1
Introduction

PURPOSE OF THIS REPORT

The Committee to Review Assembled Chemical Weapons Alternatives Program Detonation Technologies (known, for short, as the ACWA Detonation Technologies Committee) was appointed by the National Research Council (NRC) in response to a request by the U.S. Army’s Program Manager for Assembled Chemical Weapons Alternatives (PMACWA). Three detonation technologies available from technology vendors and the Army’s own explosive destruction system (EDS), collectively known as explosive destruction technologies (EDTs), are being considered for the destruction of some of the chemical weapons now stored at the Blue Grass Army Depot (BGAD) in Richmond, Kentucky, and the Pueblo Chemical Depot (PCD) in Pueblo, Colorado. In addition, two of these vendor-supplied EDTs and another EDT suitable only for treating conventional munitions, the CH2M HILL D-100, are being considered for the destruction of all the M55 rocket motors at BGAD not contaminated with chemical agent. The EDTs are being considered as supplemental technologies for destroying these weapons in order to improve operational safety and to accelerate the overall weapon destruction schedule of the main chemical agent destruction pilot plant facilities––the Blue Grass Chemical Agent Pilot Plant (BGCAPP) and the Pueblo Chemical Agent Pilot Plant (PCAPP)—being designed and constructed at the Blue Grass and Pueblo sites under the Assembled Chemical Weapons Alternatives (ACWA) program.

The vendor-supplied EDTs under consideration to supplement the pilot plant processes are detonation of ammunition in a vacuum integrated chamber (the DAVINCH) from Kobe Steel, Ltd., under the corporate mark KOBELCO; the transportable detonation chamber (TDC), formerly known as the controlled detonation chamber (CDC), from CH2M HILL; the D-100 technology for destruction of conventional weapons, also from CH2M HILL; and the Dynasafe SDC2000 static detonation chamber, formerly known as the Dynasafe static kiln. In the present report, the committee updates its presentation of the four types of EDTs (TDC, SDC, DAVINCH, and EDS) from the 2006 report Review of International Technologies for Destruction of Recovered Chemical Warfare Material (the International Technologies report, for short), evaluates and rates the four EDTs plus the CH2M HILL D-100 with respect to the requirements at the Blue Grass and Pueblo sites, and recommends EDTs for each of the requirements described in the following section (NRC, 2006).

REQUIREMENTS FOR USE OF EXPLOSIVE DESTRUCTION TECHNOLOGIES AT ACWA SITES

The possibilities for using EDTs at the Blue Grass and Pueblo sites were presented to the committee in the form of requirements.

Requirements for the Blue Grass Site

The three requirements involving use of EDTs at the Blue Grass site are as follows:



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1 introduction PurPose oF This rePorT The vendor-supplied EDTs under consideration to supplement the pilot plant processes are detonation The Committee to Review Assembled Chemical of ammunition in a vacuum integrated chamber (the Weapons Alternatives Program Detonation Tech- DAVINCH) from Kobe Steel, Ltd., under the corporate nologies (known, for short, as the ACWA Detona- mark KOBELCO; the transportable detonation chamber tion Technologies Committee) was appointed by (TDC), formerly known as the controlled detonation the National Research Council (NRC) in response chamber (CDC), from CH2M HILL; the D-100 tech- to a request by the U.S. Army’s Program Manager nology for destruction of conventional weapons, also for Assembled Chemical Weapons Alternatives from CH2M HILL; and the Dynasafe SDC2000 static (PMACWA). Three detonation technologies available detonation chamber, formerly known as the Dynasafe from technology vendors and the Army’s own explo- static kiln. In the present report, the committee updates sive destruction system (EDS), collectively known its presentation of the four types of EDTs (TDC, SDC, as explosive destruction technologies (EDTs), are DAVINCH, and EDS) from the 2006 report Review of being considered for the destruction of some of the International Technologies for Destruction of Recov- chemical weapons now stored at the Blue Grass Army ered Chemical Warfare Material (the International Depot (BGAD) in Richmond, Kentucky, and the Technologies report, for short), evaluates and rates the Pueblo Chemical Depot (PCD) in Pueblo, Colorado. four EDTs plus the CH2M HILL D-100 with respect In addition, two of these vendor-supplied EDTs and to the requirements at the Blue Grass and Pueblo sites, another EDT suitable only for treating conventional and recommends EDTs for each of the requirements munitions, the CH2M HILL D-100, are being consid- described in the following section (NRC, 2006). ered for the destruction of all the M55 rocket motors at BGAD not contaminated with chemical agent. requiremeNTs For use oF exPlosiVe The EDTs are being considered as supplemental desTrucTioN TechNoloGies aT acWa siTes technologies for destroying these weapons in order to improve operational safety and to accelerate the over- The possibilities for using EDTs at the Blue Grass all weapon destruction schedule of the main chemi- and Pueblo sites were presented to the committee in the cal agent destruction pilot plant facilities––the Blue form of requirements. Grass Chemical Agent Pilot Plant (BGCAPP) and the Pueblo Chemical Agent Pilot Plant (PCAPP)—being requirements for the Blue Grass site designed and constructed at the Blue Grass and Pueblo sites under the Assembled Chemical Weapons The three requirements involving use of EDTs at the Alternatives (ACWA) program. Blue Grass site are as follows: 

