸æ¨¡æãhébà ozhà mónÇã
67 simulation of nuclear explosion æ ¸çç¸æåºæ¨¡æ effects ãhébà ozhà xià oyìng mónÇã Using various simulating measures to å©ç¨åç§æ¨¡ææ段ç ç©¶æ ¸çç¸ç ´å research the destructive mechanisms and protective measures against the æºç以åå¯¹æ ¸çç¸æåºçä¿æ¤æª effects of a nuclear explosion. (Modified æ½ã(æ¹èªï¼åèæç®[3]ï¼p377) from: Reference [3], p377) simultaneous inspections åæ¶è§å¯ãtóngshà shìcháã E Inspections performed by IAEA C IAEA è§å¯ååæ¶æå¨çæ¶é´å 对 inspectors simultaneously or within a short period of time at two or more ä¸ä¸ªå½å®¶ç两å¤æå¤å¤è®¾æ½è¿è¡è§ facilities in a State in order to detect å¯ï¼ä»¥åç°è®¾æ½ä¹é´å¯è½è¿è¡ç串 possible diversions arranged in éè¡ä¸ºï¼ä¾å¦è®¾æ½ä¹é´ç¸äºä¸´æ¶è½¬ collusion between facilities by, for example, the temporary transfer 移(åç¨)æ ¸ææï¼ä»è使åä¸ä»½æ ¸ (âborrowingâ) of nuclear material ææ被 IAEA æ ¸æ¥ä¸¤æ¬¡ï¼å³å¨ä¸¤ä¸ª between facilities so that the same 被è§å¯ç设æ½ä¸åè¢«æ ¸æ¥ä¸æ¬¡ã(æº material would be verified twice by the IAEA, once in each of the two facilities èªï¼åèæç®[4]ï¼11.11) inspected. (From: Reference [4], 11.11) single-cycle process å循ç¯æµç¨ãdÄnxúnhuán liúchéngã slow neutrons æ ¢ä¸åãmà n zhÅngzÇã small quantities protocol (SQP) å°æ°éè®®å®ä¹¦ ãxiÇoshùlià ng yìdìngshÅ«ã source data åå§æ°æ®ãyuánshÇ shùjùã source material æºææãyuáncáilià oã Uranium containing the mixture of å«æ天ç¶å½¢æçåä½ç´ æ··åä½ç isotopes occurring in nature; uranium depleted in the isotope 235; thorium; éï¼é-235 被贫åçéï¼éï¼éå±ã any of the foregoing in the form of åéãååç©ææµç¼©ç©ç¶æçä¸è¿° metal, alloy, chemical compound, or concentrate; any other material ä»»ä½ææï¼ä»»ä½å«æä¸ç§æå¤ç§ä¸ containing one or more of the foregoing è¿°çç©è´¨å¹¶è¾¾å° IAEA çäºä¼éæ¶ in such concentration as the IAEA ç¡®å®çæµåº¦çææï¼ä»¥åçäºä¼å¯ Board of Governors shall from time to time determine; and such other material éæ¶ç¡®å®çæ¤ç±»å ¶ä»ææãæ ¹æ® as the Board of Governors shall from [INFIRCIR/153]ä¿éåå®ç 112 段ï¼
68 time to time determine. According to âæºææè¿ä¸åè¯ä¸éç¨äºç¿ç³æ paragraph 112 of [IAEA INFCIRC/153], âthe term source material shall not be ç¿æ¸£ãâ(æºèªï¼åèæç®[4]ï¼4.4) interpreted as applying to ore or ore residue.â (From: Reference [4], 4.4) South Pacific Nuclear Free å太平æ´æ æ ¸åºæ¡çº¦(æç½æ±¤å å² Zone Treaty (Treaty of æ¡çº¦) E Rarotonga) ã nántà ipÃngyáng wúhéqÅ« tiáoyuÄ C lÄluótÄngjiÄdÇo tiáoyuÄã spare warhead å¤ç¨å¼¹å¤´ãbèiyòng dà ntóuã special fissionable material ç¹ç§å¯è£åææ Plutonium-239; uranium-233; uranium ãtèzhÇng kÄlièbià n cáilià oã enriched in the isotopes 235 or 233; any é -239 ï¼ é -233 ï¼ æµ ç¼© äº å ä½ ç´ material containing one or more of the é-235 æé-233 çéï¼ä»»ä½å«ä¸è¿° foregoing; and such other fissionable material as the IAEA Board of ä¸ç§æå¤ç§ç©è´¨çææï¼ ä»¥å IAEA Governors shall from time to time çäºä¼éæ¶ç¡®å®çå ¶ä»å¯è£åæ determine; but the term âspecial æï¼ä½âç¹ç§å¯è£åææâä¸å æ¬ fissionable materialâ does not include source material. (From: Reference [4], 4.5) æºææã(æºèªï¼åèæç®[4]ï¼4.5) special inspection ä¸é¨è§å¯ãzhuÄnmén shìcháã An inspection is deemed to be special: ä¸ç§å¨ä»¥ä¸æ åµä¸è¿è¡çã被认为 when it either is additional to the routine æ¯å¾ç¹æ®çè§å¯ï¼å¨ INFIRCIR/153 inspection effort provided for in paragraphs 78â82 of [IAEA åè®®ä¸ç¬¬ 78-82 段è§å®ç常è§è§å¯ INFCIRC/153], or involves access to è¦æ±ä¹å¤è¿è¡çè§å¯ï¼æè æ¯æ³é information or locations in addition to è¿è·åæè¿å ¥é¤ INFIRCIR/153 å the access specified in paragraph 76 è®®ä¸ç¬¬ 76 段ç¹å«ææçå¯ä»¥è¿å ¥ of [IAEA INFCIRC/153] for ad hoc and çä¿¡æ¯æåºå°ä¹å¤çä¿¡æ¯æåºå°è¿ routine inspections, or both. (From: è¡çç¹å«çå常è§çè§å¯ï¼æè 以 Reference [4], 11.13; [15]) ä¸ä¸¤ç§æ åµé½å æ¬çè§å¯ã(æºèªï¼ åèæç®[4] 11.13ï¼[15]) Special Session of the General è大è£åç¹å«ä¼è®® Assembly Devoted to Disarma- ãliándà cáijÅ«n tèbié huìyìã ment
