Prior to 2001, the life sciences were largely spared from government concerns about the potential for misuse of scientific knowledge. Only a few in the scientific community had raised concerns about the potential contributions of life sciences research to biological weapons programs and bioterrorism before the anthrax attacks of 2001.1 There were no regulatory
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Overview
INTRODuCTION
Prior to 2001, the life sciences were largely spared from government
concerns about the potential for misuse of scientific knowledge. Only a
few in the scientific community had raised concerns about the potential
contributions of life sciences research to biological weapons programs and
bioterrorism before the anthrax attacks of 2001.1 There were no regulatory
1 In his presentation to the May 2000 annual meeting of the National Academy of Sci -
ences, Matthew Meselson, a leading figure in the life sciences and biological arms control
communities, highlighted the potential for harm that could be done through biotechnology:
“Every major technology—metallurgy, explosives, internal combustion, aviation, electronics,
nuclear energy—has been intensively exploited, not only for peaceful purposes but also for
hostile ones. Must this also happen with biotechnology, certain to be a dominant technology
of the coming century? During the century just begun, as our ability to modify fundamental
life processes continues its rapid advance, we will be able not only to devise additional ways
to destroy life but will also be able to manipulate it—including the processes of cognition,
development, reproduction, and inheritance. A world in which these capabilities are widely
employed for hostile purposes would be a world in which the very nature of conflict has
radically changed. Therein could lay unprecedented opportunities for violence, coercion, re-
pression, or subjugation” (Meselson 2000). Meselson and others were worried about biologi -
cal weapons programs, such as those of the former Soviet Union, and what those programs
could do with advanced molecular biology to make biological weapons. He and others (e.g.,
Block 1999; Roberts 2000; Tucker 2000; Leitenberg 2005) were concerned with the intentional
use of biotechnology for weapons development and how to evaluate the threat of bioterror-
ism. However, these studies were not yet focused on the potential subversion of legitimate
research in the life sciences for malevolent purposes of bioterrorism. Concerns about bioter-
rorism risks grew substantially after the first World Trade Center attack, the Oklahoma City
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DUAL USE RESEARCH IN THE LIFE SCIENCES
or legislative actions taken by the U.S. government aimed at constraining
research and communication in the life sciences outside of some govern-
ment laboratories where classified biological research was performed.2
But as fear gripped the nation in the aftermath of the tragic events of Sep -
tember 11 and the anthrax attacks that followed a month later, questions
began to be raised about whether publicly available scientific information
could be used for malevolent purposes and what actions the government
should take to constrain “dangerous” information. The security com-
munity and policy makers in the United States began to discuss whether
some life science research should be categorized as “sensitive but unclas -
sified (SBU) information,” asking whether such information needed to be
constrained to protect against future bioterrorist attacks.3 Additional dis-
cussions focused on risks from international collaborations and whether
research by foreign graduate students at U.S. academic institutions should
be restricted.
Given the high level of anxiety about the anthrax attacks, accentuated
by allegations in the news media about who conducted those attacks and
uncertainties as to where the anthrax bacteria originated, questions arose
bombing, and the Aum Shinrikyo sarin chemical attack and revelations about the latter’s
efforts to develop bioweapons (Wright 2007). But much of the discussion focused on the
likelihood of terrorist groups’ pursuing biological capabilities and their abilities to overcome
technical barriers to acquisition and use (for a review of these discussions and debates, see
Frerichs et al. [2004]). It was not until after the publication of a paper by Australian research -
ers showing that the insertion of an interleukin gene, IL-4, into the mousepox virus could
render the virus vaccine-resistant (Jackson et al. 2001) that concern about the potential con -
tribution of publications in the open literature to enabling bioterrorism became a significant
focus of concern. Advances in biotechnology have been increasingly seen as a dangerous
and powerful new way to produce biological weapons.
2 Regulations were put in place to control the transfer of select microbial pathogens and
toxins in 1996, but knowledge generated by fundamental biological research was not viewed
with concern.
3 SBU is one of dozens of categories the federal government uses to control access to
information; like many others, it has never been defined in statute. SBU has been used to
denote unclassified national security information that might nonetheless be useful to an ad -
versary. Efforts to define what constitutes SBU information provoke recurrent controversies
(National Research Council [NRC] 2007a). A review of SBU and other such categories by the
Congressional Research Service provides a detailed history (Knezo 2004). On May 7, 2008,
the White House announced a new policy to create a single category, “Controlled Unclassi -
fied Information,” that is to apply across the executive branch (White House 2008). Many of
the details of how the new policy will be implemented have not been decided or released.
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OVERVIEW
about the safety of freely disseminating knowledge in the life sciences. 4
Policy makers and members of the security and scientific communities
soon began to focus on the dual use dilemma in the life sciences 5—recog-
nizing that the very research needed for bettering human health, advanc -
ing the economy, and other societal benefits could be misused to do harm.
Slowing research in the life sciences, however, would harm the nation,
global health, and the advancement of science, and so whatever policies
might be developed to enhance security needed to be crafted very care -
fully. Given this tension, it is not surprising that 7 years later the debates
continue over what to do about the dual use dilemma for research and
communication in the life sciences.6
Clearly, during the past 50 years, rapidly expanding knowledge in
the life sciences has brought great benefits to society. Smallpox has been
eradicated; new vaccines are available to prevent childhood diseases such
as measles, mumps, and rubella; there is a vaccine to protect against
cervical cancer; numerous therapeutic drugs are available to treat infec-
tious diseases, heart disease, cancer, etc.; and life expectancy has been
increasing. Moreover, with regard to national security, research activities
in the life sciences are vital for providing essential protection against
infectious diseases and bioterrorism through understanding pathogenesis
and host–agent (pathogen or toxin) interactions, and the development of
vaccines, therapeutics, and diagnostics. In many areas, advances in the
life sciences, enabled by government investments such as those by the
National Institutes of Health (NIH) have led to economic development
in the United States, which contributes to national security and national
prosperity.
