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7 The Importance of Storage and Disposal in Multinational Approaches to the Fuel Cycle Charles McCombie and Neil Chapman Arius THE GLObAL NEED FOR STORAGE AND DISPOSAL FACILITIES Virtually all countries in the world with nuclear power programs have con- cluded that geological disposal is a necessity if we are to make the nuclear fuel cycle safe and environmentally acceptable without putting undue burdens on future generations (International Atomic Energy Agency [IAEA] 2002). For tech- nical reasons related to the initial rapid decay of radioactivity and heat output, disposal of spent nuclear fuel (SNF) or high-level wastes (HLW) can take place only after storage periods of decades or more. For societal or economic reasons, some countries have decided on much longer interim storage—for example, the Netherlands intends to store for 100 or more years—although it is nevertheless recognized that geological disposal is the only feasible subsequent step. Even for countries that would like to move relatively quickly to disposal, storage has become a key issue. This is because, unfortunately for the progress of nuclear power, moving toward geological disposal has proven to be a very difficult task, even in the most advanced countries. There will be no SNF/HLW repository in operation until the next decade, and many countries are looking toward the middle of the century. For the larger advanced nuclear programs, the problems are mainly societal issues associated with achieving sufficient public and political acceptance for specific sites for a national repository. For small countries, however, countries with limited nuclear power programs, or countries with no nuclear power but long-lived wastes from other applications, a national deep geological repository may be ruled out on economic or environmental grounds. If SNF and HLW are not to remain dispersed for indefinite periods in 56

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57 STORAGE AND DISPOSAL IN MULTINATIONAL APPROACHES dozens of surface storage sites around the world, these small countries need ac- cess to geological repositories. This implies that multinational facilities for the disposal of SNF/HLW are a prerequisite for the sustainable, safe, and environmentally friendly use of nuclear power and other nuclear applications. Other activities in the nuclear fuel cycle—uranium supply, enrichment, fuel fabrication, reactor construction, and reprocessing—are all provided as international services. The same status must be achieved for disposal. For storage the economic arguments for multinational facilities are more debatable, since the facilities are less costly and the economies of scale less dramatic. There are, however, other strong arguments for rational- izing global storage strategies, as pointed out in the following section. NONPROLIFERATION AND SECURITY OF INCREASING IMPORTANCE In addition to the economic, safety, and environmental benefits that multi- national repositories can offer, the nonproliferation advantages have often been stressed (IAEA 2004, Stoll and McCombie 2001). In recent years, in particular following the series of terrorist attacks from 2001 onward, increasing attention has focused on both nonproliferation and security aspects (see Alvarez et al. 2003, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission [USNRC] 2003, National Research Council [NRC] 2005). Repeated statements by the director general of the IAEA have pointed out the need to control the most sensitive parts of the fuel cycle (e.g., ElBaradei 2003). It is important to note that these include not only enrichment of fissile uranium and reprocessing, to separate plutonium, but also long-term storage and disposal of SNF/HLW. This point is made clear in the February 2005 report published by the Multinational Approaches (MNA) Expert Group that the director general set up in mid-2004 (IAEA 2005a). The MNA report addresses the security and nonproliferation issues in a manner directly applicable to all aspects of the nuclear fuel cycle and suggests five specific approaches for multinational initiatives. The implications of these proposals for storage and disposal concepts are discussed below. ASSURANCE OF NONPROLIFERATION AND OF SUPPLY AND SERVICES The MNA group sets out as the deciding factors influencing the assessment of multilateral approaches assurance of nonproliferation and assurance of supply and services. The former objective is clearly easier to achieve if multinational storage and disposal facilities can be made available. There are currently 35 countries with nuclear power plants (with more than 500 plants operating, being constructed, or planned) and a total of 69 with research reactors. A total of 674 research reactors were operational, shut down, under construction, or planned