69 specified equipment è§å®ç设å¤ãguÄ«dìng de shèbèiã spectral resolution è°±å辨çãpÇ fÄnbià nlÇã spent fuel ä¹çæãfáránlià oã Spent Fuel Management Safety ä¹çæ管çå®å ¨åæ¾å°æ§åºç©ç®¡ç and Radioactive Waste å®å ¨èåå ¬çº¦ Management Safety Joint ãfáránlià o guÇnlÇ Änquán hé fà ngshè Convention xìng fèiwù guÇnlÇ Änquán liánhé E gÅngyuÄã C spent fuel storage ä¹çæè´®åãfáránlià o zhùcúnã spontaneous fission èªåè£åãzìfÄ lièbià nã stage separation efficiency of æ°ä½æ©æ£å离级çå离æç gaseous diffusion process ãqìtÇ kuòsà n fÄnlÃjà de fÄnlà xià olÇã standard event screening æ åäºä»¶çéå¤æ® criteria ãbiÄozhÇn shìjià n shÄixuÇn pà njùã standby facility å产ç设æ½ãtÃngchÇn de shèshÄ«ã starting point of IAEA safe- å½é ååè½æºæä¿éçç£çèµ·ç¹ guards ãguójì yuánzÇnéng jÄ«gòu bÇozhà ng jiÄndÅ« de qÇdiÇnã state-level safeguards approach å½å®¶çº§ä¿éçç£æ¹æ¡ A safeguards approach developed for a ãguójiÄjà bÇozhà ng jiÄndÅ« fÄng'à nã specific State, encompassing all ä¸ºå ·ä½å½å®¶å¶å®çä¿éçç£æ¹æ¡ï¼ nuclear material, nuclear installations æ¹æ¡æ¶µç该å½ææä¸æ ¸ææãæ ¸è®¾ and nuclear fuel cycle related activities æ½ä»¥åä¸æ ¸çæ循ç¯ç¸å ³çæ´»å¨ã in that State. (From: Reference [4], 3.4) (æºèªï¼åèæç®[4]ï¼3.4) state system of accounting for å½å®¶æ ¸ææè¡¡ç®åæ§å¶ç³»ç» and control of nuclear material ãguójiÄ hécáilià o héngsuà n hé kòngzhì (SSAC) xìtÇngã statement 声æãshÄngmÃngã statute è§çº¦ãguÄ«yuÄã Statute of the International å½é ååè½æºæè§çº¦ Atomic Energy Agency ãguójì yuánzÇnéng jÄ«gòu guÄ«yuÄã Stockpile Stewardship and æ ¸æ¦åºç»´æ¤ä¸ç®¡ç计å Management Program ãhéwÇkù wéihù yÇ guÇnlÇ jìhuà ã
70 storage and custody of nuclear æ ¸æ¦å¨è´®åä¸ä¿ç®¡ weapon ãhéwÇqì zhùcún yÇ bÇoguÇnã storage environment of nuclear æ ¸æ¦å¨è´®åç¯å¢ weapon ãhéwÇqì zhùcún huánjìngã storage facility è´®å设æ½ãzhùcún shèshÄ«ã storage life of nuclear weapon æ ¸æ¦å¨è´®åæãhéwÇqì zhùcúnqÄ«ã E strategic defense æç¥é²å¾¡ãzhà nlüè fángyùã C 1 The defense against an offensive 1 æäºå ¨å±ä¸å¯¹è¿æ»ä¹æçé²å¾¡ã enemy in the overall situation of war. It is one of the basic types of strategic å®æ¯æäºä¸æç¥è¡å¨çåºæ¬ç±»åä¹ operations and usually becomes a ä¸ï¼å¾å¾æ为æäºè¿ç¨çä¸ä¸ªé¶æ®µã stage in the course of war. The aim of strategic defense is to prevent and æç¥é²å¾¡çç®çæ¯é»æ¢åæ«è´¥æ人 frustrate the enemyâs strategic offense, çæç¥è¿æ»ï¼ä¿åå积èèªå·±çå preserve and save oneâs own strength, éï¼æ¶èåæ¶çæ人ï¼æ¹åæåºå½¢ wear down and wipe out the enemy, change the battle situation and relative å¿ååé对æ¯ï¼ä¸ºè½¬å ¥æç¥è¿æ»å strength, and create conditions for é æ¡ä»¶ã(æºèªï¼åèæç®[18]ï¼p219) shifting to strategic offense. (From: Reference [18], p219) 2 The capability to defeat an enemyâs 2 æ«ä¼¤æ人使ç¨æç¥åäºè®¾æ½(主 use of its strategic military assets, è¦æ¯è¿ç¨æ ¸è¿è½½ç³»ç»)çè½åã (æ¹ primarily long-range nuclear delivery èªï¼åèæç®[71] ) systems. (Modified from: Reference [71]) strategic defense initiative (SDI) æç¥é²å¾¡å¡è®® The plan for a space-based ballistic ãzhà nlüè fángyù chà ngyìã missile defense system announced by ç½çº³å¾·Â·éæ ¹æ»ç»å¨ 1983 å¹´ 3 æ 23 U.S. president Ronald Reagan on æ¥å£°æçãæç¥é²å¾¡å¡è®®ãæä¸ºæ¦ March 23, 1983, aimed at defending æªèèå°åç¾å½ç大è§æ¨¡æç¥å¯¼å¼¹ against a mass attack of strategic nuclear missiles from the Soviet Union. åéè建ç«ç天åºå¼¹é导弹é²å¾¡ç³» It is also commonly called âStar Warsâ. ç»ç å¶è®¡åï¼ä¿ç§°âæç大æâ计 (Modified from: Reference [1], p274ï¼[17]) åã(æ¹èªï¼åèæç®[1]ï¼p274ï¼[17]) strategic missile æç¥å¯¼å¼¹ãzhà nlüè dÇodà nã strategic nuclear weapon æç¥æ ¸æ¦å¨ãzhà nlüè héwÇqìã 1 Nuclear weapons that are used to 1 ç¨äºæå»æç¥ç®æ ï¼æ§è¡æç¥ä»»
