VULNERABILITY ASSESSMENT OF AIRCRAFT

A Review of the Department of Defense Live Fire Test and Evaluation Program

Committee on Weapons Effects on Airborne Systems

Air Force Studies Board

Commission on Engineering and Technical Systems

National Research Council

NATIONAL ACADEMY PRESS

Washington, D.C.

1993



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About this PDF file: This new digital representation of the original work has been recomposed from XML files created from the original paper book, not from the original typesetting files. Page breaks are true to the original; line lengths, word breaks, heading styles, and other typesetting-specific formatting, however, cannot be retained, and some typographic errors may have been accidentally inserted. Please use the print version of this publication as the authoritative version for attribution. Washington, D.C. 1993 Air Force Studies Board National Academy Press National Research Council OF AIRCRAFT ASSESSMENT VULNERABILITY Commission on Engineering and Technical Systems Committee on Weapons Effects on Airborne Systems Live Fire Test and Evaluation Program A Review of the Department of Defense

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NATIONAL ACADEMY PRESS • 2101 Constitution Avenue, N.W. • Washington, DC 20418 typesetting files. Page breaks are true to the original; line lengths, word breaks, heading styles, and other typesetting-specific formatting, however, cannot be retained, About this PDF file: This new digital representation of the original work has been recomposed from XML files created from the original paper book, not from the original NOTICE: The project that is the subject of this report was approved by the Governing Board of the National Research and some typographic errors may have been accidentally inserted. Please use the print version of this publication as the authoritative version for attribution. Council, whose members are drawn from the councils of the National Academy of Sciences, the National Academy of Engineering, and the Institute of Medicine. The members of the committee responsible for the report were chosen for their special competence and with regard for appropriate balance. This report has been reviewed by a group other than the authors according to procedures approved by a Report Review Committee consisting of members of the National Academy of Sciences, the National Academy of Engineering, and the Institute of Medicine. The National Academy of Sciences is a private, nonprofit, self-perpetuating society of distinguished scholars engaged in scientific and engineering research, dedicated to the furtherance of science and technology and to their use for the general welfare. Upon the authority of the charter granted to it by the Congress in 1863, the Academy has a mandate that requires it to advise the federal government on scientific and technical matters. Dr. Frank Press is president of the National Academy of Sciences. The National Academy of Engineering was established in 1964, under the charter of the National Academy of Sciences, as a parallel organization of outstanding engineers. It is autonomous in its administration and in the selection of its members, sharing with the National Academy of Sciences the responsibility for advising the federal government. The National Academy of Engineering also sponsors engineering programs aimed at meeting national needs, encourages education and research, and recognizes the superior achievements of engineers. Dr. Robert M. White is president of the National Academy of Engineering. The Institute of Medicine was established in 1970 by the National Academy of Sciences to secure the services of eminent members of appropriate professions in the examination of policy matters pertaining to the health of the public. The Institute acts under the responsibility given to the National Academy of Sciences by its congressional charter to be an adviser to the federal government and, upon its own initiative, to identify issues of medical care, research, and education. Dr. Kenneth I.Shine is the president of the Institute of Medicine. The National Research Council was organized by the National Academy of Sciences in 1916 to associate the broad community of science and technology with the Academy’s purposes of furthering knowledge and advising the federal government. Functioning in accordance with general policies determined by the Academy, the Council has become the principal operating agency of both the National Academy of Sciences and the National Academy of Engineering in providing services to the government, the public, and the scientific and engineering communities. The Council is administered jointly by both Academies and the Institute of Medicine. Dr. Frank Press and Dr. Robert M.White are chairman and vice chairman, respectively, of the National Research Council. This is a report of work supported by Agreement No. MDA970-91-C-0004 from the Department of Defense to the National Academy of Sciences-National Research Council. Copyright 1993 by the National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved. Printed in the United States of America