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 ASSESSMENT OF EXPLOSIVE DESTRUCTION TECHNOLOGIES • Requirement BG-1 is for the processing of about it would save approximately 8 months in the overall schedule for BGCAPP operations.1 70,000 M55 rocket motors at Blue Grass that are not contaminated with agent. Current plans call Requirement BG-3, which combines requirements for shipment of these noncontaminated rocket BG-1 and BG-2, would have the advantages of both. motors to an off-site location for processing; With one exception, the committee considered the destruction in an EDT is being considered as an use of a single EDT system to destroy both the non- alternative. contaminated rocket motors and the mustard agent- • Requirement BG-2 is for the destruction of all filled 155-mm projectiles at BGAD. The exception is 155-mm mustard agent H projectiles at Blue the evaluation of the combination of the two CH2M Grass. HILL technologies, the D-100 for the noncontaminated • Requirement BG-3 is for doing both of the rocket motors and the TC-60 TDC for the 155-mm above. mustard agent-filled projectiles. This evaluation was done with the concurrence of the ACWA program.2 At the present time, EDTs are not in the overall design plans for destroying the BGAD chemical stock- requirement for the Pueblo site pile through the BGCAPP. However, the three require- ments given above have been defined for their possible The single requirement involving use of EDTs at the use at the Blue Grass site. Pueblo site is as follows: Requirement BG-1 is the on-site processing of • Requirement P-1. Destruction of all leakers approximately 70,000 noncontaminated rocket motors. Rocket motors that are contaminated with agent are and reject munitions at Pueblo. About 1,000 not considered under this requirement. Current plans mustard agent-filled munitions—a mixture of call for shipping the noncontaminated rocket motors to 4.2-in. mortars, 105-mm projectiles, and 155-mm an off-site facility for processing. However, the Army projectiles—would be destroyed. is considering destruction in an EDT at Blue Grass as an alternative. This approach would minimize the The current process description for the PCAPP handling and transportation of these energetic-filled includes the use of an as-yet-unspecified EDT for the motors. Under current plans the shipping and firing destruction of an estimated 1,000 leaker or reject projec- tube (SFT) segments associated with the rocket motors tiles containing distilled (sulfur) mustard agent (HD) or would have to be removed from the motors and shipped distilled mustard mixed with bis[2-(2-chloroethylthio) to an off-site treatment, storage, and disposal facil- ethyl] ether (HT). This description is called Require- ity (TSDF) that meets Toxic Substances Control Act ment P-1. (TSCA) requirements because the tubes contain high enough levels of polychlorinated biphenyls to be of assemBled chemical WeaPoNs regulatory concern. alTerNaTiVes ProGram Requirement BG-2 concerns the processing of approximately 15,000 mustard agent H-filled 155-mm Background projectiles in one or more EDTs. The current opera- tional strategy for BGCAPP is to process these pro- In 1997, Congress passed legislation that requires jectiles after the rockets have been processed. At the the Army to pursue alternatives to incineration for end of the processing campaign for each agent type, the destruction of assembled chemical weapons at essentially all of the agent monitors have to be changed two of the U.S. sites where chemical weapons have from the previous agent type to the new agent type. been stockpiled: the PCD, in Pueblo, Colorado, and Changing includes testing to ensure proper operation. In addition, when changing from one munitions type to another—for example, from 155-mm projectiles to 1Question-and-answer session with Joseph Novad, Deputy 4.2-in. mortars—the munitions handling equipment Operations and Engineering Manager, ACWA, and the committee, May 28, 2008. has to be adjusted. The primary reason for processing 2Personal communication between Joseph Novad, Deputy Opera- mustard agent H munitions in one or more EDTs is that tions and Engineering Manager, ACWA, and Richard Ayen, com- mittee chair, September 23, 2008.

