6
Conclusions and Recommendations

Conclusions

After reviewing the vulnerability assessment methodologies, evaluating the cost, effectiveness, and deficiencies of these methodologies, and reviewing the Live Fire Test (LFT) law and the Department of Defense (DoD) Live Fire Test & Evaluation (LFT&E) program, the committee has come to the following conclusions.

  • Conclusions Regarding the Live Fire Test Law & the DoD LFT&E Programs

  1. The committee believes that the requirements in the Live Fire Test law have been interpreted in several ways and that these different interpretations have caused confusion and tension in the Live Fire Test programs. Nevertheless, the committee believes that the law is a valuable contribution to vulnerability assessment and to the design of survivable aircraft. Furthermore, it is satisfactory in its present form because of the waiver process. The committee believes that verification of vulnerability by live fire testing is necessary and that this law ensures that verification.

  2. The committee believes that the 1987 congressional Live Fire Test law mandates live fire testing of full-scale, full-up aircraft, including on-board ordnance, unless a waiver is granted by the Secretary of Defense. Therefore, any LFT&E program that has not received a waiver must conduct full-scale, full-up tests. This law was written because of Congress’s belief that the Services were reluctant to fully test the vulnerability of their systems as they were being developed. The program that evoked the law was the Army’s Bradley Armored Fighting Vehicle (AFV). The AFVs were being purchased before their vulnerability was fully known. Because of Congress’s concern that a similar situation may exist for systems other than armored vehicles, it made the law applicable to all covered systems, including aircraft. According to the fiscal year (FY) 1988–1989 DoD Authorization Act Conference report, “The conferees intend that the Secretary of Defense implement this section (2366) in a manner which encourages the conduct of full-up vulnerability and lethality tests under realistic combat conditions, first at the sub-scale level as sub-scale systems are developed, and later at the full-scale level mandated in the legislation” (U.S. Congress, 1988).

  3. The committee believes that the 1988 Live Fire Test & Evaluation Guidelines and the 1989 Live Fire Test & Evaluation Planning Guide are not consistent with its interpretation of the LFT law. The Navy and the Air Force have interpreted the 1988 LFT&E Guidelines to imply that full-scale, full-up tests are not required. Furthermore, the LFT&E policies presented to the committee do not consider such tests to be cost-effective, particularly if on-board ordnance is included. Consequently, neither Service has developed LFT&E programs that contain full-scale, full-up Live Fire Tests. However, both Services strongly support the conduct of sub-scale inert and full-up tests throughout the development process. The Army policy on LFT&E supports



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typesetting files. Page breaks are true to the original; line lengths, word breaks, heading styles, and other typesetting-specific formatting, however, cannot be retained, About this PDF file: This new digital representation of the original work has been recomposed from XML files created from the original paper book, not from the original and some typographic errors may have been accidentally inserted. Please use the print version of this publication as the authoritative version for attribution. Conclusions and Recommendations 6 test the vulnerability of their systems as they were being Conclusions developed. The program that evoked the law was the Army’s Bradley Armored Fighting Vehicle (AFV). The AFVs were After reviewing the vulnerability assessment methodologies, being purchased before their vulnerability was fully known. evaluating the cost, effectiveness, and deficiencies of these Because of Congress’s concern that a similar situation may methodologies, and reviewing the Live Fire Test (LFT) law exist for systems other than armored vehicles, it made the law and the Department of Defense (DoD) Live Fire Test & applicable to all covered systems, including aircraft. Evaluation (LFT&E) program, the committee has come to the According to the fiscal year (FY) 1988–1989 DoD following conclusions. Authorization Act Conference report, “The conferees intend • Conclusions Regarding the Live Fire Test Law & the that the Secretary of Defense implement this section (2366) DoD LFT&E Programs in a manner which encourages the conduct of full-up 1. The committee believes that the requirements in the vulnerability and lethality tests under realistic combat Live Fire Test law have been interpreted in several ways conditions, first at the sub-scale level as sub-scale systems and that these different interpretations have caused are developed, and later at the full-scale level mandated in confusion and tension in the Live Fire Test programs. the legislation” (U.S. Congress, 1988). Nevertheless, the committee believes that the law is a 3. The committee believes that the 1988 Live Fire Test valuable contribution to vulnerability assessment and to the & Evaluation Guidelines and the 1989 Live Fire Test & design of survivable aircraft. Furthermore, it is satisfactory Evaluation Planning Guide are not consistent with its in its present form