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typesetting files. Page breaks are true to the original; line lengths, word breaks, heading styles, and other typesetting-specific formatting, however, cannot be retained, About this PDF file: This new digital representation of the original work has been recomposed from XML files created from the original paper book, not from the original and some typographic errors may have been accidentally inserted. Please use the print version of this publication as the authoritative version for attribution. Committee on Weapons Effects on Airborne Systems ROBERT E.BALL, Chairman, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California CHARLES W.BERNARD, Consultant, Arlington, Virginia ROBERT M.HILLYER, Orincon Corporation, San Diego, California, WALTER B.LABERGE, Consultant, Mission Viejo, California HYLA S.NAPADENSKY, Napadensky Energetics, Inc., Evanston, Illinois HARRY L.REED, Consultant, Aberdeen, Maryland ROBERT G.S.SEWELL, Consultant, Ridgecrest, California DONN A.STARRY, U.S. Army (retired), Fairfax, Virginia ARTHUR STEIN, Consultant, Institute for Defense Analyses, Alexandria, Virginia LAWRENCE G.ULLYATT, Denver Research Institute, Denver, Colorado Liaison COL Bernard (Chip) B.Ferguson, Office of the Director, Test and Evaluation Project Staff RICHARD E.ENTLICH, Study Director MARY C.PECHACEK, Study Assistant Air Force Studies Board Staff RICHARD E.ENTLICH, Director JOSEPH A.BREEN, Senior Staff Officer MARY C.PECHACEK, Administrative Associate PHILIP J.WALSH, Administrative Assistant ALICIA A.CLARK, Senior Project Assistant iii

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typesetting files. Page breaks are true to the original; line lengths, word breaks, heading styles, and other typesetting-specific formatting, however, cannot be retained, About this PDF file: This new digital representation of the original work has been recomposed from XML files created from the original paper book, not from the original and some typographic errors may have been accidentally inserted. Please use the print version of this publication as the authoritative version for attribution. Air Force Studies Board JOSEPH F.SHEA, Chairman, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge WALTER R.BEAM, Consultant, Alexandria, Virginia JOSEPHINE D.DAVIS, York College, Jamaica, New York GILBERT F.DECKER, ACUREX Environmental Corporation, Mountain View, California STEVEN D.DORFMAN, Hughes Aircraft Co., Los Angeles, California WILLIAM J.EVANS, U.S. Air Force (retired), Boothbay Harbor, Maine CRAIG L.FISCHER, Fischer Associates, Indio, California WESLEY L.HARRIS, University of Tennessee Space Institute, Tullahoma JAMES E.HUBBARD, JR., OPTRON Systems, Bedford, Massachusetts WALTER B.LABERGE, Consultant, Mission Viejo, California JAMES W.MAR, Consultant, Pacific Grove, California GEORGE H.MILEY, University of Illinois, Urbana HYLA S.NAPADENSKY, Napadensky Energetics, Inc., Evanston, Illinois LAWRENCE R.RABINER, AT&T Bell Laboratories, Murray Hill, New Jersey Air Force Materiel Command Liaisons Dr. Allan C.Schell, AFMC/ST, Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio LTCOL Larry P.Davis, AFOSR/ST, Andrews Air Force Base, District of Columbia iv

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typesetting files. Page breaks are true to the original; line lengths, word breaks, heading styles, and other typesetting-specific formatting, however, cannot be retained, About this PDF file: This new digital representation of the original work has been recomposed from XML files created from the original paper book, not from the original and some typographic errors may have been accidentally inserted. Please use the print version of this publication as the authoritative version for attribution. Preface The combat vulnerability of a military vehicle, that is, the inability of the vehicle to withstand the damage caused by a man-made hostile environment, is a critical system characteristic. A vehicle’s vulnerability can be assessed or evaluated by the use of analytical models and by empirical live fire testing. Many within the Department of Defense (DoD) hold the opinion that live fire testing can be very expensive relative to the value of the results obtained. Consequently, there has been a reluctance within DoD to conduct realistic tests on new systems during their development. This reluctance was brought into the public domain in the mid-1980s when the U.S. Army was accused of not conducting realistic vulnerability tests on its Bradley Fighting Vehicle. As a consequence of this reluctance by DoD to conduct realistic live fire tests on systems in development, Congress passed legislation in fiscal year 1987 that requires realistic vulnerability testing of covered weapon systems, including aircraft, before they can proceed beyond Low Rate Initial Production. This legislation is known as the Live Fire Test (LFT) law. The realistic vulnerability tests mandated by the LFT law must be conducted on the system, configured for combat, using weapons likely to be encountered in combat. A waiver from these mandated tests is possible if the Secretary of Defense certifies to Congress, prior to entry into engineering and manufacturing development, that such tests are unreasonably expensive and impractical. An alternate plan for assessing vulnerability must be submitted if a waiver to the mandated system tests is given. In response to the LFT law, the position of Director, Live Fire Testing, was established under the Office of the Deputy Director of Defense Research and Engineering (Test and Evaluation) [DDDR&E(T&E)] and was given the responsibility for implementing the law. The Live Fire Test & Evaluation (LFT&E) Guidelines were written in 1988 by the Test and Evaluation Committee, and the LFT&E Planning Guide was written in 1989 by the Director, LFT, to assist the system program managers in the preparation of test plans that satisfy the law. In spite of these efforts, the historical reluctance to conduct realistic vulnerability tests v