As a result of its preeminent research enterprise, the United States
has achieved a global leadership position in biotechnology. The continu -
4 In August 2008, after the current survey was conducted, the U.S. attorney in the case
announced that the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) had concluded that Bruce Ivins,
a senior researcher at the U.S. Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases, was
the “only person responsible for these attacks” (Johnson et al. 2008). (Ivins had committed
suicide in late July [Shane and Lichtblau 2008]). The FBI has released some of the evidence
they used to implicate Ivins as the suspect (Willman and Savage 2008).
5 The term “dual use” in this context refers to legitimate research knowledge and materials
that could be misused for malicious purposes; it does not refer to activities banned by the
Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC) that can be cloaked by a guise of legiti -
macy. Thus, the dilemma is that the research is legitimate and should be conducted, even
if it has the potential for misuse, as opposed to illegitimate research intended to do harm,
which should not be allowed. For a discussion of the multiple uses of the term “dual use,”
see Atlas and Dando (2006).
6 For ongoing discussion about the dual use dilemma, see the minutes of meetings of the
National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity (NSABB) available at http://oba.od.nih.
gov/biosecurity/.
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DUAL USE RESEARCH IN THE LIFE SCIENCES
ing globalization of biotechnology has meant, however, that the United
States does not have a monopoly on advanced research and technologies
in the life sciences (NRC 2006a). Any development of systematic policies
and practices to protect against the misuse of knowledge generated by
researchers in the life sciences ultimately will have to extend globally. 7
Unilateral U.S. policies could even cause harm if they disrupted interna -
tional collaborations essential to the advancement of the biomedical and
other life sciences research. A number of recent NRC reports have argued
that maintaining U.S. national security depends on continued promotion
of the open exchange of research (NRC 2007a,b, 2009). Overall, finding
the right mix of policies to advance research and share knowledge in the
life sciences and also to address the potential for misuse of the knowledge
generated by such research present a daunting challenge for the scientific
community and policy makers.8
The life sciences are not the only area of science to have experi -
enced concerns about misuse of the knowledge generated from research.
In the 1980s, there was great concern about the potential for informa -
tion in the open scientific literature being expropriated by enemies of
the United States for arms development. Much of this concern centered
on the physical sciences, with nuclear weapons development the initial
focus. A National Academy of Sciences report, Scientific Communication
and National Security, issued in 1982 and commonly known as the Corson
report after its chair Dale Corson, ignored the life sciences when it con -
sidered the national security risks associated with research in the United
States (NAS/NAE/IOM 1982). The report underscored the importance
of maintaining the openness of fundamental research regardless of the
field of science, and called upon the U.S. government to keep secret only
very narrowly defined scientific knowledge. It pointed to the need to use
classification as the means of protecting information that could readily be
misused, thereby rejecting the idea of government control of unclassified
scientific data.
However, the issue of restricting unclassified information continued
to arise. In 1984, the American Association for the Advancement of Science
(AAAS) passed a resolution opposing “continuing governmental efforts to
7A report from the National Research Council, Biotechnology Research in an Age of Terror-
ism (NRC 2004a), recommended that the United States undertake measures to address the
potential risks from dual use research. The report pointed out that this was a first step and
also called for international action to prevent the misuse of science that would be adapted
to address local needs and conditions as well as global concerns.
8 See Making the Nation Safer: The Role of Science and Technology in Countering Terrorism
(NAS/NAE/IOM 2002) for a discussion of research areas needed to enhance security against
bioterrorism and Globalization, Biosecurity, and the Future of the Life Sciences (NRC 2006a) for a
discussion of concerns about the need for enhancing biosecurity in a globalized world.
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OVERVIEW
restrict the communication or publication of unclassified research” (Bor-
ras 1984). This statement reaffirmed a AAAS resolution passed in 1982,
which voiced opposition to “governmental restrictions on the dissemina -
tion, exchange, or availability of unclassified knowledge” (Borras 1982).
According to the AAAS Committee on Scientific Freedom and Responsi -
bility, the second resolution was prompted by what the AAAS considered
excessive executive branch efforts to prevent the export of U.S. technology
to Soviet bloc countries. These efforts included requesting prepublica -
tion review of unclassified technical papers, inhibiting communication of
unclassified scientific research in university classrooms and research labo-
ratories, limiting foreign students’ access to university research projects
and results, censoring technical papers at professional society meetings,
and restricting otherwise unclassified meetings to U.S. citizens.
In response to the Corson report and continuing concerns about the
openness of science, President Reagan issued National Security Decision
Directive (NSDD) 189 in 1985, which stated that to the maximum extent
possible, fundamental research results should remain unrestricted, and
that the appropriate mechanism for controlling information produced by
federally funded research is the classification process.9 Nevertheless, by
the 1990s the issue again arose—this time for the field of cryptography.
Recognizing the threat to national security that could arise from advances
in cryptography, cryptographers agreed to submit articles on a voluntary
basis for government review simultaneously with submission to journals
and to consider requests to restrict publication of details that could harm
national security (Dam and Lin 1996:417; Diffie 1996:2).
9 NSDD-189 states: “’Fundamental research’ means basic and applied research in science
and engineering, the results of which ordinarily are published and shared broadly within
the scientific community, as distinguished from proprietary research and from industrial
development, design, production, and product utilization, the results of which ordinarily
are restricted for proprietary or national security reasons. . . . It is the policy of this Admin -
istration that, to the maximum extent possible, the products of fundamental research remain
unrestricted. It is also the policy of this Administration that, where the national security re -
quires control, the mechanism for control of information generated during federally funded
fundamental research in science, technology and engineering at colleges, universities and
laboratories is classification. Each federal government agency is responsible for: a) determin-
ing whether classification is appropriate prior to the award of a research grant, contract, or
cooperative agreement and, if so, controlling the research results through standard classi -
fication procedures; b) periodically reviewing all research grants, contracts, or cooperative
agreements for potential classification. No restrictions may be placed upon the conduct or
reporting of federally funded fundamental research that has not received national security
classification, except as provided in applicable U.S. Statutes” (White House 1985).