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58 SPENT NUCLEAR FUEL STORAGE FACILITIES in 1997, according to the most recent survey in the IAEA database (http://www. iaea.or.at/worldatom/rrdb/). Leaving spent fuel in all of these locations for many decades is obviously less proliferation resistant than collecting the material into a smaller number of facilities with very strong safeguards. In practice the existing strict controls of the IAEA and European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom) might even be enhanced by a further level of direct international control over a storage or disposal facility for SNF. For the short and intermediate time frames, shared storage facilities alone would suffice to contain the proliferation risk. Shipping spent fuel removed from reactors to one of a few centralized facilities as soon as it has cooled enough for transport would be a sensible approach. Technically, with assured centralized interim storage, the question of implementing repositories could be postponed. There have been various proposals from potential hosts and user countries for shared storage facilities (see, e.g., Bunn et al. 2001, Ansolabehere et al. 2003). However, in practice, as is strongly emphasized in the IAEA multinational stor- age report (IAEA 2005b), it will be difficult to transfer SNF/HLW to another country for storage without some clarity on the endpoint of the agreement. Re- turning cooled spent fuel to many countries after several decades would simply reinstate the current proliferation risks of dispersed storage. Returning HLW from reprocessed spent fuel reduces proliferation risks by retaining central storage of plutonium, but it increases security concerns. Moreover, accepting returned HLW would compel small countries to seek national deep disposal solutions—in which case they may as well have retained the fuel for disposal. In short, the assurance of nonproliferation sought by the MNA group is best attained by early implementation of shared storage facilities, with the essential ingredient of an agreed upon further step of disposal in multilateral reposito- ries—either in the countries storing the waste or in a limited number of other volunteering host nations. How could one guarantee assurance of supply and services in a situation where many countries are relying on storage or disposal facilities being available in another country? One obvious answer is to have more than one multinational facility and thereby avoid the danger of creating a monopoly. An alternative or a complementary measure is to have direct international guarantees that avoid monopolistic behavior. One way to achieve this is for the IAEA itself to guaran- tee continued provision of storage and disposal services. This could be done by establishment of specific internationally operated facilities, whereby agreements with the host country or countries would be required. An alternative is that the IAEA promotes binding arrangements between the service providers, ensuring that each will agree to take over the commitments of others should these cease to provide promised services for storage or disposal. The MNA group recognizes in its report that there is currently no interna- tional market for storage or disposal and recommends that the IAEA support the concept by assuming political leadership to encourage such undertakings.

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59 STORAGE AND DISPOSAL IN MULTINATIONAL APPROACHES Specific ways forward are possible based on both of the multinational repository scenarios defined by the IAEA—“partnering” and “add-on” (by a large nuclear nation), as documented in TECDOC-1314 (IAEA 2004). These possibilities are discussed below. SPECIFIC SCENARIOS FOR MULTINATIONAL APPROACHES TO DISPOSAL The add-on scenario is one in which a large nuclear program accepts wastes from smaller ones. There are several conditions that could enhance the probability of an add-on scenario being successfully implemented: •  The international community should recognize that any country offer- ing storage or disposal services is potentially a contributor to global safety and security. •  A willing host country (or countries) must come forward and should be able to demonstrate to the international community that it has the necessary level of support for the project within the host country. •  Appropriate benefits for the host(s) must be agreed on. These need not be purely financial; strategic and political issues may also be involved. •  The potential user countries of a multinational repository must not ab- dicate all responsibilities. They should, singly or as a structured group, develop mechanisms to assure that the safety standards in a multinational repository are not lower than those that each would accept for a national repository. •  International or supranational bodies (e.g., the IAEA or European Com- mission [EC]) must be willing to play an active role in developing and controlling the multinational initiatives. This involves not only safety, security, and nonpro- liferation aspects but also the assurance of supply issues discussed above. •  Real interest in sending spent fuel to any country with an international repository will be shown by small countries only if existing backlogs of stored spent fuel, HLW, and long-lived intermediate-level waste (LL-ILW) can also be transferred, since complete avoidance of the need for an expensive deep reposi- tory will be the driver. In recent times most discussion of the add-on option has revolved around concepts in which Russia acts as host country. Over the past few years Russia has been seriously examining the issue of spent fuel import and is currently the only country supporting this at the government level. Specific proposals that could advance the Russian initiative are included at the end of this paper. For the “partnering” scenario, in which a group of usually smaller countries cooperate to move toward shared disposal facilities, exploratory studies have been performed most recently by the Arius Association, which also co-manages the EC’s Support Action: Pilot Initiative for European Regional Repositories