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vi PREFACE on aircraft systems in development has persisted. Furthermore, ambiguities in the wording of the typesetting files. Page breaks are true to the original; line lengths, word breaks, heading styles, and other typesetting-specific formatting, however, cannot be retained, law, and in the published guidance for satisfying the law, have resulted in different interpretations About this PDF file: This new digital representation of the original work has been recomposed from XML files created from the original paper book, not from the original of the law’s requirements regarding what must be tested and what weapons must be used. Considerable controversy between the LFT Office and the Services has developed as a consequence of these different interpretations of the law’s requirements. and some typographic errors may have been accidentally inserted. Please use the print version of this publication as the authoritative version for attribution. In an attempt to resolve the controversy regarding the law’s requirements, and to obtain an independent opinion regarding the total vulnerability assessment process and the law’s contribution to that process, the DDDR&E(T&E), now the Director, Test and Evaluation, requested that the National Research Council (NRC) conduct a study of aircraft vulnerability assessment. The NRC appointed the Committee on Weapons Effects on Airborne Systems to conduct this study. This report is the result of the committee’s deliberations. The committee was asked to review the two methodologies used to assess the vulnerability of airborne systems (i.e., analysis/modeling and live fire testing) and to identify and evaluate the costs and effectiveness of these methodologies. Recommendations regarding the most appropriate methodology for each application were requested. In particular, the current direction of the congressionally mandated LFT&E program was to be reviewed and recommendations for change were requested, if appropriate. The tasks assigned to the committee were carried out by examining the two aircraft vulnerability assessment methodologies and the LFT law from the general point of view that the purpose of any assessment and of the law is to obtain information on the vulnerability of aircraft. This information can be described in terms of the information attributes of (1) types, amounts, and applications; (2) the accuracy of, or level of confidence in, the information; and (3) the cost required to obtain the information. In addition, the LFT law was considered to be a mandated application of the live fire test methodology. Accordingly, Chapter 1 presents a review of the two methodologies and identifies the applications of the results from these methodologies. Chapter 2 presents an evaluation of the cost, effectiveness, and deficiencies of the two methodologies based upon the three information attributes described above. Chapter 3 presents a review of the LFT&E program directed by the LFT Office. Chapter 4 contains the LFT programs of the three Services and the views of the Services’ LFT test community and of industry. Chapter 5 presents the committee’s view of the future of vulnerability assessment, and Chapter 6 gives the committee’s conclusions and recommendations. The LFT law and the major issues and conclusions of two earlier studies of vulnerability assessment and live fire testing of military vehicles by the U.S. General Accounting Office and the Board on Army Science and Technology are presented in Appendixes A, B, and C, respectively. The committee believes that its recommendations merit serious consideration and that the results of this study should eliminate, or at least significantly reduce, the controversy that has revolved around the LFT law. The committee, in its deliberations, discovered that the controversy over the LFT law was aggravated by several inconsistent definitions of important words and terms used in vulnerability assessment. Consequently, the committee has included the various published definitions as well as those selected for use in this report in the following chapter entitled “Definitions.” The key definitions used in the report are live fire test (any test that involves the firing of actual munitions at a target); Live Fire Test (a live fire test that is part of the congressionally mandated LFT&E program); full-scale or complete system test (a test conducted on the complete or total system, with or without the full complement of fuel, ammunition, and hydraulic fluid carried into combat); sub-scale or partial system test (a test conducted on a part of the system, such as a component, a subsystem, or a subassembly, with or without the full complement of fuel, ammunition, and hydraulic fluid carried into combat); and full-up test (a test conducted on a complete or a partial system with the full complement of fuel, ammunition, and hydraulic fluid carried by the system into combat). The committee held four meetings. The first meeting was in July 1991 in Washington, D.C. The committee received briefings from the study sponsor, the Live Fire Test Office, the Tactical Warfare Programs Office, the Joint Live Fire Test Program Office, and the