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 INTRODUCTION the BGAD, in Richmond, Kentucky.3 The destruction imately 32,000 projectiles containing H, GB, or VX. of chemical weapons at these two facilities is being Neither the GB or VX projectiles at BGAD contain carried out under the ACWA program, which is head- bursters. Table 1-1 provides a more detailed description quartered at the Edgewood Area of Aberdeen Proving of the munitions. All munitions are stored on pallets in Ground, Maryland. The initial mission of the ACWA igloos (rockets are inside their SFTs), and the igloos program was to test and demonstrate technological are monitored to detect any leakers. The leakers are alternatives to incineration for the demilitarization of stored in overpacks and are treated separately from the assembled chemical weapons. “Assembled” chemical remaining munitions. The stored munitions are deliv- weapons refers to weapons that have fuzes, explosives, ered from the BGAD storage igloos to the BGCAPP propellant, chemical agents, and SFTs and/or packag- unpack area, where they are monitored to determine ing materials that need to be destroyed. if any have leaked during transport or unpacking. The pilot plants at BGAD and PCD rely mainly on PMACWA estimates that there will be no more than weapon disassembly to access agent and energetics. 200 leaking rockets, all containing GB. A similar num- This is followed by the primary treatment process of ber of leaker and reject projectiles containing either mustard agent H or GB can be expected.5 Tables 1-1 hydrolysis (neutralization) of the agent and energetics using hot water or a caustic solution and subsequent and 1-2 provide information on overpacks. secondary waste treatment. The Bechtel Parsons Blue Figure 1-1 shows the main processing operations to Grass Team (BPBGT), a joint venture formed by be used at BGCAPP. This diagram does not show the Bechtel National, Inc., and Parsons Engineering, was secondary waste streams from the various operations. awarded a contract in June 2003 to design, construct, test, operate, and close the destruction facility for the Processing of Projectiles BGAD stockpile, BGCAPP. For destruction of the PCD stockpile, Bechtel National, Inc., was awarded a con- After being unpacked from the pallets, the pro- tract in September 2002 to design, construct, systemize, jectiles are conveyed to the linear projectile/mortar pilot test, operate, and close PCAPP. disassembly (LPMD) machine, where the nose plug is The weapons to be destroyed at BGAD contain three first removed. For H projectiles, the burster is removed different chemical warfare agent fills: nerve agents GB from the burster well. The empty burster well is then and VX and the H form of mustard agent, known also sampled to determine if agent leakage has occurred; if as Levinstein mustard. The depot stores 523 tons of not, the burster is sent to an energetics batch hydrolyzer agent in rockets and projectiles. The chemical weapons (EBH). If a leak has occurred or if the LPMD is unable at PCD contain only mustard agent in the HD and HT to process the projectile (in which case it is considered forms. 4 This depot stores 2,611 tons of agent in mor- a reject), the projectile is overpacked and returned to tars, projectiles, and cartridges. the storage igloos for later treatment. If not leaking, the projectile burster well is buckled to provide access to the agent, which is sent to the agent neutralization BGcaPP Process description system (ANS). The metal parts are sent to the metal The stockpile at BGAD consists of approximately parts treater (MPT) for decontamination prior to their 70,000 rockets containing either GB or VX and approx- release to a public-sector facility for recycling. Decon- tamination is accomplished by heating the materials to 1000oF for at least 15 minutes. Induction heaters and 3For additional information, see www.pmacwa.army.mil. superheated steam are the heating mechanisms. The 4Mustard agent is a blistering agent. The active ingredient in the MPT offgas passes to the MPT offgas treatment sys- H, HD, and HT forms of mustard agent is bis(2-chloroethyl) sulfide, or (ClCH2CH2)2S. HD, called distilled mustard, is nominally pure tem consisting of a bulk oxidizer, a cyclone, a venturi mustard agent. HT is prepared by a chemical process that synthe- scrubber, a particulate filter, and a heater to lower the sizes the HT directly in such a way that it contains 20 to 40 weight relative humidity. The offgas effluent is then passed percent agent T, bis[2-(2-chloroethylthio) ethyl] ether, in addition to through activated carbon adsorbers. the HD component. HT has a lower freezing point than pure HD. H, often called Levinstein mustard, was approximately 70 percent pure mustard agent and 30 percent impurities at the time of manufacture. However, the stored H mustard agent has deteriorated over time, 5Reject munitions are those that have presented or might present and its physical properties are highly variable. H is the only form of mustard agent stored at Blue Grass Army Depot. difficult issues for disassembly during normal operations.

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 ASSESSMENT OF EXPLOSIVE DESTRUCTION TECHNOLOGIES TABLE 1-1 Blue Grass Army Depot Chemical Weapons Inventory Known to Be Leakers Munition Agent Fill Total Quantity as of Mid-2008 Energetics Type of Overpack M16 PCCa 155-mm projectile H 15,492 69 Tetrytol 8-in. projectile GB 3,977 26 None M10A1 PCC M55 SRCb M55 rocket GB 51,716 98 Composition B Modified M1 CBPc M28 propellant Rocket warhead GB 24 Composition B M16 PCC 115-mm projectile VX 12,816 None None M55 rocket VX 17,733 Composition B None M28 propellant Rocket warhead VX 6 Composition B M16 PCC aPropellant charge container. bSingle round container. cCenter-bolted package in-transit gas shipment. SOURCE: Adapted from NRC, 2008a; BGCAPP Overpack Summary, provided to the committee by ACWA, June 27, 2008. In the agent neutralization system (ANS), the agent is Noncontaminated rocket motors, still inside the lower hydrolyzed with a hot caustic solution for VX and GB sections of the SFTs, are to be sent off-site for pro- and with hot water for mustard agent H. The EBH offgas cessing or processed on-site by an EDT. The rocket treatment system is similar to the MPT offgas treatment warhead is separated from the upper section of the system except that it does not have a bulk oxidizer. The SFT, punched, drained of agent, and the agent is sent BGCAPP design incorporates supercritical water oxida- to the ANS. The aluminum warhead, still containing the tion (SCWO) treatment for hydrolysates of agent and burster, is sheared into segments. The segments (and energetics, although PMACWA continues to investigate any contaminated rocket motors) are conveyed to the off-site shipment options.6 SCWO subjects the hydroly- EBHs. The upper section of the SFT, if uncontaminated sate to high temperatures and pressures (approximately with agent, will be sent off-site for processing. 1200°F and 3,400 psig), converting the organic com- As presently configured, the hydrolysis product from pounds to carbon dioxide, water, and salts. the agent neutralization processing step at BGCAPP, termed hydrolysate, will undergo secondary treatment by SCWO to further reduce its toxicity. Metal parts Processing of Rockets are subjected to high-pressure water washout and After being unpacked from the pallets, the individual thermal treatment by heating to 1000°F for at least rockets are conveyed to the rocket cutting machine 15 minutes to allow unrestricted release and possibly (RCM), where the rockets are cut while still in their recycling. Gas effluents are filtered through a series SFTs. The cut is indexed so that the rocket motor of high-efficiency particulate air (HEPA) filters and (including the igniter) is separated from the warhead, activated carbon adsorbers before being released to the which still contains the agent. A leaking rocket could atmosphere. Water is recycled. be detected when monitoring for agent at the RCM. PcaPP Process description 6Ray Malecki, Blue Grass Project Engineer, ACWA, “Assembled The stockpile at PCD consists of approximately Chemical Weapons Alternatives (ACWA) program: ACWA over- 780,000 projectiles (105- and 155-mm) and mortar view,” presentation to the committee, May 7, 2008.