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DUAL USE RESEARCH IN THE LIFE SCIENCES
EFFORTS TO ENHANCE BIOSECuRITy
Following the U.S. anthrax attacks in 2001, discussions within the
government and the life sciences community began to consider whether
there was SBU information in the life sciences that posed a national
security risk and if so what should be done to mitigate the potential for
misuse. Then National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice reaffirmed
the government policy embodied in NSDD-189 in November 2001.10 The
Office of Science and Technology Policy and the Office of Management
and Budget consulted with the scientific and academic communities in
several meetings conducted in 2002 about potential policies to define
and constrain unclassified information in the life sciences that could
be used for bioterrorism (Check 2002a, b). Some openly asked whether
there were areas of research in the life sciences that should be prohibited
and/or specific scientific information that should not be communicated;
for example, the bioethicist Arthur Caplan is quoted as having said: “We
have to get away from the ethos that knowledge is good, knowledge
should be publicly available, that information will liberate us. Informa -
tion will kill us in the techno-terrorist age, and I think it’s nuts to put that
stuff on websites” (Lichtblau 2001). Such comments raised the inevitable
debate as to whether scientific knowledge is value free and thus without
bounds, or whether there is “dangerous research” that should not be done
and “dangerous scientific information” that should not be freely commu -
nicated.11 Indeed, the question arose as to whether the life sciences, with
their fundamental presumption of openness, needed to be redefined and
restructured because of potentially “forbidden knowledge” (Kempner
2005).
10 The letter to former Secretary of Defense Harold Brown stated: “The key to maintaining
U.S. technological preeminence is to encourage open and collaborative basic research. The
linkage between the free exchange of ideas and scientific innovation, prosperity, and U.S.
national security is undeniable. This linkage is especially true as our armed forces depend
less and less on internal research and development for the innovations they need to maintain
the military superiority of the United States. In the context of broad-based review of our
technology transfer controls that will begin this year, this Administration will review and
update as appropriate the export control policies that affect basic research in the United
States. In the interim, the policy on the transfer of scientific, technical, and engineering
information set forth in NSDD-l89 shall remain in effect, and we will ensure that this policy
is followed” (Rice 2001).
11 For further discussions see Salyers (2002), Vastag (2002), Zilinskas and Tucker (2002),
and Petro (2007).
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OVERVIEW
Journal Editors and Authors group
During the year following the anthrax attacks of 2001, the question of
openness of scientific communication in the life sciences became a conten-
tious topic. Some members of the scientific community viewed the pos -
sibility that information might be withheld for national security purposes
as self-censorship. Others considered such actions as responsible citizen -
ship. The controversy escalated, perhaps because of the lack of guidance
as to what should constitute “forbidden knowledge” and how potentially
dangerous information should be constrained (Kempner 2005; Campbell
2006; Wimmer 2006; Selgelid 2007).
In 2002 the American Society for Microbiology (ASM) requested that
the National Academies consider whether national security concerns
should result in a fundamental change in the communication of science,
namely, whether critical details that could permit the misuse of knowl -
edge in the life sciences should be withheld from open publications. The
National Academies and the Center for Strategic and International Stud-
ies (CSIS) convened a 1-day workshop in January 2003 to discuss issues
regarding scientific publication and security.12 The challenge presented at
the workshop was how to minimize the risk of bioterrorism without jeop-
ardizing the ability to repeat experiments and validate scientific claims,
which was too important to scientific advancement to fundamentally
change the way scientific research is communicated (Atlas 2003).
The following day, a group of scientists, journal editors, and secu-
rity experts met and drafted a “Statement on Scientific Publication and
Security,” the crux of which was that many of the leading journals in
the life sciences would accept responsibility for screening manuscripts
to reduce the risk of misuse of scientific information (see Box 1-1). The
statement was simultaneously published in Science, Nature, the Proceed-
ings of the National Academy of Sciences (PNAS), and by the ASM (Fox
2003; Journal Editors and Authors Group 2003a,b,c). The overarching
principle accepted by the Journal Editors and Authors Group stated that:
“there is information that, although we cannot now capture it with lists
or definitions, presents enough risk of use by terrorists that it should not
be published” (Journal Editors and Authors Group 2003c). The group
indicated that if “the potential harm of publication outweighs the poten -
tial societal benefits,” a manuscript may be rejected (Journal Editors and
Authors Group 2003a,b,c). Of note, the statement by the Journal Editors
and Authors Group says that publications are not the only place where
science is communicated and that all scientists are responsible for moni -
12 See http://www7.nationalacademies.org/DSC/Scientific_Openness_Homepage.html.
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DUAL USE RESEARCH IN THE LIFE SCIENCES
BOX 1-1
Statement of Principles by Journal Editors and Authors Group
First: The scientific information published in peer-reviewed research journals car-
ries special status, and confers unique responsibilities on editors and authors.
We must protect the integrity of the scientific process by publishing manuscripts
of high quality, in sufficient detail to permit reproducibility. Without independent
verification—a requirement for scientific progress—we can neither advance bio-
medical research nor provide the knowledge base for building strong biodefense
systems.
Second: We recognize that the prospect of bioterrorism has raised legitimate
concerns about the potential abuse of published information, but also recognize
that research in the very same fields will be critical to society in meeting the chal-
lenges of defense. We are committed to dealing responsibly and effectively with
safety and security issues that may be raised by papers submitted for publication,
and to increasing our capacity to identify such issues as they arise.
Third: Scientists and their journals should consider the appropriate level and de-
sign of processes to accomplish effective review of papers that raise such security
issues. Journals in disciplines that have attracted numbers of such papers have
already devised procedures that might be employed as models in considering
process design. Some of us represent some of those journals; others among us
are committed to the timely implementation of such processes, about which we
will notify our readers and authors.
Fourth: We recognize that on occasions an editor may conclude that the potential
harm of publication outweighs the potential societal benefits. Under such circum-
stances, the paper should be modified, or not be published. Scientific information
is also communicated by other means: seminars, meetings, electronic posting,
etc. Journals and scientific societies can play an important role in encouraging
investigators to communicate results of research in ways that maximize public
benefits and minimize risks of misuse.
SOURCE: Journal Editors and Authors Group (2003a,b,c) and Fox (2003).
toring their communication to maximize the benefits and minimize the
risks of their research.
