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Department of Homeland Security Bioterrorism Risk Assessment: A Call for Change
Department of Homeland Security Bioterrorism Risk Assessment
A CALL FOR CHANGE
Committee on Methodological Improvements to the Department of Homeland Security’s Biological Agent Risk Analysis
Board on Mathematical Sciences and Their Applications
Division on Engineering and Physical Sciences
Board on Life Sciences
Division on Earth and Life Studies
NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NATIONAL ACADEMIES
THE NATIONAL ACADEMIES PRESS
Washington, D.C.
www.nap.edu
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Department of Homeland Security Bioterrorism Risk Assessment: A Call for Change
THE NATIONAL ACADEMIES PRESS
500 Fifth Street, N.W. Washington, DC 20001
NOTICE: The project that is the subject of this report was approved by the Governing Board of the National Research Council, whose members are drawn from the councils of the National Academy of Sciences, the National Academy of Engineering, and the Institute of Medicine. The members of the committee responsible for the report were chosen for their special competences and with regard for appropriate balance.
This study was supported by Contract No. HSHQDC-06-C-00046 between the National Academy of Sciences and the Department of Homeland Security. Any opinions, findings, conclusions, or recommendations expressed in this publication are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the organizations or agencies that provided support for the project.
International Standard Book Number-13: 978-0-309-12028-9
International Standard Book Number-10: 0-309-12028-4
Copies of this report are available from the
National Academies Press,
500 Fifth Street, N.W., Lock-box 285, Washington, DC 20055; (800) 624-6242 or (202) 334-3313 (in the Washington metropolitan area); Internet, http://www.nap.edu.
Copyright 2008 by the National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
Printed in the United States of America
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Department of Homeland Security Bioterrorism Risk Assessment: A Call for Change
THE NATIONAL ACADEMIES
Advisers to the Nation on Science, Engineering, and Medicine
The National Academy of Sciences is a private, nonprofit, self-perpetuating society of distinguished scholars engaged in scientific and engineering research, dedicated to the furtherance of science and technology and to their use for the general welfare. Upon the authority of the charter granted to it by the Congress in 1863, the Academy has a mandate that requires it to advise the federal government on scientific and technical matters. Dr. Ralph J. Cicerone is president of the National Academy of Sciences.
The National Academy of Engineering was established in 1964, under the charter of the National Academy of Sciences, as a parallel organization of outstanding engineers. It is autonomous in its administration and in the selection of its members, sharing with the National Academy of Sciences the responsibility for advising the federal government. The National Academy of Engineering also sponsors engineering programs aimed at meeting national needs, encourages education and research, and recognizes the superior achievements of engineers. Dr. Charles M. Vest is president of the National Academy of Engineering.
The Institute of Medicine was established in 1970 by the National Academy of Sciences to secure the services of eminent members of appropriate professions in the examination of policy matters pertaining to the health of the public. The Institute acts under the responsibility given to the National Academy of Sciences by its congressional charter to be an adviser to the federal government and, upon its own initiative, to identify issues of medical care, research, and education. Dr. Harvey V. Fineberg is president of the Institute of Medicine.
The National Research Council was organized by the National Academy of Sciences in 1916 to associate the broad community of science and technology with the Academy’s purposes of furthering knowledge and advising the federal government. Functioning in accordance with general policies determined by the Academy, the Council has become the principal operating agency of both the National Academy of Sciences and the National Academy of Engineering in providing services to the government, the public, and the scientific and engineering communities. The Council is administered jointly by both Academies and the Institute of Medicine. Dr. Ralph J. Cicerone and Dr. Charles M. Vest are chair and vice chair, respectively, of the National Research Council.
