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t~ Advisers to tfle Natio11 01' Scie/1ce. E/1gil'eeri/1g. a/Id Medlci/1e NationalAcademyof Sciences NationalAcademyof Engineering Instituteof Medicine Space Studies Board NationalResearch Council commssion on Physical Sdences, Mathematics and Applications March 15,2000 Dr. Edward J. Weiler Associate Administrator 1:or Space Science Code S NASA Headquarters Washington, DC 20546 Dear Dr. Weiler: In your letter of February 17, 1999,1you requestedthat the Space Studies Board (SSB) provide an external review of the Office of Space Science (OSS) technology development process. As requested, the review focused on ass,essing OSS responseto the recommendations in the SSB report Assessment the of Technology Developmj~ntin NASA 's Office of Space Science (National Academy Press, Washington, D.C.,1998). The SSB established the Task Group on Technology Development in NASA's Office of Space Science (OSS) (task group),2 drawing heavily on individuals who developed the 1998 report, to conduct this assessment.3The task group met on October 18 and 19, 1999, at the National Research Council's Georgetown offices in Washington, D.C. It received presentations by Edward Weiler (Associate Administrator, Office of Space Science), Granville Paules (Lead Technologist, Earth Science Enterprise), Arnauld Nicogossian (Associate Administrator, Office of Life and Microgravity Sciences and Applications), Peter lJlrich (Director, Advanced Technologies and Mission Studies Division, Office of Space Science), Michael Sander (Director, Technology and Applications Program, Jet Propulsion Laboratory), Mary Kicza (Associate Director, Goddard Space Flight Center), and William F. Dimmer (Program Analyst, Office of the Chief Financial Officer). SUMMARY OF THE 1998REPORT OF THE TASK GROUP ON TECHNOLOGY DEVJ~LOPMENT IN NASA'S OFFICE OF SPACE SCIENCE In the 1998 report, the task group recognized the transfer ofNASA's cross-agency technology function to ass as a positive step for two reasons: ( 1) Programs under ass are the largest consumers of spacetechnology, and (2:1ass has a well-developed strategic planning process. NASA has grouped technologies with applicBltion to more than one enterprise under the label "Cross-cutting Technologies," and these are also manag,~d ass. In the 1998 report, the task group noted that the planning for the by Cross-cutting Technolo~{ Program had not matured to a satisfactory level. ISee Appendix I. 2Task group membership: Daniel J. Fink, Chair (D.J. Fink Associates, Inc.), Robert S. Cooper (Atlantic Aerospace Electronic Corp.), Anthony w. England (University of Michigan), Donald C. Fraser (Boston University), Bruce D. Marcus (Consultant), Irwin I. Shapiro (Harvard-Smithsonian Center for Astrophysics), and Oswald Siegmund (University of California, B,~rkeley). JThe task group's assessmentwas reviewed by a individuals other than the authors in accordance with procedures approved by the National RI~search Council's Report Review Committee. See Appendix 2. 2101Constitution AvE!nue, Washington, 20418 Telephone NW, DC (202)3343477 Fax(202) 3701 ssb@nas.edu 334 Office Address MiltonHarris Building, Room 2001Wisconsin 584, Avenue, N.W"Washington, 20007 DC

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The task group also was concerned with NASA's definition of core competencies. Some NASA Centers claim that their competencies cover an extensive and broad range of technologies. No organization that has reaJistic fiscal constraints can hope to be competitive or world-class across such a wide range. The task group recommended that NASA narrow the core competencies to those that meet stringent criteria. Thus, individual NASA Centers would not have active programs in all technologies relevant to the mission requirements of the Center. The task group recommended that NASA explore alternatives to maintaining in-house, hands-on researchand development.programs to achieve smart buying. To be successful, an advanced technology development (A TD) program should be a careful mix of centralized and decentralized activities. For NASA this means appropriate roles for Headquarters and the Centers. The task group recommended in the 1998 report that the planning and selection processes be maintained as Headqllarters activities. Other activities, such as selection ofnear-term technologies for a particular mission, could be delegated to the Centers when they are not competing for these technology development activities. Many of the recommendations in the 1998 report called for external review and advice, including planning, program reviews, evaluation of competing proposals, core competency selection, and Center quality review. Providing adequate Headquarters staff to managethe reviews, utilizing clear investment and performance metric'5, and making Centers more accountable to Headquarters are essential elements of the review process. RESlrL TS AND ASSESSMENT BASED ON THE 1999 REVIEW The original rep'ort (Assessmentof Technology Development in NASA 's Office of Space Science, 1998) was organized into four main parts-planning, implementation, infrastructure, and performance measurement-and made II recommendations. The task group has chosen to retain this organization here. Each