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PREFACE vii aircraft vulnerability analysis/modeling community. This was followed by a meeting in typesetting files. Page breaks are true to the original; line lengths, word breaks, heading styles, and other typesetting-specific formatting, however, cannot be retained, September 1991 in Washington, D.C., when the committee heard briefings from the Army, Navy, About this PDF file: This new digital representation of the original work has been recomposed from XML files created from the original paper book, not from the original and Air Force Live Fire Test officials, the Ballistic Research Laboratory, the Institute for Defense Analyses, and the program offices of several major systems. In January 1992, the committee met at the Arnold and Mabel Beckman Center in Irvine, California, and heard briefings from several and some typographic errors may have been accidentally inserted. Please use the print version of this publication as the authoritative version for attribution. industry representatives involved with Live Fire Testing and from the Director, Live Fire Testing. During this month, several of the committee members also met with the congressional staffer who drafted the LFT law. The committee conducted a report writing session in April 1992. The individuals who contributed to the work of the committee during the course of this study are too numerous to be listed separately here. However, in addition to the initial guidance provided by Mr. Charles Adolph, the study sponsor, the committee would like to acknowledge with gratitude the assistance received from personnel from the Live Fire Test Office, the Joint Live Fire Test Program Office, the Institute for Defense Analyses, the Ballistic Research Laboratory, the Army/Navy/Air Force Live Fire Test Offices and major Program Offices, and representatives from Boeing, General Dynamics, McDonnell-Douglas, and Northrop. The committee also wishes to thank the staff of the Air Force Studies Board and the sponsor liaison, COL Bernard (Chip) Ferguson, for providing excellent support throughout this study. Robert E.Ball Chairman

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About this PDF file: This new digital representation of the original work has been recomposed from XML files created from the original paper book, not from the original typesetting files. Page breaks are true to the original; line lengths, word breaks, heading styles, and other typesetting-specific formatting, however, cannot be retained, and some typographic errors may have been accidentally inserted. Please use the print version of this publication as the authoritative version for attribution.

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typesetting files. Page breaks are true to the original; line lengths, word breaks, heading styles, and other typesetting-specific formatting, however, cannot be retained, About this PDF file: This new digital representation of the original work has been recomposed from XML files created from the original paper book, not from the original and some typographic errors may have been accidentally inserted. Please use the print version of this publication as the authoritative version for attribution. Contents Page LIST OF FIGURES xii LIST OF TABLES xiii DEFINITIONS xiv STATEMENT OF TASK xviii EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 1 CHAPTER 1: REVIEW OF CURRENT METHODOLOGIES USED TO ASSESS AIRCRAFT VULNERABILITY AND IDENTIFICATION OF APPLICATIONS OF THE RESULTS 11 What Are the Threats to Military Aircraft? 11 What Is Aircraft Vulnerability? 11 What Is a Vulnerability Assessment? 14 How Is Vulnerability Measured? 15 What Are the Two Methodologies Used to Assess Vulnerability? 15 What Are the Joint Live Fire and Live Fire Test Programs? 21 What Are the Applications of the Results of the Assessments? 22 Previous Studies of Vulnerability Assessment with Emphasis on Live Fire Testing 23 ix