Several journals adopted formal policies to consider dual use and
the potential for misuse of the information in the manuscript during the
review. Today, the Nature Publishing Group, PNAS, the ASM journals,
and Science have policies in place on biosecurity. Though these policies
are not uniform, they signify the concern regarding science and security
among high-impact journals. At a session on ethics in publishing held at
the 2008 AAAS meeting, Donald Kennedy suggested that security issues
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OVERVIEW
were likely to intrude upon the peer-review process in a way that leaves
editors with little control (Timmer 2008).
In practice, the authors of several contentious manuscripts reportedly
considered the dual use and societal implications of their research before
submitting their manuscripts for publication; several also have said that
their research had been modified because of dual use concerns. Prior to
the statements by the Journal Editors and Authors Group, Ron Jackson
and his colleagues brought the potential dual use issues of their work on
IL-4 insertion into mousepox virus to the attention of the Australian gov -
ernment officials before going ahead with the publication (Cohen 2002;
Federation of American Scientists 2008a). Following publication and the
ensuing controversy, the research was terminated because of concerns
about its dual use potential (Federation of American Scientists 2008a).
Eckard Wimmer has said that the original version of the manuscript on
the synthesis of poliovirus (Cello et al. 2002) included a section on social
and security implications of the experiment, but that the space limitations
in the journal forced the removal of that section prior to publication (Fed -
eration of American Scientists 2008b; private communication from Eckard
Wimmer to Kathleen Vogel). Prior to publication of his work on the syn-
thesis of a bacteriophage (Smith et al. 2003), Craig Venter had discussions
with government officials about the dual use implications of the research
(Venter 2007). The authors were fully aware of the controversy that had
occurred following publication of the Wimmer poliovirus synthesis paper
and Venter has said he was prepared to modify the manuscript. A formal
governmental review, however, did not find any reason to make modifica-
tions because of dual use concerns.
More recently, the synthesis of the 1918 influenza virus (Taubenberger
et al. 2005; Tumpey et al. 2005) also received prepublication review for
dual use concerns by government officials and by the NSABB (CDC 2005).
The NSABB endorsed publication of the paper and did not request that
any information be withheld. The board did request that a statement be
added to the manuscripts stating that the work was important for pub -
lic health and was conducted safely, and suggested that Science should
include an editorial to support the case for the importance of the research
(Kennedy 2005; Sharp 2005). The authors argued that there can be no
absolute guarantee that the research information in the publication will
not be misused: “We are aware that all technological advances could be
misused. . . . But what we are trying to understand is what happened in
nature and how to prevent another pandemic. In this case, nature is the
bioterrorist” (Nature 2005).
Finally, the publication of botulinum toxin as a threat to the milk
supply (Wein and Liu 2005) was reviewed for dual use concerns prior to
publication:
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0 DUAL USE RESEARCH IN THE LIFE SCIENCES
The PNAS review considered both the above criteria and a more general
sense that our publication of an article must not constitute a “roadmap
for terrorists” by providing anyone who intends to do harm with key
information that is otherwise difficult to obtain. . . .
NAS and PNAS representatives met with government representatives to
discuss their specific concerns about the Wein and Liu article on June 7.
Following this meeting, the Council of the National Academy of Sciences
decided to publish the article as originally accepted (after a standard
round of final copyediting), accompanied by this editorial to make clear
our reasons for doing so (Alberts 2005).
Only in a few of these cases was there any discussion of modifications
to the manuscripts to remove information of dual use concern. Deci-
sions to provide accompanying editorials to explain and endorse the
scientific importance of the research reflected the perceived need to make
the strongest case possible for the value of such potentially controversial
research.13
The Fink Committee
Beyond the ad hoc actions by the Journal Editors and Authors Group
and individual journals, a continuing need remained for broader consen -
sus building within the life sciences community regarding issues of dual
use research and the potential misuse of the life sciences for bioterrorism.
In June 2001, the National Academies began planning a project that led
to the formation of the Committee on Improving Research Standards and
Practices to Prevent Destructive Application of Advanced Biotechnology.
The committee, which began work in spring 2002, was charged with
examining how to address the potential risks posed by dual use research
in the United States. The committee addressed the critical question of
how to define what is dangerous and how to design a system that could
minimize that danger while allowing legitimate biomedical research to
proceed.
Released in October 2003, the committee’s report, Biotechnology
Research in an Age of Terrorism (also known as the Fink report after the
chair of the committee, Gerald Fink of Massachusetts Institute of Technol -
ogy [MIT]), was published as a book a few months later (NRC 2004a). Box
1-2 contains a summary of the report’s major recommendations.
13 The only statistic available regarding changes in research communication in response to
dual use research of concern is that, of the 16,000-plus manuscripts reviewed by the 11 jour-
nals of ASM since it began screening manuscripts for dual use research, only 4 manuscripts
have actually been modified in any way (these were published with minor modifications)
and only 2 others were not published because the authors were unwilling to provide full
methodological details, which the ASM regards as essential (Kaplan 2008).
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OVERVIEW
Using several published studies as examples of “contentious research”
(Epstein 2001), the committee described the dual use dilemma, which
it defined as occurring because the “same technologies can be used
legitimately for human betterment and misused for bioterrorism” (NRC
BOX 1-2
Key Recommendations: Biotechnology
Research in an Age of Terrorism
Recommendation: Educating the Scientific Community
We recommend that national and international professional societies and related
organizations and institutions create programs to educate scientists about the
nature of the dual use dilemma in biotechnology and their responsibilities to miti-
gate its risks.
Recommendation: Review at the Publication Stage
We recommend relying on self-governance by scientists and scientific journals to
review publications for their potential national security risks.
Recommendation: Harmonized International Oversight
We recommend that the international policymaking and scientific communities
create an International Forum on Biosecurity to develop and promote harmonized
national, regional, and international measures that will provide a counterpart to the
system we recommend for the United States.
Recommendation: Review of Plans for Experiments
We recommend that the Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS)
augment the already established system for review of experiments involving re-
combinant DNA conducted by the National Institutes of Health to create a review
system for seven classes of experiments (the Experiments of Concern) involving
microbial agents that raise concerns about their potential for misuse.
Recommendation: Creation of a National Science Advisory Board for Bio-
defense
We recommend that the Department of Health and Human Services create a
National Science Advisory Board for Biodefense (NSABB) to provide advice, guid-
ance, and leadership for the system of review and oversight we are proposing.