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 INTRODUCTION TABLE 1-2 Description of Overpacks Overpack Body Base Flange Lid Seal Miscellaneous 12 × 56 single 56 in. long, 0.25 in. thick, 0.75 in. thick, 0.75 in. thick, O-ring Lifting handles: round containera 12-in. ID, 15.875-in. OD, 15.875-in. OD, 15.875-in. OD, slot in 1 on top and 4 on 0.134-in. wall, carbon steel plate carbon steel plate carbon steel plate flange tube body carbon steel welded to tube welded to tube and with 10 0.50-in. tube with 10 0.50-in. bolt holes bolt holes 9 × 41 single 41 in. long, 9- 0.25 in. thick, 0.75 in. thick, 0.75 in. thick, O-ring Lifting handles: round containerb in. ID, 0.134-in. 13.44-in. OD, 13.385-in. OD, 13.385-in. slot in 1 on top and 4 on wall, carbon carbon steel plate structural steel OD, structural flange body tube steel tube welded to tube plate welded to steel plate with tube and with 8 0.50-in. bolt 8 0.50-in. bolt holes holes 7 × 27 single 27 in. long, 0.25 in. thick, 0.75 in. thick, 0.75 in. thick, O-ring Lifting handle round containerc 6.99-in. ID, 10.4-in. OD, 10.4-in. OD, 10.4-in. OD, slot in welded on top 0.134-in. wall, carbon steel plate carbon steel plate carbon steel plate flange carbon steel welded to tube welded to tube and with 8 0.50-in. tube with 8 0.50-in. bolt bolt holes holes M10A1 53.438 in. long, 0.1196-in.-thick 0.1196-in.-thick Lid drawing not Gasket in 0.0897-in.-thick propellant 8.953-in. ID, steel, formed to steel, formed provided lid steel formed into charge 0.0598-in. wall, 8.953-in. OD to 10.188 ID × spacing ring and containerd steel tube base plate with 2.125-in. high inserted over tube 0.625-in. high rim recess with 3 bolt inserted into tube holes for lid and and welded inserted over tube and welded M16A3 40.719 in. long, 0.1196-in.-thick 0.1196-in.-thick Lid drawing not Gasket in propellant 6.875-in. ID, steel, bent to form steel, formed to provided lid charge 0.0478-in. wall, 6.875-in. OD 8.125-in. ID × containerd steel tube base plate with 2.125-in. high 0.625-in. high rim recess with 3 bolt inserted into tube holes for lid and and welded inserted over tube and welded a Adapted from “Assembly for 12 × 56 single round container,” provided to the committee by ACWA, June 13, 2008. b 9 × 41-in. single round container, manufactured by U.S. Army Defense Ammunition Center, Serial Nos. S0001M to S0240M, Stockpile Certification Tests, provided to the committee by ACWA, November 7, 2008. c 7 × 27 single round container, top-level assembly S727001, provided to the committee by ACWA, June 13, 2008. d Drawing of M16 and M10 propellant charge containers, provided to the committee by ACWA, June 30, 2008. rounds (4.2-in.). These munitions (and overpacked Unreconfigured 105-mm projectiles with integral fuzes explosive components) include all of the types shown and bursters are contained in sealed tubes with bags in Table 1-3. The agent fill is HD except for some of propellant, two tubes to a box. All of the 155-mm of the mortar rounds containing HT. Some 105-mm projectiles have been reconfigured to contain lifting projectiles have been reconfigured to remove the pro- plug and burster but no fuze. The 4.2-in. mortars with pellant and fuze but keep the burster and nose plug. integral fuze, burster, propellant wafers, and ignition

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 ASSESSMENT OF EXPLOSIVE DESTRUCTION TECHNOLOGIES Munitions from storage Projectiles Rockets Contaminated shipping and Rocket cutting Disassembly firing tubes machine (RCM) Metal Contaminated Munitions parts motors, washout system warheads (MWS) Energetics Rocket shear Agent machine Agent (RSM) Energetics, warhead segments Agent Energetics Metal parts treater neutralization batch hydrolyzers (MPT) reactors (ANRs) (EBHs) Offgas Energetics hydrolysate Bulk oxidizer Agent hydrolysate Energetics Offgas neutralization system (ENS) Cyclone Energetics Offgas hydrolysate Supercritical Aluminum Offgas water oxidation filtration (SCWO) system (AFS) Venturi scrubber Effluent Energetics off- Filters gas treatment Permeate system Offgas Effluent Rejectate Offgas Reverse Particulate Particulate osmosis filter filter Offgas Offgas HEPA, activated charcoal filters FIGURE 1-1 Main operations of the BGCAPP process. SOURCE: Adapted from NRC, 2008b. cartridge are contained in sealed tubes, two tubes to a The stored munitions are delivered from the PCD box. Table 1-3 provides additional details of the muni- storage igloos to the PCAPP unpack area, where the tions and their fills. Figure 1-2 shows the main opera- munitions are monitored to determine if any have tions of the process for PCAPP and the relationship of leaked during transport. Monitoring also occurs during the EDT to these main operations. Again, secondary unpacking. New leakers, if any, are overpacked and waste streams are not shown. returned to the storage igloos. There are 537 known

