For example, the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) noted in March 2008 that

[m]ajor federal agencies continue to experience significant information security control deficiencies that limit the effectiveness of their efforts to protect the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of their information and information systems. Most agencies did not implement controls to sufficiently prevent, limit, or detect access to computer networks, systems, or information. In addition, agencies did not always effectively manage the configuration of network devices to prevent unauthorized access and ensure system integrity, patch key servers and workstations in a timely manner, assign duties to different individuals or groups so that one individual did not control all aspects of a process or transaction, and maintain complete continuity of operations plans for key information systems. An underlying cause for these weaknesses is that agencies have not fully or effectively implemented agencywide information security programs. As a result, federal systems and information are at increased risk of unauthorized access to and disclosure, modification, or destruction of sensitive information, as well as inadvertent or deliberate disruption of system operations and services. Such risks are illustrated, in part, by an increasing number of security incidents experienced by federal agencies.6

Such performance is reflected in the public’s lack of trust in government agencies’ ability to protect personal information.7 Security of government information systems is poor despite many relevant regulations and guidelines.8 Most communication and information systems are unnecessarily vulnerable to attack because of poor security practices, and

6

Statement of Gregory C. Wilshusen, GAO Director for Information Security Issues, “Information Security: Progress Reported, but Weaknesses at Federal Agencies Persist,” Testimony Before the Subcommittee on Federal Financial Management, Government Information, Federal Services, and International Security, Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, U.S. Senate, GAO-08-571T, March 12, 2008. Available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d08571t.pdf.

7

L. Ponemon, Privacy Trust Study of United States Government, The Ponemon Institute, Traverse City, Mich., February 15, 2007.

8

Appendix III, OMB Circular A-130, “Security of Federal Automated Information Resources,” (Office of Management and Budget, Washington, D.C.) revises procedures formerly contained in Appendix III, OMB Circular No. A-130 (50 FR 52730; December 24, 1985), and incorporates requirements of the Computer Security Act of 1987 (P.L. 100-235) and responsibilities assigned in applicable national security directives. See also Federal Information Security Management Act of 2002 (FISMA), 44 U.S.C. § 3541, et seq., Title III of the E-Government Act of 2002, Public Law 107-347, 116 Stat. 2899, available at http://csrc.nist.gov/drivers/documents/FISMA-final.pdf.



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