because of the waiver process. The interpretation of the LFT law. The Navy and the Air Force committee believes that verification of vulnerability by live have interpreted the 1988 LFT&E Guidelines to imply that fire testing is necessary and that this law ensures that full-scale, full-up tests are not required. Furthermore, the verification. LFT&E policies presented to the committee do not consider 2. The committee believes that the 1987 congressional such tests to be cost-effective, particularly if on-board Live Fire Test law mandates live fire testing of full-scale, ordnance is included. Consequently, neither Service has full-up aircraft, including on-board ordnance, unless a developed LFT&E programs that contain full-scale, full-up waiver is granted by the Secretary of Defense. Therefore, Live Fire Tests. However, both Services strongly support the any LFT&E program that has not received a waiver must conduct of sub-scale inert and full-up tests throughout the conduct full-scale, full-up tests. This law was written because development process. The Army policy on LFT&E supports of Congress’s belief that the Services were reluctant to fully 59

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60 VULNERABILITY ASSESSMENT OF AIRCRAFT a “building-block” approach consisting of component testing associated with such a request. The Committee holds the typesetting files. Page breaks are true to the original; line lengths, word breaks, heading styles, and other typesetting-specific formatting, however, cannot be retained, About this PDF file: This new digital representation of the original work has been recomposed from XML files created from the original paper book, not from the original through full-scale, full-up system testing that satisfies the Live opinion that the waiver is an acceptable alternate LFT&E path. Fire Test law. The Army also strongly supports subscale testing. The waiver is accepted by Congress as reasonable when the The emphasis of its LFT&E program is on sub-scale testing, full-scale, full-up tests are certified by the Secretary of Defense with limited full-scale, full-up testing to confirm the results to be unreasonably expensive and impractical, and an and some typographic errors may have been accidentally inserted. Please use the print version of this publication as the authoritative version for attribution. obtained from the sub-scale testing. However, the Army LFT&E alternative plan for realistic vulnerability testing is proposed. program for the RAH-66 did not contain firm plans for testing No approval by Congress is necessary if the certification is a full-scale, full-up helicopter; the full-scale testing was going given before the system enters full-scale engineering to be conducted only if the sub-scale test results showed it to development. be necessary. 8. A serious problem in both the analyses and the Joint 4. Because all three Services believe that an LFT&E Live Fire Testing (JLF) of aircraft has been the omission of program plan that contains only sub-scale testing is in on-board ordnance as a critical component. It may be one of compliance with the law as interpreted by the Office of the the largest contributors to vulnerability, particularly for aircraft Secretary of Defense (OSD) 1988 LFT&E Guidelines, no that carry the ordnance internally. Alternatively, on-board waivers have been requested. The OSD Live Fire Test Office ordnance may reduce the aircraft’s vulnerability by shielding has been unable to convince them that an LFT&E program critical components. Analysis and testing must be conducted that does not contain full-scale, full-up tests is not in compliance both with and without on-board ordnance in order to properly with the law. This conflict in interpretation is exacerbated by account for this materiel. the fact that all of the current Service aircraft acquisition 9. The stated intent of the full-scale, full-up tests mandated programs were under way at the time the law was written. by the Live Fire Test law is to aid in design by providing Furthermore, the 1987 law made no provisions for funding information on any weaknesses sufficiently early in the these tests. It is difficult to make a major change, such as that design process to allow the weaknesses to be corrected. required by the LFT law, in the middle of a test and evaluation However, the Services and industry believe that the full-scale (T&E) program without additional funding and schedule LFTs are conducted too late in the development cycle to have delays. any impact on the design. The committee believes that if no 5. The committee believes that a waiver is required to major vulnerabilities are discovered in the full-scale tests, this omit the full-scale, full-up tests. Congress recognized that there information is of great value to the acquisition decision makers, may be weapon systems for which a full-scale, full-up test and if a major vulnerability is discovered, it should be program is unreasonably expensive and impractical when it corrected. Other arguments against the full-scale, full-up tests wrote the LFT law. Therefore, it included a provision for the are the facts that full-scale tests may be conducted on a Secretary of Defense to grant a waiver from such tests, provided nonrepresentative target and consume money that could be a plan for alternatives to realistic vulnerability testing is used for more of the earlier sub-scale tests. Counterarguments