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60 SPENT NUCLEAR FUEL STORAGE FACILITIES Box 1 SAPIERR Support Action: Pilot Initiative for European Regional Repositories • Project dates: 2003-2005 • Managed by DECOM (Slovakia) and Arius • Main deliverables — Legal report (Boutellier, 2004) — Inventory teport (Stefula, 2004) — Options and scenarios of regional disposal (draft) — Future research and technical development recommendations • Final Workshop: Brussels, November 9, 2005 (SAPIERR) project (www.arius-world.org, www.sapierr.net; see Box 1). The following stages can be envisioned for a partnering scenario; it is interesting that these stages do not differ greatly from steps taken within a federally organized state to seek a national disposal solution. Pilot feasibility studies: A sufficient number of interested national organiza- tions cooperate to organize and fund pilot studies aimed at establishing the basic technical, legal, economic, and political feasibility of multinational repositories. A formalized study consortium: To progress to the detailed level of study needed, a structured project team must be created, staffed, and funded at the ap- propriate level. At this stage, participating countries can still choose to leave open the question of whether all partners are potential hosts or whether some, perhaps with small areas or with no nuclear power production, can choose to enter only as potential users of a shared repository. The study consortium must agree on the level of funding needed, on the distribution of costs among partners, and, very im- portantly, on an organizational structure and medium-term (multiyear) program. A dedicated regional repository project team: The project team must cover the same key aspects of repository planning that also affect national repositories. Of course, some tasks are more challenging in a multinational context than in national programs. A sensible option would be to recruit core team members by delegation of appropriate staff from the national programs involved. Siting studies leading to candidate siting areas in different partner countries: The siting study is clearly the most sensitive work area. Optimally, it should involve working in parallel on a volunteer strategy and on a technical/societal

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6 STORAGE AND DISPOSAL IN MULTINATIONAL APPROACHES study aimed at ranking options and keeping multiple options open. At this stage the project is coming close to moving into the phase of on-site investigations at potential sites. Reorganization and further formalization of the cooperation may be appropriate, in order to handle the growing political and technical challenges and the increased financing. Establishment of a business consortium or joint enture: The purpose of this organization is to organize and fund characterization of the sites, finalize agreements on the key issue of compensation for host communities and countries, select a short list of preferred sites, and interact with political and regulatory bodies in the candidate countries. At this stage, at the very latest, it is imperative to assure involvement of and cooperation with relevant international bodies, in particular the EC (for a European venture) and the IAEA. Establish a construction and operation company: It may be necessary to reorganize the existing joint venture in order to take account of specific wishes of the host country or countries with respect to legal structures, shared liabilities, funding mechanisms, and so forth. Repository operation: During the decades for which the repository will operate, the relationships between the partners can be of various types. In all cases it is expected that the user countries will require sufficient insight into operations to enable them to reassure their national publics that required safety standards are being adhered to at the repository. Given the nature of the facility, international oversight by the IAEA will be a necessity (and the EC for a Euro- pean repository). Closure and postclosure: At some time in the far future, the regional reposi- tory will be closed and possibly monitored for some long time. As with the shared benefits, agreements for sharing liabilities must be agreed upon long before this final stage is reached. On the liabilities side, the question is how much and for how long partner countries may continue to be liable should any remediation work be required. On the benefits side, one issue is whether partner countries retain any claim to spent fuel should this ever be deliberately recovered from the repository because of the high energy content of the residual fissile materials it contains. The scenario sketched above is one of many possible variants. At the heart of a successful project lies the siting issue. However, this is a difficult problem even in national programs—but this has not prevented local communities in some countries from agreeing to host repositories. The MNA group of the IAEA also recommends an initial cooperation phase, with participating countries working on a siteless pilot project—which is, of course, the precise course taken by the European SAPIERR project.