of the previous 11 recommendations is reprinted below, followed by a summary of and comments on NASA's progress in each area and further recommendations where warranted. The summary sections are based on the presentations made to the task group at the October 1999 meeting. A. Planning Recommendation 1. NASA' s advanced technology development (A TD) planning process should be formally evaluated in 1:~months, after changesthat are just now being completed have had time to mature. Factors to be considered in the evaluation should include (1) responsivenessto input from the outside research community and (2) the extent to which program balance is addressedregarding such dimensions as technolol"J;Y push versus program pull, near-term versus far-term applications, and science instruments versus spacecraft systems. The evaluation should be conducted by an independent, external body such as the NASA Advisory Council. [1998 Assessment,p. 14] Summary ofNASA's ]>resentation to the 1999 Task Group In responseto t]l1etask group's recommendation and at the request ofNASA's Space Science Advisory Committee (SScAC), ass assembledthe Task Force on Technology Readiness4 provide to 40SS Task Force member:;hip: Christine M. Anderson, Co-Chair {Phillips Laboratory), Daniel E. Hastings, Co- Chair {Massachusetts Institute of Technology), David Akin {University ofMaryland), Thomas A. Brackey {Hughes Space and Communications Co.), Lynn Conway {University of Michigan), Dennis Fitzgerald (National 2

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findings and recommendations on ass's current technology planning process to ensure appropriate linkage between science missions and technology opportunities and to ensure cross-theme coordination of technology requiremelrlts. Specifically, the ass Task Force addressedfour questions in 1999: ( I) Hav,~ missions for the near-term and visions for the far-term been articulated sufficiently to de:rive technology objectives and capabilities? (2) Hav,~ technology objectives for near-term and technology capabilities for far-term been described appropriately from missions and visions? (3) Hav'~ technology objectives and capabilities been well integrated across the four science thernes into a single set of technology developments? (4) Is the technology development currently planned in various program elements (core, focused, flight validation, advanced concepts, and cross-enterprise) appropriately scoped, scheduled and funded to satisfy the strategic missions and visions of the Space Scit~nce Enterprise? NASA has produced inte:gratedtechnology development plans for enabling technologies. These plans will be incorporated into the OSS strategic plan for FY 2000. The OSS Task Force will be augmented to provide an external revie:w of the technology program during February/March 2000. Extensive work Illasbeen completed by the science and technology roadmap teams with respect to the Focused Technology Program. The new process involves considerable external input and was reviewed at the OSS Str~ltegicPlanning Workshop in November 1999. NASA has devised an approach to restructure the New N[illennium Program (NMP). If recent program termination decisions are reversed, there will be open competition for technologies to be flown, and Headquarters will make the final selections of Centelrsto which missions are assigned. NASA reported that most in-house FY 2000 cross-enterpriseactivities have been competitively peer reviewed for quali~{ and the relevance of the proposed tasks to NASA's mission. In FY 2001, NASA expects to competitively peer review all thrust areas. The peer review panels consisted of extramural technology e~perts and user representatives. NASA panelists (58 out of 153 panelists) were involved chiefly to deal with the issue of relevance. Of the 567 proposals submitted, 264 were selected for funding. Depending on the thrust area, this represents 19 to 67% new work by task, averaging 44%. The first NASA Research Announcement (NRA) for the Cross-Enterprise Technology Development Program was released OIl October 29, 1999. This NRA provides for an open and broad competition in which NASA Centers can participate. Task Group's Assessment The task group 1:oundexcellent responsivenesson the part ofOSS to the task group's 1998 technology planning rec,Dmmendations.Within OSS the processwhereby technology plans are being linked with science objectives and program plans may well be a model of excellence in strategic planning. In addition, the task group lauds the progress (e.g., the number of new tasks funded) toward an objective and impartial technology program selection process administered at the NASA Centers. NASA's report that Center tasks were competitively peer reviewed during the FY 2000 selection process reflects a very positive change. When applied to technology tasks, the concept of competitive peer review must be broadened to include not only peer experts in the specific technologies being addressed,but also expert engineering ReconnaissanceOffice), Gordon P. Gannire {Pennsylvania State University), Edward Howard (NOAA), Kenneth Johnston {U.S. Naval Obs~:rvatory), Ralph L. McNutt, Jr. {Applied Physics Laboratory), and David Miller {Massachusetts Institute of Technology). 3