prepared. are that there is much to be learned from testing full-scale 6. The committee believes that there are aircraft for which targets similar to the complete system and that sufficient funds a full-scale, full-up test program is unreasonably expensive need to be programmed for vulnerability testing. Vulnerability and impractical, and that there are aircraft for which a full- testing is an important T&E task in the acquisition process scale, full-up test program is neither unreasonably expensive that has been significantly underfunded in the past. The nor impractical. Thus, there are programs for which a waiver committee believes there is a place for full-scale testing is justified and programs for which a waiver is not justified. somewhere in the life of the aircraft. For those aircraft in which The committee also believes that in order to make the waiver full-scale, full-up testing is unreasonably expensive and process a viable alternative LFT path, the waiver process must impractical during the full-scale development phase, later full- be formalized. This formal process must contain a procedure up tests on production aircraft that are no longer operational, that can identify when the full-scale, full-up tests are such as done in the JLF program, can impact any subsequent unreasonably expensive and impractical, and when they are modifications of the aircraft, as well as future aircraft designs. not. This formal procedure would remove the threat of a stigma 10. The implied intent of the Live Fire Test law is to being associated with a waiver. force the consideration of vulnerability during the design 7. The committee believes there should be no stigma process. In the programs the committee examined, evidence attached to a waiver because the waiver is an acceptable of early considerations of vulnerability was obvious. Thus, alternative LFT&E path. Apparently, the Services are opposed even though full-scale live fire tests had not been planned or to requesting a waiver for any program because of the conducted, the law has had beneficial effects. The committee apprehension that their program will suffer in some manner as believes that additional motivation to consider vulnerability a result of the waiver. They believe that a stigma will be in the design can be obtained by placing realistic design

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CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 61 requirements on the maximum amount of vulnerability allowed analysis/modeling methodology is a T&E issue. The committee typesetting files. Page breaks are true to the original; line lengths, word breaks, heading styles, and other typesetting-specific formatting, however, cannot be retained, About this PDF file: This new digital representation of the original work has been recomposed from XML files created from the original paper book, not from the original at program inception. This requirement on the design, coupled believes that the separation may be a major contributor of the with appropriate live fire testing and the Live Fire Test law, current problem. By combining the oversight of the two would better meet the intent of the LFT law and good DoD methodologies, the proper emphasis can be given to each design practice. methodology. The committee believes that in the future DoD and some typographic errors may have been accidentally inserted. Please use the print version of this publication as the authoritative version for attribution. 11. The lack of a definition of the specific threat munitions environment of prototypes and deferred production, overall to be used in design and in Live Fire Testing has resulted in vulnerability reduction in the design can best be served by the considerable controversy regarding which threat weapons integration of analyses and supporting live fire tests. to use in the Services’ LFT programs. Even the cursory review • Conclusions Regarding the Vulnerability Assessment of threats posed to the systems examined by the committee Methodologies leads to the conclusion that the design threats are probably 13. Based upon its review of the two methodologies, the not the only threats likely to be encountered in combat. committee concludes that both vulnerability analysis and Furthermore, other threats likely to be encountered in combat live fire testing, including the mandated Live Fire Testing, may be more lethal than the design threats. This is particularly are essential in a mix peculiar to each aircraft development true for the C-17, and possibly the RAH-66. Nevertheless, the program. The committee believes that a primary application acquisition process must include a threat projection and a for these methodologies should be to aid in the design of design threat selection as an integral feature; it is both necessary aircraft throughout the development process. The proper design and feasible. Without it there is no real discipline in the and validation of the vulnerability of an aircraft require a well- development process, and the testing process is free to test planned application of both methodologies, including against whatever threat it chooses, relevant or not relevant. analyses, sub-scale testing, and full-scale testing. The The ambiguity in the phrase “munitions likely to be importance of early sub-scale testing to the design cannot be encountered in combat” makes it possible to put a system in