Appendix C
Final Questionnaire

Welcome!


Thank you for your participation in a survey that examines scientists’ attitudes toward potential security risks from agricultural, public health, and biomedical research and the role that scientists, institutions, scientific societies, and the government should play in fostering an environment that enhances both the scientific enterprise and national security.


In 2004, the U.S. government established the National Science Advisory Board on Biosecurity (NSABB) under the auspices of the National Institutes of Health to contemplate the possibility and impact of greater oversight for life sciences research to prevent or mitigate deliberate misuse. The NSABB identified several categories of life science experiments that it feels should bear greater scrutiny.


Federal agencies are currently planning to issue further guidelines and considering additional policies regarding responsible scientific research. We believe balancing advancement of the scientific enterprise with the nation’s security needs is a very relevant topic to all life scientists. Giving scientists a voice in the policy-making process is one goal of this survey.


The survey is anonymous and will take approximately 20 minutes to complete. Survey results will be shared with policy makers, the scientific community, and the public.



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Appendix C Final Questionnaire Welcome! Thank you for your participation in a survey that examines scientists’ attitudes toward potential security risks from agricultural, public health, and biomedical research and the role that scientists, institutions, scientific societies, and the government should play in fostering an environment that enhances both the scientific enterprise and national security. In 2004, the U.S. government established the National Science Advisory Board on Biosecurity (NSABB) under the auspices of the National Insti - tutes of Health to contemplate the possibility and impact of greater over- sight for life sciences research to prevent or mitigate deliberate misuse. The NSABB identified several categories of life science experiments that it feels should bear greater scrutiny. Federal agencies are currently planning to issue further guidelines and considering additional policies regarding responsible scientific research. We believe balancing advancement of the scientific enterprise with the nation’s security needs is a very relevant topic to all life scientists. Giving scientists a voice in the policy-making process is one goal of this survey. The survey is anonymous and will take approximately 20 minutes to complete. Survey results will be shared with policy makers, the scientific community, and the public. 

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 APPENDIX C Thank you for your vital contribution to this important policy process. In recent years, members of the scientific and security policy communities have raised concerns about the potential for misuse of knowledge, tools, and techniques for purposes of bioterrorism. Such research is sometimes called “dual use” research because, although the research is intended for beneficial purposes only, it could be misapplied. 1. Have you ever conducted research or managed others’ research in the life sciences? Yes No (goes to question 3) 2. Have you made any changes in how you conduct or manage research because of concerns that knowledge, tools, or techniques from your research might be deliberately misused to facilitate bioterrorism? Yes No I decided against conducting a specific research project/experiment I decided to shift my research away from an area altogether I decided against seeking funding for a proposed research project I decided against collaborating with particular scientists, postdocs, students, etc. I limited my conversations about my research I decided against submitting a manuscript to a journal I modified a manuscript I decided against presenting research at a conference I modified a conference presentation 3. Are you currently conducting or managing research in the life sciences? Yes No (goes to question 5) In recent years, members of the scientific and security policy communities have raised concerns about the potential for misuse of knowledge, tools, and techniques for purposes of bioterrorism. Such research is sometimes called "dual use" research because, although the research is intended for beneficial purposes only, it could be misapplied.

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 APPENDIX C 4. Do you consider any of the research you currently conduct or manage to have dual use potential? Yes No The National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity (NSABB) has identi- fied a subset of life sciences research that they believe may be worthwhile but may also need special review. Such research includes experiments designed to (1) enhance the harmful consequences of a biological agent or toxin; (2) disrupt immunity or the effectiveness of an immunization without clinical and/or agricultural justification; (3) confer to a biologi - cal agent or toxin, resistance to clinically and/or agriculturally useful prophylactic or therapeutic interventions against that agent or toxin, or facilitate their ability to evade detection methodologies; (4) increase the stability, transmissibility, or the ability to disseminate a biological agent or toxin; (5) alter the host range or tropism of a biological agent or toxin; (6) enhance the susceptibility of a host population; and (7) generate a novel pathogenic agent or toxin, or reconstitute an eradicated or extinct biological agent. 5. Are you currently conducting or managing research that includes any of these seven types of experiments? Yes No 6. Do you now or have you ever worked with or managed research using select agents? Yes No Don’t know 7. Do the journal(s) in your field require reviewers to evaluate whether manuscripts include knowledge, tools, and techniques with dual use potential? All of the journals have a policy Some of the journals have a policy None of the journals have a policy Don’t know

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 APPENDIX C 8. Do the journal(s) in your field require authors to disclose any research with dual use potential to editors upon submission of the manuscript? All of the journals have a policy Some of the journals have a policy None of the journals have a policy Don’t know 9. Should scientific journals have policies regarding publication of dual use research? Yes No Don’t know 10. Have you ever contacted an editor because you felt that a manuscript you were reviewing contained knowledge, tools, or techniques that could pose a threat to national security? Yes No, although I have reviewed manuscripts No, because I have not reviewed manuscripts 11. Should professional science societies have codes for the responsible conduct of dual use life sciences research? Yes No Don’t know 12. Are you a member of any professional science societies that have codes of responsible conduct for dual use research? Yes (please specify)____ No Don’t know 13. Principal investigators should be responsible for the initial evaluation of the dual use potential of their life sciences research. Strongly Neutral/ Strongly agree Agree No opinion Disagree disagree