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generalists who can pro'ride a broad perspective on the overall relevance of technology development proposals to NASA's future needs. In addition, competitive peer review ofNASA in-house Cross- Enterprise Technology Development Program activities should be conducted by experts both inside and outside the centers. The task group ~;upports change in the NMP that refocuses it on flight demonstration of the critical new technologies and applauds NASA's intention to use flights of opportunity rather than exclusively dedicated flights. The division between OSS and Earth Science Enterprise (ESE) New Millennium missions could be misinterpreted as giving a science (rather than technology) objective to NMP. The task group understands it to be a budget convenience but hopes that this artificial division does not inhibit flying clritical ESE technologies on OSS New Millennium missions, or critical OSS technologies on ESE New Millennium missions where it makes technical senseto do so. The task group also would expect that using any flight opportunity includes "purchasing" demonstration rights on the science missions of OSS and ESE, if inclusion would not add significantly to the risk of mission failure. Subsidizing the use of new technologies on science missions even though the enhanced capabilities of the new technologies are not neededcould be appropriate where flight validations of the new technologies have significant value for future missions. For example, it might prove a wise investment to use a new technology communication system that will be needed for future deep-spacescience missions on a low-cost near-Earth spacecraft even though the capabilities of the enhanced communicatic,ns system are not needed on the near-Earth mission. In this case, the added cost of the new communications technology should not be charged against the near-Earth spacecraft, but could be borne by a flight validation effort such as the New Millennium or Focused Programs. However, the validation of flight blardwareon such science missions must be balanced against possibly increased mission risk. Before the Space Science Program budgets were augmentedto do technology development and before the Advanced Concepts Program was started, the Cross-Enterprise Technology Development Program spannedTechnology ReadinessLevel (TRL) 1-5. The Researchand Analysis Program had some technology components that were far term and the NMP was expected to do technology development, although 1:here was no money in the program to do so. Today, the Advanced Concepts Program addressesTRl, 0-2. The Cross-Enterprise Technology Development Program addressesTRL 1- 3 and ramps down with co-funding from the Focused Programs that fund TRL 3-6. The Research and Analysis Program still has far-term technology components. One of the objectives of the New Millennium Program is to take technologies to flight qualification. However, the space sciences portion of the NMP was termin;lted, and unless it is restored there will be no program dedicated to flight qualifications of technology. The portfolio mix ofnear-term versus far-term technology development remains of some concern to the task group, but appearsto be moving in the right direction with the "visionary" pull for far-term efforts and use of strategic plans for near-term needs. The task group views the technology development budget increase in FY 2000 as a very positive step, although budget earmarks will place constraints on NASA's ability to deploy those funds optimally for technology development. Recommendation 2. The planning process for cross-cutting technology should be modified so that it mirrors the process used by the Office of Space Science for spacescience technologies. Key attributes are the use oftechnolog'Y roadmaps that are linked to enterprise science roadmaps and that are developed with the broad participaltion of the research community. [1998 Assessment,p. 14] L1

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Summary of NASA's Presentation to the 1999 Task Group Each science theme in OSS has developed a far-terrn vision to guide far-terrn technology .NASA reported that the Cross-Enterprise Program is now 100% competitively peer reviewed for quality and relevance, as discussed under 1998 Recommendation 1. Newly designatedN ASA Center thrust area managers(TAMs) have been able to exert NASA-wide perspective and managementapproachesand have acted in a non-parochial manner in their recommendedfunding allocations among NASA Centers. One example of this is that in 7 out of 10 cases,the funding to the Center where the TAMs worked decreasedfrom FY 1999 to FY 2000. NASA reported that there is wide managementsupport at all levels for open and broad competition for funding. In FY 1999, $6 million in Cross-Enterprise funds was allocated through the Explorer Technology NRA. The first Advanced Cross-Enterprise Technology Development for NASA Missions NRA was releasedOctober 29, 1999. Task Group's Assessment The task group agreeswith NASA that considerable progress has been made in responding to 1998 recommendation 2. The restructuring of the cross-cutting technology program is moving in the right direction. The ESE has made excellent progress in