overemphasized. The analytical and testing aspects of an unfavorable position based on Live Fire Tests against threats vulnerability design and assessment must be not conducted for which the system was not designed.1 The committee believes independently. A consistent oversight of the entire process is that the design threat selected for some systems is not the required. In general, analysis/modeling is all that is available major threat likely to be encountered when these systems are in the very early design stages, whereas confirming sub-scale fielded. The design threat must be projected forward in time in testing is essential in the middle and later design stages. The order to prevent the system capabilities from falling behind sub-scale tests also provide information for the data bases that the threat capabilities. There will be an understandable support the analysis/modeling efforts. Full-scale testing, reluctance on the part of the intelligence community to make because it occurs late in the development cycle, is used to such a projection, but it can, and must, be done. Furthermore, discover any weaknesses of the total and integrated design. the design threat must be reviewed at each milestone or other 14. The committee believes that both methodologies need major decision point. to be improved and that these improvements should be 12. Apparent separation of the oversight of vulnerability mutually beneficial. There appears to be a sufficient start of a analysis from the oversight of live fire testing, both of which modeling capability and weapons effects and materials data are part of the T&E process, has created a situation that is base to warrant an increased dependence on analysis/modeling detrimental to the overall OSD vulnerability program. The for future vulnerability assessments as an aid in design. committee is concerned that the apparent organizational However, the committee also believes that the current analytical separation of OSD review of vulnerability analyses and Live methodology and supporting data bases are not yet sufficiently Fire Testing that currently exists could substantially impede a robust, correct, precise, representative, and interactive to permit coordinated program to determine vulnerability policy, facility a total dependence on this methodology. Much work needs to requirements, and model and data base development. The be accomplished in the model development and in the problem with the separation of the two oversight accumulation of weapons effects and material Pk/h data bases. responsibilities is that there can be undue emphasis placed on Consequently, live fire testing in the future should be oriented one or the other methodologies. By making one office toward verifying the improved modeling procedures, extending responsible for both, a proper sense of perspective and a the data base of weapons effects and material responses, and synergistic, long-term development program can be achieved. validating proposed design features and equipment for Furthermore, the committee believes that oversight to the reducing vulnerability. The analysis/modeling methodology requires additional support to continue the development of models that account for all of the phenomena and damage effects observed in live fire tests and in combat. In particular, 1 The Army’s DIVAD gun system was a victim of this practice. It met the documented target requirements but failed against nondocumented additional realistic sub-scale testing, both inert and full-up, targets.

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62 VULNERABILITY ASSESSMENT OF AIRCRAFT is necessary in order to continue the development of the Pk/h Group on Aircraft Survivability (JTCG/AS) is an organization typesetting files. Page breaks are true to the original; line lengths, word breaks, heading styles, and other typesetting-specific formatting, however, cannot be retained, About this PDF file: This new digital representation of the original work has been recomposed from XML files created from the original paper book, not from the original data base needed for improved models. This requires the that has fostered this type of teamwork and inter-Service development or improvement of test facilities that can cooperation. However, it would be useful to have a standing perform such tests. board of vulnerability experts annually review the programs • Conclusions Regarding the Vulnerability Programs for and plans with the Director, Test and Evaluation. and some typographic errors may have been accidentally inserted. Please use the print version of this publication as the authoritative version for attribution. Aircraft 19. The vulnerability community of the future most likely 15. The vulnerability of currently fielded U.S. aircraft will become smaller in both the number of programs and will become more important in the future. Under present the size of the infrastructure. The committee recognizes the funding expectations, current aircraft are going to remain in fact that the Department of Defense is going to reduce the size, the inventory for many more years. These aircraft are going to funding, and number of aircraft programs, both new and product require product improvements because of the anticipated improvements. There most likely will be a corresponding improvements in the weapons available to the Third World. drawdown in the related vulnerability assessment activities, One of these product improvements should be in the area of both in analyses/modeling and in testing. The committee vulnerability reduction. No formal process currently exists to believes that this drawdown should be carried out very carefully focus routinely on changes in the vulnerability of U.S. aircraft to ensure that essential vulnerability assessment personnel, caused by the increase in weapon lethality. Such a routine capabilities, and facilities are not lost in the process. vulnerability reduction review should be established. Vulnerability reduction as a means of achieving survivability enhancement is particularly important for existing aircraft that Recommendations cannot take advantage of the new stealth technology. 