Recommendation: Additional Elements for Protection Against Misuse
We recommend that the federal government rely on the implementation of cur-
rent legislation and regulation, with periodic review by the NSABB, to provide
protection of biological materials and supervision of personnel working with these
materials.
Recommendation: A Role for the Life Sciences in Efforts to Prevent Bioter-
rorism and Biowarfare
We recommend that the national security and law enforcement communities de-
velop new channels of sustained communication with the life sciences community
about how to mitigate the risks of bioterrorism.
SOURCE: National Research Council (2004a).
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DUAL USE RESEARCH IN THE LIFE SCIENCES
ons. The first legislation that included provisions dealing directly with
possession of biological agents that were highly dangerous was the Anti -
terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (P.L. 104-132, April 24,
1996), which was enacted after a U.S. scientist attempted to obtain plague-
causing bacteria for potentially nefarious purposes (Gronvall 2008). The
act established the “select agent” program to control the transfer of certain
biological agents that were considered especially dangerous.32 The pro-
gram was created to prevent bioterrorism and protect public safety while
not unduly hindering research using select agents.
After the anthrax attacks of 2001, the United States sought to estab-
lish a rigorous formal oversight system to decide who could possess
microorganisms and toxins that could be used as weapons. Appropriately
defined, such a system would ensure that pathogens and toxins would be
available to legitimate researchers and denied to those who should not
possess dangerous agents. The aim of material control efforts for the life
sciences soon focused on ways to ensure that any individual given access
to select agents was trustworthy and that these agents would be secure
within each facility that housed dangerous pathogens and toxins. 33
The USA PATRIOT Act of 2001 (P.L. 107–56, October 26, 2001) estab-
lished restrictions on the possession of select agents by aliens from coun-
tries designated as supporting terrorism and for other individuals who
were deemed unsafe for specific objective reasons, such as those ineligible
to purchase handguns. The act also made it an offense for a person to
knowingly possess any biological agent, toxin, or delivery system of a
type or in a quantity that, under the circumstances, is not reasonably justi-
fied by prophylactic, protective, bona fide research or other peaceful pur-
pose. The provisions of the Patriot Act were subsequently augmented by
the Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response
Act, known as the Bioterrorism Preparedness Act of 2002 (P.L. 107–188,
32 Since its inception the select agent program has been modified to include oversight of
possession as well as transfer of certain agents; the list of agents that might be used as bio -
logical weapons to attack humans has also increased, and potential agricultural biothreat
agents have been added. More information on the program can be found at http://www.
cdc.gov/od/sap/.
33 In 2008, after the FBI identified a researcher at the USAMRIID as the perpetrator of
the 2001 anthrax attacks, the issue of whom to trust and how to ensure the reliability of
those with access to dangerous pathogens again gained special attention. The NSABB was
charged with developing a system for determining the reliability of researchers with access
to potentially dangerous pathogens and toxins. The U.S. Congress, following a report by
the Commission on the Prevention of WMD Proliferation and Terrorism (2008), also began
to consider taking action to enhance the protection of biological agents against acquisition
by terrorists; see, for example, the hearings of the U.S. Senate Homeland and Government
Affairs Committee at http://hsgac.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?Fuseaction=Hearings.
Detail&HearingID=d0d0b4c1-d1d1-4b7a-9c16-fd9af22d97e0.
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OVERVIEW
June 12, 2002). This act added requirements for regulations governing
possession of select agents, including approval for laboratory personnel
by the attorney general following a background check by the FBI. 34 While
some scientists have expressed concern about the impact of the select
agent regulations on the advancement of science, others have worried that
additional oversight is needed. On January 9, 2009, President George W.
Bush issued an executive order, Strengthening Laboratory Biosecurity in the
United States, that established a process for new government oversight
to further “the policy of the United States that facilities that possess bio -
logical select agents and toxins have appropriate security and personnel
assurance practices to protect against theft, misuse, or diversion to unlaw-
ful activity of such agents and toxins” (White House 2009).
In addition to the United States, Great Britain and some other nations
have also taken the approach of legally restricting who can have access to
the microorganisms and toxins thought to have the highest risk of use for
bioterrorism and have established regulations for the possession of these
agents. In the United Kingdom, the Anti–Terrorism, Crime and Security
Act of 2001 strengthened controls on access to pathogens and toxins
used in research laboratories. All UK facilities handling pathogens and
toxins in hazard group 2, 3, or 4 must be registered, and strict control of
hazard group 3 and 4 organisms is in place.35 In Germany, the Act on the
Reform of the Communicable Diseases Law (Communicable Diseases Law
Reform Act) contains provisions that limit the distribution of pathogens to
authorized individuals. Although the purpose of this act is to prevent the
spread of communicable diseases in human beings by early detection of
infections, the provisions that restrict the distribution of human pathogens
are intended to contribute to the deterrence of bioterrorism.36
Policies implemented in the United States after September 11 have
significantly increased the level of scrutiny and the time involved in the
34 Clinical laboratories were granted a special exemption to permit them to legally isolate
and identify (and thereby possess) select agents cultured from patients as part of the medical
diagnostic process, even if they were not registered to possess select agents. This is critical
for medical diagnoses where there is no way to predict what disease a patient might have,
thereby precluding the ability to register for specific select agents. The clinical laboratories,
however, are required to destroy any select agents or transfer them to a registered laboratory
that is permitted to possess that select agent within a few days, and they must also notify
public health authorities whenever a select agent has been isolated and identified.
35 The approved list of biological agents established by an Advisory Committee on Danger-
ous Pathogens is available at http://www.hse.gov.uk/pubns/misc208.pdf. The categories
are similar to the biosafety levels for laboratories in the United States, but the lists of agents
within the categories are different.
36Available at http://www.unog.ch/80256EDD006B8954/(httpAssets)/E0C6A0305240
C953C12574AA0044D41B/$file/BWC_MSP_2008_MX-Statement-Germany-080818-PM.pd f.