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x CONTENTS References 24 typesetting files. Page breaks are true to the original; line lengths, word breaks, heading styles, and other typesetting-specific formatting, however, cannot be retained, About this PDF file: This new digital representation of the original work has been recomposed from XML files created from the original paper book, not from the original CHAPTER 2: EVALUATION OF THE COST, EFFECTIVENESS, AND DEFICIENCIES OF THESE METHODOLOGIES 26 Analysis/Modeling 26 and some typographic errors may have been accidentally inserted. Please use the print version of this publication as the authoritative version for attribution. Live Fire Testing 29 Advantages and Disadvantages of Analysis/Modeling and Live Fire Testing 36 Conclusion 36 References 37 CHAPTER 3: THE OSD LIVE FIRE TEST AND EVALUATION PROGRAM 38 The LFT Program Approach 39 Controversy Regarding the Definition of “Realistic Survivability Testing” 40 Conclusion 41 References 41 CHAPTER 4: LIVE FIRE TEST PROGRAMS OF THE THREE SERVICES, AND VIEWS OF THE TEST COMMUNITY AND INDUSTRY 42 The Army LFT&E Programs 42 The Navy LFT&E Programs 44 The Air Force LFT&E Programs 46 The Test Community’s View of Live Fire Testing 51 The Industry View of Live Fire Testing 51 Controversy Regarding Which Munitions to Use in the Live Fire Testing Program 51 A Program Manager’s View of the Live Fire Test Law 53 Issues Relating to Distrust Among the Participants in Live Fire Testing 53 Conclusion 53 References 54 CHAPTER 5: THE FUTURE OF VULNERABILITY ASSESSMENT 55 Characteristics of the Future DoD Environment 55 Crucial Requirements of Future Vulnerability Assessment Procedures and Infrastructure 56 Categories for Cost Reduction in Vulnerability Assessment While Maintaining or Improving the Current Assessment Capabilities 56 Reference 58 CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 59 Conclusions 59 Recommendations 62 The Future 64 Reference 64 APPENDIXES Appendix A. Live Fire Test Legislation 67 Appendix B. The General Accounting Office Study: Live Fire Testing; Evaluating DoD’s Programs 70

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About this PDF file: This new digital representation of the original work has been recomposed from XML files created from the original paper book, not from the original typesetting files. Page breaks are true to the original; line lengths, word breaks, heading styles, and other typesetting-specific formatting, however, cannot be retained, and some typographic errors may have been accidentally inserted. Please use the print version of this publication as the authoritative version for attribution. CONTENTS ACRONYMS JTCG/AS Pk/h Workshop Vehicle Vulnerability to Anti-Armor Weapons Appendix D. Preliminary Recommendations from the of the Army’s Assessment Methodology for Combat Appendix C. Board on Army Science & Technology Review xi 83 81 78

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typesetting files. Page breaks are true to the original; line lengths, word breaks, heading styles, and other typesetting-specific formatting, however, cannot be retained, About this PDF file: This new digital representation of the original work has been recomposed from XML files created from the original paper book, not from the original and some typographic errors may have been accidentally inserted. Please use the print version of this publication as the authoritative version for attribution. List of Figures Page 1-1 The attrition kill tree for a two-piloted, two-engined helicopter 15 1-2 Example of a grid and random shotlines from FASTGEN for COVART 17 1-3 Grid cells and shotlines for the contact-fuzed high explosive weapon 18 1-4 Aircraft vulnerability to the externally detonating HE warhead 18 2-1 Relationship among the probability of occurrence on each test, the number of tests, and the probability of at least one observation over the number of tests 32 4-1 Program/ballistics detailed schedule for the COMANCHE 44 4-2 Live Fire Test and Evaluation of Navy aircraft 45 4-3 Vulnerability assessment methodology for the F-22 48 4-4 Vulnerability program for the F-22 49 4-5 Vulnerability requirements for the F-22 50 xii

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About this PDF file: This new digital representation of the original work has been recomposed from XML files created from the original paper book, not from the original typesetting files. Page breaks are true to the original; line lengths, word breaks, heading styles, and other typesetting-specific formatting, however, cannot be retained, and some typographic errors may have been accidentally inserted. Please use the print version of this publication as the authoritative version for attribution. 2-2 2-1 1-4 1-3 1-2 1-1 xiii List of Tables Applications of the Methodologies Live Fire Test Options for the C-17A on a Single-Piloted, Two-Engined Helicopter Definitions of Types of Test Articles and Type of Tests List of Some Subsystem Damaged-Caused Failure (Kill) Modes List of Typical Nonredundant and Redundant Critical Components Relative Advantages and Disadvantages of the Two Methodologies 35 24 34 14 Page 13 20