16. There is insufficient attention given to the requirement Based upon the results of the committee’s study and the to design for vulnerability. DoD Instruction (DoDI) 5000.2 conclusions given above, the committee makes the following includes survivability as a critical system characteristic and recommendations: requires that survivability objectives be defined initially at • Recommendations Regarding the DoD Live Fire Test & Milestone I and finally at Milestone II. However, no specific Evaluation Program reference to vulnerability is made in DoDI 5000.2. Vulnerability 1. The committee recommends that the Director, Test requirements should be identified as part of the survivability and Evaluation, issue Guidelines that replace the 1988 Live characteristics and incorporated in development contracts. Fire Test & Evaluation Guidelines and that more clearly 17. The collection of actual combat data on the conform with the requirements for the full-scale, full-up vulnerability of U.S. aircraft is not given proper emphasis. tests mandated by the Live Fire Test law. The binding force Peacetime live fire testing, as well as computer-based modeling, of the existing 1988 LFT&E Guidelines is unclear to the would benefit greatly from a comparison with actual combat committee and to the Services, and should be replaced with a data. However, the procedures required to collect the proper directive whose force is understood. The recommended data are not in place. In briefings provided to the committee, a directive should completely define the procedures and list of lessons learned from the attempts to collect combat requirements for planning and conducting the Live Fire Test survivability data during Desert Storm, including the and Evaluation program for both sub-scale and full-scale following: (1) existing official reporting systems were not tests. The directive should require the conduct of vulnerability adequate for capturing survivability data; (2) valuable records tests under realistic combat conditions, first at the sub-scale were destroyed because of established retention limits; (3) data level as sub-scale systems are developed, and later at the full- questionnaires could not be completed adequately by field scale level mandated in the legislation. In addition, the personnel on their own, (4) permission for data collectors to directive should contain a formal process for requesting a enter the theater was strongly resisted; and (5) arrangements to waiver and the requirements for developing the alternatives support the data collectors were not in place and were worked to the realistic survivability testing of the full-scale, full-up out with great difficulty for the few collection teams that did system. deploy. 2. The committee recommends that the Director, Test and • Conclusions Regarding the Vulnerability Infrastructure Evaluation, formalize the waiver process by developing a 18. The process of designing and testing for vulnerability risk-benefit assessment methodology that can be used is extremely complex and would benefit from continuous uniformly to determine whether a full-scale, full-up test input and oversight from a broad range of experts in the program for any particular aircraft is “unreasonably vulnerability community. It is important that cooperation be expensive and impractical.” The methodology must also established among the Services and between the Services and be applicable to the evaluation of the alternate Live Fire the Live Fire Test Office. The Joint Technical Coordinating Test program for the sub-scale targets. The process for

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CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 63 requesting a waiver, described in the DoD directive conducted during the design phase, the committee encourages typesetting files. Page breaks are true to the original; line lengths, word breaks, heading styles, and other typesetting-specific formatting, however, cannot be retained, About this PDF file: This new digital representation of the original work has been recomposed from XML files created from the original paper book, not from the original recommended above, should include a risk-benefit assessment the use of threats more lethal than the design threat when methodology that quantifies the benefits associated with full- appropriate. scale, full-up Live Fire Tests and the risks associated with 5. The committee recommends that the Director, Test waiving these tests. Such a methodology should give emphasis and Evaluation, expand the charter of the Live Fire Test and some typographic errors may have been accidentally inserted. Please use the print version of this publication as the