71 strike strategic targets for strategic å¡çæ ¸æ¦å¨ã(æ¹èªï¼åèæç®[3],p1105) missions. (Modified from: Reference [3], p1105) 2 Strategic nuclear weapons are 2 æç¥æ ¸æ¦å¨æ¯æè½æå»è¿è·ç¦»å° designed to engage objects in åçæç¥ç®æ (è¶ è¿ 5 500 å ¬é)å® geographically remote strategic regions (over 5 500 km) to accomplish strategic ææç¥ä»»å¡çæ¦å¨ãç¹æ®æ åµä¸æ missions. In exceptional situations, ç¥æ ¸æ¦å¨å¯ç¨äºå®ææ役任å¡ãæ E strategic nuclear weapons may be used to accomplish campaign missions. ç¥æ ¸æ¦å¨æå½¹äºæç¥æ ¸é¨éã(æºèªï¼ C Strategic nuclear weapons are in åèæç®[5]ï¼p24) service with the strategic nuclear forces. (From: Reference [5], p24) Note: Strategic refers to missions 注ï¼æç¥æ è´å¯¹ææ¹åå ¶åäºåé designed to have a long-term rather 产çé¿æçèéçæå½±åç使å½ã than immediate effect on the enemy and its military forces. (Modified from: (æ¹èªï¼åèæç®[9]ï¼p516-517) Reference [9], p516-517) Refer to âtactical nuclear weaponâ åè§âææ¯æ ¸æ¦å¨â strategic point æç¥è¦ç¹ãzhà nlüè yà odiÇnã strategic stability æç¥ç¨³å®æ§ãzhà nlüè wÄndìngxìngã strategy of flexible response çµæ´»ååºæç¥ ãlÃnghuó fÇnyìng zhà nlüèã strategy of going beyond è¶ è¶éå¶æç¥ containment ãchÄoyuè èzhì zhà nlüèã strategy of massive retaliation 大è§æ¨¡æ¥å¤æç¥ ãdà guÄ«mó bà ofù zhà nlüèã strategy of mutual assured ç¸äºç¡®ä¿æ§æ¯æç¥ destruction (MAD) ãxiÄnghù quèbÇocuÄ«huÇ zhà nlüèã strategy of realistic deterrence ç°å®å¨æ æç¥ ãxià nshà wÄishè zhà nlüèã subcritical assembly 次临çè£ ç½®ãcìlÃnjiè zhuÄngzhìã subcritical experiment 次临çå®éªãcìlÃnjiè shÃyà nã Hydrodynamic detonation experiment in å®éªä¸è£åç³»ç»å¤äºæ¬¡ä¸´çç¶æç which the fission system remains subcritical, the material used would not çè½°æµä½å¨åå¦å®éªï¼è£åææç
72 exceed the amount that may produce a ç¨é以ä¸ä¼åçèªæé¾å¼è£åæ ¸å self-sustaining chain reaction. (Modified from: Reference [1], p214) åºä¸ºéã(æ¹èª:åèæç®[1]ï¼p214) subcritical gas centrifuge äºä¸´çæ°ä½ç¦»å¿æºãyà lÃnjiè qìtÇ lÃxÄ«njÄ«ã subcritical safety simulation 次临çå®å ¨æ¨¡æå®éªç³»ç» experiment system ãcìlÃnjiè Änquán mónÇ shÃyà n xìtÇngã E subcriticality 次临ç度ãcìlÃnjiè dùã C submarine-launched ballistic æ½å°å¼¹é导弹 missile ãqiánshè dà ndà odÇodà nã supercritical gas centrifuge è¶ ä¸´çæ°ä½ç¦»å¿æº ãchÄolÃnjiè qìtÇ lÃxÄ«njÄ«ã surveillance of nuclear material æ ¸ææçè§ãhécáilià o jiÄnshìã survivability of nuclear weapon æ ¸æ¦å¨çåè½å Capability for nuclear weapons on ãhéwÇqì shÄngcún nénglìã active service to remain intact after ä¸æ¹çç°å½¹æ ¸æ¦å¨å¨å¯¹æ¹è¿è¡ç¬¬ä¸ another country launches a first nuclear æ¬¡æ ¸æå»åä¿æå®å¥½çè½åã(æºèªï¼ strike. (From: Reference [2], p222) åèæç®[2]ï¼p222) suspect-site inspection å¯çåºå°è§å¯ãkÄyà chÇngdì shìcháã suspension of IAEA safeguards å½é ååè½æºæä¿éçç£çä¸æ¢ ãguójì yuánzÇnéng jÄ«gòu bÇozhà ng jiÄndÅ« de zhÅngzhÇã suspension protocol æåå®æ½è®®å®ä¹¦ ãzà ntÃng shÃshÄ« yìdìngshÅ«ã swipe samples of nuclear æ ¸æææ¦ææ ·å material ãhécáilià o cÄshì yà ngpÇnã swipe sampling æ¦æåæ ·ãcÄshì qÇyà ngã The collection of environmental sam- ä¸ç§ç¯å¢æ ·åçæ¶éæ¹æ³ï¼å®éè¿ ples by swiping a surface with a piece of ç¨ä¸åè¶ æ´åä»è´¨(ä¾å¦å¸)æ¦æç© ultraclean medium (such as cloth) to remove from the surface traces of the ä½è¡¨é¢ä»¥è·åç©ä½è¡¨é¢æ®ççææ materials present. (From: Reference [4], 9.4) ç迹ã(æºèªï¼åèæç®[4]ï¼9.4) synthetic aperture radar (SAR) åæåå¾é·è¾¾ ãhéchéng kÇngjìng léidáã
73 systematic sampling ç³»ç»åæ ·ãxìtÇng qÇyà ngã The process of selecting samples in a å¨ä¸ä¸ªè¿ç»çè¿ç¨ä¸ä»¥éå¤çæ¹å¼ repeated pattern, such as every 11th è¿è¡åæ ·ï¼å¦æ¯é 10 个ç©é¡¹åæ ·æ item or at fixed time intervals, from a æ¯éä¸å®çæ¶é´é´éåæ ·ã(æºèªï¼ continuing process. (From: Reference [4], 7.9) åèæç®[4]ï¼7.9) system-generated ç³»ç»çµç£èå² electromagnetic pulse ãxìtÇng dià ncà mà ichÅngã E C tactical missile ææ¯å¯¼å¼¹ãzhà nshù dÇodà nã tactical nuclear weapon ææ¯æ ¸æ¦å¨ãzhà nshù héwÇqìã 1 Nuclear weapons used to attack 1 ç¨äºæå»æå½¹ãææ¯çºµæ·±å éè¦ in-depth key targets at the campaign ç®æ çæ ¸æ¦å¨ã(æ¹èªï¼åèæç®[3]ï¼ and tactical level. (Modified from: Reference [3], p1107) p1107) 2 Nuclear weapons, such as artillery 2 ç¨äºæåºä½æçæ ¸æ¦å¨ï¼è¯¸å¦æ ¸ shells, bombs, and