D
Preliminary Recommendations from the JTCG/AS Pk/h Workshop

Preliminary Recommendations from the Fuel System Working Panel of the 1991 JTCG/AS Pk/h Workshop:

  • Develop the Ullage Explosion Model to calculate ullage vulnerability to explosions from API, HE, and fragment impacts.

  • Reexamine the BRL Void Space Fire data to determine that the probabilities for fire due to fragments and 23-millimeter HE projectiles are consistent with other data.

  • Modify the COVART model to handle the simultaneous analysis of thermal and mechanical damage to components.

  • Determine how the BRL void space fire probabilities need to be modified for JP-5 and JP-8 fuel.

  • Determine how the BRL void space fire probabilities will change from open to closed void spaces.

  • Determine the probability of fire initiation due to “mixed functioning” of the incendiaries.

  • Develop a methodology to determine the probability of fires due to secondary ignition sources.

  • Develop data curves for the vulnerability of fuel system hardware components.

  • Determine how the BRL void space fire probabilities will change if the “striker plate” consists of composite materials.

  • Perform a test program to determine the probability of fire initiation due to a “mixed functioning” of the incendiaries.

  • Determine if the burn characteristics of composite materials are sufficiently different to warrant a change in the BRL void space probability numbers.

  • Determine how the altitude will affect the probability of fire initiation, the probability that fires will sustain, and the damage that might result from sustained fires.

  • Determine and quantify the vulnerability of fuel system components due to directed energy weapons.

The following findings of the eight working panels are taken from a preliminary copy of a briefing being prepared to be given to the JTCG/AS Central Office and to OSD. This briefing material was furnished by Gerald Bennett, ASD/XRM, WPAFB.

Fuel System Panel

  • Empirically based fuel/fire/explosion Pk/h data exist that are

    1. more than 15 years old,

    2. for metallic structures only,

    3. for sea level only.

  • No traceable fuel system hardware Pk/h data exist.



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typesetting files. Page breaks are true to the original; line lengths, word breaks, heading styles, and other typesetting-specific formatting, however, cannot be retained, About this PDF file: This new digital representation of the original work has been recomposed from XML files created from the original paper book, not from the original and some typographic errors may have been accidentally inserted. Please use the print version of this publication as the authoritative version for attribution. Preliminary Recommendations from the JTCG/AS Pk/h Workshop D Preliminary Recommendations from the Fuel System Working fire initiation due to a “mixed functioning” of the Panel of the 1991 JTCG/AS Pk/h Workshop: incendiaries. • Determine if the burn characteristics of composite materials • Develop the Ullage Explosion Model to calculate ullage are sufficiently different to warrant a change in the BRL void vulnerability to explosions from API, HE, and fragment space probability numbers. impacts. • Determine how the altitude will affect the probability of • Reexamine the BRL Void Space Fire data to determine fire initiation, the probability that fires will sustain, and the that the probabilities for fire due to fragments and 23-millimeter damage that might result from sustained fires. HE projectiles are consistent with other data. • Determine and quantify the vulnerability of fuel system • Modify the COVART model to handle the simultaneous components due to directed energy weapons. analysis of thermal and mechanical damage to components. The following findings of the eight working panels are • Determine how the BRL void space fire probabilities need taken from a preliminary copy of a briefing being prepared to to be modified for JP-5 and JP-8 fuel. be given to the JTCG/AS Central Office and to OSD. This • Determine how the BRL void space fire probabilities will briefing material was furnished by Gerald Bennett, ASD/ change from open to closed void spaces. XRM, WPAFB. • Determine the probability of fire initiation due to “mixed functioning” of the incendiaries. Fuel System Panel • Develop a methodology to determine the probability of fires due to secondary ignition sources. • Empirically based fuel/fire/explosion Pk/h data exist • Develop data curves for the vulnerability of fuel system that are hardware components. 1. more than 15 years old, • Determine how the BRL void space fire probabilities 2. for metallic structures only, will change if the “striker plate” consists of composite 3. for sea level only. materials. • No traceable fuel system hardware Pk/h data exist. • Perform a test program to determine the probability of 81

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82 APPENDIX D Flight Controls and Hydraulics Panel 1. Results are design and threat specific. typesetting files. Page breaks are true to the original; line lengths, word breaks, heading styles, and other typesetting-specific formatting, however, cannot be retained, About this PDF file: This new digital representation of the original work has been recomposed from XML files created from the original paper book, not from the original 2. Analyses predict burn and prompt reaction • Actuators thresholds. 1. Analyses are only on older (1950s) designs. 3. Complex propellants require added tests. 2. Sparse test data do not match actuators analyzed. and some typographic errors may have been accidentally inserted. Please use the print version of this publication as the authoritative version for attribution. 3. New designs and technologies have no analyses or • Flares, ammunition drums, and ammunition boxes: limited tests. test data and Pk/h estimates • Hydraulic fluid reservoirs, and accumulators 1. One set of experimentally validated fluid Pk/h data Electrical and Avionics Panel exists. • Most work (test and analysis) dates from 1983 or before. 2. Other components have no documented test data or • Component design technologies date from the 1950s and analyses. 1960s. • A large test base exists, but for ballistic resistance (V50) • Cables, bellcranks, and mechanical components development. 1. Analytic models and some Pk/h data exist. • More than 90% of the tests/analyses are for fragments. 2. Selective tests needed to validate analyses. • No Pk/h estimates exist for many common components. • Techniques are adequate for penetration related kill Crew Station Panel criteria. • Pk/h for some lethal mechanisms are only obtainable from • Traceable crew Pk/h data are available for fragments and tests. projectiles (toxic gases, overpressure, and burns not • Avionics and electronics are flight critical for many new considered). aircraft designs. • JLF crew station tests will provide test data support. • Ejection seat pyrotechnic Pk/h data are not available. • Cockpit controls and displays Pk/h data are not available. Structures, Landing Gear, and Armor Panel • Liquid oxygen (LOX) converter Pk/h estimates are of low • Structure confidence. 1. Analysis/data are not easily mapped into vulnerability • Windscreen/canopy Pk/h data developed. analyses. • For the on-board oxygen generating system (OBOGS), 2. Models are largely for skin panels and simple on-board inert gas generating system (OBIGGS), flat panel structure. displays, there are no Pk/h or test data. • Landing gear Engines and Accessories Panel 1. Few test/analysis data exist (not flight critical). 2. Some data are available for Army truck tires. • Pk/h data have kept pace with new designs. • Test data form important Pk/h input. • Armor • Large analysis data base exists on obsolete and current 1. Data are experimentally derived, so confidence levels designs. are high. • Confidence level is high for older/current designs 2. Most data are for projectiles and current materials. (exceptions: large engines, fan sections, and small unguided- aerial-vehicle engines). • Fuel ingestion analytical technique is available. Helicopter Unique Components Panel • Analysis techniques are valid for metal rotor blades. Stores, Ammunition, and Flares Panel • Component Pk/h data are mostly for fragments and armor- piercing projectiles. • Bombs and missile warheads • Flight controls can use aircraft techniques and data. 1. Results are design and threat specific. • Tail boom structural analysis capability is poor. 2. Analyses predict burn and prompt reaction • Little recent test/analysis has been done for P k/h thresholds. development. 3. Intermediate zone requires added tests. • Extensive tests are needed for failure at specified conditions. • Propellant and rocket motors