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6 SPENT NUCLEAR FUEL STORAGE FACILITIES THE FIVE APPROACHES OF THE MNA GROUP AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS FOR STORAGE/ DISPOSAL OF SPENT NUCLEAR FUEL It is emphasized correctly by the MNA group that disposal and storage of SNF/HLW should not be looked at in isolation but instead as part of a broader nuclear strategy. Nevertheless, it is interesting to examine the five suggested ap- proaches for encouraging multinational initiatives and to consider specifically their implications for these two activities. Approach : Reinforcing existing commercial market mechanisms on a case-by- case basis through long-term contracts and transparent suppliers’ arrangements with goernment backing. Examples: commercial fuel banks, fuel leasing, and fuel take-back and commercial offers to store and dispose of spent fuel. Commercial market mechanisms in the past have made possible the transfer of SNF with no return of wastes, for example, to reprocessing plants in France, the United Kingdom, and Russia. Increasing public and political pressures on the organizations involved led to these services being withdrawn. Russia is cur- rently reopening the door for accepting fuel from nuclear power plants in other countries—but only for take-back of fuel elements supplied by Russia. Both Russia and the United States have implemented processes for taking back spent research reactor fuel—for purely nonproliferation reasons. Although initially also restricted to fuel supplied by themselves, this could change. The United States is already negotiating taking non-U.S. fuel from the new Australian OPAL (open pool Australian light water) research reactor. In practice, the only commercial offer currently being made for SNF is by Russia—and this is at present restricted to storage, with possible later reprocessing and return of HLW. The potential acceptability, both within Russia and in a potential customer country, of including disposal in this arrangement, could be greatly enhanced by IAEA support and by an IAEA commitment to rigorously oversee, or even co-manage, the facilities. If the Russian approach achieves global acceptance, it is even possible that competition could arise, as other nations realize the com- mercial opportunity and receive international encouragement to provide such a service. Approach : Deeloping and implementing international supply guarantees with IAEA participation. Different models should be inestigated, notably the IAEA as guarantor, that is, as administrator of a fuel bank. Supply guarantees for a storage or disposal service are important to any customer country. Withdrawal of the services could lead to shortage of storage capacity, which could impact continued reactor operation or could put the country

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6 STORAGE AND DISPOSAL IN MULTINATIONAL APPROACHES back into its original position of having to implement an expensive geological repository. The latter potential problem will, fortunately, never be an urgent tim- ing issue since disposal is easily postponed. Nevertheless, an IAEA initiative to organize for a group of service providers jointly to guarantee the continued availability of storage/disposal facilities would be of value. Approach : Promoting oluntary conersion of existing facilities to MNAs, and pursuing them as confidence-building measures, with the participation of NPT (nonproliferation treaty) nonnuclear weapons states and nuclear weapons states, and non-NPT states. Conversion of existing facilities is currently conceivable only for storage of spent fuel, since no geological repositories for SNF are in operation. For storage it has generally been found, even for small nuclear countries, that implementa- tion of national facilities is affordable and politically feasible, especially if the stores are at existing nuclear plants. In fact, shortage of national storage capacity has threatened progress only in the large nuclear programs of Taiwan and Japan (and, to some extent, the United States). In the United States a private commercial initiative has been launched to fulfill the growing need for away-from-reactor storage, but it is not at present conceivable that this could be used for storing for- eign fuel. For Japan and Taiwan the possibility of storing SNF for some decades in another country, such as Russia, could be of interest because of the difficulties in siting new storage facilities. In the case of geological repositories, although none is operating, several countries have advanced projects leading to implementation—in particular Fin- land, the United States, Sweden, and France. All of these, however, have made it very clear that the repositories are purely national and will not accept foreign fuel or waste. The general consensus in the waste disposal community is that suc- cess in these programs will help the cause of geological disposal worldwide. If this success is currently more assured by purely national approaches, then these should continue, but this should not be interpreted as evidence that only national programs can succeed. Approach : Creating, through oluntary agreements and contracts, multina- tional, and in particular regional, MNAs for new facilities based on joint own- ership, drawing rights, or co-management for front-end and back-end nuclear facilities, such as uranium enrichment, fuel reprocessing, or disposal and storage of spent fuel (and combinations thereof). Integrated nuclear power parks would also sere this objectie. For geological disposal the creation in the future of new multinational and/or regional repositories is the most promising approach. Interest in the partnering scenario that could lead to these is clearly evidenced by recent developments,