short-range ç®å¼¹ãæ ¸ç¸å¼¹åçç¨æ ¸å¯¼å¼¹çã(æ¹ missiles, for use in battlefield èªï¼åèæç®[8]) operations. (Modified from: Reference [8]) 3 Tactical nuclear weapons are 3 ææ¯æ ¸æ¦å¨æ¯æè½æå»ææ¹é¨ç½² designed to engage objects in the çææ¯çºµæ·±ç®æ (æè¿ 300 å ¬é)å® tactical depth of enemy deployment (up æææ¯ä»»å¡çæ¦å¨ãå¨æäºæ åµä¸ï¼ to 300 km) to accomplish a tactical mission. Under certain conditions, ææ¯æ ¸æ¦å¨å¯ç¨äºä½æåæç¥ä»» tactical nuclear weapons may be å¡ï¼æç¥æ ¸ç¸å¼¹ä¹å¯ç¨äºææ¯ç®çã involved in operational and strategic (æ¹èªï¼åèæç®[5]ï¼p24) missions. A strategic bomb can be used for tactical purposes. (Modified from: Reference [5], p24) Notes 1: Activities at a tactical level 注 1ï¼ææ¯å±é¢çæ´»å¨æ¯ä¸ºå®ææ focus on the ordered arrangement and æç®çèå ³æ³¨æ¶åå·±æ¹åææ¹çä½ maneuver of combat elements in relation to each other and to the enemy æè¦ç´ çé¨ç½²åè°é£ã(æ¹èªï¼åèæ to achieve combat objectives. (Modified ç®[9]ï¼p532) from: Reference [9], p532) Note 2: A campaign is a series of 注 2ï¼æå½¹æ¯æåå¢ä¸ºè¾¾ææäºç combat operations carried out by å±é¨ç®çæå ¨å±æ§ç®çï¼å¨ç»ä¸æ
74 corps-level military forces under æ¥ä¸è¿è¡çç±ä¸ç³»åææç»æçä½ uniformed command to achieve partial æè¡å¨ã(æºèªï¼åèæç®[33]ï¼p9) or overall objectives. (From: Reference [33], p9) Refer to âstrategic nuclear weaponâ åè§âæç¥æ ¸æ¦å¨â tag æ ç¾ãbiÄoqiÄnã E A unique identifier set up for facilitating å¨åå¤æ§å¶æ¡çº¦çéå¶å¯¹è±¡ä¸ï¼ä¸º verification of items restricted by arms C 便äºæ ¸æ¥è设置çæç§ç¬ç¹æ å¿ã control treaties. A tag must have intrinsic characteristic which make it æ ç¾å¿ é¡»å ·æåºæçç¹å¾ï¼ä¸è½å¤ difficult to be duplicated, transferred, å¶ã转移ã篡æ¹ææ¢æµï¼åæ¶è¦ç¨³ tampered or detected. A tag should also å®ãå¯é ã便å®ã(æºèªï¼åèæç®[1]ï¼ be stable, credible and inexpensive. (From: Reference [1], p496) p496) Note: An active tag requires electrical 注ï¼ææºæ ç¾å·¥ä½æ¶éè¦çµæºï¼ä½ power, while a passive tag works æ æºæ ç¾ä¸éè¦çµæºã without a power supply. tailored deterrence é对æ§å¨æ ãzhÄnduìxìng wÄishèã Flexible deterrence capabilities and æ ¹æ®ç®æ å½å ·ä½çå¿çãæ¿æ²»ãæ operational doctrines specifically de- signed according to the specific è¯å½¢æï¼åç»æµç¶åµèç¹å«å¶è®¢ç psychological, political, ideological, and çµæ´»çå¨æè½åä¸å®æååã(æºèªï¼ economic characteristics of the targeted åèæç®[21]ï¼p49-51) actor. (From: Reference[21], p49-51) tailored effects nuclear weapon ç¹æ®æåºæ ¸æ¦å¨ ãtèshÅ« xià oyìng héwÇqìã tamper resistance æå¹²æ°ãkà ng gÄnrÇoã tampering å¹²æ°ãgÄnrÇoã target-changing capability åæ¢æå»ç®æ è½å ãbià nhuà n dÇjÄ« mùbiÄo nénglìã target of nuclear strike æ ¸æå»ç®æ ãhédÇjÄ« mùbiÄoã target positioning ç®æ å®ä½ãmùbiÄo dìngwèiã technical characteristics ææ¯ç¹æ§å±ç¤ºåè§å¯ exhibition and inspection ãjìshù tèxìng zhÇnshì hé shìcháã
75 technologies for on-site æ ¸çç¸ç°åºè§å¯ææ¯ inspection of nuclear explosion ãhébà ozhà xià nchÇng shìchá jìshùã telemetry data packet é¥æµæ°æ®æå åå å¯ encryption ãyáocè shùjù dÇbÄo hé jiÄmìã telemetry signal for missiles 导弹é¥æµä¿¡å·ãdÇodà n yáocè xìnhà oã telemetry system for nuclear æ ¸æ¦å¨é¥æµç³»ç» weapon ãhéwÇqì yáocè xìtÇngã E template approach 模æ¿æ³ãmóbÇnfÇã C The template approach to identify 模æ¿æ³æ¯éè¿æµéç©ä½çæäºç¹ treaty-limited objects works by measur- å¾ï¼å¹¶ä¸ä»æ个åç §ç©(å¦ç»è®¤è¯ç ing certain characteristics of an object ä¸ä»¶ç¹å®ç±»åçæ¦å¨)æµå¾çåæ · and comparing them with the same set ä¸ç»ç¹å¾(å³æ¨¡æ¿)ç¸æ¯è¾ãå¦æè¿ of measurements taken from a refer- 两ç»æ°æ®æµéç¸ç¬¦ï¼å°±å¯ä»¥å¤å®è¯¥ ence object (e.g., an authentic weapon ç©ä½å°±æ¯è¿ç§ç±»åçæ¦å¨ã(æºèªï¼ of a particular type): the template. (From: åèæç®[11]ï¼p99) Reference [11], p99) temporal resolution æ¶é´å辨ç ãshÃjiÄn fÄnbià nlÇã Ten Principles of the Bandung ä¸éä¼è®®å项åå Conference ãwà nlóng huìyì shÃxià ng yuánzéã Ten-Nation Committee on åå½è£åå§åä¼ Disarmament (TNCD) ãshÃguó cáijÅ«n wÄiyuánhuìã termination of IAEA safeguards å½é ååè½æºæä¿éçç£çç»æ¢ ãguójì yuánzÇnéng jÄ«gòu bÇozhà ng jiÄndÅ« de zhÅngzhÇã theater nuclear weapon æåºæ ¸æ¦å¨ãzhà nqÅ« héwÇqìã theoretical maximum æ°ä½ç¦»å¿æºçæ大ç论å离åç separative power of a gas ãqìtÇ lÃxÄ«njÄ« de zuìdà lÇlùn fÄnlà gÅnglÇã centrifuge theory of cascade 级èç论ãjÃlián lÇlùnã theory of escalation éæ¥å级论ãzhúbù shÄngjÃlùnã theory of low intensity conflict ä½å¼ºåº¦å²çªç论 ãdÄ«qiángdù chÅngtÅ« lÇlùnã