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DUAL USE RESEARCH IN THE LIFE SCIENCES
process of obtaining a visa for a short or extended stay and increased
the tracking of students and scholars once they arrive on U.S. shores. 37
Although there are differing views within the scientific community
regarding the consequences of the select agent regulations, several in
the scientific community consider that increased restrictions on foreign
students and scholars through measures such as more stringent visas
pose a far greater threat to the conduct of life sciences research.38 As the
presidents of the National Academies have stated: “Our visa processing
system not only must provide genuine security against those who might
do us harm, but also keep our borders open to the stream of scientific and
technical talent that fuels our progress . . . the U.S. scientific, engineering,
and health communities cannot hope to maintain their present position
of international leadership if they become isolated from the rest of the
world” (Alberts et al. 2002).39 As noted earlier, in addition to limiting
visas, the restrictions in place under the Patriot and Bioterrorism Pre-
paredness acts prohibit any national of a country currently designated
by the Department of State as a state sponsor of terrorism from having
access to select agents.
Oversight of Research
A more contentious issue than control of pathogens and toxins is
whether there should be oversight of life science research and communi -
cation, and if so, what kind. The BWC does not include measures to limit
research, although its intersessional processes and confidence-building
measures do collect information about national activities and address how
continuing advances in research affect the implementation and operation
of the treaty. This brief review highlights some of the major proposals
from government and private sources but does not attempt to do justice
to the range and variety of ideas for addressing dual use research.
The Controlling Dangerous Pathogens Project of the Center for Inter-
national and Security Studies at Maryland has developed a proposal for
37 The National Academies created a special International Visitors Office to provide a re -
source on visa policy and to collect data on cases involving delays or difficulties experienced
by students or visiting scientists. For further information see http://www7.nationalacad-
emies.org/visas/.
38 In addition to visa issues, the issue of the impact of export controls on scientific research
through restrictions on the transfer of dual use equipment and materials has drawn sub -
stantial attention from the scientific community. These problems are dealt with in another
NRC report, Beyond Fortress America: National Security Controls on Science and Technology in
A Globalized World (NRC 2009).
39 See NRC (2006b) for a discussion of this issue focused on international graduate
students.
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OVERVIEW
the oversight of research in the life sciences that involves enhancing the
responsibilities of institutional biosafety committees (IBCs) to include
review of biosecurity implications of research activities (Steinbruner et al.
2007). This review would be complemented by regional IBCs and interna-
tional IBCs. The project has also developed an electronic questionnaire for
these entities to help them evaluate research activities for their dual use
potential. A consequence of the proposal would be that the performance
and communication of specific life sciences research falling within a nar-
row set of parameters could be prevented at a series of review stages,
including potential review by a new international organization. Van Aken
(2006) has also called for internationally harmonized and legally binding
rules for conducting dual use research, in order to prevent the misuse of
biological knowledge.
Under the scientific self-governance approach, the Center for Biosecu-
rity of the University of Pittsburgh Medical Center supports responsible
stewardship and self-governance by life scientists without mandated
governmental restrictions (Kwik et al. 2003). The basic tenets of this
perspective are that scientists should be involved in determining which
experiments are dangerous and made aware of the potential misuse
of biotechnology; security measures should be thoughtfully developed
and integrated into the existing research culture; biosecurity awareness
and measures should begin with scientists rather than be prescribed by
governments; periodic evaluation and improvement of biosecurity mea-
sures should occur; and through collaborations, the norms and ethical
standards to prevent misuse of biotechnology should be established and
propagated globally.
The Fink committee also supported a self-governance approach for
protecting scientific knowledge from misuse. However, as already men-
tioned, it supported an advisory role for the federal government in pro-
viding guidelines along the model of RAC administered by the NIH.
Although formal federal regulations or guidelines have yet to be devised,
the IBCs of three of the six member institutions in the Southeast Regional
Center of Excellence for Emerging Infections and Biodefense (SERCEB)
have assumed responsibility for dual use review (Davidson et al. 2007).
Providing federal government guidelines and then relying upon self-
governance by research institutions is the key to the proposed NSABB
oversight system. As mentioned earlier, in June 2007 the NSABB released
its Proposed Framework for the Oersight of Dual Use Life Sciences Research,
which it hopes will lead to common oversight standards across all federal
agencies funding such research (NSABB 2007). Under the proposed sys -
tem, each principal investigator would make an initial assessment of the
potential for misuse, and IBCs would expand the scope of their current
reviews to include a biosecurity evaluation. The proposed framework
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DUAL USE RESEARCH IN THE LIFE SCIENCES
is currently undergoing an interagency review.40 Some have expressed
concerns that this may result in mandated actions, including: training
for all life scientists receiving federal funds, signing of codes of conduct
(equivalent to taking an oath), and reporting of suspicions about others’
research activities. In particular, concern has been expressed about what
actions will be required once awareness of dual use issues increases (Steb-
bins 2008).
One area of life sciences research that has attracted particular atten-
tion regarding potential oversight is synthetic biology. This growing field
combines elements of biological science, chemistry, and engineering into a
highly interdisciplinary area of research. Synthetic biology has the poten -
tial for construction of bioengineered microorganisms that can mass-
produce drugs to treat disease, detect and break down toxic chemicals to
reverse polluted sediments and water, and generate new energy forms to
help solve the energy crisis. There also is substantial concern, however,
regarding the potential for the creation of dual use products, either inten-
tionally or unintentionally, that could function as biological weapons in
the hands of terrorists. The NSABB has proposed greater oversight of syn-
thetic biology (NSABB 2006). In addition, several groups have proposed
governance strategies for preventing misuse of synthetic biology that
combine government oversight and self-governance. In the United States
this includes a collaboration among the Venter Institute, CSIS, and a sci-
entist at MIT (Garfinkel et al. 2007a,b), as well as a group in the Goldman
School of Public Policy at the University of California, Berkeley (Maurer et
al. 2006). Internationally, the International Consortium for Polynucleotide
Synthesis (Bügl et al. 2006) and the Industry Association for Synthetic
Biology (Bernauer et al. 2008) have also made proposals.
LIFE SCIENTISTS’ ATTITuDES AND
AWARENESS OF DuAL uSE ISSuES
Since responsible conduct is considered key to the success of self-
governance measures to protect against the misuse of the life sciences,
there is concern that life scientists are insufficiently aware of and engaged
in discussions about biosecurity and dual use issues. Most life scientists
have little experience with the issues of biological weapons. Without
conscious personal effort or systematic education, very few life scientists
working today in the United States or overseas would have reason to
know of past offensive weapons programs. Between the end of the U.S.