linking technology planning and strategic planning. However, the task group did not see evidence of similar progress in the Office of Life and Microgravity Sciences and Applications and encouragesit to make renewed efforts. The Cross- Enterprise Technology Program NRA is seen as a positive step by the task group. The TAMs have the potential to be effective extensions of Headquarters in enabling NASA's responsesto several of the task group's past concerns (see also 1998 Recommendations4 and 6). The task group believes that the T AMs ' assignments and responsibilities should be formalized as an indication of their importance. B. Implementation Recommendation 3. NASA should establish a comprehensive Center evaluation process that includes regular, objective, external evaluations of core competencies. Those internal core competencies essential to achieving a Center's mission should be identified and appropriate recommendations made to achieve and maintain excellence. As a result of these evaluations, NASA will have to make difficult choices about limiting internal research emphasis in some areas. External organizations with world-class capabilities should be selected competitively to complement the in-house work and ensure the maintenance ofNASA' s centers of excellence. A TD funds should not be set aside to provide support for in-house capability but should be earned by Centers through open competition with outside organizations. [1998 Assessment,p. 21] Summary of NASA's Presentation to the 1999 Task Group It is unfortunate that the task group, despite ample notification, could not receive any response from Headquarters regarding the agency responseto recommendation 3 on the treatment of core competencies. The task group understandsthat the action had been assignedto the Office of the Chief Engineer, but a scheduling conflict apparently prevented a representative's attendance at the task group meeting. The task group did hear views from the Goddard SpaceFlight Center and the Jet Propulsion Laboratory and, while these presentations were interesting, there was no evidence of agency-wide guidance or direction to the process of selecting (and de-selecting) and maintaining core competencies. Goddard Space Flight Center's core competencies are defined as "those capabilities in which Goddard 5

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must excel and that must reside within the civil service workforce and facilities to achieve the mission of the Center." Goddard's view is that it should have a core competency in a particular area if: (1) the capability is necessaryto fulfill its mission and does not readily exist elsewhere, (2) having the capability is a necessaryelement ~,ithin the larger NASA context and it does not readily exist elsewhere, or (3) having breadth and/or d(~pthof a capability is essential to meeting Goddard's customers' requirements. Goddard is emphasizing its core competencies in the areasof experimental and theoretical research, sensors, instruments, and associatedtechnologies, end-to-end mission systems engineering, advanced flight and ground systems development, large-scale scientific information systems, and program and project management. It is also competing for opportunities to establish competence in astrobiology. JPL 's core competencies are driven by its agency and enterprise assignmentsand strategic plans. It has program roles and responsibilities that contribute to three NASA strategic enterprises: ass, ESE, and Human Exploration and Development of Space(HEDS). There are eight existing core competencies at JPL and three additional ones needed for the future. The existing core competencies include ( 1) complete-life-cycle deep-spacemissions design and architecture, (2) system engineering, (3) micro- and nano-technology for flig;ht systems,(4) deep-spacenavigation, (5) deep-spacecommunications, (6) mobility systems for planetary missions, (7) advanced science instruments, and (8) autonomous systems for deep-spacesystems. JPL would like to add large real and virtual spaceapertures, astrobiology, and planetary protection as l'uture core competencies. Task Group's Assessment The task group views core competencies as central to implementing an effective A TO plan across the NASA CenteJrs.The task group also recognizes that the issue of core competencies goes beyond the authority of ass alone and must be addressedon a NASA-wide level. Having now heard from several of the Centers on this subject, the task group finds little consistency in the selec1:ion processesor the criteria used to select the Center core competencies required to pursue NASA 's missiion. That mission includes the preservation of U.S. leadership (not just NASA leadership) in space sci(:nce and technology. Thus the selection ofNASA 's core competencies must be made with a senseofre~;ponsibility to the nation's technological health and not just to the "care and feeding" ofNASA Centers. It is natural that individual Centers might emphasizethe latter, which is one reason that a Headquartl~rs-Ied(with major Center participation) effort should be made in defining and locating NASA 's internal core competencies. An approach to the problem can be gleaned from a paper by Quinn and Hilmer,5 who use a classical "nine-block" to develop a matrix for selecting core competencies versus those that could be outsourced. Their criteria include industrial measuressuch as competitive edge versus strategic vulnerability .Such an approach can be modified to make judgments about NASA' s core competencies. For example, Figure 1 shows a matrix whose axes now represent the potential for state-of-the-art advancement versus the depth of external capability .Every technology can be placed somewhere on that matrix. Those that hav(: a very high potential and for which the external (to NASA) capability is very low are clearly candida1:es a NASA core competency. In contrast, those technologies that are mature for and widely available externally can be purchased virtually as "commodities." Those with a high potential for advancem(:ntthat are also widely available could be candidates for strategic purchasing requiring a "smart buyer." There are many shadesof gray in the matrix, all of which can be used to sharpen core competenc:yselection. The task group shows this example not as a final solution, but as an illustration of an appro2lchthat could be used acrossNASA to select Center core competencies. sJamesBrian Quinn and Frederick G. Hilmer, 1994, "Strategic Outsourcing," Sloan Management Review, Figure 2, page 24. 6

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The task group strongly recommends that Headquarters, working with the Centers, take the issue of core competency seriously. At a time of shrinking budgets yet great opportunity to raise the technology level of our nation's space program, selection of the proper NASA Center core technologies with full knowledge of v{hat capability is important and what is available in industry and academia will be a requirement for suc'~ess. High Strategic Purchases Core Competency by a "Smart Buyer" +"' c u e u u ~ > ~ < ~ < I U £ I.!. o I U ~ +"' f/) .. Conventional .s Purchasesof "(U "Commodities" Low .~ 0 ~ Low Higl1 Depth of External Capability FIGURE I Sample matrix for selecting core competencies. Adapted from Quinn and Hilmer, 1994 Recommendation 4. ~lith the support of external reviewers, NASA Headquarters should conduct make-or-buy decisions :md competitive procurements for all long-term Am. [1998 Assessment, p. 22] Summary of NASA's Presentation to the 1999 Task Group NASA reported that 1998 recommendation 4 is impractical, given the reduction in Headquarters staffing and transfers of responsibility to Centers. However, Headquarters has retained the role of formal selection official. The roles of Headquarters and Centers have been clarified in key areas such as the New Millennium, Cros5:-EnterpriseTechnology Development, and Focused programs. For the New Millennium Program, H[eadquartersselects the technology, mission, and implementing Center. For the Cross-Enterprise Technology Development Program, Headquarters determines allocations to each thrust area, and the T AMs perform as an extension of Headquarters. For the Focused Programs, Headquarters periodically evaluates programs and projects, specifically make-or-buy decisions, as a part of program and project reviews. 7

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Task Group's Assessment Despite the "impracticality" of the task group's recommendation, it does appear that NASA is making considerable progress in satisfying the intent of the recommendation. It is clarifying the roles of Headquarters and the Centers, retaining certain important decisions at Headquarters, and expanding the "reach" of Headquarters through the effective use of the TAMs. In addition, the recent hiring of two additional senior staff at Headquarters should help considerably in leveling the workload. The effectiveness and clarit:y of the relative roles of Headquarters and the Centers in the make-buy process should become evident over the next year and should after that time be examined closely and evaluated by the task group. Recommendation 5. For near-term technology development needed to support ongoing programs already under the direc1:ionof a particular Center, that Center should conduct make-or-buy decisions. However, if the Center decides to buy, then NASA should avoid real or perceived conflicts of interest by either administering th~:competition and external review from Headquarters or excluding from the competition all in-house organizations located at that Center. A Center decision to "make" should have Headquarters concurrence. [ 1998 Assessment,p. 22] Summary of NASA's Presentation to the 1999 Task Group Center-led pro<:esses proposed, approved, and reviewed by NASA Headquarters. are Task Group's Assessllllent NASA describc~d process that now captures the spirit of the 1998 recommendation, and the task a group is satisfied with 1:heimplementation of this recommendation. Recommendation 6. l.;jASA should ensure that adequate resources, especially personnel, are available for Headquarters to org;anize, conduct, and respond to the needed number of external reviews to support competitive A TD procurements. [1998 Assessment, p. 22] Summary ofNASA's Presentation to the 1999 Task Group The appointment process is under way for NASA to finish hiring at Headquarters two new staff members at the Senior Executive Service level. NASA also reported that the T AMs are functioning effectively as extensions ofNASA Headquarters. Task Group's Assessment The task group endorsesNASA's efforts to fill two new positions and agreesthat the description of the TAMs' role is aI~ropriate. The TAMs are located at Centers but have job descriptions similar to those ofNASA Headquarters program managers. Their performance is monitored by .Headquarters, especially the parochial or non-parochial nature of their decisions. Headquarters is also involved in their performance evaluations. R