76 theory of peaceful settlement å平解å³ç论ãhépÃng jiÄjué lÇlùnã theory of victory decided by æ ¸æ¦å¨å¶è论ãhéwÇqì zhìshènglùnã nuclear weapons thermal neutrons çä¸åãrèzhÅngzÇã thermal radiation of nuclear æ ¸çç¸å (ç)è¾å° explosion ãhébà ozhà guÄngrèfúshèã E thermonuclear ignition çæ ¸ç¹ç«ãrèhé diÇnhuÇã C thermonuclear weapon çæ ¸æ¦å¨ãrèhéwÇqìã third-generation nuclear 第ä¸ä»£æ ¸æ¦å¨ãdìsÄndà i héwÇqìã weapon THOREX (thorium extraction) æ¢é·å æ¯æµç¨ãsuÅléikèsÄ« liúchéngã process (éèåæµç¨) thorium-uranium nuclear fuel é-éæ ¸çæå¾ªç¯ cycle ãtÇ yóu héránlià o xúnhuánã Three Principles on Nuclear ä¸å½æ ¸åºå£ä¸é¡¹åå Export Control of China ãzhÅngguó héchÅ«kÇu sÄnxià ng China's three principles of nuclear ex- yuánzéã ports: guarantee for peaceful purposes ä¸å½æ ¸åºå£ä¸é¡¹ååï¼ç¬¬ä¸ï¼åªç¨ only; acceptance of IAEA safeguards; äºåå¹³ç®çï¼ç¬¬äºï¼æ¥åå½é åå and no retransfer to any third party è½æºæçä¿éåçç£ï¼ç¬¬ä¸ï¼æªç» without prior approval of the Chinese ä¸å½åæï¼æ¥åå½ä¸å¾è½¬è®©ç»ç¬¬ä¸ side. (From: Reference [1], p414) å½ã(æºèªï¼åèæç®[1]ï¼p414) throw weight of nuclear missile æ ¸å¯¼å¼¹ææ·éé ãhédÇodà n tóuzhì zhònglià ngã TNT equivalent 梯æ©æ¢¯å½éãtÄ«âÄntÄ« dÄnglià ngã transfer guideline 转让ååãzhuÇnrà ng zhÇnzéã transient radiation effects on çµåç³»ç»çç¬æè¾å°æåº electronics ãdià nzÇ xìtÇng de shùntà i fúshè xià oyìngã transmutation å¬åãshà nbià nã transparency éæ度ãtòumÃngdùã Openness of information. In the verifica- ä¿¡æ¯å ¬å¼ãå¨æ ¸æ¥é¢åå¯æå½å®¶å tion field it may refer to openness about äºæ´»å¨åå¯è½å¸¦æåäºæå³çåå¹³
77 a stateâs military activities and about æ´»å¨(å¦åæ°ä¸¤ç¨ææ¯)çå ¬å¼ã(æº any peaceful activities that may have military implications (such as dual-use èªï¼åèæç®[54]) technology). (From: Reference [54]) treatment of radioactive solid æ¾å°æ§åºä½åºç©å¤ç waste ãfà ngshèxìng gùtÇ fèiwù chÇlÇã Treaty Banning Nuclear ç¦æ¢å¨å¤§æ°å±ãå¤å±ç©ºé´åæ°´ä¸è¿ E Weapon Tests in the è¡æ ¸æ¦å¨è¯éªæ¡çº¦ Atmosphere, in Outer Space ãjìnzhÇ zà i dà qìcéng wà icéng kÅngjiÄn C and Under Water (PTBT) hé shuÇxià jìnxÃng héwÇqì shìyà n tiáoyuÄã Treaty Between the United ç¾ä¿å ³äºè¿ä¸æ¥åååéå¶è¿æ»æ§ States of America and the æç¥æ¦å¨æ¡çº¦ Russian Federation on Further ãmÄi é guÄnyú jìnyÄ«bù xuÄjiÇn hé Reduction and Limitation of xià nzhì jìngÅngxìng zhà nlüè wÇqì Strategic Offensive Arms tiáoyuÄã (START II) Treaty Between the United ç¾ä¿ååè¿æ»æ§æç¥æ¦å¨æ¡çº¦(è« States of America and the æ¯ç§æ¡çº¦) Russian Federation on ãmÄi é xuÄjiÇn jìngÅngxìng zhà nlüè Strategic Offensive Reductions wÇqì tiáoyuÄ mòsÄ«kÄ tiáoyuÄã (Moscow/SORT) Treaty Between the United ç¾èå ³äºæ¶é¤ä¸¤å½ä¸ç¨åä¸çç¨å¯¼ States of America and the å¼¹æ¡çº¦(ä¸å¯¼æ¡çº¦) Union of Soviet Socialist ãmÄi sÅ« guÄnyú xiÄochú liÇngguó Republics on the Elimination of zhÅngchéng jà zhÅngduÇnchéng Their Intermediate-Range and dÇodà n tiáoyuÄ zhÅngdÇo tiáoyuÄã Shorter-Range Missiles (INF Treaty) Treaty Between the United ç¾èå ³äºéå¶åå¼¹é导弹系ç»æ¡çº¦ States of America and the (å导æ¡çº¦) Union of Soviet Socialist ãmÄi sÅ« guÄnyú xià nzhì fÇn Republics on the Limitation of dà ndà odÇodà n xìtÇng tiáoyuÄ fÇndÇo Anti-ballistic Missile Systems tiáoyuÄã (ABM Treaty) Treaty Between the United ç¾èéå¶è¿æ»æ§æç¥æ¦å¨æ¡çº¦ States of America and the ãmÄi sÅ« xià nzhì jìngÅngxìng zhà nlüè Union of Soviet Socialist wÇqì tiáoyuÄã Republics on the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (SALT II Treaty)