authoritative version for attribution. to early testing and, where possible, consider the desirability and Evaluation program from its current oversight of those of Live Fire Testing of full-scale development prototypes and tests that are part of the congressionally mandated LFT structural test models. Once the benefits and risks have been program to include oversight of vulnerability assessment. quantified, a decision can be made as to whether the full-scale, This new OSD program, known perhaps as the Vulnerability full-up tests are unreasonably expensive and impractical. The Test and Evaluation program, would have broad oversight of committee strongly believes that such a methodology is the evaluation of the vulnerability of the system design essential to the process of requesting a waiver. throughout the lifecycle of the system and would be the 3. The committee recommends that the Secretary of Services’ advocate for the recommended integrated Defense take measures to ensure (a) that the LFT&E vulnerability evaluations at OSD milestone reviews. These Guidelines are properly enforced by requiring either that evaluations would be accomplished using both analyses and covered systems be subjected to full-scale, full-up testing or live fire testing, including all of the Live Fire Testing that a waiver be obtained; (b) that any waiver be fully mandated by the LFT law. justified; (c) that the waiver process be uniformly applied; • Recommendations Regarding the and (d) that no stigma be attached to the use of the waiver Vulnerability Assessment Methodologies process. The committee believes that requesting a waiver is a 6. The committee recommends that both the analysis legitimate procedure that must not adversely affect the program. community and the live fire testing community routinely The granting of a waiver does not eliminate all requirements include on-board ordnance in their assessments. A waiver to for Live Fire Testing; an acceptable alternative realistic allow full-scale Live Fire Tests without on-board ordnance vulnerability assessment program must still be conducted. should be granted only after an examination of the results Furthermore, the availability of the risk-benefit methodology from alternate live fire tests of sub-scale components and their in recommendation will remove the arbitrary basis for granting integration into analyses of the full-up aircraft carrying such a waiver currently in place and replace it with a logically based ordnance. procedure used for other large-scale projects in which risk is 7. The committee recommends that the Secretary of involved. Defense direct the multi-Service coordinated development 4. The committee recommends, for the full-scale, full-up and authorization for use of improved analytical Live Fire Tests, that the specific “likely to be encountered” vulnerability assessment models that are applicable to all munitions referred to in the Live Fire Test law be the military aircraft. The committee believes it is inevitable that weapon(s) specified in the requirements documentation for the emphasis given to, and reliance on, the models will increase the system, projected forward to the time when the system is in the future as budget limitations force greater reliance on to be fielded. Furthermore, the threat should be reviewed prototyping. Consequently, it is imperative that the models be and updated periodically at the milestone decision points to improved. The current JTCG/AS-approved models could form ensure that the specified design weapon(s) is representative the basis for the new models. The 1987 General Accounting of the major “likely to be encountered” threat(s) to the Office (GAO) study on Live Fire Testing provides many system. There has been considerable disagreement on what suggestions on how to improve these models. “weapons likely to be encountered in combat” means and what 8. The committee recommends that a long-term live fire weapons should be used for system design and in the Live Fire test program be funded in which realistic components, Tests. The design weapon(s) specified in the requirements subsystems, and systems are specifically tested to develop documentation must be the best estimate of the primary threat, a data base to support the analytical models. The committee projected forward to the time the system is to be fielded. believes that improvements in the analyses/ models Selecting threats for the design that are less lethal than others recommended above can be achieved only when properly likely to be encountered is unacceptable. Furthermore, this supported by live fire testing programs and design threat must be the threat used to satisfy the system tests phenomenological investigations, and the committee is mandated by the Live Fire Test law. Without this linkage concerned that the present OSD Live Fire Test priorities do between a realistic design threat and the test threat, the test not adequately support this data base improvement. The agency can arbitrarily select threats that may not meet the funding for these tests should be provided by the Director, user’s requirement for the system and that may jeopardize the Test and Evaluation. future of the program. For the component and subsystem tests 9. The committee recommends that the Secretary of