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6 SPENT NUCLEAR FUEL STORAGE FACILITIES in particular in Europe. The Arius Association, founded in 2002, pursues this concept as its main activity. Organizations from eight countries are currently involved. The EC has promoted the concept of regional repositories in Europe in its council directive on the management of spent nuclear fuel and radioactive waste. The commission is also funding the SAPIERR project, which is studying the necessary boundary conditions for regional repositories in Europe (see Table 1). Organizations from 14 European countries participate in SAPIERR. The key question of siting is deliberately not addressed in the current phase. Consistent with the remarks made above on avoiding monopolies, it may be advisable ulti- mately to seek more than one site (see Tables 2 and 3). Of course, new multinational facilities might also be constructed in the “add- on” scenario. Again, Russian possibilities have as yet been discussed the most. In 2003, and again this year, delegations have visited the Krasnokamensk site in eastern Siberia, where the local population is in favor of implementation of a repository for spent nuclear fuel from other countries (Laverov et al. 2004). Approach 5: The scenario of a further expansion of nuclear energy around the world might call for the deelopment of a nuclear fuel cycle with strong multilat- TAbLE 1 European Perspectives A—The 14 SAPIERR Working Group members: (not all C—No nuclear are EU member B—National power plants but states—e.g., Only: Major EU some waste for Bulgaria, countries where deep disposal: Croatia, implementer has Some Group Romania); does taken definite C are also in NOT imply position that the SAPIERR that they have waste disposal Working Group chosen a disposal programs will be (e.g., Lithuania, strategy purely national Austria, Croatia) Groups A and C Undecided Belgium Finland Cyprus Austria United Bulgaria France Denmark Croatia Kingdom Czech Republic Germany Estonia Latvia Hungary Sweden Greece Italy Ireland Lithuania Luxembourg Netherlands Malta Romania Poland Slovakia Portugal Slovenia Switzerland

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65 STORAGE AND DISPOSAL IN MULTINATIONAL APPROACHES TAbLE 2 SAPIERR Working Group: Spent Fuel Locations Purpose Built Storage Facilities Storage in Reactor Pools Ignalina, Lithuania Krsko, Slovenia Doel, Belgium Trino Vercellese, Italy SCK·CEN Mol, Belgium Saluggia, Italy Tihange, Belgium Caorso, Italy Temelin, Czech Republic Dodewaard, Netherlands Dukovany, Czech Republic Borselle, Netherlands Bohunice, Slovakia Mochovce, Slovakia Paks, Hungary Gösgen, Switzerland ZWILAG, Switzerland SCN Pitesti, Romania Cernavoda, Romania Kozloduy, Bulgaria NRC Sofia, Bulgaria TAbLE 3 Number of Nuclear Power Reactors in Operation SAPIERR 37 France 59 United Kingdom 23 Germany 18 Sweden 11 Spain 9 Finland 4 eral arrangements—by region or by continent—and broader cooperation inol- ing the IAEA and the international community. This conclusion of the MNA group is very relevant now that interest in in- creased use of nuclear power is higher than it has been for decades. On the topic of multinational geological disposal, unfortunately, there has been controversy as well as cooperation between IAEA member states. However, the advanced national disposal programs are becoming more confident of success and subse- quently feel less threatened by multinational initiatives, and the active support of the IAEA and the EC has become stronger. There should, therefore, be little difficulty in the international community in further supporting broader coopera- tion on multinational approaches and no obstacles in the way of intensive IAEA involvement.