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typesetting files. Page breaks are true to the original; line lengths, word breaks, heading styles, and other typesetting-specific formatting, however, cannot be retained, About this PDF file: This new digital representation of the original work has been recomposed from XML files created from the original paper book, not from the original and some typographic errors may have been accidentally inserted. Please use the print version of this publication as the authoritative version for attribution. Definitions Many of the important words and terms used in the survivability, lethality, and live fire test disciplines have been defined in several public documents. The published definitions of the words and terms of particular interest to this study are given in the Table below. Previously Published Definitions configured for combat The term “configured for combat,” with respect to a weapon system, platform, or vehicle, means loaded or equipped with all dangerous materials (including all flammables and explosives) that would normally be on board in combat (U.S. Congress, 1986–1989). covered product improvement program A program under which a modification will be made to a covered system that (as determined by the Secretary of Defense) is likely to affect significantly the survivability of such system (U.S. Congress, 1986–1989). covered system A vehicle, weapon platform, or conventional weapon system that includes features designed to provide some degree of protection to users in combat and is a major system (see section 2303(5) of title 10 U.S. Code for the definition of a major system) (U.S. Congress, 1986–1989). damage mechanism The output of a warhead that causes damage to the aircraft (Ball, 1985). damage process The interaction between the damage mechanism and the aircraft components (Ball, 1985). xiv

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DEFINITIONS xv full-scale tests Those conducted on complete weapons systems typesetting files. Page breaks are true to the original; line lengths, word breaks, heading styles, and other typesetting-specific formatting, however, cannot be retained, rather than components or mock-ups (GAO, 1987). About this PDF file: This new digital representation of the original work has been recomposed from XML files created from the original paper book, not from the original full-up testing Firings against a full-scale target containing all the dangerous materials (e.g., ammunition, fuel, hydraulic and some typographic errors may have been accidentally inserted. Please use the print version of this publication as the authoritative version for attribution. fluids), system parts (e.g., electrical lines with operating voltages and currents applied, hydraulic lines containing appropriate fluids at operating pressures), and stowage items normally found on that target when operating in combat. Full-up testing includes firings against full-up components, full-up subsystems, full-up subassemblies, or full-up systems. The term “full-up testing” is synonymous with “realistic survivability testing” or “realistic lethality testing” as defined in the legislation covering Live Fire Testing (OSD, 1988; DDDR&E, 1989). full-up tests Those conducted with the full complement of fuel, ammunition, and hydraulic fluid carried by the system into combat (GAO, 1987). Live Fire Test A test event within an overall Live Fire Test & Evaluation program that involves the firing of actual munitions at target components, target subsystems, target subassemblies, and/or full-scale targets to examine personnel casualty, vulnerability, and/or lethality issues (OSD, 1988; DDDR&E, 1989). Live Fire Test and Evaluation The program conducted by the Director, Live Fire Testing, Office of the Director of Defense Research (LFT&E) Program and Engineering and described in (DDDR&E, 1989). Live Fire Test law Legislation in the fiscal year 1987 Department of Defense Authorization Act that requires realistic survivability testing before a covered system can proceed beyond low-rate initial production (U.S. Congress, 1986–1989). realistic survivability testing The term “realistic survivability testing” means testing for vulnerability of the system in combat by firing munitions likely to be encountered in combat (or munitions with a capability similar to such munitions) at the system configured for combat, with primary emphasis on testing vulnerability with respect to potential user casualties and by taking into equal consideration the susceptibility to attack and combat performance of the system (U.S. Congress, 1986– 1989). simulants Fabricated substitutes for unavailable threat weapons or targets (GAO, 1987). sub-scale tests Any tests conducted on less-than-full-scale target weapon systems, such as component vulnerability tests or behind-armor-debris studies (GAO, 1987). surrogate Any existing munition or target substituted for one that is unavailable for testing on the basis of similarity (GAO, 1987). survivability The capability of an aircraft to avoid and/or withstand a man-made hostile environment (Ball, 1985).