40 Thestatus of the NSABB oversight document in the U.S. federal agency review process
was discussed at the December 10, 2008, NSABB meeting. The archived Webcast can be
viewed at http://oba.od.nih.gov/biosecurity/nsabb_past_meetings.html#dec2008.
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OVERVIEW
biological weapons program in 1969 and the anthrax mailings in October
2001, few biologists had connections to the national security branches of
government.41 This has left the life sciences community poorly prepared
to interact with the security community and divided about whether dual
use issues are really of serious concern. Many studies and conferences on
biosecurity thus end with recommendations for greater awareness raising
and education in the life sciences community.42 The report of the Commis-
sion on the Prevention of WMD Proliferation and Terrorism, released in
2008, gave the scientific community this ominous warning:
The choice is stark. The life sciences community can wait until a cata -
strophic biological attack occurs before it steps up to its security respon -
sibilities. Or it can act proactively in its own enlightened self interest,
aware that the reaction of the political system to a major bioterrorist
event would likely be extreme and even draconian, resulting in signifi-
cant harm to the scientific enterprise (Commission on the Prevention of
WMD Proliferation and Terrorism 2008:26).
Many of the major U.S. scientific organizations and professional soci -
eties, however, including the National Academies, delayed undertaking
significant education and awareness-raising initiatives until the U.S. gov -
ernment clearly defined its policies. In the interim, a number of universi -
ties and organizations, such as the NIH-supported Regional Centers for
Excellence, the Federation of American Scientists (FAS), and AAAS have
undertaken educational activities.43
41 In this regard, the life sciences community differs markedly from the physics and engi -
neering communities, which have been continuously aware of security concerns associated
with government-sponsored weapons research programs since at least World War II. The
closest analogy in the life sciences is development and advancement of recombinant DNA
technology. Other examples of social considerations to the life sciences include human sub -
jects research (e.g., the Tuskegee syphilis experiments) and the welfare of research animals.
Although the United States had a biological weapons program between 1943 and 1969, it
has not used biological weapons in times of war. At the time of the Asilomar conference
(1975) and the development of the BWC (1972), there was extensive discussion about the
harmful uses of recombinant DNA, but the concerns of biotechnology and offensive biologi-
cal weapons programs did not propagate that interest or awareness of science policy to the
broader life sciences community.
42 See, for example, NRC (2004a,b, 2006a), and the discussions at the 2008 BWC meet -
ings of experts and states parties (http://www.unog.ch/80256EE600585943/(httpPages)/
92CFF2CB73D4806DC12572BC00319612?OpenDocument).
43 FAS Case Studies in Dual use Biological Research illustrate the dual use potential of actual
life science research via interviews with the lead researchers. The case studies provide a
historical background on bioterrorism, bioweapons, and the current laws, regulations, and
treaties that apply to biodefense research. They include interviews with researchers as well
as the primary scientific research papers and discussion questions meant to raise awareness
about the importance of responsible biological research. The case studies are available at
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DUAL USE RESEARCH IN THE LIFE SCIENCES
In September 2005, the National Academies and AAAS cohosted a
workshop, “Education and Raising Awareness: Challenges for Respon-
sible Stewardship of Dual Use Research in the Life Sciences,” that brought
together over 50 participants to share information and explore ways to
engage and educate the life science research community most effectively.44
The workshop addressed (1) opportunities for outreach presented by
the BWC, NSABB, and others interested in biosecurity education; (2)
challenges and opportunities in framing the discourse on biosecurity as
well as differences in those factors created by multiple stakeholders and
audiences; (3) case studies of outreach; and (4) the roles of codes of ethics,
conduct, and practices in raising awareness.45
Although the workshop did not produce formal recommendations,
one theme that emerged from the discussions was the need to move
beyond anecdotal evidence to empirical information about perceptions
and attitudes among life scientists that could provide a basis for creating
programs and assessing their impact. Remarkably few data are available
today. There have been numerous surveys of scientists on other topics
related to professional responsibility, such as ethics, responsible conduct,
and financial conflicts of interest.46 Several small-scale studies using inter-
views or surveys with practicing scientists in the United States and the
http://www.fas.org/programs/ssp/bio/educationportal.html. The SERCEB Policy, Ethics
and Law Core has developed an online module to assist those involved with the biologi -
cal sciences to better understand the dual use dilemma of some life science research. This
module is intended for graduate students and postdoctoral fellows, faculty members, and
laboratory technicians involved in biological research in microbiology, molecular genetics,
immunology, pathology, and other fields related to emerging infectious diseases and bio -
defense. The module consists of an approximately 20-minute online presentation followed
by a brief assessment. The recently updated module is available at http://www.serceb.
org/modules/serceb_cores/index.php?id=3. It has been used by over 600 people. AAAS
held a workshop in November 2008 to document and discuss existing education programs
on dual use research and to highlight challenges and provide recommendations for develop -
ment and implementation of other educational programs on dual use research. A summary
of the workshop is available at http://cstsp.aaas.org/files/AAAS_workshop_report_educa-
tion_of_dual_use_life_science_research.pdf.
44 The participants included staff from several U.S. government agencies, representatives
of nongovernmental organizations such as the ASM, the FAS, and the Royal Society, as well
as university professors from the United States and Britain.
45 For details, see http://www7.nationalacademies.org/dsc/Biosecurity_Workshop.html.
46 See, for example, Blumenthal et al. (1996a,b, 1997, 2006); Eastwood et al. (1996); Wenger
et al. (1997, 1999); Korenman et al. 1998; Rabino (1998, 2003a,b); Berk et al. (2000); McCrary
et al. (2000); MORI (2000); Price et al. (2001); Campbell et al. (2002); Martinson et al. (2005,
2006); Union of Concerned Scientists (2005a,b, 2006, 2008); De Vries et al. (2006); Hansen et
al. (2006); Royal Society/Research Councils UK/The Wellcome Trust 2006; and Vogeli et al.
(2006).