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 INTRODUCTION TABLE 1-3 Pueblo Chemical Depot Weapons Inventory Known Agent Total Leakers as of Burster Leaker Overpack Quantities as of Mid-2008 and Descriptiona Munition Fill Quantity Mid-2008 Energetics 31 in M16A3 PCCc in 12 × 56 SRCd; 105-mm projectile M60b HD 383,419 33 0.12 kg tetrytol 1 in M16 PCC placed in M10A1 PCC placed in 7 × 27 SRC; and 1 in 7 × 27 SRC 1 M10A1 PCC placed in 12 × 56 SRC 155-mm projectile M110 HD 266,492 1 0.19 kg tetrytol 155-mm projectile M104 HD 33,062 0.19 kg tetrytol None 8 in fiber container placed in 7 × 27 SRC; 2 4.2-in. mortar M2A1 HD 76,722 10 0.064 kg tetrytol in M16A3 PCC in 12 × 56 SRC (M6 propellant) 1 M16A3 PCC placed in 12 × 56 SRC 4.2-in. mortar M2 HT 20,384 1 0.064 kg tetrytol (M8 propellant) leakers will be overpacked as follows: 9 × 41 SRC for 155-mm projectiles, 7 × 27 SRC for 4.2-in. mortar rounds and aNew 105-mm projectiles, and 12 × 56 SRC for leaking propellant charge containers. Information from personal communication between Joseph Novad, Technical Director, ACWA, and Margaret Novack, NRC, study director, July 1, 2008. bSome of these projectiles are stored with their propellant charge. However, leakers will be sent to the EDT for disposal in overpacks with their propellant charges removed. cPCC, propellant charge container. dSRC, single round container. SOURCE: Adapted from NRC, 2008a; information provided to the committee by CMA, June 26, 2008. overpacked munitions or explosive components at Agent is sent to the ANS. The casing and nose plugs are PCD, and PMACWA projects that the total number of sent to the metal treatment unit (MTU) for decontami- overpacked munitions/explosive components will be nation prior to unrestricted release to a public-sector about 1,000.7 facility for possible recycling. Decontamination is After being unpacked, the munitions are conveyed accomplished by heating the materials to 1000°F for to the linear projectile/mortar disassembly (LPMD) at least 15 minutes. Electrical resistance heaters exter- machine, where nose plugs, fuzes, boosters, and nally heat the muffle walls, which in turn radiate heat bursters are removed. The empty burster well is to the munitions parts. The MTU offgas passes to the sampled to determine if a leak has occurred; if not, the offgas treatment system, consisting of a bulk oxidizer, bursters and fuzes will be removed and shipped off-site a venturi scrubber, a particulate filter, and a heater to a commercial treatment, storage, and disposal facil- to lower the relative humidity. The effluent is passed ity (TSDF). If a leak has occurred in the burster well, or through activated carbon adsorbers. if the LPMD machine is unable to process the projectile In the ANS, the mustard agent is hydrolyzed with (in which case it is considered to be a reject), the muni- hot water and the hydrolysate pH is adjusted with tion is overpacked for treatment by the EDT. caustic solution. The PCAPP design incorporates six If not leaking, an empty projectile burster well is immobilized cell bioreactors (ICBs) for the treatment buckled with a hydraulic ram to provide access to the of agent hydrolysate, although PMACWA continues to investigate off-site shipment options.8 The water stream agent; in the case of a mortar, its base is cut. Mustard agent is drained from the weapons, and the agent cavity from biotreatment is recycled, and the biosludge is sent of each munition is washed with high-pressure water. to an off-site permitted disposal facility. 7Question-and-answer session with Joseph Novad, Deputy 8Ray Malecki, Blue Grass Project Engineer, ACWA, “Assembled Operations and Engineering Manager, ACWA, and the committee, Chemical Weapons Alternatives (ACWA) program: ACWA over- May 28, 2008. view,” presentation to the committee, May 7, 2008.

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 ASSESSMENT OF EXPLOSIVE DESTRUCTION TECHNOLOGIES Explosive Contaminated energetics and leakers Munitions Unpack and destruction from storage reconfiguration technology (EDT) Munitions Contaminated bursters Linear projectile/ mortar disassembly (LPMD) Munitions Vent to MTU offgas treatment system Munitions Munitions washout treatment Offgas, munitions bodies system (MWS) unit (MTU) Vent to BTA Agent Offgas offgas treatment system, then to atmosphere Agent Biotreatment hydrolysis area (BTA) Hydrolysate reactors To process water system (recycle) Water recovery system To process water system (recycle) Contaminated Brine Supplemental decontamination dunnage and recovery unit (SDU)/Autoclave secondary waste area (BRA) Vent to BRA offgas treatment Offgas system, then to atmosphere Offgas from HEPA and Venturi munitions Scrubber activated scrubber treatment unit charcoal filters Spent Particulates solution To atmosphere Recycle to agent hydrolysis reactors FIGURE 1-2 Main operations of the PCAPP process. SOURCE: Adapted from NRC, 2008b. TYPes oF exPlosiVe desTrucTioN Warfare Materiel, often referred to as the International TechNoloGies Technologies report (NRC, 2006). Since the publica- tion of that report in 2006, these technologies—the Four of the EDTs addressed in this report were controlled detonation chamber (CDC), the DAVINCH, described and evaluated in Review of International the Dynasafe static kiln, and the Army’s EDS—have Technologies for Destruction of Recovered Chemical been used to destroy a variety of chemical munitions,