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xvi DEFINITIONS The ability of a weapon system to avoid being killed typesetting files. Page breaks are true to the original; line lengths, word breaks, heading styles, and other typesetting-specific formatting, however, cannot be retained, in battle, including its vulnerability if hit, but also About this PDF file: This new digital representation of the original work has been recomposed from XML files created from the original paper book, not from the original taking other factors such as maneuverability and the ability to avoid detection into account (GAO, 1987). and some typographic errors may have been accidentally inserted. Please use the print version of this publication as the authoritative version for attribution. susceptibility The inability of an aircraft to avoid the radars, guns, ballistic projectiles, guided missiles, exploding warheads, and other elements that make up the hostile environment. It can be measured in a general sense by PH, the probability the aircraft is hit by one or more damage-causing mechanisms, such as a bullet, fragment, or blast wave (Ball, 1985). Comprises all the capabilities and characteristics of a target and threat that influence or determine the probability that the target is hit, including the threat capability to detect, lock on, track, and fire, and the target capability to evade the threat (GAO, 1987). vulnerability The inability of an aircraft to withstand the damage caused by the hostile environment. Vulnerability can be measured by PK/H, the conditional probability that the aircraft is killed given a hit by a damage mechanism, such as a bullet or fragment, or by PK/D, the conditional probability that the aircraft is killed by a warhead detonation (Ball, 1985). The inability of a weapon system to withstand damage from a specific attack, given that it has been hit (GAO, 1987). The committee notes that the definitions for several of the words and terms given above either are not consistent or do not conform with conventional usage. This inconsistency and lack of conformity has created considerable confusion. The committee has reviewed these definitions and has selected the definitions given below as the ones to use throughout this report. Definitions Used in This Report live fire test Any test that involves the firing of actual munitions at a target. Live Fire Test A live fire test that is a part of the congressionally mandated LFT&E program. full-scale or complete system test A test conducted on the complete or total system, with or without the full complement of fuel, ammunition, and hydraulic fluid carried into combat. sub-scale or partial system test A test conducted on a part of the system, such as a component, a subsystem, or a subassembly, with or without the full complement of fuel, ammunition, and hydraulic fluid carried into combat. full-up test A test conducted on a complete system or a partial system, with the full complement of fuel, ammunition, and hydraulic fluid carried by the system into combat.

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DEFINITIONS xvii inert test A test conducted on a complete system or a partial typesetting files. Page breaks are true to the original; line lengths, word breaks, heading styles, and other typesetting-specific formatting, however, cannot be retained, system, without the full complement of fuel, About this PDF file: This new digital representation of the original work has been recomposed from XML files created from the original paper book, not from the original ammunition, and hydraulic fluid carried by the system into combat. A semi-inert test is one in which some of the combustibles are on-board. and some typographic errors may have been accidentally inserted. Please use the print version of this publication as the authoritative version for attribution. Note the important distinction between a live fire test and a Live Fire Test. Also note that a “complete system test” is equivalent to a “full-scale test,” and a “partial system test” is equivalent to a “sub-scale test.” Furthermore, the term “full-up test” does not imply that a complete system is tested. References • Ball, R.E., 1985. The Fundamentals of Aircraft Survivability Analysis and Design, American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics, Inc., New York. • Deputy Director, Defense Research & Engineering (DDDR&E), 1989. Fire Test and Evaluation Planning Guide, Live Fire Testing Office. • Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), Test and Evaluation Committee, 1988. Live Fire Test and Evaluation Guidelines, Memorandum for Assistant Secretary of the Army (Research Development and Acquisition), Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Research Development and Acquisition), and Assistant Secretary of the Air Force (Acquisition). • U.S. Congress, 1986–1989. Survivability and Lethality Testing of Major Systems, DoD Authorization Acts, FY86—Sec. 123, FY87—Sec. 910, FY88-89—Sec. 802, Washington, D.C. • U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO), 1987. LIVE FIRE TESTING, Evaluating DoD’s Programs, GAO/PEMD-87-17, Washington, D.C., U.S. Government Printing Office.

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typesetting files. Page breaks are true to the original; line lengths, word breaks, heading styles, and other typesetting-specific formatting, however, cannot be retained, About this PDF file: This new digital representation of the original work has been recomposed from XML files created from the original paper book, not from the original and some typographic errors may have been accidentally inserted. Please use the print version of this publication as the authoritative version for attribution. Statement of Task There is concern by the Director, Test and Evaluation, for evaluating airborne systems level vulnerability assessment methodologies. Several methodologies such as computer modeling, engineering analysis, and live-fire testing are available to the Services. The committee will: 1. review current methodologies used by the Army, Navy, and Air Force to determine the vulnerability of airborne systems to enemy conventional weapons and identify the applications of the results; 2. evaluate the costs and the effectiveness of these methodologies and identify deficiencies; 3. recommend the most appropriate methodologies for the applications, weighing the confidence in the results versus costs; 4. in particular, review the current direction on live fire testing and evaluation, compare this direction to the committee’s recommended methodologies, and recommend changes, if appropriate. xviii