www.national-academies.org
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Department of Homeland Security Bioterrorism Risk Assessment: A Call for Change
COMMITTEE ON METHODOLOGICAL IMPROVEMENTS TO THE DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY’S BIOLOGICAL AGENT RISK ANALYSIS
GREGORY S. PARNELL,
U.S. Military Academy,
Chair
DAVID BANKS,
Duke University
LUCIANA L. BORIO,
University of Pittsburgh
GERALD G. BROWN,
Naval Postgraduate School
L. ANTHONY COX, JR.,
Cox Associates
JOHN GANNON,
BAE Systems
ERIC HARVILL,
Pennsylvania State University
HOWARD KUNREUTHER,
University of Pennsylvania
STEPHEN S. MORSE,
Columbia University
MARGUERITE PAPPAIOANOU,
Association of American Veterinary Medical Colleges
STEPHEN POLLOCK,
University of Michigan
NOZER D. SINGPURWALLA,
George Washington University
ALYSON WILSON,
Los Alamos National Laboratory
Staff
NEAL GLASSMAN, Study Director,
Board on Mathematical Sciences and Their Applications
KERRY A. BRENNER, Senior Program Officer,
Board on Life Sciences
BARBARA WRIGHT, Administrative Assistant
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Department of Homeland Security Bioterrorism Risk Assessment: A Call for Change
BOARD ON MATHEMATICAL SCIENCES AND THEIR APPLICATIONS
C. DAVID LEVERMORE,
University of Maryland,
Chair
MASSOUD AMIN,
University of Minnesota
TANYA STYBLO BEDER, SB
Consulting Corporation
MARSHA J. BERGER,
New York University
PHILIP A. BERNSTEIN,
Microsoft Corporation
PATRICIA FLATLEY BRENNAN,
University of Wisconsin
GUNNAR E. CARLSSON,
Stanford University
BRENDA L. DIETRICH,
IBM Thomas J. Watson Research Center
DEBRA ELKINS,
Allstate Insurance
JOHN F. GEWEKE,
University of Iowa
DARRYLL HENDRICKS,
UBS AG
JOHN E. HOPCROFT,
Cornell University
KAREN KAFADAR,
Indiana University
CHARLES M. LUCAS,
AIG (retired)
JILL PORTER MESIROV,
Broad Institute
ANDREW M. ODLYZKO,
University of Minnesota
JOHN RICE,
University of California at Berkeley
DONALD G. SAARI,
University of California at Irvine
J.B. SILVERS,
Case Western Reserve University
GEORGE SUGIHARA,
Scripps Institution of Oceanography, University of California at San Diego
LAI-SANG YOUNG,
New York University
Staff
SCOTT WEIDMAN, Director
NEAL GLASSMAN, Senior Staff Officer
BARBARA WRIGHT, Administrative Assistant
For more information on the Board on Mathematical Sciences and Their Applications, see its Web site at http://www7.nationalacademies.org/bms/, write to BMSA, National Research Council, 500 Fifth Street, N.W., Washington, DC 20001, call (202) 334-2421, or send e-mail to bms@nas.edu.
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Department of Homeland Security Bioterrorism Risk Assessment: A Call for Change
BOARD ON LIFE SCIENCES
KEITH YAMAMOTO,
University of California at San Francisco,
Chair
ANN M. ARVIN,
Stanford University School of Medicine
RUTH BERKELMAN,
Emory University
DEBORAH BLUM,
University of Wisconsin
VICKI L. CHANDLER,
University of Arizona
JEFFERY L. DANGL,
University of North Carolina
PAUL R. EHRLICH,
Stanford University
MARK D. FITZSIMMONS,
John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation
JO HANDELSMAN,
University of Wisconsin
KENNETH H. KELLER,
Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies
JONATHAN D. MORENO,
University of Pennsylvania
RANDALL MURCH,
Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University
MURIEL E. POSTON,
Skidmore College
JAMES REICHMAN,
University of California at Santa Barbara
BRUCE W. STILLMAN,
Cold Spring Harbor Laboratory
MARC T. TESSIER-LAVIGNE,
Genentech, Inc.