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 INTRODUCTION in some cases having undergone evolutionary changes detonation because the chamber is at or near ambient with their design and operation. The CDC has since temperature at the beginning of destruction operations. been renamed and is now called the transportable In the Dynasafe SDC, the munition is inserted into an detonation chamber (TDC). The Dynasafe static kiln already hot, externally heated chamber. The high tem- has become the Dynasafe static detonation chamber perature of the chamber results in the deflagration or (SDC). The nontransportable D-100 detonation cham- detonation of the munition’s explosive fill, if present, ber (described below) was not included in the Interna- and destruction of the agent. This type of technology tional Technologies report and is designed for treating is called “hot” detonation. The EDS fits into neither of only conventional munitions. these categories; it employs explosive shaped charges The statement of task for the committee describes to open a munition followed by use of neutralization the EDT systems reviewed in the International Tech- chemicals to destroy the agent. Brief descriptions of all nologies report as “. . . three detonation technologies five EDTs follow. More complete descriptions of four and the EDS. . . .” The committee’s analysis of the EDT of the EDTs are given in Appendix A, with the latest systems and EDS, however, indicates that evaluation of information given in Chapter 3. the four systems for destruction of chemical weapons can be facilitated by the understanding that they work ch2m hill Tc-60 Tdc on three basic principles: The CH2M HILL TDC was originally developed in . Detonation technology. The DAVINCH and TDC the United States, subsequently deployed for long-term systems destroy the vast majority of the agent and operations in Belgium, and further refined through test- explosives in the munition by detonating donor ing programs in the United Kingdom. Its three main explosives wrapped around the munition. components are a detonation chamber, an expansion . Neutralization technology. The EDS uses small chamber, and an emissions control system. A munition explosive shaped charges to open the munition and wrapped in explosive is mounted in the detonation cham- consume the explosive in the burster and fuze. The ber. The floor of the chamber is covered with pea gravel, agent is destroyed by subsequent neutralization. which absorbs some of the blast energy. Bags containing . Thermal destruction. Dynasafe uses the heat water are suspended near the projectile to help absorb of the electrically heated containment vessel blast energy and to produce steam, which reacts with (approximately 550°C-600°C) or the heat gener- agent vapors. Oxygen is added when munitions contain- ated by previous detonations to open the munition ing mustard agent are destroyed. After the explosive is and destroy the agent and then follow up with detonated, the gases are vented to the expansion cham- offgas treatment systems. Explosives in the muni- ber, then to the emissions control system. Systems with tion will burn or detonate when they are exposed design capacities ranging from 12 lb of TNT-equivalent to the heat of the containment vessel. However, net explosive weight (NEW) (the T-10 model) to 60 lb the burster and fuze do not need to be exploded of TNT-equivalent NEW (TC-60 model) have been con- or burned to access the agent and destroy it. structed and operated. The latest versions incorporate a manually operated mechanical system to move the muni- tions and their donor charges from the preparation area “cold” detonation” Versus “hot” detonation and suspend them in the detonation chamber. A characteristic that distinguishes all of the EDTs The offgas treatment system includes a reactive-bed discussed in this report from the integrated processes filter system. Hydrated lime is fed into the offgas line that will be used for BGCAPP and PCAPP is that the upstream of a particle filtration system (DiBerardo et EDTs do not require disassembly of the munitions. Two al., 2007). The offgas mixes with the lime, and the reac- of the vendor-supplied EDTs, namely the DAVINCH tions between the acid gases and the lime to form salts and the TDC, employ an explosive donor charge that begin. The lime, along with other particulate matter is placed around the munition. The munition and its such as soot and pea gravel dust, accumulates on rigid donor charge are placed in an explosive containment ceramic candles within the filter to form a filter bed, structure and the donor charge is detonated. The result- and the reactions of the acid gases with the lime to form ing temperature, pressure, and fireball destroy the agent salts continue as the offgases pass through this bed. and explosives. This type of process is called “cold” Lime is fed immediately before a detonation event and