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c. Infrastructure Recommendation 7. NASA should foster increased workforce mobility among Centers and between NASA and industry, universities, and other government agencies to facilitate the transfer of information, obtain fresh points of vit:w, and maintain the expertise of its workforce. Expanded use of Intergovernmental Personnel Act (IPA) exchanges and cooperative agreements should be considered to facilitate these efforts. [ 1998 Assessment,p. 25] Summary of NASA's Presentation to the 1999 Task Group NASA reported that it is continuing the effort to increase workforce mobility. However, it has found this recommendation difficult to implement given employees' personal constraints, cost of living inequities, and other government restrictions. IP As generally involve relocation and disruption of families for a three-year period or more and, thus, it is difficult to attract people to these positions. Task Group's Assessment The task group recognizes the difficulty in implementing this recommendation but believes that NASA has the ability to do more. There remains a need to encourage identification of alternative approaches to ensuring that Centers can be "smart buyers." The smart-buyer argument should not be used to maintain unnecessarycompetency at the Centers. NASA routinely uses IP As to operate its science programs. However, IPAs have not been effectively used to provide transfer of information into the technology program:). The task group continues to encourage NASA to expand its use of IPAs and other cooperative agreements at Headquarters and at the Centers, specifically to transfer technology information (or expertis,e)into NASA technology programs. Recommendation 8. NASA should take prompt action to re-staff the Office of the Chief Scientist. [ 1998 Assessment, p. 25] Summary of NASA's Presentation to the 1999 Task Group Dr. Kathie Olsen was appointed as NASA Chief Scientist on May 24, 1999. Task Group's Assessment The task group I~ommends NASA for filling the position of Chief Scientist. This position provides NASA Headquarters an important focus for evaluating the progress of technology investment in strengthening the nation's science investment. A first step toward this might be a standing committee organized by the Chief ~~cientist assessthe progress in important technologies for ass and other to science programs defint~dby the roadmaps. If the Centers are to have essentially non-overlapping responsibilities in the d<:velopmentof new technologies, then it is essential that Headquarters management understand the status of the various projects to balance funding allocations in a manner that achieves a maximum ntlmber of significant enhancementsto the science missions. 9

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Recommendation 9. Full-cost accounting is essential to effective management of A TD programs, and NASA should provide sufficient resources to complete and implement a full-cost accounting system. NASA should also dete1mine how it will address workforce issuesthat may be raised when funding allocations are guided by full-cost accounting and organizational excellence, as determined through full and open competition. 1[1998 Assessment,p. 26] Summary of NASA's Presentation to the 1999 Task Group Acting on this recommendation goes beyond the authority of ass alone. NASA reported that it is making progress on implementing a full cost management system and that the FY 2002 budget will be the first to include it. Task Group's Assessment The task group realizes that 1998 recommendation 9 goes beyond the authority of ass. But it also believes that full cost accounting is necessaryto permit proper program management and will revolutionize the way NASA does business. The lack of full cost accounting makes it difficult to accurately determine anId compare the costs of different programs. As pointed out in the task group's 1998 report, without acl:urate fiscal data about funds allocations and program costs, it is impossible for NASA to make informc:d judgments about Center roles, make-or-buy decisions, or contract awards for competitive procurements that include NASA Centers. However, the task group was encouraged to see that NASA 's efforts to implement full cost accounting appear to be nearing fruition and that they are projected to be completed by FY 2002. D. Performance Measurement Recommendation 10. NASA should identify perfonnance measurementapproaches (including independent external reviews) and metrics (including adequate investment data) needed to effectively manage its A TD programs. The findings and recommendations of external reviews of the Centers should be reported to Headquarters