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 APPENDIX C 14. Scientists should provide formal assurance to their institution that they are assessing their work for dual use potential. Strongly Neutral/ Strongly agree Agree No opinion Disagree disagree 15. Scientists conducting or managing research should take an oath, simi- lar to medicine’s Hippocratic oath, to carry out research responsibly and guard against deliberate misuse of the knowledge, tools, or techniques of dual use research. Strongly Neutral/ Strongly agree Agree No opinion Disagree disagree 16. Preventing the potential that SA A N/NO D SD knowledge, tools, or techniques from dual use research could pose a threat to national security requires . . . Certification of researchers conducting dual use research Greater restrictions on access to specific biological agents or toxins Licensure of certain biological equipment that is commonly used in life science research Restrictions on disclosure of details about the research or its findings through personal communication Alteration or removal of certain experimental methods or findings prior to publication or presentation Restrictions on publication of findings based on dual use potential Classification of research findings based on dual use potential

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0 APPENDIX C 17. Dual use research needs greater federal oversight. Strongly Neutral/ Strongly agree Agree No opinion Disagree disagree 18. Principal investigators should be responsible for training lab staff, students, and visiting scientists about dual use research including policies and practices to minimize the potential for misuse of information from their research. Strongly Neutral/ Strongly agree Agree No opinion Disagree disagree 19. University and college students should receive educational lectures and materials on dual use life sciences research including the potential that knowledge, tools, and techniques of such research that could pose a threat to national security. Strongly Neutral/ Strongly agree Agree No opinion Disagree disagree 20. Institutions should provide mandatory training for scientists regard- ing dual use life sciences research. Strongly Neutral/ Strongly agree Agree No opinion Disagree disagree 21. All grant proposals for life sciences research with dual use potential should be reviewed by a researcher’s institution prior to submission for funding. Strongly Neutral/ Strongly agree Agree No opinion Disagree disagree

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 APPENDIX C 22. Funding agencies should require grantees to attest on grant applica- tions that they have considered dual use implications of their proposed research. Strongly Neutral/ Strongly agree Agree No opinion Disagree disagree 23. Funding agencies would be less likely to fund grant proposals if the proposed research had dual use potential. Strongly Neutral/ Strongly agree Agree No opinion Disagree disagree 24. What is the percent chance (ranging from 0 percent chance to 100 percent chance) that an act of bioterrorism will occur somewhere in the world in the next 5 years? _________ % 25. What is the percent chance (ranging from 0 percent chance to 100 percent chance) that an act of bioterrorism will occur in the United States in the next 5 years? _________ % 26. What is the percent chance (ranging from 0 percent chance to 100 percent chance) that knowledge, tools, or techniques from dual use life sciences research will facilitate an act of bioterrorism in the next 5 years? _________ % 27. To date, there have been few acts of bioterrorism. Which of the fol- lowing help explain why? Yes No Don’t Know Terrorists lack the knowledge to work with or create dangerous biological agents. Terrorists lack the equipment to work with or create dangerous biological agents.

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 APPENDIX C Terrorists lack access to dangerous biological agents. Terrorists are deterred by the threat of being caught and punished. Terrorists prefer to use other means. 28. Do the following means of communication provide sufficient infor- mation for an individual with college-level life science training to delib - erately create a harmful biological agent? Yes No Don’t Know Scientific journal articles Presentations at scientific conferences or meetings Personal communications (e.g., e-mail, phone calls) Internet 29. On June 1, 2007, what was your citizenship status? U.S. citizen, since birth or naturalized on-U.S. citizen, with a Permanent U.S. Resident Visa (Green n Card) non-U.S. citizen, with a Temporary U.S. Resident Visa 30. What is the highest educational degree you have been awarded? Bachelor’s degree or equivalent (e.g., B.S., B.A., A.B.) Master’s degree or equivalent (e.g., M.S., M.A., M.B.A.) Doctorate or equivalent (e.g., Ph.D., D.Sc., Ed.D., etc.) ther professional degree (e.g., J.D., L.L.B., M.D., D.D.S., D.V.M., O etc.) Joint doctorate and professional degree (e.g., Ph.D. and M.D.) Other 31. In what year was your highest educational degree awarded? (YYYY)

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 APPENDIX C 32. Which one of the following best describes your current occupational status? Are you . . . Employed Unemployed [goes to question 34] Retired [goes to question 34] Other—please specify [goes to question 34] ________________ 33. Which one of the following best describes your principal employer during the week of June 1, 2007? ndustry (including self-employed, business owner, private sector I employee) Educational institution overnment employee (including city, county, federal, or military G service) Other 34. Which scientific discipline of the following do you consider to be your primary area of work or study? (If currently unemployed or retired, please select the discipline that most closely matches your last occupation.) Agricultural Science Biochemistry Biomedical Engineering Biotechnology Botany Cell Biology Ecology Endocrinology/Physiology Genetics Geology/Soil Sciences/Geography Immunology Marine Biology Medicine Microbiology Molecular Biology Neuroscience Pharmacology Zoology Other: ________________________

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 APPENDIX C 35. Do you have any additional comments regarding regulation and oversight of dual use research you would like federal policy makers to consider? (optional) _____________________________ Thank you very much for taking the time to complete this survey!