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0 ASSESSMENT OF EXPLOSIVE DESTRUCTION TECHNOLOGIES continues until the detonation and expansion chambers pollution control system consists of a cartridge-type have been purged with ambient air. The accumulated particulate filter with pulsed jet cleaning, followed by reactive bed is periodically removed from the candles an exhaust fan. by applying a short burst of compressed air inside the Before being processed, the rocket motors would filter. The solids drop to the bottom of the filter housing be removed from their SFTs and their fins would be and are removed from the system. A catalytic oxidation banded. Banding the fins prevents them from deploy- (CATOX) unit oxidizes hydrogen, carbon monoxide, ing during subsequent processing. This allows easier and organic vapors from the gas stream before it is handling when mounting the rocket motors in the firing vented through a carbon adsorption bed. The scrap stand and, after firing, removing them from the stand. metal that is removed periodically from the detonation The motors would then be loaded into a static firing chamber meets the requirement to have a vapor screen- stand, the stand would be moved into the detonation ing level (VSL) of ≤1 VSL for agent.9 chamber, and the firing wires would be connected. New igniters would be installed as necessary in the rocket motors. After the chamber door is closed, the ch2m hill d-100 rocket motors would be ignited. The door would then CH2M HILL also offers a line of EDTs for conven- be opened and the chamber would be ventilated for tional weapons. As indicated previously, one of these, 5 to 10 minutes. The firing stand would be removed the nontransportable D-100 detonation chamber, is and replaced with another firing stand freshly loaded being evaluated for destruction of the noncontaminated with rocket motors. rocket motors at Blue Grass. A D-100 system has been installed at BGAD, and approval from the Department daViNch of Defense Explosives Safety Board (DDESB) has been obtained for 49.3 lb total explosives.10 Permitting The DAVINCH technology was developed by Kobe of this system to meet applicable regulations under the Steel, Ltd., and has been used in Japan to destroy Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) Japanese chemical bombs, some containing a mustard is under way.11 BGAD has proposed a test program agent/lewisite mixture and others containing vomiting for BGCAPP to evaluate the technical feasibility of agents. A system was recently started up in Belgium using this existing D-100 CDC system to destroy to destroy recovered chemical munitions from the the rocket motors by static firing.12 The test program World War I era. The technology has not been used would include the development of detailed operating in the United States. It uses a detonation chamber procedures. The D-100 detonation chamber has inter- in which chemical munitions and their contents are nal dimensions of 14 ft wide × 16 ft high × 20 ft long. destroyed when donor charges wrapped around the It is connected to a cylindrical expansion tank made munitions are detonated under a near vacuum. The use of mild steel, 10 ft in diameter × 71 ft long. The air of vacuum reduces noise, vibration, and blast pressure, thus increasing the vessel life. Agent is destroyed by the high temperatures and pressures resulting from 9VSLs are based on the airborne exposures limits (AELs) that the detonation and by the fireball in the chamber. Off- have been established by the Centers for Disease Control and Pre- gases are produced that require secondary treatment. vention and vary depending on the agent. For mustard agent, 1 VSL In Belgium, for example, they are oxidized in a cold is equal to 0.003 mg/m3. This use of VSLs replaces an earlier system plasma oxidizer and then passed through an activated used by the Army to indicate the degree of agent decontamination. carbon adsorber. The explosion containment capability That earlier system was based on procedural methods and values of 1X, 3X, and 5X, the latter indicating complete decontamination. of DAVINCH chambers varies from 45 to 65 kg TNT- The 3X classification is analogous to a determination of ≤1VSL. equivalent NEW, depending on the application. The VSL system will be used throughout this report to indicate the status of mustard agent decontamination. 10Personal communication between Brint Bixler, Vice President, dynasafe sdc2000 CH2M HILL, and Richard Ayen, committee chair, July 23, 2008. 11BGAD is a storage site for conventional munitions in addition The Dynasafe SDC2000 static detonation chamber to chemical weapons and consequently must periodically dispose of is manufactured by Dynasafe AB, a Swedish company. conventional munitions that become outdated or defective. The detonation chamber has an explosion containment 12Personal communication between Brint Bixler, Vice President, capability of 2.3 kg TNT-equivalent NEW and is a CH2M HILL, and Margaret Novack, NRC, study director, July 10, nearly spherical, armored, double-shelled, high-alloy 2008.

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 INTRODUCTION stainless steel detonation chamber (heated retort) kept at containment vessel. After detonation of the shaped between 550°C and 600°C (1022°F and 1112°F) (UXB charges and opening of the munition, the appropriate International, 2007). This system has been in opera- neutralization reagents are pumped into the vessel and tion at the Gesellschaft zur Entsorgung Chemischen the vessel contents are heated and mixed until the treat- Kampfstoffe u. Rüstungs-Altlasten mbH (GEKA) site ment goal has been attained. After the contents of the in Münster, Germany, and has been used to treat more chamber have been sampled and the concentration of than 13,000 recovered chemical weapons. According to chemical agent is shown to be below the treatment goal, the manufacturer, the access doors, loading chamber, the liquid waste solution is transferred out of the cham- and detonation chamber have been designed to with- ber into a waste drum. The drummed EDS liquid waste stand up to 10 kg TNT-equivalent NEW; however, the is normally treated further at a commercial hazardous GEKA detonation chamber is permitted for only 2.3 kg waste TSDF. The EDS-2 generates 8 to 10 gallons of TNT-equivalent NEW. liquid waste per operating cycle. The scrap metal is ≤1VSL for agent. The detonation chamber can operate in a pyrolytic or oxidizing environment. Chemical munitions are placed in a cardboard or polypropylene box or carrier, which sTudY scoPe aNd rePorT sTrucTure is transported to the top of the detonation chamber. The boxed munitions are fed into the detonation chamber The committee’s complete statement of task is set through two offset loading chambers, each having its forth in the preface to this report. The committee’s main own door. The intact munitions are dropped onto a responsibilities were twofold: heated (550°C-600°C) bed of scrap metal, resulting in deflagration or detonation of the munition’s explo- 1. Update the earlier evaluation of the DAVINCH, sive fill, if there is any. If there is no explosive fill, the the CDC, the Dynasafe static kiln technologies, heat of the chamber will cause the agent to vaporize, and the EDS and consider any other viable detona- rupturing the munition casing and exposing the agent tion technologies for the destruction of chemical to thermal destruction. No explosive donor charge is munitions. The evaluations are to include process used, nor is a reagent needed to neutralize the agent. maturity, process efficacy, process throughput If sufficient energy from energetics in the munition rate, process safety, public and regulatory accept- is released, no additional external heating from the ability, secondary waste issues, destruction verifi- electrical resistance elements is required. The offgas cation capability, and process flexibility. treatment system at GEKA includes a secondary com- 2. Obtain detailed information on the identified bustion chamber, a fast quench system to minimize requirements involving prospective EDT usage dioxin and furan formation, a three-stage scrubber at Pueblo and Blue Grass. Rank each of the three system, a selective catalytic reduction system, and an detonation technologies and the EDS with respect adsorber/particulate filter system. The scrubber system to satisfying these requirements and recommend generates liquid waste. The scrap metal that is removed a preferred technology. periodically from the detonation chamber is acceptable for unrestricted release. During the study, the committee was also asked by PMACWA to include the committee’s thoughts on design changes and upgrades that could allow the tech- explosive destruction system (eds) nologies to be better able to process a large number of At the heart of the EDS is an explosion contain- rounds, on the order of 15,000, in a reasonable amount ment vessel. The EDS Phase 1 (EDS-1) containment of time. This was to be done for the three vendor- vessel has an inside diameter of 20 in. (51 cm), is supplied technologies but not the EDS. The committee 36 in. (91 cm) long, and can process up to 1.5 lb TNT- was to specifically address reliability, maintainability, equivalent NEW. The EDS Phase 2 (EDS-2) contain- and capacity. However, an analysis of proprietary capi- ment vessel has an inside diameter of 28 in. (71 cm), tal cost data was not part of the committee’s task, nor is 56 in. (142 cm) long, and is designed to handle up did the committee have sufficient resources to predict to 4.8 lb TNT-equivalent NEW. other components of the life-cycle costs of the EDTs. The EDS uses shaped explosive charges to access Lastly, the committee did not separately assess the the agent cavity and destroy any energetics in the muni- ACWA public involvement program for this report but tion; this operation takes place in the sealed explosion did include public and regulatory acceptability among