78 Treaty Between the United ç¾èéå¶å°ä¸æ ¸æ¦å¨è¯éªæ¡çº¦(é States of America and the å½éæ¡çº¦) Union of Soviet Socialist ãmÄi sÅ« xià nzhì dìxià héwÇqì shìyà n Republics on the Limitation of tiáoyuÄ xià ndÄnglià ng tiáoyuÄã Underground Nuclear Weapon Tests (TTBT) Treaty Between the United ç¾èå ³äºåååéå¶è¿æ»æ§æç¥æ¦ States of America and the å¨æ¡çº¦ E Union of Soviet Socialist ãmÄi sÅ« guÄnyú xuÄjiÇn hé xià nzhì C Republics on the Reduction jìngÅngxìng zhà nlüèwÇqì tiáoyuÄã and Limitation of Offensive Strategic Arms (START I) Treaty Between the United ç¾èåå¹³å©ç¨å°ä¸æ ¸çç¸æ¡çº¦ States of America and the ãmÄi sÅ« hépÃng lìyòng dìxià hébà ozhà Union of Soviet Socialist tiáoyuÄã Republics on Underground Nuclear Explosion for Peaceful Purposes (PNE) Treaty for the Prohibition of æä¸ç¾æ´²åå åæ¯æµ·ç¦æ¢ Nuclear Weapons in Latin æ ¸æ¦å¨æ¡çº¦ America and the Caribbean ãlÄdÄ«ngmÄizhÅu hé jiÄlèbÇhÇi (Treaty of Tlatelolco) jìnzhÇ héwÇqì tiáoyuÄã Treaty on the Non-Proliferation ä¸æ©æ£æ ¸æ¦å¨æ¡çº¦ of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) ãbùkuòsà n héwÇqì tiáoyuÄã Treaty on the Southeast Asia ä¸åäºæ æ ¸æ¦å¨åºæ¡çº¦(æ¼è°·æ¡çº¦) Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone ã dÅngnányà wúhéwÇqìqÅ« tiáoyuÄ (Treaty of Bangkok) mà ngÇ tiáoyuÄã triad strategic nuclear force ä¸ä½ä¸ä½æç¥æ ¸åé Refer to âold nuclear triadâ ãsÄnwèiyÄ«tÇ zhà nlüè hélìlià ngã åè§âæ§æ ¸ä¸ä½ä¸ä½â trigger list 触åæ¸ åãchùfÄ qÄ«ngdÄnã The NSG prescribes that items on the æ ¸ä¾åºå½éå¢è§å®ï¼åæ æ ¸æ¦å¨å½ list exported to non-nuclear-weapon 家åºå£âæ¸ åâä¸ç项ç®ï¼è¦â触 states should trigger the IAEA safe- åâå½é ååè½æºæçä¿éçç£ã guards. (From: Reference [1], p407) (æºèªï¼åèæç®[1]ï¼p407) tri-phase bomb ä¸ç¸å¼¹ãsÄnxià ngdà nã A type of hydrogen bomb whose energy æ¾è½è¿ç¨ç»åç±è£åå°èååå°è£ release process consists of three
79 phases: fission, fusion, and then fission. åä¸ä¸ªé¶æ®µçä¸ç§æ°¢å¼¹ï¼å ¶æåç The final fission phase is achieved by the use of natural uranium, depleted è£åé¶æ®µç±ä¸´è¿äºçæ ¸çæçå¤©ç¶ uranium, or enriched uranium in éãè´«éææµç¼©éæ¥å®æãä¸çä¸ proximity to the thermonuclear fuel. 大å¤æ°æç¥æ ¸æ¦å¨é½å±äºè¿ç§ç±» Most strategic nuclear weapons in the world belong to this type. (Modified from: åã(æ¹èªï¼åèæç®[3]ï¼p802) Reference [3], p802) E tritium æ°ãchuÄnã C tritium production reactor 产æ°å ãchÇn chuÄn duÄ«ã tunnel nuclear test å¹³æ´å°ä¸æ ¸è¯éª ãpÃngdòng dìxià héshìyà nã two cycle process å循ç¯æµç¨ ãshuÄngxúnhuán liúchéngã type (environment) of nuclear æ ¸çç¸æ¹å¼(ç¯å¢) explosion ãhébà ozhà fÄngshì huánjìngã Nuclear weapons or nuclear explosive æ ¸æ¦å¨ææ ¸çç¸è£ ç½®å¨ä¸åä»è´¨ã devices can be exploded in different ä¸åé«åº¦æ深度ççç¸ï¼å æ¬å¤§æ° media or at different heights/depths, in å±æ ¸çç¸ãé«ç©ºæ ¸çç¸ãæ°´ä¸æ ¸ç the atmosphere, in space, underwater and underground. (Modified from: Reference ç¸åå°ä¸æ ¸çç¸çã(æ¹èªï¼åèæç® [1], p191) [1]ï¼p191) UN General Assembly èåå½å¤§ä¼ãliánhéguó dà huìã UN resolution concerning the èåå½å ³äºä¾µç¥å®ä¹çå³è®® definition of aggression ãliánhéguó guÄnyú qÄ«nlüè dìngyì de juéyìã unannounced inspection ä¸éç¥è§å¯ãbùtÅngzhÄ« shìcháã undeclared facility or location æªç³æ¥è®¾æ½æ设æ½å¤åºæ outside facilities (LOF) ãwèi shÄnbà o shèshÄ« huò shèshÄ«wà i chÇngsuÇã underground nuclear test å°ä¸æ ¸è¯éªãdìxià héshìyà nã unified uranium å计éãhéjì yóuã United Nations Advisory Board èåå½è£åäºå¡å¨è¯¢å§åä¼ on Disarmament Affairs ãliánhéguó cáijÅ«n shìwù zÄ«xún wÄiyuánhuìã
