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ATTACHMENT C: REFERENCES Anderson, R.M. and R.M. May. 1991. Infectious Diseases of Humans: Dynamics and Control. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Blower S.M. and H. Dowlatabadi. 1994. Sensitivity and uncertainty analysis of complex models of disease transmission: an HIV model, as an example. International Statistical Review 2:229-43. Biosafety in Microbiological and Biomedical Laboratories (BMBL) 5th Edition. 2007. Washington: US Government Printing Office. Accessed on April 22, 2008 at http://www.cdc.gov/OD/ohs/biosfty/bmbl5/BMBL_5th_Edition.pdf. Chowell G., C. Castillo-Chavez, P.W. Fenimore, C.M. Kribs-Zaleta, L. Arriola, and J.M. Hyman. 2004. Model parameters and outbreak control for SARS. Emerging Infectious Diseases 10(7):1258-63. Diekmann, O. and J.A.P. Heesterbeek. 2000. Mathematical Epidemiology of Infectious Diseases: Model Building, Analysis and Interpretation. New York: John Wiley and Sons. Fell, A.H. and P.J. Bailey. 2005. Public Response to Infectious Disease Research: The UC Davis Experience. ILAR Journal 46(1):65-71. Fraser, C., S. Riley, R.M. Anderson, and N.M. Ferguson. 2004. Factors that make an infectious disease outbreak controllable. PNAS USA 101(16):6146-51. GAO (US Government Accountability Office). 2007. High-Containment Biosafety Laboratories: Preliminary Observations on the Oversight of the Proliferation of BSL-3 and BSL-4 Laboratories in the United States. GAO-08-108T. Accessed on April 15, 2008 at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d08108t.pdf. Halloran, M.E., N.M. Ferguson, S. Eubank, I.M. Longini Jr., D.A. Cummings, B. Lewis, S. Xu, C. Fraser, A. Vullikanti, T.C. Germann, D. Wagener, R. Beckman, K. Kadau, C. Barrett, C.A. Macken, D.S. Burke, and P. Cooley. 2008. Modeling targeted layered containment of an influenza pandemic in the United States. PNAS USA 105(12):4639-44. Harding, A.L., and K.B. Byers. 2006. Epidemiology of laboratory-associated infections. In Biological safety: Principles and practices. 4th ed., edited by O. Fleming, D. and D.L. Hunt. ASM Press. Pp. 53-77. Johnson, K.M. 2003a. Biosafety at National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases: 1982-2003. In Final Environmental Impact Statement, National Emerging Infectious Diseases Laboratories. 2005. National Institutes of Health. Appendix 4, pp. 4-7. Accessed on April 28, 2008 at http://www.nems.nih.gov/aspects/nat_resources/programs/nepa4.cfm. 20

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Johnson, K.M. 2003b. Biosafety at BSL-4: More than 20 Years Experience at Three Major Facilities. In Final Environmental Impact Statement, National Emerging Infectious Diseases Laboratories. 2005. National Institutes of Health. Appendix 4, pp. 8-16. Accessed on April 28, 2008 at http://www.nems.nih.gov/aspects/nat_resources/programs/nepa4.cfm. Johnson, K.M. 2004. Biosafety Update: Short Review of BSL-3 and BSL-4 Viral Agent Laboratory Incidents Worldwide. In Final Environmental Impact Statement, National Emerging Infectious Diseases Laboratories. 2005. National Institutes of Health. Appendix 4, pp. 17-21. Accessed on April 28, 2008 at http://www.nems.nih.gov/aspects/nat_resources/programs/nepa4.cfm. Kaplan, S. and B.J. Garrick. 1981. On the Quantitative Definition of Risk. Risk Analysis 1(1):11–27. Klempner, M.S. 2008. “National Emerging Infectious Diseases Laboratories.” Presentation to the National Institutes of Health Blue Ribbon Panel to Advise on the Risk Assessment of the National Emerging Infectious Diseases Laboratories at Boston University Medical Center, Washington, D.C., March 13, 2008. Lipsitch, M., T. Cohen, B. Cooper, J.M. Robins, S. Ma, L. James, G. Gopalakrishna, S.K. Chew, C.C. Tan, M.H. Samore, D. Fisman, and M. Murray. 2003. Transmission dynamics and control of severe acute respiratory syndrome. Science 300:1966-70. Lofstedt, R. 2002. Good and bad examples of siting and building biosafety level 4 laboratories: a study of Winnipeg, Galveston, and Etobicoke. Journal of Hazardous Materials 93:47-66. Mossong J, Hens N, Jit M, Beutels P, Auranen K, Mikolajczyk R, Massari M, Salmaso S, Tomba GS, Wallinga J, Heijne J, Sadkowska-Todys M, Rosinska M, Edmunds WJ. Social contacts and mixing patterns relevant to the spread of infectious diseases. PLoS Med. 2008 Mar 25;5(3):e74. NRC (National Research Council). 1989. Improving risk communication. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. NRC. 1996. Understanding Risk: Informing Decisions in a Democratic Society. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. Race, M.S. 2008. Evaluation of the Public Review Process and Risk Communication at High-Level Biocontainment Laboratories. Applied Biosafety 13(1):45-56. 21