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 ASSESSMENT OF EXPLOSIVE DESTRUCTION TECHNOLOGIES the evaluation criteria used. The overall public involve- factors were process maturity, process efficacy, process ment program for ACWA was deemed outside the throughput rate, process safety, public and regulatory statement of task for this report (see Preface). The com- acceptability, secondary waste issues, destruction veri- mittee is aware, however, that the ACWA program has fication capability, and process flexibility. established strong relationships with local communities Chapter 3 presents current information for each of and national groups over the course of its existence for the four EDTs on the purpose of pursuing meaningful involvement by • Changes to the technology since data gathering interested members of the public. The committee listened to briefings from the vendors for the NRC International Technologies report of the DAVINCH, TDC, and Dynasafe technologies was halted. • Operating or testing experience gained in that and from the U.S. Army on the EDS. Of special inter- est were improvements or changes to the technologies same period of time. • For technologies other than the EDS, the commit- and testing or operational experience since the 2006 International Technologies report. The requirements at tee’s thoughts on design changes and upgrades the Blue Grass and Pueblo sites were provided by the that would allow the technologies to be better U.S. Army. able to process a large number (about 15,000) of To carry out its charge, the committee held three rounds and that would improve reliability, main- meetings. The first was held at the National Academy tainability, and capacity. of Sciences headquarters building in Washington, D.C., on May 7 and 8, 2008. Presentations were heard from Chapter 3 also discusses regulatory approval and the vendors of the Dynasafe and TDC technologies and permitting for the various EDTs, including possible from the Army on the EDS. The requirements for Blue permitting options and other information obtained from Grass and Pueblo were discussed in a teleconference Kentucky and Colorado regulators. with PMACWA representatives. On May 12 and 13, Chapter 4 provides summary evaluations of the 2008, between the first and second committee meet- EDTs against the requirements for Blue Grass and ings, a member of the committee witnessed the TC-60 Pueblo and recommends one or more technologies for TDC in operation at Schofield Barracks in Hawaii. A each requirement. teleconference involving committee members, Colo- Appendix A is a reprint of Chapter 4 from Review rado regulators, and NRC staff took place between the of International Technologies for Destruction of Recov- first and second meetings, on May 22, 2008. A similar ered Chemical Warfare Materiel (NRC, 2006). It teleconference with Kentucky regulators was held on describes the various EDT technologies in detail. July 22, 2008, after the second meeting. The second Appendix B lists committee meetings and site visits. meeting was held at the Keck Center in Washington, Appendix C provides biographical sketches of the com- D.C., May 27 and 28, 2008. A presentation on the mittee members. DAVINCH technology was received from Kobe Steel, Ltd., and a presentation on the use of the TC-60 TDC reFereNces at Schofield Barracks was received from the Army. DiBerardo, R., T.A. Blades, and N. McFarlane. 2007. Demonstration/ The requirements for the EDTs were discussed further Validation of the TC-60 Controlled Detonation Chamber Porton Down, with PMACWA representatives. One member of the U.K., Final Demonstration Test Report, ECBC-SP-021, June. Aberdeen committee viewed equipment and participated in dis- Proving Ground, Md.: Edgewood Chemical and Biological Center. cussions on the operation of the DAVINCH DV50 at NRC (National Research Council). 2006. Review of International Tech- nologies for Destruction of Recovered Chemical Warfare Materiel. Poelkapelle, Belgium, and Dynasafe’s SDC2000 at the Washington, D.C.: The National Academies Press. GEKA facility in Münster, Germany, during site visits NRC. 2008a. Review and Assessment of Developmental Issues Concern- between August 3 and 7, 2008. The third meeting of ing the Metal Parts Treater Design for the Blue Grass Chemical Agent Destruction Pilot Plant. Washington, D.C.: The National Academies the committee was held at the J. Erik Jonsson Center at Press. Woods Hole, Massachusetts, August 25-27, 2008, and NRC. 2008b. Review of Secondary Waste Disposal Planning for the Blue was focused on writing the report. Grass and Pueblo Chemical Agent Destruction Pilot Plants. Washington, D.C.: The National Academies Press. Chapter 2 discusses the evaluation factors to be UXB International Incorporated. 2007. Static Detonation Chamber Test- employed in ranking the technologies against the ing Using a Dynasafe SDC 2000, Final Report. Blacksburg, Va.: UXB requirements for Blue Grass and Pueblo. The evaluation International Incorporated.