JAMES TIEDJE,
Michigan State University
CYNTHIA WOLBERGER,
Johns Hopkins University School of Medicine
TERRY L. YATES,
University of New Mexico
Staff
FRANCES E. SHARPLES, Director
KERRY A. BRENNER, Senior Program Officer
ANN H. REID, Senior Program Officer
MARILEE K. SHELTON-DAVENPORT, Senior Program Officer
EVONNE P.Y. TANG, Senior Program Officer
ROBERT T. YUAN, Senior Program Officer
ADAM P. FAGEN, Program Officer
ANNA FARRAR, Financial Associate
MERCURY FOX, Program Assistant
REBECCA L. WALTER, Program Assistant
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Department of Homeland Security Bioterrorism Risk Assessment: A Call for Change
Acknowledgments
This report has been reviewed in draft form by individuals chosen for their diverse perspectives and technical expertise, in accordance with procedures approved by the National Research Council’s Report Review Committee. The purpose of this independent review is to provide candid and critical comments that will assist the institution in making its published report as sound as possible and to ensure that the report meets institutional standards for objectivity, evidence, and responsiveness to the study charge. The review comments and draft manuscript remain confidential to protect the integrity of the deliberative process. We wish to thank the following individuals for their review of this report:
Vicki M. Bier, University of Wisconsin, Madison,
Baruch Fischhoff, Carnegie Mellon University,
Edward H. Kaplan, Yale School of Management,
Terrance Leighton, Children’s Hospital Oakland Research Institute,
Edward L. Melnick, New York University,
Tara O’Toole, Center for Biosecurity of the University of Pittsburgh Medical Center,
Harvey Ruben, University of Pennsylvania,
Ponisseril Somasundaran, Columbia University, William Studeman, Reston, Virginia, and
Henry Willis, RAND Corporation.
Although the reviewers listed above have provided many constructive comments and suggestions, they were not asked to endorse the conclusions or recommendations, nor did they see the final draft of the report before its release. The review of this report was overseen by B. John Garrick, independent consultant. Appointed by the National Research Council, he was responsible for making certain that an independent examination of this report was carried out in accordance with institutional procedures and that all review comments were carefully considered.1 Responsibility for the final content of this report rests entirely with the authoring committee and the institution.
The committee also acknowledges the valuable contribution of the following individuals, who provided input at the meetings on which the interim and final report are based:
Norman Coleman, National Institutes of Health,
George Famini, Department of Homeland Security,
Cyril Gay, Department of Agriculture,
Peter Highnam, Department of Health and Human Services,
Marc Lipsitch, Harvard University,
Thomas McGrann, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory,
Darrell Morgenson, Institute for Defense Analyses,
Mark Mullen, Department of Homeland Security,
Tapan Nayak, George Washington University,
Tara O’Toole, University of Pittsburgh,
James Petro, White House Homeland Security Council,
Gregory Pompelli, Department of Agriculture,
Adam Rose, Pennsylvania State University,
Raymond Schuder, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory,
Mark Teachman, Department of Agriculture,
Detlof von Winterfeldt, University of Southern California, and
The Staff of the Battelle Memorial Institute, Columbus, Ohio.
The committee also thanks Alan R. Washburn, U.S. Naval Postgraduate School, for his thoughtful review of and report on the Department of Homeland Security’s 2006 Bioterrorism Risk Assessment, and Marc Lipsitch, Harvard University, for allowing his remarks to the committee to be paraphrased in this report.
1
After the report in prepublication form was returned from a required security review conducted by the sponsor, the committee made a few revisions in the text to modify statements that might be misinterpreted.
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Department of Homeland Security Bioterrorism Risk Assessment: A Call for Change
Contents
SUMMARY
1
1
INTRODUCTION
6
This Is the Challenge,
6
The Threat Is Growing,
6
The Government Has Taken Action,
7
The National Research Council Established This Committee,
7
Completion of the Interim Report,
8
Overview of the Final Report and of Its Recommended Methodological Improvements,
8
Structure of the BTRA of 2006 Examined,
8
Hypothetical Anthrax-Attack Scenario Employed,
9
Lexicon of Risk Terminology Developed,
9
Technical and Process Improvements Recommended,
9
References,
10
2
THE CRITICAL CONTRIBUTION OF RISK ANALYSIS TO RISK MANAGEMENT AND REDUCTION OF BIOTERRORISM RISK