80 United Nations Charter èåå½å®ªç« ãliánhéguó xià nzhÄngã United Nations Commission for èåå½å¸¸è§åå¤å§åä¼ Conventional Armaments ãliánhéguó chángguÄ« jÅ«nbèi wÄiyuánhuìã United Nations Disarmament èåå½è£å审议å§åä¼ Commission (UNDC) ãliánhéguó cáijÅ«n shÄnyì wÄiyuánhuìã E United Nations Institute for èåå½è£åç 究æ Disarmament Research ãliánhéguó cáijÅ«n yánjiÅ«suÇã C (UNIDIR) United Nations Office èåå½è£åäºå¡é¨ (Department) for Disarmament ãliánhéguó cáijÅ«n shìwùbùã Affairs United Nations Register of èåå½å¸¸è§æ¦å¨è½¬è®©ç»è®°å Conventional Weapons ãliánhéguó chángguÄ« wÇqì zhuÇnrà ng dÄngjìcèã uranium éãyóuã uranium alloy éåéãyóu héjÄ«nã uranium chemical concentrate éåå¦æµç¼©ç© ãyóu huà xué nóngsuÅwùã uranium decontamination cycle éååå¾ªç¯ ãyóu jìnghuà xúnhuánã uranium dioxide äºæ°§åéãèryÇnghuà yóuã uranium hexafluoride å æ°åéãliùfúhuà yóuã uranium hexafluoride å æ°åé水解ãliùfúhuà yóu shuÇjiÄã hydrolysis uranium isotope separation éåä½ç´ å离ãyóu tóngwèisù fÄnlÃã uranium mine and ore éç¿å¼éåæ°´å¶ processing ãyóukuà ng kÄicÇi hé shuÇyÄã uranium purification plant é纯ååãyóu chúnhuà chÇngã uranium recycling éå循ç¯ãyóu zà ixúnhuánã A process of reusing the uranium å°ä»ä¹çæä¸åæ¶å¾å°çéå¨ååº extracted from spent fuel in nuclear å å å循ç¯ä½¿ç¨çè¿ç¨ã(æºèªï¼å reactors. (From: Reference [2], p457) èæç®[2]ï¼p457)
81 uranium spectrum éå è°±ãyóu guÄngpÇã uranium-233 é-233ãyóu 233ã uranium-plutonium cycle éé循ç¯ãyóu bù xúnhuánã uranium-plutonium mixed ééæ··åæ°§åç© dioxide ãyóu bù hùnhé yÇnghuà wùã uranium-plutonium partition ééåç¦»å¾ªç¯ E cycle ãyóu bù fÄnlà xúnhuánã C U.S. Nuclear Non-Proliferation ç¾å½ 1978 å¹´æ ¸ä¸æ©æ£æ³ Act of 1978 ãmÄiguó 1978 nián hébùkuòsà n fÇã The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act æ ¸ä¸æ©æ£æ³å£°æäºç¾å½çæ¿çï¼(1) declares it United States policy: (1) to pursue the establishment of inter- 寻æ±å»ºç«æ ¸è®¾å¤ãæ ¸ææåæ ¸ææ¯ national controls of nuclear equipment, çå½é æ§å¶ï¼(2)æé«ç¾å½ä½ä¸ºæ ¸å material, and technology, (2) to enhance the reliability of the United åºå åæ ¸çæä¾åºå½çå¯é æ§ï¼(3) States as a supplier of nuclear reactors é¼å±æ¹åãä¸æ©æ£æ ¸æ¦å¨æ¡çº¦ã (4) ï¼ and fuels, (3) to encourage ratification 帮å©å ¶ä»å½å®¶æ ¸å®åè°æ´éå½çè½ of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, and (4) to aid other æºç产ææ¯ã(æ¹èªï¼åèæç®[35]) nations in identification and adaptation of appropriate energy production technology. (Modified from: Reference [35]) value function ä»·å¼å½æ°ãjià zhà hánshùã variable frequency power for 离å¿æºä¸ç¨åé¢çµæº special purpose of a centrifuge ãlÃxÄ«njÄ« zhuÄnyòng bià npÃn dià nyuánã variance Ï2 æ¹å·® Ï2ãfÄngchÄ Ï2ã verification æ ¸æ¥ãhécháã In the arms control field, it refers to the å¨åæ§ä¸æ¯æ确认ç¼çº¦å½æ¯å¦éµå® process of establishing whether state parties are complying with the provision åè®®æ¡æ¬¾çè¿ç¨ãå®å¿ é¡»çæµåç¼ of an agreement. It entails monitoring 约å½æå ³æ¡çº¦æ¿è¯ºçæ´»å¨ï¼åæä» the activities of the parties relevant to their treaty commitments, analysing the çæµæ¶éçä¿¡æ¯ï¼å¹¶ç¡®å®åç¼çº¦å½ information collected from monitoring, æ¯å¦éµå®å ¶å¯¹æ¡çº¦æ¿è¯ºçä¹å¡ã and determining whether the parties are complying with their agreement obliga- (æ¹èªï¼åèæç®[19]ï¼p237) tions. (Modified from: Reference [19], p237)
82 verification and validation éªè¯ä¸ç¡®è®¤ãyà nzhèng yÇ quèrènã (V&V) éªè¯ï¼æ¯ä¸ä¸ªç¡®å®è¿ç¨ï¼å³éªè¯è®¡ Verification is the process of confirming ç®ç¨åºæ£ç¡®å°æ±è§£äºæ°å¦æ¹ç¨çè¿ that a computer code correctly implements the algorithms that were ç¨ã intended. Validation is the process of confirming 确认ï¼ä¹æ¯ä¸ä¸ªç¡®å®è¿ç¨ï¼å³ç¡®è®¤ E that the predictions of a code 计ç®ç¨åºç计ç®ç»ææ°å½å°æè¿°äº adequately represent measured physi- C ç¸å ³ç©çç°è±¡çè¿ç¨ã(æ¹èªï¼åèæ cal phenomena. (Modified from: Reference ç®[63]) [63]) verification of the fissile ç¦æ¢ç产æè£åæææ ¸æ¥ material production cutoff ãjìnzhÇ shÄngchÇn yìlièbià n cáilià o hécháã virtual nuclear test èææ ¸è¯éªãxÅ«ânÇ héshìyà nã The numerical simulation of a nuclear ç¨å è¿ç计ç®æºç¨åºåé«æ§è½è®¡ç® explosion test done by advanced com- æºå¯¹æ ¸çè¯éªè¿è¡æ°å¼æ¨¡æã(æ¹èªï¼ puter programs and high performance computers. (Modified from: Reference [2], åèæç®[2]ï¼p430) p430) visual