as well as to senior Center management. Investment data should cover the current program, and these metrics should be tracked for future use. [1998 Assessment,p. 26] Summary ofNASA's ]Presentation to the 1999 Task Group NASA reported that the annual technology inventory has been greatly improved and is available online. It provides qualrltitative information on resource allocations to each technology area. External reviews were cited for all major program elements, including the New Millennium Program, the Cross- Enterprise Technology Development Program, and the Focused Programs. Task Group's Assessnlent The task group recognizes that NASA is increasing the level of technology and programmatic external reviews. However, based on material presentedto the task group there appears to be little change in Center external reviews. The task group has seenno evidence of Headquarters leadership or interest in the Center review process. There is no coordinated and consistent process for Center review. 10

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Each Center has developed its own method of review. In some cases,their customers are reviewing Centers. These customer reviews do not equate to impartial external reviews. NASA might find value in benchmarking against some of our leading industrial organizations. Recommendation 11. To ensure accountability , NASA should formally respond to the recommendations contairu~d in this task group report. Regular status reports should be made to external bodies, such as the NASA Advisory Council. [ 1998 Assessment, p. 28] Summary of NASA's Prt~sentation to the 1999 Task Group NASA is adoptin!~this recommendation by reporting regularly to the NRC task group, the OSS Task Force on Technolog:v Readiness, and the Space Technology Management Operations Working Group. Task Group's Assessmelllt The task group halsa very positive reaction to NASA 's and ass's efforts. Sincerely, .Dantei J. Fink, Chair Claude R. Canizares, Chair Task Group on Technolo!~y Development Space Studies Board in NASA' s Office of Space Science

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APPENDIX 1 National Aeronautk:s and Request Letter from NASA Spaco AdministratIon Hoadqua~ Washington. OC ~)46-0001 FEn 17 ~99 SM Reply ~ AIm 01: Mr. Daniel J. .Fink Chair D. J. Fink }.ssociates, Inc. 18153 Chretj.en Court San Diego, c~ 92128 Dear Hr. Fink: I want to tJlank you and your Task Group for your excellent report -Assessmcnt or Technology Development in NASA's Off.i.ce of Space ScienceH OCR for page 1
APPENDIX 1 Request Letter from NASA 2 Significant progress is baing made on these Aqenc~f matters . on bot.b o f the:;e i terns . A number of steps have already been taken in the direction or your rec"Ommendi3,tions. For example : We a.re in th~e process of updating the OSS Strategic Plan and have ins:tituted a process to ensure that technology development is well integrated with science planning. For the Crof;s-cutting Technology program, we have begun t.h.e NASA Researc:h Announcement process which will ensure that by fiscal y,~ar 2001, SO percent of the funding in that program wilJ. be broadly announced and peer reviewed. The Cross-c\1tting Te~hnology program has also instituted annual independent external reviews or program excellence Without an aggressive successful technology program which is responsive to "our needs, we will not be able to achieve our exciting and challenging visions for the future. Your analysis of our technolo9Y manaqement and your recommendations will hclp us to achieve that. I look forward to Dr. Ulrich's report of the review discussed above, and I extend our thanks to you and your committee members for ta)0;ing the tiro.e from your busy schedules to assist NASA in improvin9 its Space Science Technology proqram. Sincerely, Edward .lir. WeiJ.cr ASSoci~e Adm.j.nistrator for Space Sc:ience cc: Space Studies Board/Mr. Alexander, Study Director AF /Mr .Venner j. S/Dr. Huckins S IMr .Allen SMfDr. Ulrich 13

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APPENDIX 2 Acknowledgment of Reviewers This report has been reviewed by individuals chosen for their diverse perspectives and technical expertise, in accordancc~ with procedures approved by the National Research Council's (NRC's) report Review Committee. The purpose of this independent review is to provide candid and critical comments that will assist the authors and the NRC in making the published report as sound as possible and to ensure that the report meets institutional standards for objectivity, evidence, and responsivenessto the study charge. The contents of the review comments ~nd draft manuscript remain confidential to protect the integrity of the deliberative process. We wish to thank the following individuals for their participation in the review of this report: Lew Allen, Jr., Jet Propulsion Laboratory (ret.), John J. Donegall, John DoneganAssociates,Inc., Steven H. Kahn, Columbia University, John D. MacKenzie, University of California at Los Angeles, and Robert J. Spinrad, Xerox PARC (ret.). Although the individuals listed above have provided many constructive comments and suggestions, responsibility for the final content of this report rests solely with the authoring task group and the NRC. 3/,510 111