11
Risk Analysis Is the Discipline That the Department of Homeland Security Should Use,
11
Problem Formulation,
11
Risk Assessment,
12
Risk Perception,
13
Risk Communication,
14
Risk Management,
15
Terrorist Threats Differ from Natural Hazards and from Other Humanly Made Hazards,
16
References,
18
3
DESCRIPTION AND ANALYSIS OF THE DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY’S BIOLOGICAL THREAT RISK ASSESSMENT OF 2006
20
Details of the Model Used to Produce the Department of Homeland Security’s BTRA of 2006,
22
The BTRA of 2006 Uses a Probabilistic Risk Assessment Event Tree,
22
The BTRA of 2006 Does Not Use Event Trees for Consequence Analysis,
27
The Event Tree Can Be Improved,
27
The Approach to Determining the Probabilities of Terrorist Decisions Is Incomplete,
27
The Mathematics Used by the BTRA in Modeling Multiple Attacks Has Errors,
28
The 2006 BTRA’s Assessment of Outcome Probabilities Is Unnecessarily Complex,
28
BTRA Results Should Not Be Normalized by an Unspecified Constant,
30
The BTRA Event Tree Can Be Simplified,
30
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Department of Homeland Security Bioterrorism Risk Assessment: A Call for Change
Additional Observations Regarding the Department of Homeland Security’s BTRA of 2006,
30
Reporting Results,
30
Tailored Risk Assessments,
31
Analysis of Sensitivity and Risk,
31
Critical Knowledge Gaps and Biodefense Vulnerabilities,
31
Planned Improvement for the BTRA of 2008,
31
References,
33
4
DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY DECISION REQUIREMENTS FOR RISK MANAGEMENT
34
Risk Management Requires Timely, Accurate Information,
34
The Biological Threat Risk Assessment Should Support Risk Management,
35
Transparency of Risk Assessment Is Necessary for Successful Risk Management,
36
Risk Assessment Transparency Improves Confidence,
36
There Are Several Other Ways to Build Confidence,
37
The Department of Homeland Security’s BTRA of 2006 Was Not Transparent,
37
The BTRA Should Become a Decision Support System,
38
Use Scenarios,
39
Sensitivity Analysis Is Important for Validation,
39
Create a Context for Use,
40
References,
41
5
RISK ASSESSMENT FOR UNKNOWN AND ENGINEERED BIOTHREAT AGENTS
42
Biological Threat Risk Assessments Need to Include Unknown and Engineered Agents,
42
Including Unknown and Engineered Agents Is Challenging But Possible,
44
References,
45
6
IMPROVING BIOTERRORISM CONSEQUENCE ASSESSMENT
47
Existing Knowledge Does Not Support the Detail in Department of Homeland Security Consequence Models,
47
Other Consequences Need to Be Modeled,
49
References,
50
7
IMPROVING THE DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY’S BIOLOGICAL THREAT RISK ASSESSMENT AND ADDING RISK MANAGEMENT
51
The Use of Probabilistic Event Trees Alone Is Insufficient to Model Terrorism Threats,
51
Several Methods Are Available for Improved Modeling of Intelligent Adversaries,
52
Red Teaming Can Be Used to Understand Intelligent Adversaries,
52
Decision Trees Can Model Bioterrorist Threats,
52
Attacker-Defender Optimization Can Unify Risk Management, Risk Assessment, and Resource Allocation,
53
Game Theory Models Can Help with Risk Management,
56
Risk Management Strategies,
57
The Existing BTRA Framework Should Not Be Used for the Risk Analysis of Biological, Chemical, or Radioactive Threats,
58
Intelligent-Adversary Risk Analysis Techniques Can Be Used on Radioactive and Chemical Threats as Well as on Biological Threats,
58
References,
58
APPENDIXES
A Lexicon
63
B Mathematical Characterization of the Biological Threat Risk Assessment Event Tree and Risk Assessment,
Gerald G. Brown
78
C Computational Example Illustrating the Replacement of a Joint Distribution of Arc Probabilities with Marginal Expected Values of Individual Arc Probabilities,
Alyson Wilson and Stephen Pollock
80
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Department of Homeland Security Bioterrorism Risk Assessment: A Call for Change
D Bioterrorism Risk Analysis with Decision Trees,
Gregory S. Parnell
85
E Optimizing Department of Homeland Security Defense Investments: Applying Defender-Attacker (-Defender) Optimization to Terror Risk Assessment and Mitigation,
Gerald G. Brown, W. Matthew Carlyle, and R. Kevin Wood
90
F Combining Game Theory and Risk Analysis in Counterterrorism: A Smallpox Example,
David L. Banks and Steven Anderson
103
G On the Quantification of Uncertainty and Enhancing Probabilistic Risk Analysis,
Nozer D. Singpurwalla
111
H Game Theory and Interdependencies,
Geoffrey Heal and Howard Kunreuther
116
I Review of BTRA Modeling,
Alan R. Washburn
122
J Reprinted Interim Report
126
K Meeting Agendas
149
L Biographies of Committee Members
153
M Acronyms
157
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