observation ç®è§è§å¯ãmùshì guÄncháã voluntary offer agreement èªæ¿æ交åå®ãzìyuà n tÃjiÄo xiédìngã voluntary reporting scheme on å ³äºæ ¸ææãè§å®è®¾å¤åéæ ¸ææ nuclear material and specified èªæ¿æ¥åæºå¶ equipment and non-nuclear ãguÄnyú hécáilià o guÄ«dìngshèbèi hé material fÄihécáilià o zìyuà n bà ogà o jÄ«zhìã vulnerability assessment æææ§è¯å®ãyìsÇnxìng pÃngdìngã waste from nuclear fuel cycle æ ¸çæ循ç¯åºç© ãhéránlià o xúnhuán fèiwùã waste from nuclear power plant æ ¸çµååºç©ãhédià nchÇng fèiwùã waste solidification åºç©åºåãfèiwù gùhuà ã waste storage åºç©è´®åãfèiwù zhùcúnã weapon-grade plutonium æ¦å¨çº§éãwÇqìjà bùã Plutonium containing no more than 7% å«å°äºæçäº 7%以ä¸é-240 çéã Pu-240. (From: Reference [1], p233) (æºèªï¼åèæç®[1]ï¼p233)
83 Note: Pu containing much more than 注ï¼å«è¿å¤§äº 7%以ä¸é-240 çé 7% Pu-240 can actually be used in a äºå®ä¸äº¦å¯ç¨äºæ ¸æ¦å¨ã(æºèªï¼å nuclear weapon. (From: Reference [13], èæç®[13]ï¼p32-33) p32-33) weapon-grade uranium æ¦å¨çº§éãwÇqìjà yóuã Enriched uranium containing no less å«å¤§äºæçäº 90%以ä¸é-235 ç than 90% U-235. (From: Reference [1], p233) E éã(æºèªï¼åèæç®[1]ï¼p233) C weaponization æ¦å¨åãwÇqìhuà ã weaponization of space å¤ç©ºæ¦å¨åãwà ikÅng wÇqìhuà ã To deploy systems or components é¨ç½²ä¸é¨è®¾è®¡ç¨äºå¨/ä»å¤ç©ºä½æ specifically designed to fight a war in or çç³»ç»æé¨ä»¶ï¼æé¨ç½²ä¸é¨è®¾è®¡ç¨ from space, or military capabilities on the earth specifically designed to äºå¨å°çä¸æ»å»å¤ç©ºä¸ç®æ çåäº destroy or disable targets in space. è½åã(æ¹èªï¼åèæç®[56]ï¼p29) (Modified From: Reference [56], p29) Refer to âmilitarization of spaceâ åè§âå¤ç©ºåäºåâ weapon-usable material å¯ç¨äºæ¦å¨çææ ãkÄyòngyú wÇqì de cáilià oã Western Group 西æ¹å½å®¶éå¢ ãxÄ«fÄng guójiÄ jÃtuánã wet storage 湿æ³è´®åãshÄ«fÇ zhùcúnã X-ray laser pumped by nuclear æ ¸çæ¿å± X å°çº¿æ¿å å¨ explosion ãhébà o jÄ«lì X shèxià n jÄ«guÄngqìã yellow cake é»é¥¼ãhuángbÇngã A concentrate produced during the éæ°´å¶è¿ç¨ä¸çä¸é´äº§ç©ï¼å«æ大 uranium milling process that contains about 80% U3O8 with small amounts of 约 80ï¼ å¸¦çå°ééé °ççå «æ°§åä¸ uranyl salts. In preparation for uranium é(U3O8)ãç¨äºéæµç¼©çé»é¥¼è¢«è½¬ enrichment, the yellowcake is converted åæå æ°åéæ°ä½(UF6)ï¼ç¨äºå¤©ç¶ to uranium hexafluoride gas (UF6). In the preparation of natural uranium éååºå çæçé»é¥¼è¢«å å·¥æ纯å reactor fuel, yellowcake is processed çäºæ°§åéã(æºèªï¼åèæç®[12]) into purified uranium dioxide. (From: Reference [12])
84 yield å¨åãwÄilìã yield-to-weight ratio æ¯å¨åãbÇwÄilìã Zangger Committee æ¡æå§åä¼ãsÄnggÄ wÄiyuánhuìã The Zangger Committee, also known as ä¸äºææ ¸åºå£è½åçãä¸æ©æ£æ ¸æ¦ the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty Exporters Committee, is a nuclear å¨æ¡çº¦ã(NPT)ç¼çº¦å½ç»æçæ ¸åºå£ E export group, which consists of parties æ§å¶éå¢ï¼å称 NPT åºå£å½å§å of the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty C ä¼ã该å§åä¼äº 1971 å¹´æç«ï¼å®æ¨ (NPT) who have the capability of nuclear export. The committee was æ¯æ§å¶ãä¸æ©æ£æ ¸æ¦å¨æ¡çº¦ãæå formed in 1971. It aims to prevent the å½å¯¹æ²¡ææ ¸æ¦å¨çéæ¡çº¦æåå½ç prohibition of nuclear weapons by æ ¸ææåæ ¸è®¾å¤çåºå£ï¼ä»¥é²æ¢æ ¸ controlling the export of nuclear materials and equipment from parties of æ¦å¨æ©æ£ãå§åä¼ç主è¦åºå£æ§å¶ the NPT to non-nuclear-weapon states. æºå¶æ¯â触åæ¸ åâï¼å³åæ æ ¸æ¦ The main export control mechanism of å¨å½å®¶åºå£è§¦åæ¸ åä¸ç项ç®ï¼æ¥ the committee is the âTrigger Listâ. Items on this List exported to æ¶å½å¿ é¡»æ¥åâå½é ååè½æºæâ non-nuclear- weapon states must be çä¿éçç£ãç®å该å§åä¼æ 36 个 subject to IAEA safeguards. The æåå½ã(æ¹èªï¼åèæç®[1]ï¼p374) committee now has 36 member states. (Modified from: Reference [1], p374) Zangger Committee Export æ¡æå§åä¼åºå£åå Guidelines ãsÄnggÄ wÄiyuánhuì chÅ«kÇu zhÇnzéã zero-yield experiment é¶å¨åå®éªãlÃngwÄilì shÃyà nã Refer to âsubcritical experimentâ åè§â次临çå®éªâ