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66 SPENT NUCLEAR FUEL STORAGE FACILITIES CONCLUSIONS There is clear recognition internationally that multinational approaches in the overall nuclear fuel cycle can enhance security and help hinder proliferation. Despite earlier controversies, the potential advantages are also recognized for multinational storage and disposal facilities. What concrete steps can be taken to move beyond empty expressions of support toward specific practical initiatives? Specific repository projects involving technical and societal efforts toward siting and constructing a shared repository will need closer coordination, direct involvement of the interested countries and the international agencies, and sig- nificantly increased resources. Most of the small countries that could benefit most directly from shared repositories have not yet accumulated sufficient funds to implement a national repository. However, there are certainly sufficient resources available in these countries, if pooled, to support a serious joint waste disposal program. Initially, this would be aimed at clarifying the options for a shared regional facility. However, more support for back-end studies on storage and disposal is needed. The relatively large funding that is proposed for tackling se- curity issues at the front end could be complemented by increased—although still comparatively modest—financial support for progressing shared repository proj- ects for commercial reactor fuels (see Box 2). The “partnering” scenario outlined earlier in this paper exemplifies one possible practical approach. Box 3 shows a proposal for a second phase of activity under SAPIERR along these lines. In addition to implementing comprehensive multinational disposal projects that closely parallel national projects in their structure, siting strategies, and timescales, the international community could support more specific, limited ini- tiatives, for example, strengthening of ongoing efforts to secure all spent sealed Box 2 Prerequisites to Identification of Potential Host Sites or Countries 1. Recognition of a common need for a repository 2. Transparent specification of all requirements to be fulfilled 3. Establish, document, and discuss pros and cons of hosting a facility 4. Establish trust in the potential implementing organization Siting an international repository will entail the same problems as a national repository—in both cases it is not something that is done at the start of a program.

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67 STORAGE AND DISPOSAL IN MULTINATIONAL APPROACHES Box 3 SAPIERR-2 Proposal, Content, and Component Studies Proposal • Develop feasibility studies into practical implementation strategy and organi- zational structures • Enable shared EU radioactive waste storage and disposal activities to begin in 2008 • Participating EU member states will be able to use these structures as, when, and if needed for the furtherance of their individual national policies Content • In-depth studies of key issues related to design, location, and safety of shared storage and disposal facilities • A business framework and project plan to underpin the establishment of a self-sufficient European organization in late 2008 Component Studies • Management study of legal and business options for establishing a European waste management sharing organization leading to a proposed framework for such an organization • Study of legal liability issues of international waste transfer within Europe • More detailed definition of the SAPIERR waste inventory, timescales of waste arisings, and local implications for waste storage and conditioning • Study of thermal and container materials aspects of repository size and design and of alternative designs • Assessment of broad geological environments potentially available for shared facilities in partner countries: act as boundary conditions for design studies • Development of a project plan for initial stages of work of waste management sharing organization sources worldwide or to repatriate research reactor fuel. Significant progress in these areas has been made in recent years. However, the biggest, potentially fully international, storage/disposal initia- tive that could be grasped and developed immediately is that proposed by Russia. A combination of fuel leasing, allowing take-back of Russian-origin fuels, and acceptance of foreign fuels requiring U.S. consent under existing fuel-flagging rules would be a first step. In our view, however, the Russian storage initiative will only be acceptable if the endpoint of disposal is available—this means actually available, or specifi-