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64 VULNERABILITY ASSESSMENT OF AIRCRAFT Defense (a) establish a program to examine the combat data leaders, high-level OSD officials, and nationally recognized typesetting files. Page breaks are true to the original; line lengths, word breaks, heading styles, and other typesetting-specific formatting, however, cannot be retained, About this PDF file: This new digital representation of the original work has been recomposed from XML files created from the original paper book, not from the original collected from Desert Storm for “lessons learned” regarding experts from industry and academia. This board would be the susceptibility and vulnerability of U.S. and allied aircraft; advisory to the Director, Test and Evaluation, and chartered to and (b) develop formal, institutionalized procedures for review annually the proposed vulnerability assessment and collecting data in future conflicts, for ensuring that the data budgets of DoD and to review the vulnerability assessment and some typographic errors may have been accidentally inserted. Please use the print version of this publication as the authoritative version for attribution. collectors have access to the theater, and for permanently programs on specific aircraft programs as the need arises. This storing the data. The combat survivability data collection board would be similar to the boards already formed for conduct program should reflect the importance of collecting and of coordinated 6.1, 6.2, and 6.3a Tech Base programs in the preserving the data and should be coordinated among the three DoD. The committee believes that such a board would provide Services through a joint agency, such as the JTCG/AS. the Services with a “before-the-fact” input into the • Recommendations Regarding the Vulnerability establishment of vulnerability policy and would lead to a better Programs for Aircraft acceptance of this policy. 10. Because of the expected service life extension of 15. The committee recommends that studies be conducted currently fielded U.S. military aircraft, the committee to determine if the existing Army, Navy, and Air Force recommends that the Under Secretary of Defense, Acquisition vulnerability analysis community, test facilities, and establish a formal vulnerability assessment and reduction infrastructure can be reduced proportionally to the expected program for these aircraft. This program should require that overall infrastructure reduction within DoD. Project Reliance, all product improvement or upgrade programs to existing the existing senior joint Services’ R&D cooperation group, aircraft include vulnerability reduction as a major goal of the should be charged with conducting the studies of how best to program. accomplish a meaningful infrastructure reduction. As a part of 11. The committee recommends (a) that a vulnerability this consolidation study, mechanisms for accommodating assessment program be an integral part of every aircraft unique Service needs in consolidated testing facilities must acquisition program; (b) that vulnerability assessment and be developed in order to allow multi-Service acceptance of evaluation be a specific item examined at each formal data derived from singularly designated facilities. The milestone review; and (c) that adequate funds be appropriated committee believes that this drawdown should be carried out to the program. The specific distribution of the funds between very carefully to ensure that essential vulnerability assessment analysis/modeling and live fire testing for each program should personnel, capabilities, and facilities are not lost in the process. be proposed by the individual Service, with OSD review and acceptance. 12. The committee recommends that aircraft programs The Future that become “prototype” programs, such as the RAH-66, not be excluded from live fire testing. The RAH-66 The committee recommends to the Secretary of Defense that COMANCHE helicopter has recently been changed to a the broad issue of how to both design and test for “prototype” program. The committee is concerned that the vulnerability in an austere future be studied. Present RAH-66 might be developed as a prototype without adequate concepts of analyses and live fire testing for vulnerability may consideration or testing of its vulnerability. If the decision is not be adequate in a future of reduced budgets, fewer fielded made at a later date to go into production with the prototype, aircraft, fewer program starts, smaller procurement numbers, it will be too late to correct any design weaknesses. and more “storage on the shelf” of technology capabilities 13. The committee recommends that specific vulnerability with less time to react to emergencies. When such a study has requirements on the design be a part of the survivability been completed and an effective process has been developed objectives defined at Milestones I and II. These vulnerability for vulnerability design and validation, OSD should consult requirements should be identified as part of the survivability with Congress regarding revisions to the LFT law that reflect characteristics and incorporated in the aircraft development this new process. contracts. • Recommendations Regarding the Vulnerability Infra structure Reference 14. The committee recommends that the Director, Test and Evaluation, establish a permanent Senior Vulnerability • U.S. Congress, 1988. FY88–89 DoD Authorization Act Conference Assessment Board comprised of senior Services’ technical Report, Live-Fire Testing (Sec. 802).