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OVERVIEW
United Kingdom, including those in biodefense research in the U.S. case,
offer perspectives on dual use research.47
Seminars and discussions conducted by Brian Rappert and Malcolm
Dando provide insights about the views of some 2,500 scientists in 13
countries. A series of about 100 information exchange seminars have
served as focus groups to gauge awareness of dual use issues, ascertain
attitudes about potential oversight mechanisms, and raise awareness of
the potential misuse of the life sciences for bioweapons development. As
a result, Rappert and Dando have compiled substantial qualitative infor-
mation. They report that their 26 seminars in the United Kingdom “found
little evidence that [scientists] regarded bioterrorism or bioweapons as
a substantial threat; considered that developments in the life sciences
research contributed to biothreats; were aware of the current debates
and concerns about dual use research; or were familiar with the BTWC”;
similar results were found in the 28 seminars they conducted in Finland,
South Africa, and the Netherlands, although not completely in the United
States (Rappert 2008).48
With regard to measures to address the potential risk of dual use
research, Rappert and Dando reported that they encountered overwhelm-
ing skepticism about the value of publication restraint, but there was a
sense that some contentious experiments perhaps should not have been
openly reported. For instance, they found support for doing the IL-4
mousepox research and communicating the results; to whom the results
were communicated was a topic of contention, however. They also stated
that only a small percentage of scientists indicated knowledge of the IL-4
study. Although some saw value in community involvement in dem-
onstrating responsibility, there was general skepticism of the oversight
approach proposed by the Fink committee. Doubts were also expressed
about the feasibility of pre-project review and oversight systems for dual
use research (Rappert 2007).
All of these studies provide useful information and insights. How -
ever, there is no example of a large-scale, representative survey of prac -
ticing life scientists regarding their views on biosecurity and how they
would allocate responsibility for biosecurity activities such as education,
training, and oversight among individuals and institutions. The need for
a baseline survey to address these questions at this time was underscored
47 See, for example, Corneliussen (2005), McLeish and Nightingale (2005), Fischer (2006),
Lentzos (2006), Sutton (2007, 2009), and U.S. Government (2008).
48 “A significant difference between the U.S. seminars and those elsewhere was the greater
knowledge about biosecurity discussions in general, potential misuse policy initiatives, and
related BW issues. This is perhaps not surprising because of the heightened attention to po -
tential misuse issues in the US and because nearly all the organizations visited had a direct
stake in that they were receiving biodefence research funding” (Rappert et al. 2006).
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0 DUAL USE RESEARCH IN THE LIFE SCIENCES
by the release in 2007 of the NSABB’s draft oversight framework for all
federally funded life sciences research and its plans for education and
outreach activities (NSABB 2007).
THE AAAS-NRC PROJECT
Building on the results of their 2005 planning meeting, the AAAS
Center for Science, Technology, and Security Policy (CSTSP)49 and two
program units within the National Research Council50 developed a plan to
survey a sample of the AAAS membership in the life sciences about their
knowledge of dual use issues and attitudes toward their responsibilities
to help mitigate the risks of misuse. In addition to providing essential
baseline data, it was hoped that the results of the survey would generate
more attention to the continuing challenges of dual use issues and addi-
tional debate among life scientists about their personal and professional
responsibilities. Concerns about potential misuse of dual use research
relate to questions of whether advanced research could facilitate biologi -
cal weapons development by states and nonstate actors. The introductory
material in this chapter has covered both issues. The survey, however,
focused on bioterrorism by nonstate actors because that is the concern
that has driven so many of the policy discussions of dual use research in
the United States since September 11.
The survey project occurred in three phases:
Phase 1:
• Define the issues to be addressed and identify the critical populations
to be surveyed by a questionnaire that will assess the attitudes and val -
ues of a statistically valid sample of life scientists relevant to the design
of biosecurity education programs; and
49 CSTSP is a nonpartisan, nonadvocacy organization supported by the John D. and Cath -
erine T. MacArthur Foundation’s Science, Technology and Security Initiative. CSTSP serves
as a two-way portal between scientists studying matters related to national and interna -
tional security and the Washington policy community, especially the Congress, the execu -
tive branch agencies, and Washington-based nongovernmental organizations. The center’s
goal is to bring to the Washington policy community objective, high-quality, scientific and
technical information related to security issues. For additional information see http://cstsp.
aaas.org.
50 NRC is part of the National Academies, which also include the National Academy of
Sciences, the National Academy of Engineering, and the Institute of Medicine. Created in
1916, NRC has become the principal operating agency of both the National Academy of Sci -
ences and the National Academy of Engineering in providing services to the government,
the public, and the scientific and engineering communities. The program units involved in
this project were the Board on Life Sciences and the Program on Development, Security,
and Cooperation.
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OVERVIEW
• Devise a preliminary questionnaire to be used in the survey.
Phase 2:
• Work with a professional firm to conduct focus groups to explore the
attitudes and values of selected groups of scientists and also provide a
pretest of the questionnaire;
• Implement the survey in partnership with AAAS; and
• Review the results of the survey and prepare a report of the initial
findings.
Phase 3:
• Based on the analysis of the findings of the survey, recommend ap -
proaches for engaging members of the life sciences community on bios -
ecurity issues.
NRC appointed a committee to provide oversight for the Academies’
participation in the project. The biographies of the committee members
can be found in Appendix A. Kavita Marfatia Berger, Project Director at
the AAAS CSTSP, served as a consultant to the committee and actively
participated in the development and implementation of the survey and
preparation of the final report. Because funding came in increments to
support particular phases of the project, however, the committee was
not formally appointed until after the focus groups were completed and
decisions had been made about the survey instrument, the survey design
and whom to survey without input from the committee. The committee
oversaw the analysis of the survey results and the preparation of the final
report. To ensure the privacy of the AAAS members who were sampled,
while also permitting follow-ups to encourage a higher response rate, the
AAAS Office of Member Services administered the questionnaire. The
NRC assumed responsibility for the review of the final report. This was a
genuine partnership between the two organizations.
This chapter has provided an introduction to the issues surrounding
dual use research and the rationale for undertaking the survey. The next
chapter describes the survey methodology and provides details about the
sample and the demographic characteristics of the respondents. Chapter 3
describes the results of the survey and Chapter 4 provides the committee’s
conclusions and recommendations.
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