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68 SPENT NUCLEAR FUEL STORAGE FACILITIES Box 4 Getting Started and Ensuring Support • A. National entities need to be convinced that it is politically feasible before they will provide full backing. • B. Implementers need to convince themselves that it can work in order to divert funding from their own national programs. — Consequence: research and development is done with limited resources. • Action, not words: high-level external political and financial support would help achieve A and B. — Many stakeholders will not be convinced unless international bodies like the EC-EP and the IAEA give concrete support or take a leading role. — Both add-on and partnering scenarios could be immensely strengthened by considering a measure of external control (supranational scenario). cally planned and financed, rather than held out as a vague future prospect. If the international community thus wants to make a really useful contribution to global security and safety, this is where it could direct its resources. Specifically, we propose that the IAEA offer to assist Russia to move forward by assembling both the funding and the enormous expertise that exists internationally to develop, in a timely fashion, a state-of-the-art international deep geological repository. Currently, some movement in this direction is taking place, as evidenced by this workshop and by the Conference on Multilateral Technical and Organizational Approaches to the Nuclear Fuel Cycle Aimed at Strengthening the Non-prolifera- tion Regime held in Moscow, July 13-15, 2005. In return for this offer, Russia should agree to a new level of transparency and international oversight in the development work. Only in this way can the trust of the international community be enhanced to a level needed for other countries to enter into long-term com- mitments to transfer fuel to the Russian Federation (see Box 4). This would be a truly worthy project with truly global benefits; it is surely to promote solutions such as this that the IAEA was founded and exists today. Of course, as emphasized above, a single supplier of disposal services could present strategic and economic risks for potential customer countries. Global waste inventories easily justify multiple international repositories, and commer- cial competition could conceivably encourage this. If the international community acknowledges the global value of having international repositories available and is prepared to support their development, it is not unlikely that other candidates

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69 STORAGE AND DISPOSAL IN MULTINATIONAL APPROACHES could appear. These might be other large countries or they might be smaller coun- tries willing to consider hosting a facility implemented with partners. We need bold initiatives for global solutions if we are to achieve multina- tional goals. These solutions need not only the strongest of support from the United Nations and its member states but also to be championed by the major countries, working together. REFERENCES Alvarez, R., J. Beyea, K. Janberg, J. Kang, E. Lyman, A. MacFarlane, G. Thompson, and F. von Hippel. 2003. Reducing the hazards from stored spent power-reactor fuel in the United States, Science and Global Security, 11:1-51. Ansolabehere, S., J. Deutch, M. Driscoll, P. Gray, J. Holdren, P. Joskow, R. Lester, E. Moniz, and N. Todreas. 2003. The Future of Nuclear Power: An Interdisciplinary MIT Study. Cambridge, MA: MIT. Bunn, M., J. Holdren, A. Macfarlane, S. Pickett, A. Suzuki, T. Suzuki, and J. Weeks. 2001. Interim Storage of Spent Nuclear Fuel: A Safe, Flexible, and Cost-Effectie Near-Term Approach to Spent Fuel Management. Joint Report from Managing the Atom Project, Harvard University, and Project on Sociotechnics of Nuclear Energy, University of Tokyo. ElBaradei, M. 2003. Towards a safer world. The Economist, Oct. 16. IAEA. 2002. Institutional Framework for Long Term Management of High Leel Waste and/or Spent Nuclear Fuel. TECDOC/1323. Vienna: IAEA. IAEA. 2004. Deeloping and Implementing Multinational Repositories: Infrastructural Framework and Scenarios of Co-operation. TECDOC/1413. Vienna: IAEA. IAEA. 2005a. Multilateral Approaches to the Nuclear Fuel Cycle. Expert group report submitted to the director general of the IAEA, February 22. Vienna: IAEA. IAEA. 2005b. Technical, Economical and Institutional Aspects of Regional Spent Fuel Storage Facili- ties. TECDOC/1482. Vienna: IAEA. Laverov, N.P., V.I. Velichkin, and V.A. Petrov. 2004. International Repository Project in Russia. Waste Management Symposium WM’04, February 29-March 4, Tucson, AZ. NRC. 2005. Safety and Security of Commercial Spent Nuclear Fuel Storage: Public Report. Wash- ington, DC: The National Academies Press. Stoll, R., and C. McCombie. 2001. The Role of Geologic Disposal in Preenting Nuclear Prolifera- tion. 9th International High-Level Radioactive Waste Management Conference, April 29-May 3, Las Vegas, NV. USNRC. 2003. Nuclear Regulatory Commission review of “Reducing the hazards from stored spent power-reactor fuel in the United States,” Science and Global Security, 11:203-211.